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2015 Pre-budget consultations: Federal leadership to support an aging population

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy11753
Date
2015-07-31
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Population health/ health equity/ public health
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2015-07-31
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Text
Helping physicians care for patients Aider les médecins à prendre soin des patients Canada is a nation on the precipice of great change. This change will be driven primarily by the economic and social implications of the major demographic shift already underway. The added uncertainties of the global economy only emphasize the imperative for federal action and leadership. In this brief, the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) is pleased to present four recommendations to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance for meaningful federal action in support of a national seniors strategy; these are essential measures to prepare for an aging population. Canada's demographic and economic imperative In 2011 the first of wave of the baby boomer generation turned 65 and Canada's seniors population stood at 5 million.1 By 2036, seniors will represent up to 25% of the population.2 The impacts of Canada's aging population on economic productivity are multi-faceted. An obvious impact will be fewer workers and a smaller tax base. Finance Canada projects that the number of working-age Canadians for every senior will fall from about 5 today to 2.7 by 2030.3 The projected surge in demand for services for seniors that will coincide with slower economic growth and lower government revenue will add pressure to the budgets of provincial and territorial governments. Consider that while seniors account for about one-sixth of the population, they consume approximately half of public health spending.4 Based on current trends and approaches, seniors' care is forecast to consume almost 62% of provincial/territorial health budgets by 2036.5 The latest fiscal sustainability report of the Parliamentary Budget Officer explains that the demands of Canada's aging population will result in "steadily deteriorating finances" for the provinces and territories and they "cannot meet the challenges of population ageing under current policy."6 Theme 1: Productivity A) New federal funding to provincial/territorial governments Canada's provincial and territorial leaders are aware of the challenges ahead. This July, the premiers issued a statement calling for the federal government to increase the Canada Health Transfer to 25% of provincial and territorial health care costs to address the needs of an aging population. To support the innovation and transformation needed to address these needs, the CMA recommends that the federal government deliver additional funding on an annual basis beginning in 2016-17 to the provinces and territories by means of a demographic-based top-up to the Canada Health Transfer (Table 1). For the fiscal year 2016-17, this top-up would require $1.6 billion in federal investment. Table 1: Allocation of the federal demographic-based top-up, 2016-20 ($million)7 Jurisdiction 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 All of Canada 1,602.1 1,663.6 1,690.6 1,690.3 1,879.0 Newfoundland and Labrador 29.7 30.5 33.6 35.3 46.1 Prince Edward Island 9.1 9.7 10.6 10.6 11.5 Nova Scotia 53.6 58.6 62.3 61.9 66.6 New Brunswick 45.9 50.7 52.2 52.0 57.2 Quebec 405.8 413.7 418.8 410.2 459.5 Ontario 652.2 677.9 692.1 679.0 731.6 Manitoba 28.6 30.6 33.5 31.1 36.6 Saskatchewan 3.5 4.9 7.3 11.9 15.4 Alberta 118.5 123.3 138.9 134.9 157.5 British Columbia 251.6 258.7 270.3 258.4 291.3 Yukon 1.4 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.5 Northwest Territories 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.1 Nunavut 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 B) Federal support for catastrophic drug coverage A major gap in Canada's universal health care system is the lack of universal access to prescription medications, long recognized as the unfinished business of medicare. Canada stands out as the only country with universal health care without universal pharmaceutical coverage.8 According to the Angus Reid Institute, more than one in five Canadians (23%) report that they or someone in their household did not take medication as prescribed because of the cost during the past 12 months.9 Statistics Canada's Survey of Household Spending reveals that households headed by a senior spend $724 per year on prescription medications, the highest among all age groups and over 60% more than the average household.10 Another recent study found that 7% of Canadian seniors reported skipping medication or not filling a prescription because of the cost.11 In addition to the very real harms to individuals, lack of coverage contributes to the inefficient use of Canada's scarce health resources. While there are sparse economic data in Canada on this issue, earlier research indicated that this inefficiency, which includes preventable hospital visits and admissions, represents an added cost of between $1 billion and $9 billion annually.12 As an immediate measure to support the health of Canadians and the productivity of the health care sector, the CMA recommends that the federal government establish a new funding program for catastrophic coverage of prescription medication. The program would cover prescription medication costs above $1,500 or 3% of gross household income on an annual basis. Research commissioned by the CMA estimates this would cost $1.48 billion in 2016-17 (Table 2). This would be a positive step toward comprehensive, universal prescription drug coverage. Table 2: Projected cost of federal contribution to cover catastrophic prescription medication costs, by age cohort, 2016-2020 ($ million)13 Age cohort 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Share of total cost Under 35 years 107.0 107.6 108.2 108.8 109.3 7% 35 to 44 years 167.4 169.8 172.7 175.7 178.4 11% 45 to 54 years 274.2 270.2 270.2 265.7 262.8 18% 55 to 64 years 362.5 370.7 378.6 384.6 388.2 25% 65 to 74 years 292.1 304.0 315.8 328.4 341.9 21% 75 years + 286.3 292.0 299.0 306.6 314.4 20% All Ages 1,480.4 1,497.2 1,514.2 1,531.2 1,548.1 100% Theme 2: Infrastructure and communities All jurisdictions across Canada are facing shortages in the continuing care sector. Despite the increased availability of home care, research commissioned for the CMA indicates that demand for continuing care facilities will surge as the demographic shift progresses.14 In 2012, it was reported that wait times for access to a long-term care facility in Canada ranged from 27 to over 230 days. It is estimated that 85% of "alternate level of care" patients in hospitals (i.e., patients who do not require hospital-level care) are in these beds because of the lack of availability of long-term care. Due to the significant difference in the cost of hospital care (approximately $846 per day) versus long-term care ($126 per day), the CMA estimates that the shortages in the long-term care sector represent an increased cost of $2.3 billion. Despite the recognized need for infrastructure investment in the continuing care sector, to date, this sector has been excluded from the Building Canada Plan. The CMA recommends that the federal government amend the criteria of the Building Canada Plan to include capital investment in continuing care infrastructure, including retrofit and renovation. Based on previous estimates, the CMA recommends that $540 million be allocated for 2016-17 (Table 3). Table 3: Estimated cost to address forecasted shortage in long-term care beds, 2016-20 ($ million)15 Forecasted shortage in long-term care beds Estimated cost to address shortage Federal share to address shortage in long-term care beds (based on 1/3 contribution) 2016 6,028 1,621.5 540.5 2017 6,604 1,776.5 592.2 2018 8,015 2,156.0 718.7 2019 8,656 2,328.5 776.2 2020 8,910 2,396.8 798.9 Total 38,213 10,279.3 3,426.4 Theme 3: Jobs As previously mentioned, Canada's aging population will produce significant changes in the labour force. There will be fewer Canadian workers, each with a greater likelihood of having caregiving responsibilities for family and friends. According to the report of the federal Employer Panel for Caregivers, Canadian employers "were surprised and concerned that it already affects 35% of the Canadian workforce."16 This report highlights key findings of the 2012 General Social Survey: 1.6 million caregivers took leave from work; nearly 600,000 reduced their work hours; 160,000 turned down paid employment; and, 390,000 quit their jobs to provide care. It is estimated that informal caregiving represents $1.3 billion in lost workforce productivity. These costs will only increase as Canada's demographic shift progresses. In parallel to the increasing informal caregiving demands on Canadian workers, Canada's aging population will also increase the demand for personal care workers and geriatric competencies across all health and social care professions.17 Theme 4: Taxation The above section focused on the economic costs of caregiving on the workforce. The focus of this section will be on the economic value caregivers provide while they take on an increased economic burden. Statistics Canada's latest research indicates that 8.1 million Canadians are informal caregivers, 39% of whom primarily care for a parent.18 The Conference Board of Canada reports that in 2007 informal caregivers contributed over 1.5 billion hours of home care - more than 10 times the number of paid hours in the same year.19 The economic contribution of informal caregivers was estimated to be about $25 billion in 2009.20 This same study estimated that informal caregivers incurred over $80 million in out-of-pocket expenses related to caregiving in 2009. Despite their tremendous value and important role, only a small fraction of caregivers caring for a parent received any form of government support.21 Only 5% of caregivers providing care to parents reported receiving financial assistance while 28% reported needing more assistance than they received.22 As a first step to providing increased support for Canada's family caregivers, the CMA recommends that the federal government amend the Caregiver and Family Caregiver Tax Credits to make them refundable. This would provide an increased amount of financial support for family caregivers. It is estimated that this measure will cost $90.8 million in 2016-17.23 Conclusion The CMA recognizes that in the face of ongoing economic uncertainty the federal government may face pressures to avoid new spending initiatives. The CMA strongly encourages the federal government to adopt the four recommendations outlined in this submission rather than further delay making a meaningful contribution to meeting the future care needs of Canada's aging population. The CMA would welcome the opportunity to provide further information and its rationale for each recommendation. 1 Statistics Canada. Generations in Canada. Cat. No. 98-311-X2011003. Ottawa: Statistics Canada; 2012. Available: www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-311-x/98-311-x2011003_2-eng.pdf 2 Statistics Canada. Canada year book 2012, seniors. Available: www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-402-x/2012000/chap/seniors-aines/seniors-aines-eng.htm 3 Finance Canada. Economic and fiscal implications of Canada's aging population. Ottawa: Finance Canada; 2012. Available: www.fin.gc.ca/pub/eficap-rebvpc/eficap-rebvpc-eng.pdf 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information. National health expenditure trends, 1975 to 2014. Ottawa: The Institute; 2014. Available: www.cihi.ca/web/resource/en/nhex_2014_report_en.pdf 5 Calculation by the Canadian Medical Association, based on Statistics Canada's M1 population projection and the Canadian Institute for Health Information age-sex profile of provincial-territorial health spending. 6 Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Fiscal sustainability report 2015. Ottawa: The Office; 2015. Available: www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/files/files/FSR_2015_EN.pdf 7 Conference Board of Canada. Research commissioned for the CMA, July 2015. 8 Morgan SG, Martin D, Gagnon MA, Mintzes B, Daw JR, Lexchin J. Pharmacare 2020: The future of drug coverage in Canada. Vancouver: Pharmaceutical Policy Research Collaboration, University of British Columbia; 2015. Available: http://pharmacare2020.ca/assets/pdf/The_Future_of_Drug_Coverage_in_Canada.pdf 9 Angus Reid Institute. Prescription drug access and affordability an issue for nearly a quarter of Canadian households. Available: http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2015.07.09-Pharma.pdf 10 Statistics Canada. Survey of household spending. Ottawa: Statistics Canada; 2013. 11 Canadian Institute for Health Information. How Canada compares: results From The Commonwealth Fund 2014 International Health Policy Survey of Older Adults. Available: www.cihi.ca/en/health-system-performance/performance-reporting/international/commonwealth-survey-2014 12 British Columbia Pharmacy Association. Clinical service proposal: medication adherence services. Vancouver: The Association; 2013. Available: www.bcpharmacy.ca/uploads/Medication_Adherence.pdf 13 Supra at note 7. 14 Conference Board of Canada. Research commissioned for the CMA, January 2013. 15 Ibid. 16 Government of Canada. Report from the Employer Panel for Caregivers: when work and caregiving collide, how employers can support their employees who are caregivers. Available: www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/seniors/reports/cec.shtml 17 Stall S, Cummings G, Sullivan T. Caring for Canada's seniors will take our entire health care workforce. Available: http://healthydebate.ca/2013/09/topic/community-long-term-care/non-md-geriatrics 18 Statistics Canada. Family caregivers: What are the consequences? Available: www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-006-x/2013001/article/11858-eng.htm 19 Conference Board of Canada. Home and community care in Canada: an economic footprint. Ottawa: The Board; 2012. Available: http://www.conferenceboard.ca/cashc/research/2012/homecommunitycare.aspx 20 Hollander MJ, Liu G, Chappeel NL. Who cares and how much? The imputed economic contribution to the Canadian health care system of middle aged and older unpaid caregivers providing care to the elderly. Healthc Q. 2009;12(2):42-59. 21 Supra at note 16. 22 Ibid. 23 Supra at note 7.
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Accessibility: the solution lies in cooperation

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy11518
Date
2015-03-25
Topics
Health human resources
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2015-03-25
Topics
Health human resources
Text
ACCESSIBILITY: THE SOLUTION LIES IN COOPERATION Joint Brief of The Quebec Medical Association and the Canadian Medical Association BILL no. 20: An Act to enact the Act to promote access to family medicine and specialized medicine services and to amend various legislative provisions relating to assisted procreation March 25, 2015 Preamble We would like to thank the members of the Committee on Health and Social Services for giving the Quebec Medical Association (QMA) and the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) the opportunity to express their preliminary views on Bill 20. We use the word "preliminary" deliberately because the bill in its current form sets out broad principles but is lacking in specifics. We would have liked to see more transparency on the government's part early in the process, whereas the regulatory guidelines were only made public on March 19. This shows a lack of respect or courtesy, or is a deliberate expression of the government's determination to ignore the opinion of the professionals concerned, that is to say, physicians. We have chosen not to critique the bill clause by clause, so we will not go that route for the regulatory guidelines either. We will instead limit ourselves to a few general comments. For example, how was it determined that an HIV-positive patient is "worth" two vulnerable patients, or that a patient receiving end-of-life care at home is worth 25? Why not 22, 26, or 30? Only ministry insiders know for sure, since neither of our organizations was consulted. And how many civil servants will it take to measure and monitor this new form of "mathematical" medical practice? The QMA is the only Quebec association whose members include general practitioners, specialists, residents and medical students. It calls on its vast network of members to consider the issues the medical profession faces, propose solutions and innovate in order to rethink the role doctors play in society and continually improve medical practice. The CMA is the largest national association of Canadian physicians and advocates on their behalf at the national level. The association's mission is to help physicians care for patients. The CMA is a leader in engaging and serving physicians and the national voice for the highest standards for health and health care. This brief is a historic first for both organizations. This is the first time that the CMA has submitted a brief in Quebec's National Assembly as well as the first time that the QMA and CMA have submitted a joint brief. This joint initiative says a lot about how concerned the country's physicians are about Bill 20. This attack on the professional autonomy of physicians is unprecedented in the history of Canadian organized medicine. Undoubtedly, the issues speak to the entire medical profession because of the consequences the bill could have on the profession itself. Our input is intended to be realistic, constructive and reflective of our member's opinions and legitimate concerns. Our two organizations-which, we note, are not negotiating bodies-have a profound understanding of the health community in Quebec, Canada and internationally. In keeping with the tradition of our two organizations, we are constantly seeking ways to improve the health care system in order to bring about patient-centred care. That said, we are also well aware of the budget constraints Quebec is currently facing. Our comments will mainly address the following points: o Access to family physicians and specialists; o The "productivity" of Quebec physicians; o Examples elsewhere in Canada; o Success factors. Physician access Obviously, access to health care and services in Quebec is a problem, particularly with regard to family physicians. Statistics Canada reported that, in 2013, an average 15.5% of Canadians did not have a regular medical doctor1. Quebec, with 25.1% of residents lacking a family physician, was well above the national average. All four of the Atlantic Provinces as well as Ontario provided better access than Quebec while Manitoba and British Columbia reported rates that were about the same as the national average. Despite considerable investment in recent years, plainly many Quebecers still do not have access to a family physician and other specialists. We do not believe the status quo is an option. Something must be done. Unlike as provided in Bill 20, however, we do not believe that imposing patient quotas on physicians is the solution. Quotas could have the adverse effect of leading physicians to choose quantity of care over quality, which could result in incomplete examinations, increased use of diagnostic tests and, ultimately, overdiagnosis. This is the sort of practice that the QMA and CMA have been trying to eliminate for 18 months with their "Choosing Wisely Canada"2 awareness campaign, which advocates for better medicine and fewer tests and procedures of no added value. Overdiagnosis has significant impacts on cost, quality, effectiveness, efficacy and patient access to health care and, as a result, on the efficiency of the entire health care network. In short, doing more is not always better. The campaign has been embraced both by physicians and patients, but Bill 20 risks not only undermining considerable effort but also sending the public a contradictory message. The "productivity" of Quebec physicians The services provided by Quebec physicians have been the subject of much debate in recent months. The government's claim that Quebec physicians are less "productive" than their colleagues in other provinces is based on a false premise. The reality is that billing methods are different and cannot be meaningfully compared. The national data shows that 8.5% of Canadian physicians are salaried, while 41.9% are paid a fee per service and 41.4% are paid lump sums or through capitation, or a combination of the two. Longitudinal analysis of the 2014 National Physician Survey-a partnership between the College of Family Physicians of Canada, the Canadian Medical Association and the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada-offers a way to relativize the "productivity" of Quebec physicians compared to that of their colleagues in other provinces. For more than a decade, the survey has been a point of reference for researchers, governments and stakeholders interested in analyzing and improving health care in Canada. The Canadian database for this study clearly shows that the gap between the hours devoted per week to direct patient services by Quebec and other Canadian physicians is shrinking. Even though physicians in the rest of Canada still report working more than their Quebec colleagues, the difference decreased 44% between 2010 and 2014 to 1.37 hours per week. For family physicians, the gap decreased 23% to 2.41 hours in 2014. Plainly, we are far from the alarming situation that has been decried in recent weeks. Furthermore, the results show that, on average, Quebec physicians perform more than 20% more research-related activities per week than their Canadian counterparts, confirming a trend over the past 10 years. On-call work for health care establishments should also be considered in the productivity debate as family physicians who perform such work spend on average more than eight hours per week on related tasks compared to approximately six hours in the rest of Canada. Counting specialists, the figure rises to more than 11 hours per week, compared to a bit less than eight hours per week by family physicians and specialists in the rest of the country. In 2014 Quebec family physicians reported having to spend 23% more time each week on administrative tasks than their Canadian colleagues (2.8 hours versus 2.27 hours). This trend has become more pronounced over the past 10 years. In short, Quebec physicians work almost as much as their colleagues in the rest of Canada. Yet they appear to be less efficient. Why? Because of the shortcomings in the way our system is organized, physicians are busy doing administrative work, seeking out clinical information that should be at their fingertips, and performing tasks that could be left to other health care professionals. These figures, which show that the number of hours worked by physicians in direct patient care declined an average of 10% in the other provinces between 2004 and 2014, raise a question. How is it that, despite this decrease in hours worked, there is better accessibility to health care services? Because in collaboration with physicians, Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia have each successfully introduced measures in recent years to improve their services, particularly on the front line. Quebec would do well to examine those initiatives. Elsewhere in Canada A GP for Me A GP for Me is an initiative in British Columbia jointly funded by the provincial government and Doctors of BC to:
Enable patients who want a family doctor to find one;
Increase the capacity of the primary health care;
Confirm and strengthen the continuous doctor-patient relationship; including better support for the needs of vulnerable patients. The mission of Doctors of BC3 is to make a meaningful difference in improving the health care for British Columbians by working to achieve quality patient care through engagement, collaboration and physician leadership. Its goal is to promote a social, economic and political climate in which members can provide the citizens of BC with the highest standard of health care, while achieving maximum professional satisfaction and fair economic reward. Ontario Ontario chose to tackle the access problem by obtaining the support and cooperation of faculties of medicine, health organizations and the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. Two hundred family health teams (the equivalent of Quebec's family medicine groups) were created. The groups promote access to care by bringing different health care providers together under the same roof. Ontario also has more specialized nurse practitioners than Quebec does. The result of all these efforts is that two million more Ontarians can now call on a family physician. The inspiring example of Taber, Alberta The Taber Integrated Primary Healthcare Project4 is an initiative launched in the early 2000s in the town of Taber, in rural Alberta. The goal of the project was to improve health care services delivery through integration of the services provided by a physician group and the Chinook Health Region. In light of the project's success, it was expanded to the entire region five years later. According to Dr. Robert Wedel, one of the people behind the project, four factors explain the initiative's success: a community assessment and shared planning; evidence-based, interdisciplinary care; an integrated electronic information system; and investment in processes and structures that support change. Community evaluation and shared planning: First, successful integration of primary health care depends on gaining an understanding of individual, family and community health care needs. Health services providers and users must also have a shared vision of optimal health care delivery. Evidence-based, interdisciplinary care: Second, the introduction of interdisciplinary teams (physicians, nurses, managers and other health professionals) facilitated the transition from a facility-based service delivery approach to a community-based wellness approach. Electronic information system: Third, the introduction of an integrated information system aided interdisciplinary care and access to patient information in various points of service. Alternative payment plan: Finally, processes and structures were put in place to support change over the long term. An alternative payment plan was implemented to clarify physician remuneration, define service and productivity expectations and protect organizational autonomy. The plan was also designed to enable physicians to delegate tasks to other professionals on the team in order to spend additional time with patients with more complex needs. The physicians now receive a fixed salary for specific services (in-clinic ambulatory services, emergencies, minor operations, prenatal care, and so on). However, some services continue to be billed on a fee-for-service basis (births, major operations and anaesthesia). Salaries are reduced when a registered patient receives care outside the physician group. Furthermore, organizational change strategies were put in place to address resistance to the changes. Modifications were made so that a common, integrated care site could eventually be established. All these changes had significant, positive consequences in Taber but also throughout the Chinook region. This approach enables better monitoring of chronic diseases and more prevention and education services for patients. Also noted was better accessibility to care, even for vulnerable and generally underserved patients. In the early 2000s, patients had to wait about 30 days before the first available appointment, but the wait has been completely eliminated since 2006. Physician services increased about 10% and those by other professionals, 50%. Patients visit their physicians less often (2.1 visits per year rather than 5.6 visits in other regions), and a marked decline in emergency room visits and laboratory tests has been observed. Quebec could capitalize on the Taber initiative by adapting it to the situation in Quebec and encouraging physicians to participate fully like the committed partners they are of patients and the health system. Success Factors Improvements from the Taber project and other initiatives in Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia-all of which provide greater health care access than Quebec-share three common features that are available to Quebec as well: o Electronic health records (EHRs) Quebec lags behind other provinces in adopting EHRs. A mere 25% of Quebec physicians order diagnostic and laboratory tests electronically. The 2014 National Physician Survey ranks Quebec almost last in health care system computerization. The Quebec Health Record Project promised for 2011 at a cost of $543 million has been, according the health minister himself, an abject failure. Recently he said that the Quebec government planned to deliver the project in 2021 at a cost of $1.6 billion before adding that he was not sure there would be money to pay for it. Physicians have nothing to do with this delay or the squandering of public funds. They're ready and waiting to make use of computerized records to improve health care access and communicate better with patients. The confusion and delays in switching to EHRs in Quebec are a big part of the reason for Quebec's poor results on the survey. Some of the problems might indeed be caused by the older generation's reluctance to embrace information technology, but that's not the whole story. We need to have a system that is absolutely reliable and accessible. Primary care organizations in Ontario are using electronic medical records to identify and support patient needs. All Ontario's primary care organizations mentioned using EHRs in descriptions they submitted on their quality improvement plans5-an example of how technology can be used to monitor patient needs and support improved delivery of care. Approximately 38% described using EHRs to identify specific diseases. We cannot overlook the fact that EHRs have been the cornerstone of the productivity improvements elsewhere in Canada. o Interdisciplinary work organization Quebec also lags behind in providing environments conducive to greater interdisciplinary work and enlisting contributions from other health professionals (nurse practitioners [NPs], nurses, managers and other health professionals). Certain Canadian provinces are far ahead in this area. Team care allows the various professionals to do their regular tasks and delegate when the situation calls for it. The solutions that have put most Canadian provinces on the road to solving the problem of frontline health care access have generally come through collaboration between the government and the medical profession. With effective information systems and the implementation of interdisciplinary approaches, in a spirit of cooperation and collaboration, such health care systems manage to provide the kind of accessible, high quality care patients and taxpayers are entitled to expect when they need it. The bottom line is that interdisciplinary work allows physicians to do what they do best: diagnose and treat. o Remuneration practices for population-based responsibility Quebec seems to be the Canadian province where physician remuneration is closest to a fee-for-service model. Quebec Health Insurance Plan data from 2013 shows that close to 80% of Quebec physicians' total compensation is fee-for-service.6 Elsewhere in the country, mixed remuneration methods appear to make it easier to foster population-based