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CMA PolicyBase

Policies that advocate for the medical profession and Canadians


24 records – page 1 of 3.

Antibiotics used in the raising of farm animals

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10211
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs
Resolution
GC11-88
The Canadian Medical Association recommends that a prescription from a veterinarian be required for all antibiotics used in the raising of farm animals or for any other agricultural purpose.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs
Resolution
GC11-88
The Canadian Medical Association recommends that a prescription from a veterinarian be required for all antibiotics used in the raising of farm animals or for any other agricultural purpose.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association recommends that a prescription from a veterinarian be required for all antibiotics used in the raising of farm animals or for any other agricultural purpose.
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Canadian Disclosure Guidelines: Being Open with Patients and Families

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10367
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-12-03
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Health information and e-health
Resolution
BD12-03-66
The Canadian Medical Association endorses the Canadian Patient Safety Institute’s document Canadian Disclosure Guidelines: Being Open with Patients and Families as outlined in Appendix A to BD 12-61.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-12-03
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Health information and e-health
Resolution
BD12-03-66
The Canadian Medical Association endorses the Canadian Patient Safety Institute’s document Canadian Disclosure Guidelines: Being Open with Patients and Families as outlined in Appendix A to BD 12-61.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association endorses the Canadian Patient Safety Institute’s document Canadian Disclosure Guidelines: Being Open with Patients and Families as outlined in Appendix A to BD 12-61.
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Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-81
The Canadian Medical Association will educate and advise the profession and the public on methods of cellphone operation that will minimize radio frequency penetration to the brain.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-81
The Canadian Medical Association will educate and advise the profession and the public on methods of cellphone operation that will minimize radio frequency penetration to the brain.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association will educate and advise the profession and the public on methods of cellphone operation that will minimize radio frequency penetration to the brain.
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Compulsory use of helmets