responsibility, i.e., not just covering a territory, but also incorporating the determinants of population health and well-being, among which are access to high quality services and the full participation of all stakeholders. In its 2011 support strategy for the practice of population-based responsibility7, MSSS spelled out the government's approach. However, that strategy was developed around local service networks managed through CSSSs, which were recently done away with by Bill 10, An Act to modify the organization and governance of the health and social services network, in particular by abolishing the regional agencies. The authors of the strategy define population-based responsibility collectively, as follows: * Using health and social services data to develop a shared picture of the reality on the ground; * Deciding, in consultation with the public, partners in the health and social services network and other sectors, on a basket of integrated, quality services to meet the needs of the local population; * Strengthening actions on health determinants in order to improve the health and well-being of the entire local population; and * Tracking performance and seeking ongoing improvements, in the interests of greater accountability Implementing population-based responsibility clearly requires a collective approach. Nothing in Bill 20 appears to indicate that the government might arrive at such an approach. No discussion of population-based responsibility would be complete without considering the Kaiser Permanente model. Kaiser Permanente is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to provide high quality, affordable health care services and improve the health of its members and the communities it serves. Approximately 9.9 million people receive health care from Kaiser Permanente, which has 17,000 physicians and 174,000 employees (including 48,000 nurses) working in 38 hospitals and medical centres and more than 600 clinics. The organization lists five keys to its model's success:8 1. Accountability for population 2. Transparency 3. Use of electronic health records and the Internet 4. Team care 5. Moving care out of doctor's office There are no provisions in Bill 20 for developing any of the above. Clearly, the fee-for-service model does not encourage population-based responsibility. We have seen in the Taber example a broad basket of services covered in the clinic's overall budget, with other things remaining fee-for-service (births, major operations, anaesthesia etc.). The way physicians are currently compensated stands in the way of any strategy whereby physician groups would receive fixed budgets to care for a given population. This is where Bill 20 goes off track-by individualizing patient targets instead of grouping them. Under group approaches, a physician who fails to meet commitments and does not see the required number of patients risks repercussions from colleagues and not the government, because the physician is responsible for contributing to the group's objectives. A physician in that same clinic who sees only complex cases will necessarily see fewer patients, but colleagues will be freed up to deal with more. We sincerely believe that physicians are in favour of a population-based responsibility approach. Yet the inescapable conclusion is that Bill 20, with its fee-per-service and individualized appointment targets, is taking us in a different direction entirely. We are convinced that physicians are overwhelmingly in favour of mixed compensation methods. The health and welfare commissioner launched a series of studies to assess the impact of remuneration on health system effectiveness and efficiency. As soon as RAMQ data becomes available, researchers will be able to complete their work and show how adjusting remuneration methods would contribute to improving health care access. Conclusion It is no coincidence that we have not attempted a clause-by-clause critique of Bill 20. The government's entire approach needs to be changed. It is high time the government understood that physicians are part of the solution to health service access problems, and that a coercive approach is counterproductive and demoralizing. History is full of examples in which working together in a climate of mutual respect led to impressive results. Both the QMA and CMA fully support the idea and purpose of the bill-to improve access to health care-but we believe Bill 20 is not the answer. We think changes worked out in partnership get the best results. All real improvements to the health care system have always been achieved in an atmosphere of dialogue and collaboration. To sum up, the QMA and CMA recommend first and foremost that the government work with the medical profession to improve access to health care, as well as the following measures: * Speed up the process of switching to electronic health records-an indispensable tool in 2015. * Reorganize tasks to accord a greater role to other health professionals (NPs, nurses, administrators and others) by forming care teams that can pool their knowledge and skills to better serve patients. * Reconsider Quebec's near-exclusive reliance on fee-for-service and consider bringing in a form of mixed remuneration that leads towards a population-based responsibility model. Elsewhere in Canada, this approach has contributed significantly to improvements in health care access, particularly on the front line. 1 http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-625-x/2014001/article/14013-eng.htm 2 http://www.choosingwiselycanada.org/ 3 https://www.doctorsofbc.ca/sites/default/files/strategicplan-doctorsofbc-web.pdf 4 Wedel R, Kalischuk RG, Patterson E, et al. Turning Vision into Reality: Successful Integration of Primary Healthcare in Taber, Canada. Healthcare Policy 2007; 3(1): 81-95. 5 http://www.hqontario.ca/portals/0/Documents/qi/qip-analysis-pc-en.pdf 6 Régie de l'assurance maladie du Québec. Évolution du coût des services médicaux et du nombre de médecins selon le mode de rémunération. Services médicaux, Québec, 2009-2013. 7 http://publications.msss.gouv.qc.ca/acrobat/f/documentation/2011/11-228-04W.pdf 8 Molly Porter. An Overview of Kaiser Permanente: Integration, Innovation, and Information Systems in Health Care. Presentation for the Canadian Medical Association, Kaiser Permanente International, March 2, 2015.
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Answering the Wake-up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan : CMA submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1960
Last Reviewed
2010-02-27
Date
2003-06-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Health care and patient safety
Population health/ health equity/ public health
  2 documents  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2010-02-27
Date
2003-06-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Health care and patient safety
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Text
The public health system in Canada lies at the heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of our population. When the public health system is working well, few are even aware that it is at work! Only when something goes terribly wrong — like the Walkerton tragedy or when we are faced with a new threat like SARS — is the integral, ongoing role of public health really recognized. The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has been warning that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to the latest crises. Canada’s physicians have repeatedly called for governments to enhance public health capacity and strengthen the public health infrastructure throughout Canada. Our public health system is the first — and often the only — line of defence against emerging and ongoing infectious and noninfectious threats to the health of Canadians. But we are only as strong as the weakest link in the emergency response chain of survival. As most health threats know no boundaries, our public health armaments must be in a constant state of “battle readiness.” In today’s climate of SARS, West Nile Virus, mad cow disease and monkey pox, even the thought that the public health system may be stretched beyond capacity strikes fear into the hearts of Canadians. Physicians have always been an integral part of the public health system serving as medical officers of health, community health specialists and other related roles. Indeed public health cannot successfully fulfill its mandate without the cooperation and commitment of front-line clinicians. In this submission, we reflect on the lessons to be learned from our recent experience with SARS and reflect on the longer-term needs of the public health system as a whole. The objectives of the pan-Canadian Public Health Action Plan proposed by the CMA are, first to realize a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies; and, second, to enhance the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country (see recommendations, below, and Appendix 1). To achieve these twin objectives, three broad strategies are presented for immediate attention. They are legislative reform; capacity enhancement; and research, surveillance and communications. Legislative reform (see recommendations 1–3) The country’s response to SARS has brought into stark relief the urgent need for national leadership and coordination of public health activity across the country, especially during a health crisis. The apparent reluctance to act quickly to institute screening at airports, the delay in unifying the practice community for a concerted response and the appalling communications confusion worked against optimum handling of the outbreak — despite the best efforts of health care professionals. This is a wake-up call that highlights the need for comprehensive legislative reform to clarify the roles of governments with respect to the management of public health threats. A renewed and enhanced national commitment to public health should be anchored in new federal legislation to be negotiated with the provinces and territories. Specifically, the CMA recommends an Emergency Health Measures Act, to deal with emergent situations in tandem with the creation of a Canadian public health agency headed by a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. Capacity enhancement (see recommendations 4–7) The SARS crisis has demonstrated the diminished capacity within the public health system. The Greater Toronto Area (GTA), with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute health systems, has not been able to manage the SARS crisis adequately and carry on other health programs. The acute care system virtually ground to a halt in dealing with SARS. There was little or no surge capacity in Canada’s largest city. We should be grateful that SARS did not first strike a smaller centre in a far less-advantaged region of Canada. A critical element of the public health system is its workforce and the health professionals within the acute care system, such as hospital-based infectious disease specialists and emergency physicians who are the front-line interface. Let there be no doubt that the ongoing efforts of the GTA front-line providers are nothing short of heroic. However, the lack of coordinated contingency planning of hospital and community-based disease control efforts was striking. The overall shortage of critical care professionals and the inability of governments to quickly deploy the required professionals to areas of need contributed to the enormous strain on the public and health care system. Considering the importance of the public health system and its clearly limited capacity to protect and promote the health of Canadians, it is incomprehensible that we do not know how much is actually spent on the system. It is imperative that public health expenditures and capacity, in terms of both physical and human resources, be tracked and reported publicly. The CMA recommends a $1-billion, 5-year capacity-enhancement program to be coordinated with and through the new Canadian public health agency. Research, surveillance and communications (see recommendations 8–10) Canada’s ability to respond to public health threats and acute events, such as SARS, and to maintain its effective public health planning and program development depends on sound research, surveillance and rapid, real-time communications. A concerted pan-Canadian effort is required to take full advantage of our capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. New-millennium challenges require moving beyond old-millennium responses. Enhanced surveillance is an overdue and integral part of public health, performing an essential function in early detection and response to threats of infectious diseases. Mandatory national reporting of identified diseases by all provinces and territories is critical for national and international surveillance. During times of crisis, rapid communication to the public, public health staff and front-line clinicians is of critical importance, but in many jurisdictions impossible. We tested our systems during the SARS outbreak and they came up short. The CMA recommends a one-time federal investment to enhance technical capacity to allow for real-time communication. Conclusion The CMA believes that its proposed three-pronged strategy, as set out in the attached recommendations, will go a long way toward addressing shortfalls of the Canadian public health system. Action now will help to ensure that Canadians can once again be confident that they are protected from any future threat of new infectious diseases. Action now will help Canada regain its position as a leader in public health. We wish the advisory committee well in its deliberations and offer the CMA’s assistance at any time in clarifying the strategies set out in our submission. Recommendations to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health Legislative reform ($20 million / 5 years*) 1. The enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. 2. The creation of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. 3. The appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada; to head the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control; and to work with provinces and territories to develop and implement a pan-Canadian public health action plan. Capacity enhancement ( $1.2 billion / 5 years*) 4. The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. 5. The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. 6. Tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures and capacity (both physical and human resources) by the Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada, on behalf of the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. 7. Federal government funding in the amount of $1 Billion over 5 years to build adequate and consistent surge capacity across Canada and improve coordination among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal authorities to fulfill essential public health functions. Research, surveillance and communications ($310 million / 5 years*) 8. An immediate, sequestered grant of $200 million over 5 years to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to initiate an enhanced conjoint program of research with the Institute of Population and Public Health and the Institute of Infection and Immunity that will expand capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. 9. The mandatory reporting by provinces and territories of identified infectious diseases to the newly established Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to enable appropriate communications, analyses and intervention. 10. The one-time infusion of $100 million, with an additional $2 million a year, for a “REAL” (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Coordination Initiative to improve technical capacity to communicate with front line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. *See Appendix 2: Estimated cost of implementing recommendations. PURPOSE The CMA prepared this submission in response to an invitation from Dr. Naylor to provide input to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. We applaud this initiative and welcome the opportunity to present the views of Canada’s medical community to the committee. The CMA’s basic message is that our health protection laws are woefully outdated and the public health system is stretched beyond capacity. This submission draws on our long history of engagement in public health in Canada and our experience both post-September 11, 2001 and with SARS. It builds on the knowledge and experience of our members, national specialist affiliated societies and provincial and territorial divisions. (We acknowledge, in particular, the outstanding efforts of the Ontario Medical Association and the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians in battling SARS.) In this submission, we examine the lessons to be learned from our experience with the SARS outbreak and reflect on both the immediate and longer-term needs of the public health system as a whole. The objectives of the public health action plan proposed by the CMA are, first, to realize a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies and, second, to enhance the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country, including those posed by preventable chronic disease. INTRODUCTION The public health system in Canada lies at the heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of the population. When the public health system is working well, few are even aware that it is at work! Only when something goes terribly wrong — like the contamination of the blood supply in the 1980s, the Walkerton tragedy or SARS — is the integral, ongoing role of public health recognized. Our public health system is the first — and often the only — line of defence against emerging and ongoing infectious and noninfectious threats to the health of Canadians. But we are only as strong as the weakest link in the emergency response chain of survival. As most health threats know no boundaries, our public health system must be in a constant state of “battle readiness.” We can ill afford any weakness in our public health preparedness. In today’s climate of SARS, West Nile Virus, mad cow disease and monkey pox, the mere thought that the public health system may be stretched beyond capacity strikes fear into the hearts of Canadians. Physicians have always been an integral part of the public health system serving as medical officers of health, specialists in infectious disease and community medicine (who will not remember the stalwart efforts of Dr. Donald Low on SARS?) and in other related roles. Indeed, public health cannot successfully fulfill its mandate without the cooperation and commitment of front-line clinicians. The CMA has been warning for some time that our system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to crises. Canada’s physicians have repeatedly called for governments to enhance public health capacity and strengthen the public health infrastructure throughout Canada. For example, the CMA’s submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance’s prebudget consultations on October 22, 2001 called for substantial investments in public health and emergency response as a first step to improve the public health system infrastructure and its surge capacity. This submission not only reiterates our previous recommendations, but also outlines specific actions that the CMA believes must be taken to ensure a strong public health system in Canada. The Enduring Impact of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome): in February 2003, these four letters sent massive shock waves around the world, causing widespread fear and confusion among health care officials and citizens of many countries. The “fear factor” extended across Canada as people realized the full threat of SARS. Since SARS was first identified in a patient in Toronto in March 2003, 438 probable or suspected cases have been reported to Health Canada and 38 people have died (as of June 23, 2003). However, these numbers do not reflect the full impact of the outbreak. The number of indirect deaths due to system shutdown will never be known. Local public health authorities across the country went on high alert. Those in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) as well as their provincial counterparts diverted almost all of their resources to respond to the crisis. Acute care services were adversely affected as stringent infection-control and screening measures were put into place to control the spread of SARS. In the GTA, the health system — acute and public — was brought to its knees. Over half of the reported SARS cases involved front-line providers as the outbreak largely affected health care settings. Approximately 20 physicians in Ontario contracted SARS and close to 1000 were quarantined. Thousands of nurses and other health care workers also faced quarantine, some more than once. Institutions closed their doors, limiting access to emergency departments, clinics and physicians’ offices. Intensive care units were full and surgeries were cancelled. Front-line health care professionals involved in critical care were stretched to their physical and mental limits. Others found themselves underutilized due to the impact of the infection-control measures on their practice settings. Feast and famine co-existed. Although the outbreak was mainly confined to health care settings, the entire GTA felt the effects. Upwards of 20,000 people entered voluntary quarantine. Businesses were affected. The tourism industry is still reeling. The disruption that SARS caused continues to reverberate through health care systems and economies. In response to urgent requests from both the Ontario Medical Association and Health Canada, the CMA mobilized its membership and assisted in the country’s response to SARS. Everything that could be done was done to facilitate bringing in qualified personnel to relieve those on the front line and make appropriate information available in real time. The CMA has learned its own lessons, both positive and negative. A full chronology of CMA activity is attached as Appendix 3. It has become abundantly clear that Canada’s public health system was ill prepared to deal with the SARS outbreak. If not for the heroic efforts of public health officials, health care providers and research scientists, Canada’s experience would have been much worse. Public health in Canada Public health is the science and art of protecting and promoting health, preventing disease and injury, and prolonging life. It complements the health care system, which focuses primarily on treatment and rehabilitation, sharing the same goal of maximizing the health of Canadians. However, the public health system is distinct from other parts of the health system in two key respects: its primary emphasis is on preventing disease and disability and its focus is on the health needs of populations rather than those of specific individuals. Public health is the systematic response to infectious diseases. It also ensures access to clean drinking water, good sanitation and the control of pests and other disease vectors. Further, it is immunization clinics and programs promoting healthy lifestyles. But it is also there to protect Canadians when they face a public health crisis like SARS. If the public health system is fully prepared to carry out essential services, then communities across the country will be better protected from acute health events. The reality in Canada today is that a strong, consistently and equitably resourced and integrated public health system does not exist. Public health systems across Canada are fragmented — a patchwork of programs, services and resources across the county. In reality, it is a group of multiple systems with varying roles, strengths and linkages. Each province has its own public health legislation. Most legislation focuses on the control of communicable diseases. Public health services are funded through a variable mix of provincial and municipal funding formulae, with inconsistent overall strategies and results, and with virtually no meaningful role for input from health professionals via organizations such as the CMA, or the federal level, in terms of strategic direction or resources. Federal legislation is limited to the blunt instrument of the Quarantine Act and a variety of health protection-related acts. (e.g., Food and Drugs Act, Hazardous Products Act, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Radiation Emitting Devices Act) Some of the laws, such as the Quarantine Act, date back to the late 19th century. Taken as a whole, the legislation does not clearly identify the public health mandate, roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government. In many cases, the assignment of authorities and accountabilities is anachronistic. Moreover, there is little information available on the functioning and financing of Canada’s public health system. There is no “one-stop shopping” for authoritative information on public health issues. In 2001, a working group of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health assessed the capacity of the public health system through a series of key informant interviews and literature reviews. The consistent finding was that public health had experienced a loss of resources and there was concern for the resiliency of the system infrastructure to respond consistently and proactively to the demands placed on it. Significant disparities were observed between “have” and “have-not” provinces and regions in their capacity to address public health issues. The report’s findings are consistent with previous assessments by the Krever Commission and the Auditor General of Canada. In 1999, the Auditor General said that Health Canada was unprepared to fulfill its responsibilities in public health; communication between multiple agencies was poor; and weaknesses in the key surveillance system impeded the effective monitoring of injuries and communicable and non-communicable diseases. In 1997, Justice Horace Krever reported that the “public health departments in many parts of Canada do not have sufficient resources to carry out their duties.” The Challenges Ahead The 21st century brings with it an awesome array of new public health risks and ancient foes. Not all of them can be identified at the present time. New diseases (e.g., SARS, West Nile Virus) will likely continue to emerge. Dr. Alan Bernstein, President of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, recently noted that SARS is here to stay. Old threats, such as contamination of a community water supply (e.g., Walkerton), can strike quickly if vigilance is relaxed or delegated to third parties. This century will likely bring greater focus on threats from the physical environment. Our social environment is also a source of illness as shown by the recent epidemic trends in obesity and type 2 diabetes mellitus. A substantial minority of Canadians continue to smoke. In short, there is no lack of public health threats to Canadians. Although for each of these issues, there is a clear role for clinical care, it is the public health system that will identify and monitor health threats and provide interventions to prevent disease and injury and improve health. The system will also be at the front lines in any response to a biological, chemical or nuclear event. The public health system must have the infrastructure to respond to a range of threats to health, including emergencies. The experience with SARS has reaffirmed that we do not have the system flexibility to respond to these events after they have occurred. It is vital that we take steps now “to embrace not just the essential elements of disease protection and surveillance but also new strategies and tactics capable of addressing global challenges.”<1> CMA’S PROPOSED PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION PLAN No one policy instrument can possibly address the multiple factors involved in meeting the public health challenge head on. Similarly, no one level of government or constituency (e.g., community medicine) can or should shoulder all of the responsibilities. Although we need to restore public confidence quickly, we must also do what it takes to get it right. Accordingly, the CMA is proffering a three-pronged approach to meet the challenge: * A legislative reform strategy * A capacity enhancement strategy * A research, surveillance and communication strategy. These three broad strategies make up the CMA’s proposed 10-point Public Health Action Plan. Taken together, the CMA believes the Plan, if adopted, will serve us very well in the future. Legislative Reform Our experience with SARS — and the seeming lack of coordination between international, federal, provincial and local system levels — should be a massive wake-up call. It highlights the need for legislative reform to clarify the roles of governments with respect to the management of public health issues and threats. Four years ago, national consultations on renewing federal health protection legislation<2> resulted in a recommendation that * “The federal government must be given, either through legislation or through memoranda of understanding among provincial and territorial governments, the authority it needs to effectively address any outbreak of a communicable disease, where the health risk extends beyond provincial borders. * “Federal health protection legislation should be amended to give Health Canada authority to act quickly and decisively in the event of a national health emergency... if it poses a serious threat to public health; affects particularly vulnerable segments of the population; exceeds the capacity of local authorities to deal with the risk; and involves pathogens that could be rapidly transmitted across national and international borders.” Such legislative reform is consistent with the federal government’s well-recognized responsibility to act to protect public health and safety. It fits well with Health Minister McLellan’s recently announced plans to act now to review and update health protection legislation. The SARS outbreak has provided further experience to support these, and in our view, even stronger recommendations. There is ample historical evidence to support the federal government’s role in the management of communicable disease, a role that dates back to the time of confederation. The quarantine power was the initial manifestation of this authority in 1867 under Section 91 of the British North America Act and it gave the federal government the responsibility for ensuring the containment of infectious diseases. The outbreak of the Spanish Flu epidemic in 1918 further highlighted the need for coordinated national efforts and (at the urging of the CMA and others) resulted in the creation of the federal Department of Health in 1919. It would be reasonable to assume that legislators at the time had an expansive view of the need for centralized authority to deal with pan-Canadian health threats. One hundred and thirty-five years after confederation, we have a highly mobile global community. This mobility and the attendant devastating speed with which diseases can spread demand a national response. Currently, there is tremendous variation in public health system capacity among the various provinces and territories and, more particularly, among municipalities and local authorities. Inconsistencies in provincial approaches to public health matters have resulted in significant disparities between and within the provinces.