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10175
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-66
The Canadian Medical Association supports the compulsory use of helmets by people of all ages when riding all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-66
The Canadian Medical Association supports the compulsory use of helmets by people of all ages when riding all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association supports the compulsory use of helmets by people of all ages when riding all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles.
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Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10173
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Ethics and medical professionalism
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-64
The Canadian Medical Association calls for federal government adherence to the United Nations’ "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict."
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Ethics and medical professionalism
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-64
The Canadian Medical Association calls for federal government adherence to the United Nations’ "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict."
Text
The Canadian Medical Association calls for federal government adherence to the United Nations’ "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict."
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Improving Accountability in Canada's Health Care System: The Canadian Medical Association's Presentation to the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10230
Date
2011-10-19
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Health systems, system funding and performance
  1 document  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Date
2011-10-19
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
The CMA appreciates the opportunity to appear before this committee as part of your review of the 10-Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care. An understanding of what has worked and what hasn't since 2004 is critical to ensuring the next accord brings about necessary change to the system. Overview of 2004 Accord On the positive side of the ledger, the 2004 accord provided the health care system with stable, predictable funding for a decade - something that had been sorely lacking. It also showed that a focused commitment, in this case on wait times, can lead to improvements. However, little has been done on several other important commitments in the Accord, such as the pledge that was also made in 2003 to address the significant inequity among Canadians in accessing prescription drugs. Along with the lack of long-term, community and home-based care services, this accounts for a major gap in patient access along the continuum of care. We also know that accountability provisions in past accords have been lacking in several ways. For instance, there has been little progress in developing common performance indicators set out in previous accord. i The 2004 accord has no clear terms of reference on accountability for overseeing its provisions. Vision and principles for 2014 What the 2004 accord lacked was a clear vision. Without a destination, and a commitment to getting there, our health care system cannot be transformed and will never become a truly integrated, high performing health system. The 2014 Accord is the perfect opportunity to begin this journey, if it is set up in a way that fosters the innovation and improvements that are necessary. By clearly defining the objectives and securing stable, incremental funding, we will know what changes we need to get us there. Now is the time to articulate the vision- to say loudly and clearly that at the end of the 10-year funding arrangement, by 2025, Canadians will have the best health and health care in the world. With a clear commitment from providers, administrators and governments, this vision can become our destination. As a first step to begin this long and difficult journey, the CMA has partnered with the Canadian Nurses Association, and together we have solicited support from over 60 health care organizations for a series of "Principles to Guide Health Care Transformation in Canada." These principles define a system that would provide equitable access to health care based on clinical need; care that is high quality and patient-centred; and that focuses on empowering patients to attain and maintain wellness. They call for a system that provides accountability to those who use it and those who fund it; and that is sustainable - by which I mean adequately resourced in terms of financing, infrastructure and human resources, and measured against other high-performing systems, with cost linked to outcomes. Based on our experience working within the provisions of the 2004 accord, we would like to suggest three strategies to ensure the next accord leads to a sustainable, high-performing health care system. They are: a focus on quality; support for system innovation; and the establishment of an accountability framework and I will touch briefly on each one. Focus on quality First, the crucial need to focus on improving the quality of health care services. The key dimensions of quality, and by extension, the areas that need attention are: safety, effectiveness, patient-centredness, efficiency, timeliness, equitability and appropriateness. Excellence in quality improvement in these areas will be a crucial step towards sustainability. To date, six provinces have instituted health quality councils. Their mandates and their effectiveness in actually achieving lasting system-wide improvements vary. What is missing and urgently needed is an integrated, pan-Canadian approach to quality improvement in health care that can begin to chart a course to ensure Canadians ultimately have the best health and health care in the world. Canadians deserve no less and, with the resources at our disposal, there is no reason why this should not be achievable. The CMA recommends that the federal government fund the establishment and resource the operations of an arms-length Canadian Health Quality Council, with the mandate to be a catalyst for change, a spark for innovation and a facilitator to disseminate evidence-based quality improvement initiatives so that they become embedded in the fabric of our health systems from coast to coast to coast. To help expand quality improvement across the country, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement's Triple Aim provides the solid framework. Our health care systems will benefit inordinately from a simultaneous focus on providing better care to individuals and better health to populations, while reducing the per-capita cost. There is ample evidence that quality care is cost effective care. This approach, when adopted and applied as the pan-Canadian framework for any and all structural changes and quality improvement initiatives, will not only serve patients well, but will also enhance the experience of health care providers on the front lines. System innovation The second strategy revolves around system innovation. Innovation and quality improvement initiatives are infinitely more likely to be successful and sustained if they arise out of a commitment by frontline providers and administrators to the achievement of a common goal. We need to shift away from compliance models with negative consequences that have little evidence to support their sustainability. Innovative improvements in health care in Canada are inadequately supported, poorly recognized, and constrained from being shared and put into use more widely. This needs to change. The 2014 accord, with a focus on improving Canadians' health and health care, can facilitate the transformation we all seek. Building on the success of the 2004 Wait Times Reduction Fund and the 2000 Health Accord Primary Health Care Transition Fund, the CMA proposes the creation of a Canada Health Innovation Fund that would broadly support the uptake of health system innovation initiatives across the country. A Working Accountability Framework And, third, there needs to be a working accountability framework. This would work three ways. To provide accountability to patients - the system will be patient-centred and, along with its providers, will be accountable for the quality of care and the care experience. To provide accountability to citizens - the system will provide and, along with its administrators and managers, will be accountable for delivering high quality, integrated services across the full continuum of care. And to provide accountability to taxpayers - the system will optimize its per-capita costs, and along with those providing public funding and financing, will be accountable for the value derived from the money being spent. We have done all of this because of our profound belief that meaningful change to our health care system is of the essence, and that such change can and must come about through the next health accord. Therefore I thank this committee for your efforts on this important area. I would be happy to answer your questions. Appendix A Issues identified in 2004 Accord and Current Status [NOTE: see PDF for correct dispaly of table] Issue Current Status Annual 6% escalator in the CHT to March 31, 2014 Has provided health care system with stable, predictable funding for a decade. Adoption of wait-time benchmarks by December 2005 for five procedural areas Largely fulfilled. However, no benchmarks were set for diagnostic imaging. The Wait Time Alliance is calling for benchmarks for all specialty care. Release of health human resource (HHR) action plans by December 2005 Partially fulfilled. Most jurisdictions issued rudimentary HHR plans by the end of 2005; F/P/T Advisory Committee on Health Delivery and Human Resources issued a paper on a pan-Canadian planning HHR framework in September 2005. First-dollar coverage for home care by 2006 Most provinces offer first-dollar coverage for post-acute home care but service varies across the country for mental health and palliative home care needs. An objective of 50% of Canadians having 24/7 access to multidisciplinary primary care teams by 2011 Unfulfilled: Health Council of Canada reported in 2009 that only 32 per cent of Canadians had access to more than one primary health care provider. A 5-year $150 million Territorial Health Access Fund Fulfilled: Territorial Health System Sustainability Initiative (THSSI) funding extended until March 31, 2014. A 9-point National Pharmaceuticals Strategy (NPS) Largely unfulfilled: A progress report on the NPS was released in 2006 but nothing has been implemented. Accelerated work on a pan-Canadian Public Health Strategy including goals and targets F/P/T health ministers (except Quebec) put forward five high-level health goals for Canada in 2005, although they were not accompanied by operational definitions that would lend themselves to setting targets. Continued federal investments in health innovation Unknown-no specificity in the 2004 Accord. Reporting to residents on health system performance and elements of the Accord P/T governments ceased their public reporting after 2004, and only the federal government has kept its commitment (at least to 2008). Formalization of the dispute advance/resolution mechanism on the CHA Done but not yet tested. i P/T governments ceased their public reporting after 2004, and only the federal government has kept its commitment (at least to 2008).Government of Canada. Healthy Canadians: a federal report on comparable health indicators 2008. http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/alt_formats/hpb-dgps/pdf/pubs/system-regime/2008-fed-comp-indicat/index-eng.pdf. Accessed 06/21/11.
Documents
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Insite: CMA submission regarding Insite supervised injection site and program.