<3> Health Canada’s mandate as set out in its enabling legislation states that “[t]he powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction relating to the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of Canada.” The CMA believes that it is time for the federal government to take responsibility for public health matters that touch the lives of all Canadians. The legal staffs at CMA, in consultation with external experts, have conducted a detailed review of existing legislation. We have concluded, as Health Minister McLellan recently announced, that there is a long overdue need to consolidate and rationalize current related laws. We also believe there is now public support and a demonstrable need to enhance the powers afforded the federal government. We recognize that the government has put forward Bill C-17, the Public Safety Act and a review of health protection legislation is underway. We believe that amending and updating existing legislation is necessary but not sufficient to address today’s public health challenges. The CMA is calling for the enhancement of the federal government’s “command and control” powers in times of national health emergencies. Specifically we are recommending a three-pronged legislative approach. 1. The CMA recommends The enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. The existing Emergencies Act gives the federal government the authority to become involved in public welfare emergencies when regions of the country are faced with “an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent... disease in human beings... that results or may result in a danger to life or property... so serious as to be a national emergency.” However, to use this power, the federal government must declare a “national emergency,” which itself has political and economic ramifications, particularly from an international perspective, and mitigates against its use. The CMA believes that this all-or-nothing approach is not in the public’s best interest. The concept of emergency in the context of public health requires a different response from governments in the future. Although we recognize that provincial and municipal governments currently have preplanned sets of responses to health threats, the CMA is proposing new legislation to allow for a rapid federal response to public health emergencies. The proposed Emergency Health Measures Act clarifies the roles and authority of governments and ensures a consistent and appropriate response with sufficient human and financial resources to protect Canadians faced with a public health emergency. Of utmost importance, all Canadians, regardless of their location, can be assured that the response to a health emergency will be delivered systematically by experts who can sustain the effort as needed. The proposed legislation would be founded on a graduated approach that would give the federal government the powers necessary to deal with a crisis, in an appropriately measured way, as it escalates. As the emergency grows, the government could implement stronger measures as required to meet the challenge — in principle, akin to the Unites States’ homeland security levels, which increase as the level of threat increases (see Appendix 4 for a description of the Canadian Emergency Health Alert System). The CMA strongly believes that the federal government must have jurisdiction to act when the ability of the provinces to respond to public health emergencies is so disparate. The inability of one province to stop the spread of virulent disease would have serious implications for the health of residents in the rest of the country. The federal government and the provinces must work together to ensure the safety of all our citizens. 2. The CMA recommends The creation of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. Although some provinces have established centres of public health expertise, considering the breadth of public health issues, the relative population sizes and differences in wealth, it will never be feasible to have comprehensive centres of public health expertise for each province and territory. Even if one achieved this, there would increasingly be issues of economies of scale and unnecessary duplication among centres. This issue is not unique to Canada.1 The CMA is proposing the development of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) operating at arm’s length from any level of government. CODSC would have overall responsibility for protecting the health of Canadians. The Office would provide credible information to enhance health decisions and promote health by developing and applying disease prevention and control, environmental health and health promotion and education activities. CODSC would enable a consistent and coordinated approach to public health emergencies as well as play a key role in the prevention and control of chronic diseases and injuries. It would provide national health surveillance, apolitical scientific expertise, system development including standards and guideline development, development and dissemination of an evidence base for public health interventions, skills training and transfer of expertise (i.e., through secondment of staff) and resources, including funding for core programs, to other levels of the system (e.g., provincial and local). 3. The CMA recommends The appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada; to head the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control; and to work with provinces and territories to develop and implement a pan-Canadian public health action plan. Many national or federal–provincial–territorial committees play an important role in recommending public health strategies or actions. The National Advisory Committee on Immunization and the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health are two excellent examples. But there is currently no single credible public health authority in whom is vested, through legislation or federal–provincial–territorial agreement, the overall responsibility for pan-Canadian public health issues. Therefore, the CMA is recommending the appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. Potential roles for this officer may include: * Serve as the head of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control * Serve as the national spokesperson for public health with the independence to comment on critical public health issues * Report annually on the health of the population * Develop, implement and report independently to parliament on public health system performance measures * Lead processes to identify and address gaps in the nation’s public health system. Capacity enhancement The public health system infrastructure is the foundation that supports the planning, delivery and evaluation of public health activities. In March 2001, the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Public Health<3> reported, In the view of respondents the system ‘is lacking in depth.’ This means that a sustained crisis would seriously compromise other programming. While the research does not indicate that the public health system in Canada is strained beyond capacity, there does appear to be agreement that there is a capacity to manage just one crisis at a time. However, just 2 years later, the GTA, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and carry on any other programs. The Ontario government recognized this state of affairs when, on 12 June, Ontario’s Health Minister Tony Clement said, “I was concerned that if we had one additional large-scale crisis, that the system would crash.” Important public health issues ranging from immunization to suicide prevention went virtually unaddressed, as the public health capacity in Toronto was overwhelmed. In the absence of a mechanism to share resources within the system and a general lack of overall system surge capacity, the city of Toronto and the province competed with each other to recruit trained staff from other health departments. The SARS outbreak has shown there is no surge capacity in Canada’s largest city. The acute care system in Toronto virtually ground to a halt in dealing with SARS. We must ask ourselves what would have happened if SARS had struck first in a smaller centre in a far less-advantaged region of Canada. Clearly Canada is not fully prepared. We should not have needed a crisis to tell us this. The CMA sees several components to rebuilding the capacity of the public health system. Public health human resources For the essential functions of the public health system to be realized, public health agencies need a workforce with appropriate and constantly updated skills. Canada’s public health workforce is extremely thin. There appear to be too few graduate-level public health professionals (i.e., those holding a master’s degree and physicians who are certified specialists in community medicine); those who do exist are not distributed equitably across jurisdictions. The scarcity of hospital-based infection control practitioners and emergency physicians within the acute care system and the lack of integration of hospital and community-based disease control efforts have been particularly striking during the SARS outbreak. The knowledge and skills required for effective public health practice are not static. They continually evolve as new evidence is identified. However, continuing education programming for public health practitioners is woefully underdeveloped in Canada. Health Canada has made some limited progress in this area, but the issue needs to be addressed much more substantively. 4. The CMA recommends The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. Canada has world-class expertise in public health. However, it does not have the depth of other countries, partly because we do not have a national multidisciplinary school of public health of the calibre of Harvard in Boston, Johns Hopkins in Baltimore and the School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in London. A national school of public health, which might be based on a virtual network of centres nationwide, could * Develop a plan to assess and address the substantial educational needs of new and existing public health staff * Address the coordination of the various academic training programs to meet the needs of the field * Ensure self-sufficiency of our public health workforce. 5. The CMA recommends The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. The SARS outbreak clearly demonstrated the need for a pre-planned approach to supporting and augmenting the public health and acute care workforce during a crisis. When health professionals in the GTA were overwhelmed, we were ill prepared to move health professionals in from other jurisdictions to help. Health professional associations like the CMA took the first steps in investigating and overcoming obstacles regarding licensure and insurance. We were taken aback when we found that the Ontario government had unilaterally awarded an exclusive contract to a for-profit company to arrange for emergency relief. The further delay caused by concerns about privacy, confidentiality and harmonizing fees hampered relief efforts. The deployment of health professionals during health emergencies is too important to be left in the hands of for-profit organizations as it was during the SARS experience. An established Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, operating on a non-profit basis, would * Maintain a “reserve” of public health professionals who are fully trained and could be deployed to areas of need during times of crisis * Co-ordinate the logistics of issues such as portable licensing, malpractice and disability insurance * Identify funding for staff training and a more equitable distribution of numbers and skills among jurisdictions. Investment in public health Considering the importance of the public health system and its capacity to protect and promote the health of Canadians, it is amazing that we have no reliable or comprehensive information about how much money is actually spent on the system or what public health human resources are available across Canada. This is partially due to the lack of uniform definitions, service delivery mechanisms and accounting practices. Even in the absence of reliable data on public health expenditures, there is ample evidence that the public health system continues to operate under serious resource constraints across Canada. 6. The CMA recommends Tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures and capacity (both physical and human resources) by the Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada, on behalf of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. In its latest report on health system expenditures, the CIHI states that 6% of total expenditures in 2000 were spent on “public health and administration.”<4> The inclusion of administrative costs in this figure means that public health funding is substantially less than 6% of health system expenditures.2 Federal Government Estimates report that Health Canada allocated $433 million in 2003–2004 for health promotion and prevention activities with spending scheduled to decrease to $308 million by 2005–2006 or by almost 30%. This decrease in spending exemplifies a decade that has seen tremendous fluctuations in spending on public health activities. The situation is alarming when looked at from a current-dollar basis; there was an 8.8% decrease in funding of public health activities between 1994–1995 and 1997–1998. In fact, federal spending on public health on a constant dollar basis did not regain its 1994–1995 level until 2000–2001. Although the late 1990s saw some reinvestment in public health initiatives, the most recent 2003–2004 estimates suggest that, once again, federal investment in public health will decrease dramatically over the next few years. Indeed, public health continues to represent only a small fraction of total federal direct spending on health (9.7% in 2002–2003). At the provincial level, although we cannot distance public health from administration, we know that it fell victim to the brutal climate of fiscal retrenchment of the 1990s, when in real terms provincial–territorial per capita health spending declined for 5 consecutive years after 1991–1992. During this period, public health was further destabilized by regionalization. According to the Survey of Public Health Capacity in Canada most provincial and territorial officials reported reductions in programming as a result of the transfer of funding and responsibility to regional structures. Although Ontario did not regionalize, in 1997 public health funding was downloaded to municipalities, which left public health departments scrambling to find funds to meet existing programs as well as new services that were mandated by the provincial Health Protection and Promotion Act. Whether talking about federal or provincial–territorial jurisdictions, we can no longer afford to have funding for health and safety subject to the vagaries of financial cycles. However, what perhaps is most alarming is the potentially large economic impact of underinvestment in this area. Although the net cost of the SARS outbreak in Ontario is not yet known, recent estimates suggest that it could be as high as $2.1 billion.3 Given this, the proverbial ounce of prevention that is worth a pound of cure comes to mind suggesting that a relatively modest increase in funding for public health could potentially result in substantial savings in the longer term. 7. The CMA recommends Federal government funding in the amount of $1 billion over 5 years to build adequate and consistent surge capacity across Canada and improve coordination among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal authorities to fulfill essential public health functions. The best way to ensure that the public health system is capable of addressing the range of public health threats, including emergencies, is to significantly increase investment in its capacity. This investment must assist all levels of the system to fulfill essential public health functions, with particular attention to local and regional agencies. The strategic national leadership that we are calling for includes the development of new mechanisms for federal cost sharing of basic public health services and the guarantee of a basic core set of local programs serving everyone in Canada, regardless of where they live. The system also needs to receive targeted funds so that it can do its work smarter and more effectively. Priority areas for this targeted funding should include development of an integrated information system and staff training. Research, surveillance and communications Canada’s ability to respond to emerging public health threats and acute events, such as the SARS outbreak, and to maintain its effective public health planning and program development depends on sound research, surveillance and rapid, real-time communications. 8. The CMA recommends An immediate sequestered grant of $200 million over 5 years to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to initiate an enhanced conjoint program of research with the Institute of Population and Public Health and the Institute of Infection and Immunity that will expand capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. Similar to the efforts in clinical care to support the use of evidence-based practices, interventions in public health must be based on research, evidence and best practices. A national effort should be undertaken to develop and make widely available, on an ongoing basis, a comprehensive and up-to-date review of the evidence base for public health programs. This information would support effective practice, enhance public health research capacity and support other infrastructure elements (e.g., minimum programs and services, performance measurement, system funding). It could also reduce unnecessary duplication of efforts by different public health agencies. We applaud the tremendous work of the unique trans-Canada partnership of 4 CIHR-funded research teams who, in just 11 weeks, discovered the complete DNA sequence of the coronavirus associated with SARS. This is a perfect example of what can be accomplished when our talented research teams work together. The recent announcement by the CIHR of an integrated national strategy for research on SARS reflects the intent of this recommendation for other public health challenges. 9. The CMA recommends The mandatory reporting by provinces and territories of identified infectious diseases to the newly established Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to enable appropriate communications, analyses and interventions. Public health surveillance is defined as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health data necessary for designing implementing and evaluating public health programs. It is an integral part of the public health system and performs an essential function in early detection and response to threats to human health. Current surveillance systems for communicable and noncommunicable diseases are inadequate to allow public health professionals to detect and react to major health issues. For effective public health management, surveillance must be a continuous process covering a range of integrated data sources to provide useful and timely information. 10. The CMA recommends The one-time infusion of $100 million, with an additional $2 million a year, for a “REAL” (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Coordination Initiative to improve technical capacity to communicate with front line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. In today’s world, international travel, business and migration can move infectious diseases around the world at jet speed. But during the SARS experience, governments and public health authorities were unable to communicate in real time with health professionals on the front lines. Gaps in the basic communication infrastructure prevent public health agencies from talking with each other in real time, and also hinder exchanges between public health staff, private clinicians and other sources of information about emerging new diseases. In response to requests from both the Ontario Medical Association and Health Canada, the CMA mobilized its communication networks to provide physicians with critical information about public health management of SARS. In less than 48 hours, via email and fax, we reached over 45,000 physicians with authoritative information. Through the good offices of the Canadian Council of Health Services Accreditation, this information was also made available to over 1500 accredited health facilities across Canada. Although necessity caused the limits of the system to be tested, SARS highlighted the fact that we do not have information systems in place to facilitate real-time communication with health professionals. Information is the key to effective response during times of emergency. Information in real time is also essential for effective day-to-day health care to provide, for example, information on adverse drug reactions. CONCLUSION SARS brought out the best in Canada and Canadians’ commitment to one another. It also turned a bright, sometimes uncomfortable spotlight on the ability of this country’s health care system to respond to a crisis, be it an emerging disease, a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or a large-scale accident. We must learn from the SARS experience and quickly move to rebuild the infrastructure of a strong public health system. The CMA believes that this 10-point Public Health Action Plan will go a long way toward addressing shortfalls in the Canadian public health system. Action now will help to ensure that Canadians can be confident once again that their governments are doing all they can to protect them from the threat of new infectious diseases. We wish the advisory committee well in its deliberations and offer the CMA’s assistance at any time in clarifying the strategies set out in our submission. APPENDIX 1: THE CMA’S PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION PLAN [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] [TABLE END] APPENDIX 2: ESTIMATED COST OF IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Recommendation Estimated cost over 5 years Legislative and institutional reform 1. Canada Emergency Health Measures Act N/A 2. Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) ? $20 million 3. Chief Public Health Officer of Canada Capacity enhancement 4. Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health $100 million 5. Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service $35 million 6. Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada $35 milliona 7. Surge capacity $1 billionb Research, surveillance and communications 8. Canadian Institutes of Health Research $200 millionc 9. Mandatory reporting Included under 2 and 3 above 10. Enhanced reporting $110 million TOTAL $1.5 billion a. Work is currently underway to break-out public health from the current category of “public health and administration.” b. This is an incremental investment in addition to funding currently available under Health Canada’s Health Promotion and Prevention Strategic Outcome area. c. Funding must be sequestered specifically for new initiatives related to public health. Additional money could also be acquired through funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, which received an additional $500 million in 2002–2003 (announced in the 2003 federal budget) to enhance the Foundation’s support of public health infrastructure. [TABLE END] APPENDIX 3: CHRONOLOGY OF THE CMA’S RESPONSE TO SARS 2002 November 16 * First known case of atypical pneumonia (SARS) occurs in Guangdong province, China 2003 February 11 * World Health Organization (WHO) receives reports from the Chinese Ministry of Health about SARS; 305 persons affected and 5 deaths February 13 * Canadian index case arrives in Hong Kong for a family visit February 18-21 * Canadian index case is a guest at the Metropole hotel in Kowloon February 21 * A medical doctor from Guangdong checks into Metropole hotel in Kowloon. The physician, who became ill a week before staying at the hotel, is considered to be the original source of the infection * This leads subsequently to outbreaks in Vietnam, Hong Kong, Singapore and Canada after guests leave the hotel and return home February 23 * Canadian index case returns home to Toronto March 5 * Canadian index patient dies in Toronto, 9 days after the onset of her illness March 12 * WHO issues global alert about SARS March 13 * National and international media reports begin appearing about SARS * The Canadian index patient’s son, Canada’s second SARS victim, dies 15 days after the onset of his illness March 14 * First reports from Toronto about deaths from SARS March 16 * Health Canada receives notice of SARS patients in Ontario and British Columbia; begins regular updates on SARS on its website * Health Canada initiates its pan-Canadian communication infrastructure, based on its pandemic influenza contingency plans March 17 * CMA calls Health Canada to offer assistance and request “real time information.” CMA immediately placed on list of participants in daily pan-Canadian teleconferences. * CMA adds a SARS page to its website home page (cma.ca) with CMA Shortcuts to expert information and daily updates March 19 * CMA alerts all its divisions and affiliates to the Health Canada and CMA SARS web pages * eCMAJ includes SARS updates on its website March 20 * CMA divisions add a link to SARS information for health professionals to their websites * Health Canada requests CMA’s assistance to inform physicians of the public health management guidelines for SARS March 28 * CMA sends an email to 33,000 members (copied to divisions and affiliated societies) to alert them to Health Canada’s SARS public health management documents and SARS web page April 1 * CMA CEO initiates cross-directorate task force and deploys dedicated staff resources. Some other CMA programs deferred/delayed. Task force begins daily staff SARS Working Group meetings * CMA communicates with the Ontario Medical Association on a daily basis April 2 * CMA holds teleconference with divisional communication directors re: SARS April 3 * CMA contacts the British Medical Association to establish whether we can secure a supply of masks from European sources * CMA organizes a teleconference among national health care organizations to discuss SARS developments April 7 * CMA posts electronic grand rounds on SARS for clinicians on cma.ca; * CMA sends email and fax communication to physicians to raise awareness of SARS e-grand rounds on cma.ca * Working with the Mental Health Support Network of Canada, CMA prepares and posts on cma.ca, fact sheets for health professionals and the public on coping with the stress caused by SARS April 9 * CMA hosts second teleconference among national health care organizations to discuss SARS developments April 17 * Electronic grand rounds on SARS updated and promoted through cma.ca April 23 * CMA sends email to membership requesting volunteers for the CMA Volunteer Emergency SARS Relief Network April 24 * CMA consults with the American Medical Association regarding the possibility of US physicians volunteering for the relief network April 25 * CMA CEO sends letter to deputy minister of health about the urgent need to create a national ministerial SARS task force April 30-May 1 * CMA participates in Health Canada-sponsored international SARS conference in Toronto May 6 * Health Canada announces the National Advisory Group on SARS and Public Health, headed by Dr. David Naylor May 12 * Opinion editorial by Dr. Dana Hanson, CMA president, on SARS and public health surge capacity published in The Ottawa Citizen; May 28 * CMA organizes a meeting of national health care organizations to discuss lessons learned from SARS June 3 * CMA receives an invitation to submit a brief to the National Advisory Group on SARS and Public Health June 6 * CMA sends e-mail to targeted segment of its membership (community medicine, public health, infectious disease and medical microbiology) requesting volunteers for the CMA Volunteer Emergency SARS Relief Network June 25 * CMA president outlines the CMA’s Public Health Action Plan during a speech at the Canadian Club in Toronto * CMA submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and public health APPENDIX 4: CMA’S PROPOSED HEALTH EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Health alert may be declared in: Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 * Any area under federal jurisdiction * Any community or province/territory with a risk of transmission to other provinces/territories or countries * Any community or province/territory with insufficient resources to manage the public health emergency within the capacity of the local public health authorities Definition of the area of concern Voluntary quarantine for individuals or property Increasing surveillance Chief public health officer takes the lead in coordinating the response Regulation or prohibition of travel Facilitating communication Reviewing and updating health emergency procedures Determination of local capacity to lead and respond Coordinating necessary response efforts with national disaster relief agencies, armed forces or law enforcement agencies at the federal–provinical–territorial level Medium to significant limitations of civil rights and freedoms Mandatory surveillance Assessing future resource requirements Deployment of a national response team Medium to significant limitations of civil rights and freedoms Evacuation of persons and the removal of personal property Providing the public with necessary information. Discretionary deployment of the national response team or on request of local authorities Quarantine of individuals and/or property with enforcement by law Implementing interventions, as appropriate, and emergency response actions Regulation of the distribution and availability of essential goods, services and resources Assessing further refinement of actions Restricting access to the area of concern Requisition, use or disposition of property Required consent of governor in council No No Yes Yes Yes Lead response team Municipal or provincial Provincial or national Provincial or national National or international International [TABLE END] REFERENCES 1. Garrett, L. Betrayal of trust: the collapse of global public health. New York: Hyperion; 2000. 2. Health Canada. National consultations, summary report: renewal of the federal health protection legislation. Ottawa: Health Canada; 1999. 3. Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health. Survey of public health capacity in Canada: highlights. Ottawa: The Committee; 2001. 4. Canadian Institutes for Health Information. National health expenditure trends: 1975–2002. Ottawa: CIHI; 2002. 5. Lévesque M. The economic impact of SARS. TD Economics Topic Paper. TD Bank Financial Group; 6 May 2003. Available: http://www.td.com/economics/topic/ml0503_sars.html (viewed: 20 June 2003). 1 Many countries (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands) have developed critical masses of public health expertise at the national level. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States, which has a critical mass, great depth of scientific expertise and the tools and fiscal resources to fund public health programs at both state and local levels through demonstration projects, is a sterling example of the effectiveness of such a central agency. 2 A review by the Canadian Institute for Health Information recognizes the problem with current expenditure tracking systems and has recommended separating public health from government administrative costs and prepayment administration in future health system cost estimates. 3 On 6 May, the TD Bank released a paper<5> suggesting that the cost of SARS to the Canadian economy may be between $1.5 and $2.1 billion.
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Best Practices and Federal Barriers: Practice and Training of Healthcare Professionals

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy11513
Date
2015-03-17
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2015-03-17
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) is pleased to present its brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health for consideration as part of its study of "Best Practices and Federal Barriers: Practice and Training of Health Professionals". The subject under discussion is relevant to both parts of the CMA's mission. The CMA has undertaken considerable activity on the issue. For example, in 2012 and 2013 we participated, with the Canadian Nurses Association and the Health Action Lobby (HEAL) on the Council of the Federation's (CoF) working group on Team-based Care. For many years, the CMA has conducted the National Physician Survey, which develops comprehensive information on physician demographics and practice patterns. In the past decade a number of health professions have expanded their scopes of practice. In most provinces, for example, pharmacists can now renew prescriptions or provide emergency prescription refills. Ontario has established nurse-practitioner-led primary health care clinics which collaborate with family physicians and others in the community. Nova Scotia has experimented with using paramedics as first-contact primary caregivers in rural or remote areas. Governments expand scopes of practice for a number of possible reasons: cost-effectiveness (i.e. replacing one health professional with a less expensive one); improving access, particularly in areas underserviced by physicians; increasing convenience for patients (for example, allowing a neighbourhood pharmacist to give a flu shot may save the patient from taking time off work for a doctor's appointment): or responding to lobbying by health provider groups. The CMA believes that ideally, every health care provider should have a scope of practice that is consistent with his or her education and training, and that the health care system should enable them to practice to the fullest extent of this scope. More importantly, the scope of practice of every health professional should enable them to contribute optimally to providing high quality patient-centered care without compromising patient safety. Indeed, the primary reason for expanding the scope of practice of a health professional should be to improve Canadians' health and health care. In the following pages we will discuss several specific topics related to the Scope of Practice issue, and make recommendations for a possible federal role in supporting best practices among health professionals. 1. A Canada-Wide Approach to Scopes of Practice Scopes of practice are determined largely by provincial and territorial governments, and each jurisdiction has developed its own regulations regarding what health professional groups may do and under what circumstances. This has led to inconsistency across the country. For example, about half the jurisdictions in Canada allow pharmacists to order laboratory tests and prescribe for minor ailments; provinces vary in the degree to which they fund nurse practitioner positions; and there is wide variation in how, and even if, physician assistants are regulated. While recognizing that the authority to determine scopes of practice rests with provincial/territorial governments, CMA believes that it is desirable to work toward consistency in access to health services across Canada. Recommendation 1: that the federal government work with provincial/territorial governments and with health professional associations to promote a consistent national approach to scope-of-practice expansions 2. Promoting and Facilitating Team-Based Care The scopes-of-practice issue is closely related to the development of models for team-based care, a development that CMA supports. When Canadians seek health care today, it is mainly to help them maintain their health or to manage chronic diseases. This trend is expected to continue as the population ages and the rate of chronic disease rises correspondingly. For patients who have multiple chronic diseases or disabilities, care needs can be complex and a number of different health and social-services professionals may be providing care to the same person. A patient might, for example, be consulting a family physician for primary health care, several medical specialists for different conditions, a pharmacist to monitor a complex medication regime, a physiotherapist to help with mobility difficulties, health care aides to make sure the patient is eating properly or attending to personal hygiene, and a social worker to make sure his or her income is sufficient to cover health care and other needs. The complexity of today's health care requires that the system move away from the traditional "silo" method of delivering care and encourage health professionals to work collaboratively to effectively meet patients' needs. The CMA believes that the following factors contribute to the success of inter-professional care: Patient access to a primary care provider who is familiar with the patient's needs and preferences, and has responsibility for the overall care of the patient, co-ordinating the various providers involved in this care. For more than 30 million Canadians, that primary care provider is a family physician. The College of Family Physicians of Canada believes that family practices can serve as patient's "medical home," in which care is anchored and co-ordinated by a family physician, with access to other health care providers as required. Mechanisms that encourage collaboration and communication among providers. These include: o Interdisciplinary primary care practices, such as Family Health Networks in Ontario, which permit patients to access a variety of different health professionals and their expertise from one practice setting; Widespread use of the electronic health record, which can facilitate information sharing and communication among providers. A smooth, seamless process for referral from one provider to another. Role clarity and mutual trust. Each health professional on a care team should have a clear understanding of their own roles and the roles of other team members. The CoF's Team-Based Care Working Group investigated the critical factors for successful team based care, and identified models in certain provinces that it believed should be considered for rollout across Canada. This rollout could be enhanced if it were encouraged by all governments, including the Government of Canada. In the past, Health Canada has supported demonstration projects in health system reform through the National Primary Care Research Group. The CMA believes that the federal government could take a similar role in future, in supporting and disseminating promising models of inter-professional practice. The dissemination process should be accompanied by a process to rigorously evaluate the effect of such models on health outcomes, quality of patient care, and health care costs. Recommendation 2: that the Government of Canada support research into and evaluation of innovative models of team-based care, and actively promote the dissemination of successful models nationwide. Recommendation 3: that Canada Health Infoway work with provinces and territories to increase the adoption of electronic medical records at the point of care and build connectivity among points of care. 3. A Health-Care System That Supports Best Practices in Team-Based Care We have already discussed the part that governments could play in identifying, disseminating and evaluating models of inter-professional practice. The health care system's planners, funders and managers can also foster team-based care in other ways, such as: Promoting education in inter-professional care. As the Committee has heard, the Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada's guiding principles for medical education include valuing inter-professionalism and incorporating it into residency learning and practice. CMA encourages the development of programs to help new physicians and other health professionals acquire the skills needed to function optimally an in inter-professional setting. Improving access to health services not funded under the Canada Health Act. At present, patients who do not have private health care coverage must pay out of pocket for physiotherapy, dietitian services, mental health care and most social services. This works against the principles of inter-professional care by hindering access to necessary services; this could compromise patient health and safety. Undertaking an open and meaningful consultation process when changes to scopes of practice are proposed. CMA's experience has been that physicians are more accepting of changes in other professions' scopes of practice if their medical associations have been involved in negotiation on these changes. Ensuring that the supply of health professionals in Canada is sufficient to the needs of Canadian patients, by developing, implementing and monitoring human resource plans for all major health professions. Recommendation 4: that the federal government work with provincial/territorial government and national health professional associations to develop and implement a health human resources plan that ensures Canadians' access to all appropriate health care providers. In conclusion, the Canadian Medical Association recognizes that the great majority of decisions regarding scopes of practice are made at the provincial/territorial level. But we believe that in order to encourage a Canadian health-care system in which all providers work together, contributing their unique skills and expertise to providing patient-centered, seamless, cost-effective care, the support and encouragement of the federal government will be extremely beneficial.
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Bill C-2 An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Respect for Communities Act)

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy11519
Date
2015-05-14
Topics
Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2015-05-14
Topics
Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs
Text
Bill C-2 An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Respect for Communities Act) Canadian Medical Association Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs On behalf of its more than 82,000 members and the Canadian public, CMA performs a wide variety of functions. Key functions include advocating for health promotion and disease prevention policies and strategies, advocating for access to quality health care, facilitating change within the medical profession, and providing leadership and guidance to physicians to help them influence, manage and adapt to changes in health care delivery. The CMA is a voluntary professional organization representing the majority of Canada's physicians and comprising 12 provincial and territorial divisions and 51 national medical organizations. The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) provides this brief for consideration as part of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs study of Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Respect for Communities Act).1 Bill C-2 (formerly Bill C-65) is subsequent to the 2011 unanimous ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada2 that recognized the significant evidence on the benefits of Insite, Vancouver's supervised injection site. The Supreme Court ordered that the federal government grant the exemption for medical and scientific purposes to Insite. The ruling left decisions regarding future applications for exemptions to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) for Insite and other potential supervised injection sites up to the discretion of the Minister of Health, with the provision that the Minister seek to strike the appropriate balance between the public health and public safety goals, and suggests the decision be based on five elements: "evidence, if any, on the impact of such a facility on crime rates, the local conditions indicating a need for such a supervised injection site, the regulatory structure in place to support the facility, the resources available to support its maintenance and expressions of community support or opposition." 3 In response, the Minister of Health proposed Bill C-2, which amends the CDSA to include section 56.1, and provides a federal regulatory framework for supervised consumption sites.* CMA is deeply concerned with the proposed legislation, as it has the potential to create unnecessary obstacles and burdens that would ultimately deter the creation of new supervised consumption sites, even in municipalities where the need and cost-effectiveness has been well researched and the health and safety benefits clearly established. Moreover, it does not strike the appropriate balance between public health and public safety, as is the spirit and intent of the Supreme Court of Canada ruling on Insite. This will make the renewal of exemptions for Insite, the very facility which the Supreme Court ruled "saves lives", very difficult. Public health approach to addiction Addiction should be recognized and treated as a serious, chronic and relapsing medical condition for which there are effective treatments. The CMA has long called for a comprehensive national drug strategy that addresses addiction, and includes prevention, treatment, harm reduction and enforcement components. Public health objectives in addressing addictions will vary depending upon the circumstances: preventing drug use in those who have not initiated use (e.g. pre-teens); avoiding use in circumstances associated with a risk of adverse outcomes (e.g. drug use and driving motor vehicle); assisting those who wish to stop using drugs (e.g. treatment, rehabilitation); and assisting those who continue to use drugs to do so in such a manner as to reduce the risk of adverse effects (e.g. needle distribution program). Despite drug use being primarily a health and social issue, the focus of the federal National Anti-Drug Strategy is heavily skewed towards a criminal justice approach, as evidenced by a recent evaluation.4 This approach does not address the determinants of drug use, treat addictions, or reduce the harms associated with drug use. Other models are more effective in achieving the desired objectives and more investments need to be made in prevention, harm reduction and treatment, keeping individuals out of the criminal justice system.5 Drug use is a complex issue, and collaboration among health and public safety professionals, and society at large, is essential. Harm reduction is part of health practice Harm reduction is not restricted to services for people who use drugs; it is an approach that is adopted routinely in every health and social program. For example, seat belts, air bags and helmets are encouraged and even mandated to reduce some of the possible harmful consequences of driving or cycling - regardless of who is at fault. Many medications do not cure diseases, and are essential to prevent complications. An example is the use of insulin by people with diabetes.6 There are many programs created to reduce the harms created by alcohol, a legal substance that contributes to a significant burden of disease, disability and deaths. Examples include low risk drinking guidelines, designated driver or alternate driver programs for drinkers, graduated licenses and changes in the hours of liquor stores to reduce the use of non-beverage alcohol.7 While the risk is still present, this approach reduces harms. Harm reduction related to psychoactive substances, "refers to policies, programmes and practices that aim primarily to reduce the adverse health, social and economic consequences of the use of legal and illegal psychoactive drugs without necessarily reducing drug consumption. Harm reduction benefits people who use drugs, their families and the community".8 They are part of a comprehensive approach which also includes abstinence-based programs. The CMA fully supports harm reduction strategies as they aim to reduce mortality and morbidity even in the face of continued exposure to a potentially harmful substance. Addiction is an illness, and harm reduction is a clinically mandated and ethical method of care and treatment. Physicians must treat patients as a matter of good medical practice and ethical obligation, whether the patient is believed to contribute to his or her injury or not. Section 31 of CMA's Code of Ethics provides that all physicians must "recognize the responsibility of physicians to promote fair access to health care resources".9 Harm reduction information, services and interventions are respectful and non-judgmental, and have the purpose of promoting health and safety. These strategies were developed in response to critical situations and high costs to the health, social and criminal justice systems. Harm reduction approaches are evidence-based, cost effective and have a high impact on individual and community health. Such programs for injection drug users are now well established within every province and territory in Canada, in the form of needle and syringe distribution programs, methadone maintenance and the provision of sterilized equipment.10 Supervised Consumption Sites are evidence-based Supervised consumption sites, within a comprehensive drug strategy, are another example of a harm reduction program. They were developed to reduce the harms of Injection drug use, which are an increased incidence and prevalence of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C, and skin- and blood-borne infections; frequent drug overdoses resulting in significant morbidity and mortality; and increased hospital and emergency service utilization. Many of these health problems are not due to the drugs themselves, but to the injection method and equipment. Supervised consumption sites are "specialized facilities that provide injection drug users with a clean, safe, unhurried environment. Sterile injection equipment is provided and health care and social service professionals are available to deal with health issues, provide counselling, and facilitate access to detoxification and treatment programs. Supervision is provided by health professionals trained in low-risk injection techniques and overdose intervention."11 The drugs are acquired elsewhere, and they are located in areas of concentrated and highly visible drug scenes. Such services have existed for many years in many countries, and there are over 90 sites operating in countries such as Australia, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Switzerland.12 Clients of these sites have complex histories of trauma, mental illness and drug use, and live at the margins of society, unreached by traditional health and social services. Supervised consumption sites are developed as low threshold services for hard-to-reach populations which are experiencing unacceptable levels of deaths and diseases. Existing outreach and treatment programs are insufficient to meet the needs of this population, and these sites are a point of entry into health and social services. Insite, the first supervised injection site in North America, operates in Vancouver's downtown east side as part of the 'four pillars' drug strategy: prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and enforcement.13 14 In 2012, Insite had an average of 1028 visits per day. There were 497 overdose incidents with no fatalities and 3418 clinical treatment interventions. Insite staff made 4564 referrals for further health care, housing and social supports, and the vast majority was for detox and addiction treatment.15 Insite has been one of the most researched public health interventions to date.16 Research was conducted by the BC Centre for Excellence on HIV/AIDS, funded partially by Health Canada, and there are over 30 publications in leading peer-reviewed scientific and medical journals.17 18The evidence shows that there has been: * A reduction in the overall rate of needle sharing in the area;19 * A reduction in deaths due to overdose in the area, with no overdose deaths in the facility;20 21 * Increased access to addiction counseling and increased enrolment in detox programs;22 23 * Opportunities for HIV prevention through education, and increased links between patients and HIV treatment and services;24 * Improvements in measures of public order including reduced public drug injections and publicly discarded syringes;25 and * No increase in levels of drug dealing or other drug related crime in the area in which the facility is located. 26 * Cost savings to health and social systems, reducing risks of infectious diseases, intervening early when there are issues, and reducing the need for emergency care.27 28 Reports from other countries show similar results.29 30 However, "research evidence, even if it meets rigorous academic standards, might be insufficient to sway opinions among those who hold a firm view of addiction as a moral failure."31 Assertions that supervised consumption sites will not reduce disease transmission, exacerbate crime, encourage drug use, have destructive effects on local businesses and residents are not based on evidence. Physicians believe that medical decisions must be based on evidence, not ideology or public opinion, and the evidence shows that supervised injection reduces the spread of infectious diseases, decreases the incidence of overdose and death and increases access to much needed services, without increasing problems with public safety. Significantly, the Court accepted the evidence that "Insite has saved lives and improved health without increasing the incidence of drug use and crime in the surrounding area."32 It also stated that Insite is supported by the Vancouver police, the city and provincial governments. Supervised consumption rooms aim to address problems of specific, high-risk populations of people who use drugs, particularly those who consume in public and other high risk situations. They seek to meet the needs of those who use drugs, but also of the communities that are struggling with a crisis situation. The CMA has the following concerns with Bill C-2: 1. Bill C-2 does not strike a balance between the public health and public safety goals of the CDSA. As written, Bill C-2 disregards the strong evidence of important positive impacts on public health and public safety and giving undue emphasis on public opinion, which might not be fully informed or experienced. Although public opinion might initially be against the introduction of such facilities, public acceptance of supervised consumption sites is considerably high in most of the locations where they have been established, in both Vancouver sites (Insite and the Dr Peter Centre) and in European countries. "Health problems have been reduced, and law and order have been improved. Communities, neighbourhoods and local authorities are usually involved in the good functioning of the facilities through cooperation and communication."33 The Supreme Court states that there has been "no discernible negative impact on the public safety and health objectives of Canada during its [Insite's] eight years of operation." 2. Bill C-2 contradicts the spirit and intent of the unanimous decision of the 2011 Supreme Court of Canada regarding Insite which states that "the potential denial of health services and the correlative increase in the risk of death and disease to injection drug users outweigh any benefit that might be derived from maintaining an absolute prohibition on possession of illegal drugs".34 Bill C-2 does not acknowledge the extensive evidence that exists regarding supervised consumption sites both internationally and in Canada, as discussed previously. Passing Bill C-2 in its current form could potentially prevent the renewal of the exemption to Section 56 of the CDSA for Insite. A likely consequence will be further costly litigation. 3. Bill C-2 would impose multiple and significant barriers that providers of health services to obtain an exemption to section 56 of the CDSA. From five criteria in the Supreme Court decision concerning Insite, Bill C-2 lists 27 requirements (Section 56(1)(3)), which include demographic and scientific data, letters of opinions from representatives of local police and local and provincial governments, information about proposed staff, descriptions of planned procedures and reports from community consultations. Such evidence could require extensive resources and funding by local public health units and community agencies. Some of the data required may only be available in the context of a research project. The data is not only influenced by the existence or not of a supervised consumption site, but by many other factors, such as poverty, enforcement resources and others. Community opinion of supervised consumption sites can also change to be significantly positive after experiencing months of its operation. Finally, Bill C-2 does not address how the Minister is to weigh the information submitted, to guarantee impartiality, or even if he or she must consider an application. Even after meeting all those requirements, the Minister has the sole discretion to decide whether a site can open, and the preamble states that exemptions will only be granted in "exceptional circumstances". 4. Bill C-2 did not involve consultation with provincial and territorial ministries of health, community agencies and professional associations, such as the CMA. Public health authorities and particularly health professionals, who work with people with addictions on a daily basis, recognize the dire need for complementary approaches to substance use that address different needs. The exemption to section 56 is for medical purposes, and public health agencies have the competency to determine when there is a need. It is the CMA's ultimate position that Bill C-2, the Respect for Communities Act must be withdrawn, and that it be replaced with legislation that recognizes the unequivocal evidence of benefits of supervised consumption sites, that was accepted by the Supreme Court. Legislation would enhance access to health services, which include prevention, harm reduction and treatment services in communities where the evidence has shown they would benefit from such health services. * "Supervised consumption site" is the term used in Bill C-2, section 56.1, and defined as "a location specified in the terms and conditions of an exemption, granted by the Minister under subsection (2) for a medical purpose, that allows any person or class of persons described in the exemption to engage in certain activities in relation to an illicit substance within a supervised and controlled environment." The Supreme Court of Canada and other documents use terms such as "supervised injection site" "supervised injection services", "drug consumption rooms" or "safer injection site". In the literature, supervised consumption sites could also include supervised inhalation services. 1 Bill C-2: An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 2nd Session, 41st Parliament. Retrieved from: http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=6256959&File=4 2 Supreme Court of Canada (2011) Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Comm. Serv. Soc. Retrieved from: http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/7960/index.do 3 Supreme Court of Canada (2011) Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Comm. Serv. Soc. supra. p.192-3 4 Department of Justice (2013) National Anti-Drug Strategy Evaluation. Retrieved from: http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/eval/rep-rap/12/nas-sna/p1.html#sec23 5 Day, Brian (2008) "Ottawa's bad prescription on addiction." Toronto Star, Sunday June 8, 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/438967 6 Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (2008) Harm reduction: what's in a name? Retrieved from: http://www.ccsa.ca/Resource%20Library/ccsa0115302008e.pdf 7 National Alcohol Strategy Working Group (2007) Reducing Alcohol-Related Harm in Canada: toward a culture of moderation. Recommendations for a National Alcohol Strategy. Retrieved from: http://ccsa.ca/Resource%20Library/ccsa-023876-2007.pdf 8 International Harm Reduction Association (2010) Harm Reduction: A position statement from the International Harm Reduction Association. IHRA Briefing. Retrieved from: http://www.ihra.net/files/2010/08/10/Briefing_What_is_HR_English.pdf 9 Canadian Medical Association (2010) Factum of the Intervener. Supreme Court of Canada (Appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal) between the Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Health for Canada and PHS Community Services Society, Dean Edward Wilson and Shelly Tomic, Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users. Retrieved from: https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/CMA-Factum_filed14April2011.pdf 10 Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (2008) Harm reduction: what's in a name? Retrieved from: http://www.ccsa.ca/Resource%20Library/ccsa0115302008e.pdf 11 Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (2008) Harm reduction: what's in a name? Retrieved from: http://www.ccsa.ca/Resource%20Library/ccsa0115302008e.pdf 12 Schatz, E. & Nougier, M. (2012) Drug consumption rooms: evidence and practice. International Drug Policy Consortium Briefing Paper. Retrieved from: http://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/17898/1/IDPC-Briefing-Paper_Drug-consumption-rooms.pdf 13 City of Vancouver Four Pillars Drug Strategy (2008) Limiting the harms of drug use. Retrieved from: http://vancouver.ca/fourpillars/harmReduction/limitHarmDrugUse.htm 14 Vancouver Coastal Health. Supervised Injection Site (N.D.) Services. Accessed September 19, 2014 at: http://supervisedinjection.vch.ca/services/services 15 Vancouver Coastal Health. Supervised Injection Site (N.D.). Accessed September 19, 2014 at: http://supervisedinjection.vch.ca/research/supporting_research/user_statistics 16 Urban Health Research Initiative (2010). Insight into Insite. Retrieved from: http://www.cfenet.ubc.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/insight_into_insite.pdf 17 Health Canada. Vancouver's Insite service and other supervised injection sites: what has been learned from Research? Final Report of the Expert Advisory Committee. Ottawa: Health Canada, 2008. Prepared for the Hon. Tony Clement, Minister of Health, Government of Canada. Retrieved from: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/pubs/_sites-lieux/insite/index-eng.php 18 Wood, E. et al. (2006) Summary of findings from the evaluation of a pilot medically supervised safer injecting facility. Canadian Medical Association J, 175(11): 1399-1404. 19 Kerr, T. et al. (2005) Safer injection facility use and syringe sharing in injection drug users. The Lancet 366: 316-18. 20 Milloy M.J., Kerr, T., Tyndall, M., Montaner, J., & Wood E. (2008) Estimated drug overdose deaths averted by North America's first medically-supervised safer injection facility. PLoS ONE 3(10):e3351. 21 Marshall B. D. L., Milloy, M.-J., Wood, E., Montaner, J. S. G., & Kerr, T. (2011). Reduction in overdose mortality after the opening of North America's first medically supervised safer injecting facility: A retrospective population-based study. Lancet. Published online April 18, 2011. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(10)62353-7. 22 Wood, E. et al. (2007) Rate of detoxification service use and its impact among a cohort of supervised injecting facility users. Addiction 102: 916-919. 23 Tyndall, M.W. et al. (2005) Attendance, drug use patterns, and referrals made from North America's first supervised injection facility. Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 24 Tyndall, M.W. et al. (2006) HIV seroprevalence among participants at a medically supervised injection facility in Vancouver Canada: Implications for prevention, care and treatment. Harm Reduction J 3:36. 25 Wood, E. et al. (2004) "Changes in public order after the opening of a medically supervised safer injecting facility for illicit injection drug users." Canadian Medical Association J 171(7): 731-34. 26 Health Canada. Vancouver's Insite service and other supervised injection sites: what has been learned from Research? Final Report of the Expert Advisory Committee. Ottawa: Health Canada, 2008. Prepared for the Hon. Tony Clement, Minister of Health, Government of Canada. Retrieved from: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/pubs/_sites-lieux/insite/index-eng.php 27 Andresen, M.A. & Boyd, N. (2010) A cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis of Vancouver's supervised injection facility. Int.J.DrugPolicy 21(1): 70-76. 28 Pinkerton, S.D. (2010) Is Vancouver Canada's supervised injection facility cost-saving? Addiction 105(8): 1429-36. 29 Schatz, E. & Nougier, M. (2012) Drug consumption rooms: evidence and practice. International Drug Policy Consortium Briefing Paper. 30 Hedrich, D. (2004) European report on drug consumption rooms. Report prepared for the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction. 31 Watson, T.M. et al. (2012) Police Perceptions of Supervised Consumption Sites (SCSs): A Qualitative Study. Substance Use & Misuse, 47:364-374. 32 Supreme Court of Canada (2011) Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Comm. Serv. Soc. supra. p. 136 33 Schatz, E. & Nougier, M. (2012) Drug consumption rooms: evidence and practice. International Drug Policy Consortium Briefing Paper. (p.20) 34 Supreme Court of Canada (2011) Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Comm. Serv. Soc. supra (p.188).
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Building a Comprehensive Post-Market Surveillance System : Canadian Medical Association Response to Health Canada’s Discussion Paper “Designing a Mandatory System for Reporting Serious Adverse Reactions”

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1951
Last Reviewed
2012-03-03
Date
2005-07-28
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2012-03-03
Date
2005-07-28
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
Building a Comprehensive Post-Market Surveillance System Canadian Medical Association Response to Health Canada’s Discussion Paper “Designing a Mandatory System for Reporting Serious Adverse Reactions” Submitted to Health Canada July 28, 2005 Overview The CMA believes that all stakeholders should work together to improve adverse drug reaction (ADR) reporting, in the interests of improving patients’ safety and health. However, we believe that activity in pursuit of this end must be based on two fundamental premises: a) Reporting is only one part of a comprehensive post-market surveillance system. In order to effectively monitor the safety of Canada’s drug supply, this system should include: * a simple, comprehensive and user-friendly reporting process; * rigorous analysis of reports to identify significant threats to drug safety; * a communications system that produces useful information, distributed to health care providers and the public in a timely, easily understood manner. There is no point in enacting a mandatory reporting requirement until all of these elements are in place. We wonder why mandatory reporting has been singled out for discussion when a holistic approach to reforming Canada’s drug safety system is called for. b) Health care providers should be encouraged to participate willingly and voluntarily in the reporting process. To be successful, Canada’s post-market surveillance system will depend on the active participation of physicians and other health professionals. Experience with health system quality and safety improvement efforts over the past several years has demonstrated that meaningful acceptance is most effectively obtained when those involved are willing participants. If you build a comprehensive, efficient and effective post-market surveillance system, physicians will participate actively in it. Forcing them to participate before the system has been built will result in alienation, frustration and failure. Comments on Discussion Paper a) Is Mandatory Reporting Necessary? This is a fundamental question and the discussion paper does not satisfactorily address it. There are two reasons why we question the necessity for imposing an ADR reporting requirement on health professionals. First, as awareness of the drug-safety system’s importance has increased, the number of ADR reports has increased along with it - more than 10% in 2004, as the discussion paper notes - without a mandatory reporting requirement. Given this trend, it is highly probable that time, education, adequate resources and increasing familiarity with the surveillance system will raise reporting rates to the desired level (however defined) without mandatory reporting. Second, as the discussion paper points out, there is no evidence that mandatory reporting has been effective in other jurisdictions where it has been implemented. The paper offers no clear explanation for this lack of success. More importantly, it does not indicate how Health Canada plans to ensure that mandatory reporting will succeed in this country when it has proven ineffective elsewhere. A primary principle of any system change is that we should not repeat the mistakes of others. Before launching a program whose success has not been proven, other viable, and possibly more effective, alternatives should be examined. b) Addressing known barriers to reporting The CMA acknowledges that ADRs are under-reported, in Canada and worldwide. The discussion paper identifies a number of barriers to reporting, and its list mirrors the observations and experiences of our own members. We believe most of these barriers can, and should, be overcome. We also agree that it is necessary to raise health professionals’ awareness of the importance of, and process for, ADR reporting. But we question the curious assertion that “Mandatory reporting could raise awareness of the value of reporting simply by virtue of the public debate.” Surely there are more positive ways to raise awareness than publicly speculating about the punitive consequences of non-compliance. We suggest that instead, Health Canada work with physicians and other health professionals to address the existing barriers to reporting. Specifically, we recommend that Health Canada implement: * a well-funded and targeted awareness-raising campaign focused on provider education and positive messaging, * a user-friendly reporting system, including appropriate forms, efficient processes and adequate fees. These measures are within Health Canada’s purview in the existing policy and legislative environment. We believe they would increase reporting without the need for coercive measures. At a minimum, positive system improvements should be tried first before considering a mandatory-reporting requirement. With regard to specific questions posed in the discussion paper: Question 1: Health professionals should be explicitly protected from any liability as a result of reporting an adverse drug reaction. This should be the case regardless of whether reporting is voluntary or mandatory. Question 2: Professionals should be compensated for all meaningful work including the completion of forms and any follow-up required as a result of the information they have provided. We would be happy to expand further on this issue on request. Question 3: Issues of confidentiality should be covered in legislation. The CMA has developed an extensive and authoritative body of knowledge on privacy issues in health care, which we would be pleased to share with Health Canada. c) Improved report quality We agree that increasing the quality and richness of ADR reports is as important as increasing their number. Perhaps it is even more important, since high-quality reports allow for high-quality analysis. Mandatory reporting will not improve the quality of ADR reports; it will simply increase their quantity. It may even compromise the system’s efficiency and effectiveness by increasing the volume of clinically insignificant reports. Experience elsewhere has taught us that true quality cannot be legislated or imposed; any attempt to do so would be pointless. If ADR reports included the information listed in Table 4, this would improve their usefulness and the effectiveness of the overall surveillance process. However, it is unrealistic to expect all reports to contain this level of information. The treating physician may not be able to provide all of it, especially if he or she is not the patient’s regular primary care provider. Some of this information, particularly about outcomes, may not be available at the time of the reporting, and gathering it would require follow-up by Health Canada. Health Canada should consider measures other than mandatory reporting to improve the quality of ADR reports. The CMA suggests that consideration be given to: * Improving follow-up capacity. We agree that it should be made easier for Health Canada officials to contact reporters and request details on follow-up or outcomes. This should be considered as part of a comprehensive initiative to improve Health Canada’s capacity to analyze ADR reports. * Establishing a sentinel system. Another option for increasing high-quality reports would be to establish a “sentinel” group of practicing physicians who would contract to report all ADRs in detail. These physicians, because of their contractual obligation, would be committed to assiduous reporting. Sentinel systems could be established concurrently with efforts to increase voluntary ADR reporting by the broader health professional community. In addition to the current information provided, consideration should be given to including on reporting forms the option to allow Health Canada officials to act on information the physician provides; for example, in the reporting of sexually transmitted diseases physicians provide certain information and have the option to request that public health officials undertake follow-up and contact tracing. d) Minimize administrative burden We agree that Health Canada should give consideration to making the ADR reporting system user-friendly, non-complex and easy to integrate into the patient-care work stream. These reforms can and should be implemented regardless of whether a mandatory requirement is in place. They do not need mandatory reporting to make them work; in fact, they are more likely to encourage ADR reporting than any form of coercive legislation. Rather than making a mandatory reporting requirement “fit” with the traditional patient-care framework, we invite Health Canada to work with us to increase health professionals’ capacity to report ADRs voluntarily. We are already working with Health Canada to improve physicians’ access to drug safety material. Health Canada’s ADR reporting form can now be downloaded from the cma.ca web site, which also posts the latest drug alerts from Health Canada and from the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S. We have developed an on-line course in partnership with Health Canada, to teach physicians when and how to make ADR reports. We hope to build on this collaboration, with the goal of making it possible for physicians to report ADRs online via cma.ca. This will permit them to fit reporting more conveniently into their daily workflow. (Note: the “MedEffects” Web portal now being developed at Health Canada does not fit well into the workflow and therefore will not make reporting easier for health professionals.) In the future, we hope that ADR reporting can be built directly into the Electronic Medical Record (EMR). We think this will be a critical element in the bi-directional communicating that ADR reporting requires. It will also enable rapid integration of advisories into the EMR so that they can be available to physicians at the time they are writing a prescription. Before electronic ADR reporting can work, a standard for electronic data should be in place (at present it is not) and Health Canada should develop the capacity to accept data electronically. Health Canada’s discussion paper makes reference to cost-benefit analysis. We recommend that you take great care not to over-emphasize cost-benefit when it comes to enhancing patient safety. Meaningful improvements in the post-market surveillance system will be costly whatever solution Health Canada eventually embraces, and it is impossible to measure financially the value of safety. What is an acceptable cost for one life saved? e) Minimize Over-Reporting The discussion paper acknowledges that not all adverse reactions need be reported. We strongly agree that one of the dangers of mandatory reporting is its potential to overwhelm the system with an unmanageable flood of reports. There is no reason to require reports of minor side effects that are already known to be associated with given drugs. We agree that the reactions Health Canada most needs to know about are those which are severe and/or unexpected. If Health Canada insists on implementing a mandatory reporting system, it should be limited to these reactions (possibly with the corollary that well known serious ADRs would not need to be reported). However, the operating definitions may need clarification, and we recommend that Health Canada consult with health professionals and others on operational guidelines for defining “serious adverse reaction.” Health Canada’s desire to encourage reports on drugs approved within the last 5 years is understandable (though some drugs may be on the market for longer than this before their true risks are known). In practice, however, many physicians do not know which drugs these are, and seeking out this information may impose a heavy administrative burden. As we move toward an EMR-based reporting system, a tag on the Drug Identification Number to tell when the drug was approved will allow physicians to identify which medications require special vigilance. Appropriate reporting could be encouraged, and over-reporting discouraged, by clear guidelines as to what should be reported as well as appropriate compensation for reporting. f) Match Assessment Capacities In our opinion, this is one of the most important sections in the document. What happens once the reports have been received is crucial if we want to identify a serious drug risk as quickly as possible. Under the current system, one of the most significant barriers to physicians’ reporting is lack of confidence that anything meaningful will be done with their reports. Enhancements to the analysis function must be made concurrently with efforts to increase ADR reporting. ADR reports are only cyber-bytes or stacks of paper unless we can learn from them. This requires rigorous data analysis that can sort “signal from noise” – in other words, sift through thousands of reports, find the ones that indicate unusual events, investigate their cause, and isolate those that indicate a serious public health risk. This requires substantial resources, including an adequate number of staff with the expertise and sensitivity required for this demanding task. Unless Health Canada has this capacity, increasing the number of reports will only add to the backlog in analysts’ in-boxes. The CMA recommends that Health Canada allocate sufficient resources to enable it to effectively analyze and respond to ADR reports and other post-market surveillance information. g) Respect privacy Privacy of both patient and physician information is a significant concern. Physicians’ ethical obligation to maintain patient confidentially is central to the patient-physician relationship and must be protected. We acknowledge that issues of privacy and confidentiality must be resolved when designing an ADR reporting system, particularly as we work toward electronic communication of drug surveillance data and its incorporation into an EMR. For example, regulations should explicitly state that ADR reports are to be used only for the purpose for which they were submitted, i.e. for post-market drug surveillance. In addition, Health Canada should ensure that any privacy provisions it develops meet the legislative test outlined in Section 3.6 of CMA’s Health Information Privacy Code (Attachment I). Health Canada can be assured that physicians take their privacy obligations seriously. The CMA has been a strong and pro-active player in debate on this issue, and our Privacy Code lays the groundwork on which we believe any privacy policies involving ADR reporting should be based. h) Compliance through sanctions Physicians are motivated to report ADRs by their concern for public health and their patients’ well-being. In addition, they are guided by the CMA Code of Ethics and governed by regulatory authorities in every province. A clear ethical and professional obligation already exists to report anything that poses a serious threat to patient safety. If physicians do not comply with this obligation, sanctions are available to the provincial regulatory authorities. In fact, the most serious threat for physicians is loss of standing with the professional regulatory authority, not the courts or any external judicial system. It would be superfluous to add a second level of regulation or scrutiny when remedies already exist. The discussion paper presents few alternatives to the existing self-regulatory system. As the paper itself acknowledges, it is unrealistic to impose sanctions based on failure to report an ADR, since it is not always easy to determine whether an adverse effect is attributable to a health product. But the only suggested alternatives - requiring physicians to demonstrate knowledge, or to have the required reporting forms in their office - seem intrusive, crude and unreasonable; they are also meaningless since they have no direct relation to a physician’s failure to report. If Health Canada is considering a large outlay of taxpayers’ dollars for post-market surveillance, we suggest they target those funds to education and awareness raising, and to enhancing the system’s ability to generate and communicate meaningful signal data, rather than to enforcing a mandatory reporting system based on weak compliance measures, with no evidence of its effectiveness in other jurisdictions. Physicians who are in serious breach of their ethical and legal responsibility to report are subject to sanctions by provincial regulatory authorities. Most provincial colleges have policies or guidelines regarding timely reporting and appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Medicine’s tradition of self-regulation has served it well, and we recommend that Health Canada respect and support existing regulatory authorities as they maintain the standards for appropriate professional behaviour. As we have said before - the preferred quality improvement tools to enhance performance and encourage compliance are education and positive reinforcement, not legislation and the threat of sanctions. Conclusion In its discussion paper Health Canada has invited stakeholders to provide their input on how best to develop a mandatory system for reporting ADRs. The Canadian Medical Association believes that the best way to do this is not to develop one at all. Instead, we believe stakeholders should concentrate on building a sustainable, robust and effective post-market surveillance system which: * encourages and facilitates voluntary reporting, by designing a simple and efficient process that can be incorporated into a physician’s daily workflow; * effectively uses reporting data to identify major public health risks; * communicates drug safety information to providers and the public in a timely, meaningful and practical way. The CMA is committed to working, in partnership with Health Canada and other stakeholders, toward the ultimate goal of a responsive, efficient and effective post-market drug surveillance system. This is part of our long-standing commitment to optimizing Canadians’ safety and health, and achieving our vision of a healthy population and a vibrant medical profession.
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Canada Pension Plan Disability Program : CMA Presentation to the Sub-Committee on the Status of Persons with Disabilities

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1965
Last Reviewed
2010-02-27
Date
2003-03-18
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2010-02-27
Date
2003-03-18
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Text
The Canadian Medical Association appreciates the opportunity to once again participate in the deliberations of the Sub-Committee on the Status of Persons with Disabilities. I am accompanied today by Mr. William Tholl, Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Medical Association. Before I begin my remarks, I want to congratulate this Committee, and particularly the Chair of the Committee, for your efforts in regard to another federal program, the Disability Tax Credit. Your 2002 report on this program, Getting it Right for Canadians, no doubt led to some of the important measures in regard to disabilities undertaken by the government in the recent federal budget. The appointment of the Technical Advisory Committee on eligibility criteria and the $105 million allocated over the next two years to improve assistance for persons with disabilities is, in our view, significant progress. The CMA appreciates this opportunity to discuss issues relating to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) specifically as the program relates to the disability benefit. I will focus my remarks today in three areas: * Physician experience with federal health programs and forms * The need for common criteria * Recommendations for action While the subject matter before the Subcommittee today is the CPP disability program, we believe a broader focus on the issue of “disability” and federal health programs in general is needed. Issues related to the CPP disability program are issues common to other federal disability assistance programs. THE PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCE I don’t think I need to tell this Committee about the alarming shortages of physicians and other health care providers in Canada. Canada’s physicians have been stretched to the limit and beyond. Therefore, it’s more important than ever that physician’s time be managed in such a way as to maximize our interaction with patients. Unfortunately however, this is not the case. Increasingly physicians are spending more and more of their time filling out forms. Forms for federal health programs such as the CPP or for-private insurance claims, pension benefits, tax credit eligibility, pharmaceutical plans and workers compensation claims to name just a few. To figure out all the various forms and determine eligibility you almost need to be a physician, a lawyer and a tax expert. The result of the proliferation in the number of forms and their increasing complexity has resulted in less time for what physicians are trained to do; treating illness and providing care to patients. If you were to ask the average physician his or her greatest frustration with the health system, the response would be too much time spent administrating the system and not enough time in providing care to patients. In regard to the CPP specifically, we have had in the past a good working relationship with the officials who manage this program. We have worked together well in the past in regard to improving the forms and bring great integrity to the program which has resulted in a reduction of appeals under the program. The CMA believes that in terms of a federal health program, the CPP set the template both in terms of administrative processes and cooperation that should be adopted across all federal programs in this area. That said, there is still considerable room for improvement. I urge the Committee to take into consideration the cumulative impact these various health programs, such as the CPP, have on our health provider workforce. We must look at ways in which to relieve the heavy administrative burden so that physicians can concentrate their efforts on what they do best, patient care. COMMON CRITERIA As with our presentation on the Disability Tax Credit program, the CMA recommends that a standard of fairness and equity be applied across all federal disability benefit programs. Currently, there is virtually a different definition and a different assessment process for each and every program. A common frustration of physicians is that while a patient qualifies as “disabled” under one disability program, that same patient does not under another. When you look at some of the common criteria used to determine the level of a disability, the problem is readily apparent. The CPP criteria define “severe” as preventing an applicant from working regularly at any job and “prolonged” as long term or that which may result in death. However, the DTC program notes that “severe” is to be interpreted to mean markedly restricting any of the basic activities of daily living and that a disability must be “prolonged” over a period of at least 12 months. While daily living includes working regularly at any job it encompasses so much more. Under the CPP criteria the physician is responsible for determining how to define long term; six months or twelve months. Other programs, such as the Veterans benefits that have entirely different criteria, are added to this mixture. This is confusing for physicians, patients and others involved in the application process. If the terms, criteria and the information about the programs are not as clear as possible then we have no doubt that faulty interpretation on the part of physicians when completing the forms can occur. This could then inadvertently disadvantage those who, in fact, qualify for benefits. There needs to be some consistency in definitions across the various government programs. This does not mean that eligibility criteria must be identical. However, there must be a way for a more standardized approach. Inconsistency in the application and administration of the program is likely without a more standardized definition of the program. The reality is that certain individuals with conditions or disabilities may qualify for the CPP disability benefit in one region of the country, while in other regions, an individual with the same condition will be deemed ineligible. There are a number of conditions that society would today view as a “disability,” yet may not fit under the current program. Severe and prolonged is a rigid standard, especially as it is applied to some medical conditions. The reality is that such a standard cannot be applied fairly in all situations. There needs to be greater flexibility and more realistic criteria that takes into account the special nature of some medical conditions that may not meet yesterday’s standards. RECOMMENDATIONS Canada’s physicians offer four specific actions for the Committee to consider: 1. That an emphasis be placed on reducing the administrative burden placed on health care providers under all federal health programs. The CPP program, both in terms of the consultative and administration process, should serve as the template for change. Unlike other federal health programs, the cost of having the eligibility form completed by a physician is subsumed under the program itself. The CMA believes this should be the case for all federal health programs. 2. The establishment of a joint governmental and stakeholder advisory group, similar to the recently announced DTC Advisory Committee, to monitor and appraise the performance of the CPP disability program to ensure it meets its stated purpose and objectives. Representation on this advisory group would include senior program officials; health care providers; various disability organizations; and patient advocacy groups. 3. That there be some consistency in definitions across the various government programs. This would not circumvent the purposes or mandates of the programs. 4. That a comprehensive information package be developed for health care providers and the public that provides a description of each program, its eligibility criteria, the full range of benefits available, copies of sample forms, physical assessment and form completion payment information, etc. CONCLUSION To conclude, the CMA believes that the CPP is a deserving benefit to those Canadians living with a disability. We again congratulate the Committee for the progress it has achieved on behalf of people with disabilities in regard to the recent initiatives announced in the federal budget. The CMA looks forward to working with all concerned to improve the CPP program and all other federal disability health programs. Thank You.
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Canadian Medical Association submission on Bill C-462 Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Act.

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy11542
Date
2015-05-22
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2015-05-22
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Text
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) is pleased to present this brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance regarding Bill C-462 Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Act. The Canadian Medical Association represents 78,000 physicians in Canada; its mission is to serve and unite the physicians of Canada and to be the national advocate, in partnership with the people of Canada, for the highest standards of health and health care. The CMA is pleased that the House of Commons has made Bill C-462 a priority. This bill is an important step toward addressing the unintended consequences that have emerged from the Disability Tax Credit since 2005. Part 2: Issues to be addressed In 2005, the Disability Tax Credit was expanded to allow individuals to back-file for up to 10 years. While this was a welcome tax measure for individuals with disabilities, the CMA has been urging the Canada Revenue Agency to address the numerous unintended consequences that have emerged. Central among these has been the emergence of a “cottage industry” of third-party companies engaged in a number of over-reaching tactics. The practices of these companies have included aggressive promotional activities to seek and encourage individuals to file the Disability Tax Credit. The primary driver behind these tactics is profit; some companies are charging fees of up to 40 per cent of an individual’s refund when the tax credit is approved. Further to targeting a vulnerable population, these activities have yielded an increase in the quantity of Disability Tax Credit forms in physician offices and contributed to red tape in the health sector. In some cases, third parties have placed physicians in an adversarial position with their patients. We are pleased that this bill attempts to address the concerns we have raised. The CMA supports Bill C-462 as a necessary measure to address the issues that have emerged since the changes to the Disability Tax Credit in 2005. However, to avoid additional unintended consequences, the CMA recommends that the Finance Committee address three issues prior to advancing Bill C-462. First, as currently written, Bill C-462 proposes to apply the same requirements to physicians as to third-party companies if physicians apply a fee for form completion, a typical practice for uninsured physician services. Such fees are subject to guidelines and oversight by provincial and territorial medical regulatory colleges (see Appendix 1: CMA Policy on Third Party Forms: The Physician Role). The CMA recommends that the Finance Committee: Amend the definition of “promoters” under section 2 to exclude “a health care practitioner duly licensed under the applicable regulatory authority who provides health care and treatment.” . If the committee imports the term “person” from the Income Tax Act, then the applicable section of Bill C-462 should be amended to specify that, for the purposes of the act, “Person does not include a health care practitioner duly licensed under the applicable regulatory authority who provides health care and treatment.” Second, the CMA is concerned that one of the reasons individuals may be engaging the services of third-party companies is a lack of awareness of the purpose and benefits of the Disability Tax Credit. Additional efforts are required to ensure that the Disability Tax Credit form (Form T2201) be more informative and user-friendly for patients. Form T2201 should explain more clearly to patients the reason behind the tax credit, and explicitly indicate there is no need to use third-party companies to submit the claim to the CRA. The CMA recommends that the Finance Committee: . Recommend that the Canada Revenue Agency undertake additional efforts to ensure that the Disability Tax Credit form is more informative, accessible and user-friendly for patients. Finally, the CMA recommends that a privacy assessment be undertaken before the bill moves forward in the legislative process. It appears that, as written, Bill C-462 would authorize the inter-departmental sharing of personal information. The CMA raises this issue for consideration because protecting the privacy of patient information is a key duty of a physician under the CMA Code of Ethics. Part 3: Closing The CMA encourages the Finance Committee to address these issues to ensure that Bill C-462 resolves existing problems with the Disability Tax Credit while not introducing new ones. The CMA appreciates the opportunity to provide input to the Finance Committee’s study of this bill and, with the amendments outlined herein, supports its passage. Summary of Recommendations Recommendation 1 The definition of “promoters” under section 2 of Bill C-462 should be amended to exclude “a health care practitioner duly licensed under the applicable regulatory authority who provides health care and treatment.” Recommendation 2 If the Committee imports the definition of “persons” from the Income Tax Act, the applicable section of Bill C-462 should be amended to specify that, for the purposes of the act, “Person does not include a health care practitioner duly licensed under the applicable regulatory authority who provides health care and treatment.” Recommendation 3 The Canada Revenue Agency should undertake additional efforts to ensure that the Disability Tax Credit form is informative, accessible and user-friendly. Recommendation 4 Prior to advancing in the legislative process, Bill C-462 should undergo a privacy assessment.
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CMA & CNA Letter on the Future Mandate of the Health Care Innovation Working Group (the Council of the Federation)

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy11477
Date
2015-01-22
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health systems, system funding and performance
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2015-01-22
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
Re: Future Mandate of the Health Care Innovation Working Group (the Council of the Federation) Dear Premiers: On behalf of the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) and the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), I am writing in advance of the meeting of the Council of the Federation later this month regarding the future mandate of the Health Care Innovation Working Group with respect to seniors care. The CNA and CMA welcomed the Council of the Federation's prioritization of seniors care as an area of focus of the Health Care Innovation Working Group. Already, seniors and their families in communities across Canada face significant challenges accessing social supports and health services. These challenges will only intensify as the demographic shift progresses. Based on current trends and approaches, the proportion of provincial/territorial health spending associated with seniors care is forecast to grow by over 15% to almost 62% of health budgets by 2036. Recognizing the significant pressure this will present for health care systems and provincial/territorial budgets moving forward, it is critical that the Council of the Federation maintain its prioritization of seniors care and meeting the needs of an aging population. As such, we respectfully encourage you in your capacity as Co-Chairs of the Health Care Innovation Working Group to ensure the future mandate of the working group on seniors care be included as part of the agenda at the January 30, 2015 meeting of the Council of the Federation. The CNA and CMA are actively engaged on this issue and welcome the opportunity to meet with each of you to discuss how we may collaborate to ensure improved health outcomes for seniors, now and in the future. Sincerely, Christopher S. Simpson, MD, FRCPC, FACC, FHRS CMA President Karima Velji, RN, PhD, CHE CNA President
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CMA’s Annual Check-up of Canada’s Health Care System: Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance Pre-Budget Consultations

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1953
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2003-09-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
  2 documents  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2003-09-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
The past year has been an historic one for health and health care in Canada. We applaud the federal government for the reinvestments that were made at the time of the February 2003 Health Accord. However, what we as physicians continue to hear in our offices, clinics and hospitals right across the country is continuing concern from our patients that Canada’s health care system won’t be there for them when they need it. And so while we can understand government’s desire to “turn the page” on health care issues, the temptation must be resisted. It is appropriate and prudent that at least once a year, the federal government take the pulse of the health care system – an annual check-up – to take stock of where we’ve been and identify priorities for the coming year. This year, the Canadian Medical Association’s (CMA’s) submission to the Standing Committee on Finance moves largely away from macro funding issues to focus in on strategic initiatives that are national in scope and promise high returns in terms of value for money. Specifically, we identify three areas that require immediate new investments while reminding committee members of work that remains unfinished from years past. Unfinished Business While the CMA applauds the federal government for its leadership in achieving the 2003 Health Accord, it is now time to follow through on some outstanding promises that were made. In particular, there are two areas that require special mention. At the time of the First Ministers’ Health Accord in February 2003, the federal government agreed to provide up to an additional $2 billion into Canada’s health care system at the end of this fiscal year (2003/04) if a sufficient surplus above the normal Contingency Reserve were available. The federal government must honour their commitment. Health cannot be treated as a residual after other contingencies are addressed. Equally important is moving forward with establishing the Canada Health Council. Suggestions to water down the mandate of the health council to make it more palatable to some jurisdictions are not the answer. Canada needs a robust mechanism that will provide for enhanced evidence and accountability on how Canada’s health care dollars are spent. Canada needs a Health Council that will create a meaningful place at the table for Canadians, health care providers and other stakeholders to provide input on how the system operates and monitor its performance. Protecting Public Health The public health system in Canada lies at the very heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of our population. It is the view of the CMA that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to emerging crises. On June 25, 2003, the CMA submitted a brief to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health headed by Dr. David Naylor. In it the CMA called upon the federal government to make a minimum investment of $1.5 billion over five years to achieve legislative reform; capacity enhancement; and enhanced research, surveillance and communications capacities. In particular, the CMA calls for immediate funding of two specific priorities. The first is the same proposal that the CMA brought to the Standing Committee on Finance last year – the REAL (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative. The purpose of this initiative is to increase the capacity of the public health system to communicate in real time, between multiple agencies and with health care providers. Had CMA’s earlier recommendations been acted upon, perhaps we would have been better prepared to communicate with health care providers when SARS first appeared in Toronto. Improved communications must be a priority this time around – we cannot afford to let this recommendation languish another year. The second short-term priority for public health is to invest in an emergency supply chain for use in times of crisis. SARS showed us that the Greater Toronto Area, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and maintain its capacity to meet other acute care requirements or important public health services such as suicide prevention programs. The federal government must assure Canadians that plans are in place when the health care system is again tested with another public health emergency. Ensuring Adequate Supply, Distribution and Mix of Canada’s Health Human Resources Health is primarily a people business. Of all of the critical issues facing Canada’s health care system, none is more urgent than the shortages of health providers. Simply put, if people are not available to provide care and treatment to patients everything else is irrelevant. While we were encouraged with the $90 million provided in the 2003-04 to “improve national health human resources planning and co-ordination, including better forecasting of health human resources needs”, details of how these funds will be allocated and for what purposes remain unclear. The CMA has proposals on how this money could be used to support much needed health human resource planning that are ready to be pulled off the shelf and implemented. For example, the CMA believes that an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) should be established to address the human side of health, just as existing institutes address the technological (CCOHTA) and information aspects of health (CIHI). Addressing the Health Status of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples Particularly alarming is the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples where, despite some improvements over the past few decades, Canada has been largely unable to adequately address the health issues facing this community. At CMA’s annual general meeting in August 2003, Health Minister Anne McLellan noted that despite significant investment Canada’s aboriginal people continue to have poor health outcomes. The CMA recommends that the federal government adopt a comprehensive review to look at how the money being spent on health, health care and related areas of investment for Aboriginal people can result in better health outcomes. The current results are not good enough. We must do better. Conclusion For those involved in the health care community, and indeed for all Canadians, this has truly been a remarkable year for Canada in terms of health and health policy. In many ways, the events of February marked a turn toward significant reinvestment in the health care system. However, with the outbreak of SARS in Ontario and the emergence of other significant public health concerns such as West Nile virus, health continued to be a top-of-mind concern for many Canadians. We also know that despite investments made in the 2003 federal budget, there continue to be areas for targeted, strategic initiatives that promise high payoff in terms of value for money. Public health, health human resources and the health status of Canada’s aboriginal people are the three areas that we have highlighted where additional attention and funding can make a real impact at the national level. When considering these investments, however, we must remember that we cannot afford to rob Peter to pay Paul. Both the public health and the acute care systems must simultaneously benefit from increased investment in order not to download one problem onto the other. To return to the analogy of an annual health check-up, let us conclude with this prognosis. Many actions taken in the past year should help over time address the acute symptoms of the patient. However, we must not be complacent. Long term health requires follow-through on last year’s initiatives, targeted new investments and ongoing vigilance. We look forward to the year ahead. INTRODUCTION When historians look back on 2003, they may very well call it the year of health. Since the Canadian Medical Association’s (CMA’s) presentation to the Standing Committee on Finance on October 22, 2002, several key events have highlighted health and health care issues in the minds of Canadians. Senator Michael Kirby and the Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology kicked off the year by releasing its final report of the review of the federal health care system in October 2002. This report was followed closely by the release of the final report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (the Romanow Commission) in November. In February 2003, Canada’s First Ministers agreed to their second Health Accord in just over two years. February also brought the federal government’s 2003 federal budget, which featured health as a key element. Emerging threats to the health of Canadians such as SARS and West Nile virus, coupled with ongoing concern that the health care system is not meeting patient needs in a timely way, clearly illustrate the prominence health care has played as an issue over the past year. Indeed, Canadians continue to show unwavering interest in health and the health care system. According to an EKOS Poll, Private Voices, Public Choices, health care was consistently identified as Canadians’ highest priority for the federal government as compared to other significant public policy issues (debt, level of taxation and unemployment) between August 1995 and January 2002.i Despite ongoing consensus on the need to make progress in the area of health, polling done for the CMA by Ipsos Reid found that the public remains unsatisfied with the federal government’s response to the health issue. In the CMA’s recently released Third Annual National Report Card on Health Care, 64% of respondents gave the federal government either a “C” or “F” rating in their performance in dealing with health care in Canada.ii Notwithstanding, the CMA acknowledges that the flurry of activity and the amount of public attention that health and health care has garnered over the past year can lead to policy fatigue. However, practitioners working in the health care system continue to see the concern of Canadians about being able to access health care services when and where they need them. Add to that their heightened sense of vulnerability in the face of new infectious diseases and ongoing reports about the poor state of our public heath care infrastructure, and anxiety regarding health and the health care system over the past year has become almost palpable. Health care is also a huge sector of our economy. At over $112 billion dollars,iii Canada’s health care system represents 9.7% of our Gross Domestic Productiv. At the federal level, major transfers to other levels of government (a large proportion of which goes to support health care in the provinces and territories) represents almost a quarter (22%) of total program spending by the federal government.v And so, while the physicians of Canada can understand the desire to “turn the page” on health care issues, the temptation must be resisted. It is appropriate and prudent that at least once a year, the federal government take the pulse of the health care system – an annual check-up if you like – to take stock of where we’ve been and identify priorities for the coming year. The CMA recognizes that great strides were made last year in terms of reinvestment in Canada’s health care system. As such, this submission to the Standing Committee on Finance will move largely away from macro funding issues to focus in on targeted, initiatives that are national in scope and promise high returns in terms of value for money. Specifically, we have identified three areas that require immediate new investment. 1. Protecting public health; 2. Ensuring adequate supply, distribution and mix of Canada’s health human resources; and 3. Addressing the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. Will any of these initiatives alone improve the overall health of Canadians and increase their access to health care? The answer is no. But by improving the public health infrastructure; ensuring better supply of health human resources; and addressing the particularly urgent health care needs of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, the proposed initiatives represent significant steps that can be taken toward eliminating many of the access issues that are top of mind concerns for so many Canadians. However, before discussing these priorities for new investment, there are a couple of areas of unfinished business that need to be brought to the attention of members of the Standing Committee. Unfinished Business – delivering on the health accord promise Federal Reinvestments in Health Care Financing In February 2003, the federal government announced new funding of $24.9 billion over 5 years1 for the provinces and territories. This was a significant investment and we applaud the federal government for making health a priority, while noting that a gap persists between the reinvestments made and the CMA’s recommendations for new funding to shore up Canada’s core health care system. (Appendix A provides further details of this gap in funding). At the time of the First Ministers’ Health Accord in February 2003, the federal government agreed to provide up to an additional $2 billion into Canada’s health care system at the end of this fiscal year (2003/04) if a sufficient surplus above the normal Contingency Reserve were available.vi Over the past summer however reports in the media have suggested that this money may not be forthcoming, a concern that has impacted negatively on the federal/provincial/territorial (F/P/T) relationship and created a barrier for advancing the business of health care reform. It is exactly this unpredictability that fosters provincial/territorial distrust of the federal government’s role in health care. While the CMA firmly believes that the federal government has a critical role to play in supporting health care across the country, it must fulfil this role in a manner that reassures provinces and territories that promises made are promises kept. This must be the modus operandi of federal health investments. Let us state in the strongest words possible that the CMA and Canada’s physicians expect the Government of Canada to ensure its fiscal house is in order so that this commitment can be fulfilled. Canada’s health care system must not be treated as a residual after other contingencies are addressed. Canada Health Transfer The CMA was pleased to see the 2003 budget announce the creation of a separate Canada Health Transfer effective April 1, 2004. It is the CMA’s view that this measure is a significant step toward greater accountability and transparency of funds and we applaud the federal government for this bold initiative. However, in creating the Canada Health Transfer the government has neglected to build-in the key feature of how to ensure the ongoing sustainability of federal support for health care in the provinces and the territories. Without a built-in escalator, claims by the federal government that its investments have introduced sustainability into the system ring hollow. As it stands now, the Canada Health Transfer does not provide for increases in funding to grow in step with increases in health care expenditures or our ability to pay as a country. In the longer term this will result in a return to the imbalance between federal funding of provincial and territorial health expenditures. The CMA reiterates its recommendation made last year to the Standing Committee on Finance and to the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, that a built-in escalator tied to increases in GDP is a fundamental component of the Canada Health Transfer. Canada Health Council One of the biggest piece of unfinished business arising from the February 2003 Health Accord is the continued lack of progress in the area of the Canada Health Council. Canadians are demanding greater accountability for their health care system. Canadians are also fed-up with inter-jurisdictional bickering on health care financing. A Council would provide a forum to allow for non-political assessment of health care issues divorced from the political wrangling that has defined health care in Canada for more than a decade. It would also enhance F/P/T accountability on how health care dollars in Canada are being spent in order to ensure that Canada’s health care dollars are being used wisely. In February, governments promised Canadians that the Health Council would be set up in May. Throughout the summer of 2003, federal government officials indicated that it would be just a matter of time. Most recently, at their Annual Conference on September 4, 2003, F/P/T Ministers of Health agreed to take another seven weeks to “expedite work on the Health Council”.vii Prior to that meeting, the CMA challenged Health Ministers to ratify an implementation plan for a Canada Health Council that would have a council in place no later than November 28, 2003, one year after the release of the final report of the Romanow Commission.viii Suggestions to water down the mandate of the Health Council to make it more palatable to some jurisdictions are not the answer. Canada needs a robust mechanism that will provide for enhanced evidence and accountability on how Canada’s health care dollars are spent. Canadians need an independent, empowered Council. Senator Kirby said it when he called for a National Health Care Council.ix Commissioner Romanow said it when he recommended a Health Council of Canada.x Canadians are demanding greater accountability. Enough is enough. Get on with it. Health Research Another area for continued reinvestment is health research. In our submission to the Romanow Commission, the CMA called for federal government support of health research equal to at least 1% of national health expenditures. For 2002 this would equal approximately $1.1 billion. Actual budgeted expenditure by the federal government for the Canadian Institutes of Health Research for 2002/03 was only $727.2 million.xi Canada must move beyond viewing health care expenditures as a drain on government budgets and start treating them the same as in any other sector – investments. Today’s research provides tomorrow’s treatments. For example, the benefits of increased investment in research extend far beyond the scientist’s lab. Rather, the return on investment is potentially many times the initial investment through increased trade potential, increased innovation and increased productivity. For this reason, the CMA supports, in principle, that idea proposed by Dr. Henry Friesen for the creation of a Health Innovation Council to encourage greater innovation and investment in Canada’s health care system. Key Recommendations Keep your word. Direct the Minister of Finance to honour his promise to put $2 billion back into Canada’s health care system in this fiscal year. Introduce a built-in escalator into the Canada Health Transfer to ensure the federal contribution to the health system keeps pace and remains sustainable. Enough is enough! Establish the Canada Health Council. Identify support for health research equal to at least 1% of national health expenditures. Protecting public health The public health system in Canada lies at the very heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of our population. It includes the systematic response to infectious disease, but also much more. It ensures access to clean drinking water, good sanitation and the control of pests and other disease vectors. It provides immunization clinics, and programs promoting healthy lifestyles as well as being there to protect Canadians when they face a public health crisis like SARS. Our public health system is the first — and often only — line of defence against emerging and ongoing infectious and noninfectious threats to the health of Canadians. But we are only as strong as the weakest link in the emergency response chain of survival. Most health threats know no boundaries, so our public health armaments must be in a constant state of “battle readiness.” It is the view of the CMA that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to emerging crises. At no time was this more apparent than following the tragic events of September 2001. As a result, the CMA dedicated our 2001 submission to the Standing Committee on Finance to issues related to emergency preparedness in terms of security, health and capacity. In light of SARS and other public health threats those recommendations continue to ring true today.xii It is our contention that had these actions been taken, Canada would have been better prepared to face the recent public health challenges. Unfortunately, the opposite road was taken. Rather than making reinvestments in public health, the federal government has scheduled declines in departmental spending in this area. In fact, according to Government of Canada estimates, by 2005/06 public health expenditures are planned to decrease in current dollars to their lowest level in over a decade (Chart 1). And while we were encouraged by recent investments made in the health care system, we question the lack of investment and forecast reductions in funding for public health. We cannot continue to rob Peter to pay Paul. Both the public health and acute care systems require ongoing investments and attention. On June 25, 2003, the CMA submitted a brief to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health headed by Dr. David Naylor. In it we identified the need to establish a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies. We also highlighted the need to enhance the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country. To achieve this, we call on the federal government to make a minimum investment of $1.5 billion over five years to achieve legislative reform; capacity enhancement; and enhanced research, surveillance and communications capacities. (For additional detail, please refer to CMA’s submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, June 2003.xiii A copy of our recommendations and associated costs are attached as Appendix B.) While significant, this level of funding represents only a small investment relative to the massive potential cost of, for example, another SARS crisis. $1.5 billion over five years should be treated as the minimum that could be allocated to these initiatives in order to operationalize each of the recommendations. Estimates do not include existing expenditures on public health that would be reallocated within the public health system. While all of our recommendations for the public health care system are important, there are two components that the CMA believes need immediate action by the federal government. The first refers to the particular urgency to improve communications between health professionals and address immediate shortages in supplies and equipment. Last year we came to the Standing Committee on Finance with a proposal for the REAL (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative. The purpose of this plan was to increase the capacity of the public health system to communicate in real time, between multiple agencies and with health care providers. (A copy of the REAL proposal is attached as Appendix C.) This followed the call in our 2001 submission for increased communications between public health officials, police, fire and ambulance services, hospitals and other services.xiv The effectiveness of the public health system depends, largely, on its capacity to disseminate authoritative information in a timely way. Information is key to be able to respond to patient needs effectively during times of emergency. Information in real time is also essential for effective day-to-day health care to provide, for example, information on adverse drug reactions. Had the CMA’s 2001 and 2002 recommendations been acted upon, perhaps we would have been better prepared to communicate with health care providers when SARS first appeared in Toronto. As it was, the CMA mobilized its own communication networks to provide physicians with the critical information that they needed to manage SARS. And while this worked to get the word out in a pinch – it also underlined the fact that Canada does not have information systems in place to facilitate real-time communication with health professionals. How many SARS-type events must we have? This must be a priority. With a one-time infusion of $100 million, and an additional $2 million a year, the REAL proposal would provide the technical capacity to communicate with front-line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. We cannot afford to let this recommendation languish another year. The second short-term priority for public health is to invest in emergency supply chain for use in times of crisis. SARS showed us that the Greater Toronto Area, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and maintain its capacity to meet other acute care requirements or important public health services such as suicide prevention programs. Most hospitals work on a just-in-time inventory basis for the purchase of drugs. Without some sort of plan to quickly re-supply their pharmacies and expand their capacity, patient care suffers. Emergency bed space is also lacking. The federal government must assure Canadians that plans are in place when the health care system is again tested with another public health emergency. That is where the federal government can ensure the health system’s readiness and reassure Canadians that help will be there when they need it. (Additional information is provided in Appendix D.) Key Recommendation Immediately allocate $1.5 billion over 5 years to reinforce Canada’s public health care system in order to respond to public health threats and acute events, such as SARS starting with a Rapid Effective Accessible Linked (REAL) Health Communications and Co-ordination Initiative; and an emergency medical supplies and equipment supply chain. Health human resources Health is primarily a people business. Of all of the critical issues facing Canada’s health care system, none is more urgent than the shortages of health providers. Bluntly put, if the people are not available to provide care and treatment to patients everything else is irrelevant. The CMA has been encouraged by significant movement toward the implementation of the 1999 Canadian Medical Forum recommendations calling for an increase in undergraduate medical training positions and the subsequent 30% increase in the number of first-year, first-time medical students. Despite these efforts, there continues to be growing concern over the shortage of physicians. Statistics Canada figures suggest that the number of Canadians who do not have a family physician is greater than three million. Indeed, in order for Canada to meet the OECD average with respect to physician numbers, Canada must increase the number of physicians by an alarming 38%. Given that Canada continues to average a net loss of approximately 200 physicians per year due to emigration, action must come without delay to address this growing concern. Similarly, research published last year by CNA predicts that Canada will have a shortage of 78,000 registered nurses by 2011 and up to 113,000 by 2016.xv While we were encouraged with the $90 million provided in the 2003-04 to “improve national health human resources planning and co-ordination, including better forecasting of health human resources needs”xvi, details of how these funds will be allocated and for what purposes remain unclear. Indeed, it appears to be somewhat of a shell game with various federal departments vying for funding but no one department coming forward to provide leadership with clear proposals. The CMA has proposals on how this money could be used to support much needed health human resource planning that are ready to be pulled off the shelf and implemented. For example, the CMA believes that an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) should be established to address the human side of health, just as existing institutes address the technological (CCOHTA) and information aspects of health (CIHI). It would be a virtual institute, in the same sense as the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR). The Institute should promote collaboration and the sharing of research among the well-known university-based centres of excellence (e.g., MCHP and CHSPR) as well as research communities within professional associations and governments. It would enable and focus on needs-based long-term planning. HIHuR would have the ability to embark upon large scale research studies such as needs-based planning that is beyond the purview or financial ability of any single jurisdiction. Standard methodologies could be established for data collection and analysis to estimate health human resource requirements based on the disease-specific health needs and demands of the population (e.g., Aboriginal peoples, the elderly, etc.). The institute would work in close collaboration with primary data providers such as Statistics Canada and CIHI. It would complement the work of the new Canada Health Council. Possible deliverables of the model could include such cross-disciplinary issues as measuring effective supply, functional specialization, regulatory restrictions, and assessing new and existing models of delivery. The institute could build on and maintain the initiatives of the various health sector studies. The institute would advise on medium and long-term research agendas that could be adopted and implemented by such funding bodies as CHSRF and CIHR. The CMA recommends that base funding be provided by the federal government (with other members also financially supporting the HIHuR) and that the annual budget for the institute be $2.5 million with an initial institute development grant from the federal government of $1 million. (Further details of the HIHuR funding proposal are attached in Appendix E). High tuition fees also have the potential to have a serious, negative impact on the supply, mix and distribution of health human resources. The CMA is very concerned that high tuition fees in undergraduate programs in medicine are creating barriers to access to a medical education and threatening the diversity of future physicians who later serve the needs of Canadians. High tuition fees have made a medical education unaffordable to many Canadians and may create an imbalance in admissions to medical school by favouring those who represent the affluent segment of society and not the variety of groups reflected in the Canadian population. High student debt loads, as a consequence of high tuition fees and insufficient financial support, can also influence students’ decisions about practice specialty and practice location. Ultimately, these factors could threaten the availability of services provided to Canadians, particularly in rural and remote communities. For these reasons, the CMA is an active participant on the National Professional Association Coalition on Tuition (NPACT) and supports its recommendations concerning professional tuition and access to post-secondary education. Key Recommendation Instruct federal departments to work together on key health human resource initiatives and fund a new Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR). Health status of Aboriginal peoples Throughout the 1980s, Canada either just maintained or lost ground in the international rankings on key health indicators with other leading industrialized countries. In 1990, Canada ranked fifth on the United Nations Human Development Index measuring average achievement on three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life; knowledge; and a decent standard of living. In 1991, Canada moved to second place behind Japan and in 1992 Canada topped the list. In 2001, however, Canada dropped back to third place as a result of new figures for life expectancy and educational enrolment.xvii Since the 1980s, Canada has continued to improve in key indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. However, other industrialized countries have also made improvements either equalling and in many cases, quite dramatically surpassing gains made in Canada. As a result, Canada’s ranking has either stayed the same or dropped. For example, although Canada’s infant mortality rate dropped by 22% between 1990 and 1999, its rank dropped from 5th to 17th among the 31 industrialized countries included in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Similarly, Canada’s ranking for life expectancy at birth decreased over the same period from 3rd to 5th. (Additional information on how Canada compares to other countries in terms of health status indicators is attached as Appendix F.) Particularly alarming is the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples where, despite some improvements over the past few decades, Canada has been largely unable to adequately address the health issues facing this community. The facts speak for themselves: * The incidence and prevalence of chronic and degenerative diseases (diabetes, cardiovascular disease, cancer and arthritis) is higher among Aboriginal Canadians than for the rest of the population (e.g., the rate of Type II diabetes among First Nations is three to five times that of Canadians in general and is considered a growing problem); * Certain infectious diseases are more prevalent among Aboriginal Canadians (e.g., the incidence of hepatitis and tuberculosis are five and ten times higher, respectively, than for other Canadians); and * Manifestations of mental health problems such as violence, suicide and sexual abuse are widespread (e.g., the rate of death from suicide is four times higher among the Inuit than Canadians in general.) These problems are compounded by the remoteness of many Aboriginal communities, which makes access to health services and infrastructure costly and difficult. Other issues include the distinct health needs of different Aboriginal communities (First Nations, Metis, Inuit and urban Natives) and jurisdictional problems such as the separation of health and social services and conflicting or overlapping F/P/T areas of responsibility. As well, it is broadly accepted that the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples is a result of a broad range of factors and is unlikely to be improved significantly by merely increasing the quantity of health services. Instead, inequities within a wide range of social and economic factors must also be addressed, for example: income and education; environmental hazards, water quality, housing quality and infrastructure; and maintenance of cultural identity. At CMA’s annual general meeting in August 2003, Health Minister Anne McLellan noted that despite significant investment Canada’s aboriginal people continue to have poor health outcomes. Simply put, these results are unacceptable. The CMA recommends that the federal government adopt a comprehensive review to look at how the money being spent on health, health care and related areas of investment for Aboriginal people can result in better health outcomes. The current results are not good enough. We must do better. Key Recommendation The federal government should adopt a comprehensive review to look at how the money being spent on health, health care and related areas of investment can result in better health outcomes. CONCLUSION For those involved in the health care community, and indeed for all Canadians, this has truly been a remarkable year for Canada in terms of health and health policy. In many ways, the events of February marked a turn toward significant reinvestment in the health care system. However, with the outbreak of SARS in Ontario and the emergence of other significant public health concerns such as West Nile virus, health continued to be a top-of-mind concern for many Canadians. We also know that despite investments made in the 2003 federal budget, there continue to be areas for targeted, strategic initiatives that promise high payoff in terms of value for money. Public health, health human resources and the health status of Canada’s aboriginal people are the three areas that we have highlighted where additional attention and funding can make a real impact at the national level. When considering these investments, however, we must remember that we cannot afford to rob Peter to pay Paul. Both the public health and the acute care systems must simultaneously benefit from increased investment in order not to download one problem onto the other. Finally, promises made must be promises kept. The federal government must ensure that the fiscal environment is such so that it can fulfill its commitment to provide an additional $2 billion in this fiscal year. As well, the CMA intends to hold the federal government and the provinces and territories to their promise to implement a Canada Health Council. Governments must open the political black box of health decision making and let others in. To exclude physicians and other health stakeholders would seriously undermine the Health Council and deprive it of the benefits of first-hand insight into how care is actually delivered. Governments must take advantage of this opportunity to introduce a mechanism that will provide evidence to Canadians that they are getting a good return on their investment in health care. To return to the analogy of an annual health check-up, let us conclude with this prognosis. Many actions taken in the past year should help over time address the acute symptoms of the patient. However, we must not be complacent. Long term health requires follow through on last year’s initiatives, targeted new investments and ongoing vigilance. We look forward to the year ahead. Appendix A: Federal Reinvestments in Health Care Financing In the January 2003 document, From Debate to Actionxviii, the Canadian Medical Association challenged Canada’s First Ministers to put the health of Canadians first. With respect to health care financing, we underlined the need for a financial commitment to health care that is adequate, stable, predictable, transparent and sustainable. In February 2003, the federal government announced new funding to the provinces and territories of $24.9 billion over 5 years.2 The CMA and others suggested that these reinvestments were good but insufficient to address the challenges facing Canada’s health care system.xix Specifically, we had called for a minimum commitment by the federal government to “fund 50% of the core health care system with at least half of the federal government’s contribution in cash”.xx. (Core defined to include non-targeted and targeted investments in infrastructure such as health human resources, information technology, capital infrastructure, and rural and remote access.) Altogether, we called for a minimum cash investment of $31.5 billion over 5 years to renew the health care system. [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Gap Between 2003 Health Accord and CMA Recommended Re-Investments in Canada’s Health Care System ($ billions) 2003?2004 2004?2005 2005?2006 2006?07 2007?2008 Total Core Funding 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.9 $21.3 Targeted Core 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 $2.5 Targeted New Programs 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 $7.7 Total 4.0 5.5 7.0 7.3 7.7 $31.5 Federal Reinvestments 4.8 3.3 4.9 5.2 6.7 $24.9 Remaining Gap in Funding (0.8) 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.0 $ 6.7 [TABLE END] There remains a significant gap of almost $ 7 billion over 5 years between our estimate of the minimum requirement needed for the renewal of the health care system and the new resources dedicated by the federal government. In light of this, the CMA calls upon the federal government to finish its unfinished business and allocate an additional $7 billion over 5 years in its next budget for the Canada Health Transfer to shore up Canada’s health care system. Appendix B: Recommendations to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health Legislative reform ($20 million / 5 years*) 1. The enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. 2. The creation of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. 3. The appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada; to head the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control; and to work with provinces and territories to develop and implement a pan-Canadian public health action plan. Capacity enhancement ( $1.2 billion / 5 years*) 4. The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. 5. The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. 6. Tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures and capacity (both physical and human resources) by the Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada, on behalf of the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. 7. Federal government funding in the amount of $1 Billion over 5 years to build adequate and consistent surge capacity across Canada and improve co-ordination among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal authorities to fulfill essential public health functions. Research, surveillance and communications ($310 million / 5 years*) 8. An immediate, sequestered grant of $200 million over 5 years to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to initiate an enhanced conjoint program of research with the Institute of Population and Public Health and the Institute of Infection and Immunity that will expand capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. 9. The mandatory reporting by provinces and territories of identified infectious diseases to the newly established Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to enable appropriate communications, analyses and intervention. 10. The one-time infusion of $100 million, with an additional $2 million a year, for a “REAL” (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative to improve technical capacity to communicate with front line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. Appendix B: Estimated Cost of Implementing the Recommendations [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] RECOMMENDATION ESTIMATED COST OVER 5 YEARS Legislative and Institutional Reform 1. Canada Emergency Health Measures Act N/A 2. Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) ? $20 million 3. Chief Public Health Officer of Canada Capacity Enhancement 4. Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health $100 million 5. Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service $35 million 6. Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada $35 milliona 7. Surge capacity $1 billionb Research, surveillance and communications 8. Canadian Institutes of Health Research $200 millionc 9. Mandatory reporting Included under 2 and 3 above 10. Enhanced communications $110 million TOTAL $1.5 billion [TABLE END] a. Work is currently underway to break out public health from the current category of “public health and administration.” b. This is an incremental investment in addition to funding currently available under Health Canada’s Health Promotion and Prevention Strategic Outcome area. c. Funding must be sequestered specifically for new initiatives related to public health. Additional money could also be acquired through funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, which received an additional $500 million in 2002–2003 (announced in the 2003 federal budget) to enhance the Foundation’s support of public health infrastructure. Appendix C: REAL (Rapid, Effective, Accessible , Linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative The effectiveness of the public health system is dependent, in large part, on its capacity to communicate authoritative information in a timely way. A two-way flow of information between experts and the practising community is necessary at all times. It becomes essential during emergency situations. Information, including health advice and alerts, needs to move out to front line health care providers from public health bodies. Information, such as data for surveillance and analysis purposes, needs to move in from these front line providers to the public health authorities. To detect new emerging diseases or health threats and effectively care for their patients, front-line health professionals must have accurate and timely information. Conversely public health specialists depend on information coming in from the front lines to track disease and institute appropriate public health interventions. Despite the tremendous developments in information management, there has been scant attention paid to this issue within public health. The SARS outbreak highlighted various weaknesses in our current communication capacity. Gaps in the basic IT infrastructure prevented public health agencies and acute care institutions from communicating with each other in real-time. There are a number of anecdotal reports of public health units stationing personnel inside hospitals to retrieve information and then telephone it into their units. Case investigators used paper-based files to manage the hundreds of cases reported to public health units, and to investigate and follow up of thousands of contacts. Identification of clusters and links between cases literally depended upon pencil and paper and brainpower. Toronto Public Health did create a database for its SARS cases and could send it electronically to the province. However the province had a different database which raised concerns about the transfer of data files from one system to another. The deficiency in IT capacity hindered exchanges between public health staff, private clinicians and other sources of information. The potential for a disconnect in communications between different jurisdictions (international, national, provincial/territorial, municipal) and sectors (environment, health, transportation) that are affected by a health emergency is a further challenge to the public health system. The importance of communicating essential health advice and public health management protocols to front line practitioners and institutions cannot be overstated. During the SARS experience it became evident that government did not have information systems in place to communicate rapidly with physicians across the country. In response to requests from Health Canada the CMA was able to mobilize its communication networks to get information to physicians in real-time. It is interesting to note that in local areas the problem often was not one of not enough information, but of too much information, which was often confusing, conflicting or impractical for a practice setting. Consistent messaging disseminated in a coordinated fashion is essential for a consistent and coordinated response to a health crisis. The CMA believes that the federal government must take a leadership role to ensure that the communication tools and information technology necessary for a modern efficient public health system, with the capacity to mount a rapid and informed response to public health emergencies, are in place in all regions of the country. The CMA brought this to the attention of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance in October 2001, and again in October 2002 with our recommendation for a REAL (rapid, effective, accessible, linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative. We called for a one-time infusion of $100 million, and an additional $2 million a year, to improve technical capacity to communicate with front-line public health providers in real-time during health emergencies. This initiative would facilitate seamless communication between local, provincial and federal levels of the public health system and rapid, real-time communication between the public health sector and other components of the health care system. It must also ensure a two-way flow of information between front-line health care providers and public health professionals at the local public health unit, the provincial public health department and the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. The REAL Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative would improve the ability of the public health system to communicate in a rapid fashion by: * Providing a focal point for inter-jurisdictional communication and co-ordination in order to improve preparedness in times of emergency; * Developing a seamless communication system leveraging formal and informal networks and * Researching the best way to disseminate emergency information and health alerts to targeted health professionals and public health officials in a rapid, effective and accessible fashion. As well as funding research and demonstration projects, funding should also be allocated to provinces/territories and municipalities to build their connectivity infrastructure. The initiative should build on communication systems currently in place, filling gaps and enhancing capacity. Communicating with Health Professionals. One of the key lessons the CMA has drawn from the experience of SARS is that physicians take up information in different ways. Some want it by e-mail, others by fax and still others by mail. Even those with e-mail have expressed a desire to get emergency information in a different format. Other health care associations have also employed various ways to communicate with their membership. During the SARS crisis, the existing communication networks between health professionals were an important, if informal, avenue to disseminate and in some cases explain public health interventions and information. In fact ten national health care associations3 met via teleconference and in person during the crisis to share information and ensure a consistency of message to health professionals. This sector can play a critical role in bridging the gap between clinicians and the public, as well as in the delivery of credible public education and training to both professionals and the public. The importance of communicating timely and relevant information directly to those in leadership positions (Chief of Staff, Hospital CEO) should not be overlooked. These individuals can make the information relevant for their particular setting, and ensure that it is widely disseminated within their community. The uptake of new information is influenced by many qualitative factors and research is needed to determine how best to communicate with individual physicians and other health care providers in emergency situations. Any new communication processes should be based on sound research and build on existing communication networks. The REAL Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative would be led by the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control and would undertake work in three phases. 1. Research Phase For example: * Evaluation of communications during the SARS crisis * Quantitative research on how health professionals want to receive information * Catalogue of existing communication networks 2. Pilot projects in areas such as risk communications and information management in public health. 3. Evaluation and dissemination of best practices in communications and information management. Appendix D: Emergency Medical Supplies and Equipment Supply Chain In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the CMA, in its October 2001 pre-budget submission to the Standing Committee on Finance, stressed the fact that in the event of a significant attack on our population among the first points of contact with the health system will be doctors’ offices and the emergency rooms of our hospitals. The SARS outbreak has proven that this point is just as valid when faced with a public health emergency. SARS showed us that the Greater Toronto Area, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and maintain its capacity to meet other acute care requirements or important public heath services such as suicide prevention programs. Most hospitals work on a just-in-time inventory basis for the purchase of drugs. Without some sort of plan to quickly re-supply their pharmacies and expand their capacity, patient care suffers. Emergency bed space is also lacking. The federal government must assure Canadians that plans are in place when the health care system is again tested with another public health emergency. That is where the federal government can ensure the health system’s readiness and reassure Canadians that help will be there when they need it. We have also witnessed in recent years the enormous strain these facilities can be placed under when even something quite routine like influenza strikes a community hard. The acute care occupancy rates of Ontario public hospitals across the Ontario Hospital Association regions in 1999-00 illustrate this point. In three of the five regions (Eastern Ontario, Central and South West) the occupancy rate ranged from 94% to 97%.xxi The highest rate was found in the very heavily populated Central region. A British Medical Journal study suggests that an occupancy rate over 90% indicates that the hospital system is in a regular bed crisis.xxii This problem is not unique to Ontario: “the decrease in the number of acute care beds across Canada over the past decade, coupled with an aging population and our extraordinary success in extending the survival of patients with significant chronic illness, has eliminated any cushion in bed occupancy in the hospital system.”xxiii With this in mind, picture the impact of another public health crisis such as an influenza pandemic when hundreds of thousands of individuals could be affected. The public health system and medical diagnostic and treatment systems in the community and hospitals would become overwhelmed very quickly without the ability to absorb the extra caseload. We need no further demonstration of the need to enable hospitals to open beds, purchase more supplies, and bring in the health care professionals it requires to meet the need. Currently the National Emergency Stockpile System can supply up to 40,000 cots, as well as medical supplies and relatively rudimentary hospital equipment. Reports indicate, however, that much of the equipment is decades old, and that protocols for logistical management (e.g., transport and rapid deployment) are outdated. There is an urgent need to reassess and reaffirm capacity in this context. The SARS experience also brought to our attention the critical lack of equipment. The Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians (CAEP) has noted that many emergency departments across the country are not adequately equipped for 21st century infection control challenges. They do not have negative pressure rooms with contained toilets, often have only one resuscitation suite for critically ill patients and do not have a safe place to segregate accompanying persons. Nor do they have protective hoods like the PARR device that is needed to safely intubate SARS patients. CAEP concluded that most emergency departments are not physically designed to cope with infection control problems. The federal government must assure Canadians that municipal and provincial plans are in place with an overarching national plan to support these jurisdictions if their service capacities are overwhelmed. But the government should help further by making available an emergency fund that would enable hospitals to plan and organize their surge capacity. The purpose of having such elaborate response plans and stockpiles of supplies and equipment is to be ready for the possibility that, in spite of all efforts to prevent a catastrophe from occurring, it nevertheless happens. That is where the federal government can facilitate the health system’s readiness and reassure Canadians that help will be there when they need it. Appendix E: Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) While the need for more health human resources is apparent, resource planning is difficult and fraught with complexity. Answers must balance affordability, reflect population health needs and consider issues pertaining to the supply, mix and distribution of physicians. Over the last decade, a number of stakeholders including government, associations, and researchers have invested significant resources in health human resource planning.xxiv However, these groups do not systematically communicate with each other and do not always buy into each other’s products. The result is silo-based planning, lack of progress on key areas of database development, and an overall failure to address important issues such as professional burnout. The CMA seeks to build consensus within the medical profession on major program and policy initiatives concerning the supply, mix and distribution of physicians and to work with major stakeholders in identifying and assessing issues of mutual importance. At the same time, the CMA remains sensitive to Canada’s provincial and territorial realities with respect to the fact that health human resource planning requires assessment and implementation at the local or regional level. However, there is a need for a national body to develop and coordinate health human resources planning initiatives that take into account the mobility of health care providers nationally and internationally. Identification of the need for more coordinated research in the area of health human resources has come from many sources. In the Listening for Directions report of 2001xxv, the partner organizations indicated health human resources as the number one priority theme for research funding over the next two to five years. A joint report in 1995 by national organizations representing occupational therapists, physiotherapists, dieticians and nurses established an integrated health human resources development framework with three main components of planning, education and training, and management.xxvi Similarly, the Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc. (CPRN) commissioned by Mr. Romanow to investigate and summarize health human resource issues, recommended the creation of a national health human resources coordinating agency to provide focus and expertise for health human resource planning. Senator Kirby also identified the need for such a planning body in his final report. He recommended that the federal government work with other concerned parties to create a permanent National Coordinating Committee for Health Human Resources, to be composed of representatives of key stakeholder groups and of the different levels of government.xxvii Finally, the final report of the Commission of the Future of Health Care in Canada called for a substantial improvement in the base of information on Canada’s health workforce and the need to establish a comprehensive plan for addressing supply, distribution, and education issues.xxviii The CMA believes that an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) should be established to address the human side of health, just as existing institutes address the technology (CCOHTA) and information aspects of health (CIHI). It would be a virtual institute, in the same sense as the Canadian Institute for Health Research. The Institute should promote collaboration and the sharing of research among the well-known university based centres of excellence (e.g., MCHP and CHSPR) as well as research communities within professional associations and governments. It would enable/focus on needs-based long term planning. HIHuR should have the ability to embark upon large scale research studies such as needs-based planning that is beyond the purview or financial ability of any single jurisdiction. Standard methodologies could be established for data collection and analysis to estimate health human resource requirements based on the disease-specific health needs and/or demands of the population (e.g., Aboriginal peoples, the elderly, etc.). The institute would work in close collaboration with primary data providers such as Statistics Canada and CIHI. It would complement the work of the new Canada Health Council. Possible deliverables of the model could include such cross-disciplinary issues as measuring effective supply, functional specialization, regulatory restrictions, and assessing new and existing models of delivery. The institute could build on, and maintain, the initiatives of the various health sector studies. The institute would advise on medium and long-term research agendas that could be adopted and implemented by such funding bodies as CHSRF and CIHR. It is recommended that base funding be provided by the federal government (with other members also financially supporting the HIHuR). It is proposed that the annual budget for the institute would be $2.5 million with an initial institute development grant from the federal government of $1 million. Appendix F : Straight facts about health…Is Canada getting left behind? Straight facts about health... Is Canada getting left behind? Through the 1980s, Canada has either remained the same or lost ground in the international rankings on key health indicators with other leading industrialized countries surpassing our progress. This worrisome turn of events, the Canadian Medical Association believes, needs attention. United Nations Human Development Index In 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began publishing an annual Human Development Report (www.undp.org/hdr). The Human Development Index (HDI) is one of the key indicators in this report. It is a composite index that measures average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life; knowledge and a decent standard of living. How has Canada fared? In 1990, Canada ranked fifth. Canada moved to 2nd place behind Japan in 1991 and into 1st place in 1992. It again dropped behind first-place Japan in 1993. Canada then led the world on the HDI between 1994 and 2000. In 2001, Canada dropped back to 3rd place. As the UNDP reported in 2001, “Norway is now ranked first in the world and Australia second. Both moved narrowly ahead of Canada, the leader for the previous six years, as a result of new figures for life expectancy and educational enrolment. Canada fell in the rankings even though its per capita income rose by 3.75 percent.” Canada remained in 3rd place in 2002. World Health Organization health system performance indicators The World Health Organization (WHO) (www.who.int/whr) ranked the health system performance of 191 member countries for the first time in its 2000 World Health Report. The ranks are based on the measurement of population health in relation to what might be expected given the level of input to the production of health. WHO presented two rankings. The first, performance on health level, considers health status in disability-adjusted life expectancy relative to a country’s resource use and human capital. Canada ranked 35th among 191 countries with respect to this indicator in 2000. The second indicator is a measurement of overall performance. This assesses health system attainment relative to what might be expected for five goals of the health system, including health status, health inequality, level and distribution of responsiveness and fairness in financing. In 2000, Canada ranked 30th on the index of overall performance. France led the world on this indicator in 2000. International health indicators Since the 1980s, Canada has continued to record improvements on key health indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. However, other industrialized countries have also recorded improvements that have either equaled or, in some cases, quite dramatically surpassed the gains made in Canada. As a result, Canada’s ranking has either stayed the same or dropped. Infant Mortality — Although Canada’s infant mortality rate dropped by 22% between 1990 and 1999, its rank dropped from 5th to 17th among the 31 industrialized coun-tries included in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Other countries have recorded even greater gains; for example, Sweden and Austria both recorded a drop of 43% in infant mortality over the same time period. Among others, Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic now rank ahead of Canada. However, the United Kingdom, United States and Australia rank behind Canada. Perinatal Mortality — Between 1990 and 1999, Canada’s perinatal mortality rate declined by 18% while its international ranking remained essentially the same — moving from 10th in 1990 to 11th in 1999. In comparison, the perinatal mortality rate for 1st-ranked Japan dropped by 31% during the same period. Life Expectancy — In 1999, Canada ranked 5th in life expectancy at birth, down from 3rd in 1990. During the 1990–1999 period, total life expectancy increased by 1.8% in Canada, compared to 2.0% in 1st-ranked Japan. Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) — Healthy life expectancy is based on life expectancy but includes an adjustment for time spent in poor health. In its 2002 World Health Report, WHO presented HALE esti-mates for 191 countries during 2001. Among these countries, Canada ranked 20th in 2001, tying with the Netherlands at 69.9 years at birth. Japan and Switzerland headed the list at 73.6 and 72.8 years respectively in 2001. Health human resources per capita Canada continues to lag behind other industrialized countries with respect to physicians per 1000 population. The OECD average of 2.8 per 1000 population is one-third higher than Canada’s rate of 2.1 (including post-graduate residents), placing us 23rd out of 27th for this indicator. In a comparison of G-8 countries (excluding Russia) between 1990 and 1999, Canada was the only country that did not show any improvement in the physician-to-population ratio. The situation for nurses is equally distressing. Canada placed only 12th in 1999 and experienced a 7% drop in the ratio between 1990 and 1999 from 8.1 per 1000 population to 7.5. This puts Canada in the middle of the G-8 group. Public sector as percent of total health spending Among the industrialized (OECD) countries, Canada has consistently reported one of the lower public shares of total health spending since the 1980s. In 1985, Canada’s public spending on health represented 75.6% of total health spending — placing Canada at 14th among the 22 countries reporting. In 2000, with public spending rep-resenting 72% of total health spending, Canada ranked 16th among 26 countries reporting. Canada’s 2000 level of public spending was down almost four percentage points from 1985. Note: The UNDP contains 173 countries, WHO contains 191 countries and the OECD contains 31 countries. Life expectancy figures represent years at birth. Infant mortality represents the number of deaths of babies less than one year of age that occurred during a year per 1000 live births during the same year expressed as a rate. Perinatal mortality represents the number of deaths under 7 days (early neonatal deaths) plus fetal deaths of 28 weeks of gesta-tion or more per 1000 total live births (live and stillbirths). Health indicators data are from OECD Health Data, 2002, 4th ed. www.oecd.org/healthdata. WHO performance indicators for 2002 are based as estimates for 1997. ENDNOTES 1 $24.9 billion includes all new federal transfers to the provinces and territories (targeted and non-targeted) announced at the time of the First Ministers’ meeting on February 4/5, 2003 and confirmed in the February 18, 2003 Federal Budget. It includes the $2 billion in funding to be made available at the end of fiscal year 2002/03. It does not include previously announced CHST funding, nor investments in federal health programs. 2 $24.9 billion includes all new federal transfers to the provinces and territories (targeted and non-targeted) announced at the time of the First Ministers’ meeting on February 4/5, 2003 and confirmed in the February 18, 2003 Federal Budget. It includes the $2 billion in funding to be made available at the end of fiscal year 2002/03. It does not include previously announced CHST funding, nor investments in federal health programs. 3 Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians, Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation, Canadian Dental Association, Canadian Healthcare Association, Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Infectious Disease Society, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Pharmacists Association, Canadian Public Health Association, Association of Canadian Academic Healthcare Organizations i Ekos Research Associates. Presentation to the Charles E. Frosst Foundation for Health Care. Private Voices, Public Choices. November 7, 2002. ii Canadian Medical Association. Third Annual National Report Card on Health Care. August, 2003. (Conducted by Ipsos Reid). p. 17. iii Canadian Institute of Health Information. National Health Exenditure Trends, 1975-2002. December 2002. iv Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Health Data 2003. v Government of Canada. The Budget Plan, 2003. February 18, 2003. p. 211. vi Government of Canada. The Budget Plan, 2003. February 18, 2003. p. 69. vii News Release, Annual Conference of Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ministers of Health, Halifax, Nova Scotia, September 4, 2003. viii Canadian Medical Association. Press Release, “CMA Calls for Council by November 28 – Further Delay Unacceptable”. September 3, 2003. ix Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada: The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role Volume Six: Recommendations for Reform. October 2002. p. 17 - 20. x Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada. Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report. November 2002. p. 52. xi Canadian Institutes of Health Research. Report on Plans and Priorities for the Fiscal Year, 2003-2004. p. 29. xii For more information, please refer to CMA’s 2001 report to the Standing Committee on Finance, Security Our Future … Balancing Urgent Health Care Needs of Today with the Important Challenges of Tomorrow. November 1, 2001. xiii Canadian Medical Association. Submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. Answering the Wake-up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan. June 2003. xiv Canadian Medical Association. Presentation to the Standing Committee on Finance Pre-Budget Consultations. Securing our Future … Balancing Urgent Health Care Needs of Today With the Important Challenges of Tomorrow. November 1, 2001. xv Canadian Nurses Association. Canada’s Nurses See Latest Data as a Warning: Action Needed to Address Nursing Shortage. Press Release, September 17, 2003. xvi Government of Canada. The Budget Plan, 2003. February 18, 2003. p. 78. xvii United Nations Human Development Project. Human Development Report 2001. Press Release, July 10, 2001, Mexico City (www.undp.org/hdro). xviii Canadian Medical Association. From debate to action. Message to First Ministers … It’s time to put the health of Canadians first. January 2003. xix Other organizations that reiterated the need for additional investment in health care included the Canadian Healthcare Association (Press Release, February 18, 2003 (www.cha.ca) and the Association of Canadian Academic Healthcare Organizations (Press Release, February 19, 2003 (www.ACAHO.org). xx Canadian Medical Association. From debate to action. Message to First Ministers … It’s time to put the health of Canadians first. January 2003. p. 8. xxi Ontario Hospital Reporting System, 2001. Acute Care Occupancy Rates, Ontario Public Hospitals by OHA region, 1999/00. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. xxii Bagust A, Place M, Posnett J. Dynamics of bed use in accommodating emergency admissions: stochastic simulation model. BMJ; 319: 155-158 July 17, 1999. xxiii Nicolle L. Viruses without borders. Can J Infect Dis Vol. 11, Issue 3, May/June 2000 (Downloaded from Web: October 23, 2001: www.pulsus.com/Infdis/11_03/nico_ed.htm) xxiv At the national level there are a number of bodies that, in some cases, have been involved in health human resource planning issues for literally decades. The long standing Advisory Committee on Health Human Resources reported to the Conference of Deputy Ministers on health human resource issues but it functioned without outside expertise from the provider community and found it difficult to implement an integrated approach to planning. The National Coordinating Committee on Postgraduate Medical Training did include membership from both the medical profession and the government but its mandate was narrow (postgraduate training of physicians) and the committee was de facto sunsetted a couple of years ago. xxv Canadian Health Services Research Foundation. Listening for Direction: A National Consultation on Health Services and Policy Issues. June 2001. xxvi Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists, Canadian Dietetic Association, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Physiotherapy Association, Integrated Health Human Resources Development – Pragmatism or Pie in the Sky, August 1995. xxvii Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role, Final Report, October 2002. xxviii Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada. Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report. November 2002. p. 108.
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