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy14129
Date
2011-02-17
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs
  1 document  
Policy Type
Court submission
Date
2011-02-17
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs
Text
S.C.C. File No.: 33556 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (APPEAL FROM THE BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL) BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA AND MINISTER OF HEALTH FOR CANADA Appellants (Appellants/Cross-Respondents) —and — PHS COMMUNITY SERVICES SOCIETY, DEAN EDWARD WILSON and SHELLY TOMIC, VANCOUVER AREA NETWORK OF DRUG USERS (VANDU) Respondents (Respondents/Cross-Appellants) —and — ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Respondent (Respondent) —and — ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC, DR. PETER AIDS FOUNDATION, VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY, CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, INTERNATIONAL HARM REDUCTION ASSOCIATION AND CACTUS MONTREAL, CANADIAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, REGISTERED NURSES' ASSOCIATION OF ONTARIO AND ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED NURSES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, CANADIAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA NURSES'S UNION Interveners FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP 100 Queen Street — Suite 1100 Ottawa, ON KIP 1J9 Guy J. Pratte/Nadia Effendi Tel: (613) 237-5160 Fax: (613) 230-8842 Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Medical Association 2 TO: Roger Bilodeau, Q.C. REGISTRAR SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND TO: Robert J. Frater Attorney General of Canada Bank of Canada Building 234 Wellington Street, Room 1161 Ottawa, Ontario KlA OH8 Telephone: (613) 957-4763 FAX: (613) 954-1920 E-mail: robert.fratergustice.gc.ca Counsel for Appellant/Respondent on Cross- Appeal, the Attorney General of Canada Robert J. Frater Attorney General of Canada Bank of Canada Building 234 Wellington Street, Room 1161 Ottawa, Ontario KlA OH8 Telephone: (613) 957-4763 FAX: (613) 954-1920 E-mail: robert.frater@justice.gc.ca Counsel for Appellant/Respondent on Cross- Appeal, the Minister of Health for Canada Joseph H. Arvay, Q.C. Arvay Finlay 1350 - 355 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2G8 Telephone: (604) 689-4421 FAX: (604) 687-1941 E-mail: jarvay@arvayfinlay.com Counsel for Respondent, PHS Community Services Society Jeffrey W. Beedell McMillan LLP 300 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K113 6L2 Telephone: (613) 232-7171 FAX: (613) 231-3191 E-mail: jeffbeedell@mcmillan.ca Agent for Respondent, PHS Community Services Society 3 Joseph H. Arvay, Q.C. Arvay Finlay 1350 - 355 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2G8 Telephone: (604) 689-4421 FAX: (604) 687-1941 E-mail: jarvay@arvayfinlay.com Counsel for Respondent, Dean Edward Wilson and Shelly Tomic John W. Conroy, Q.C. Conroy & Company 2459 Pauline St Abbotsford, British Columbia V2S 3S1 Telephone: (604) 852-5110 FAX: (604) 859-3361 E-mail: jconroy@johnconroy.com Counsel for Respondent/Appellant on Cross- Appeal, Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) Craig E. Jones Attorney General of British Columbia 1001 Douglas Street, 6th floor Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4 Telephone: (250) 387-3129 FAX: (250) 356-9154 E-mail: craigjones@gov.bc.ca Counsel for Respondent, the Attorney General of British Columbia Hugo Jean Procureur general du Quebec 1200 Route de l'Èglise, 2e etage Ste-Foy, Quebec G1V 4M1 Telephone: (418) 643-1477 FAX: (418) 644-7030 E-mail: hjean@justice.gouv.qc.ca Counsel for Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec Jeffrey W. Beedell McMillan LLP 300 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K113 6L2 Telephone: (613) 232-7171 FAX: (613) 231-3191 E-mail: jeffbeedell@mcmillan.ca Agent for Respondent, Dean Edward Wilson and Shelly Tomic Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin St P.O. Box 466, Stn "D" Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1C3 Telephone: (613) 233-1781 FAX: (613) 788-3433 E-mail: henry.brown@gowlings.com Agent for Respondent/Appellant on Cross- Appeal, Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Burke-Robertson 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0A2 Telephone: (613) 566-2058 FAX: (613) 235-4430 E-mail: rhouston@burkerobertson.com Agent for Respondent, the Attorney General of British Columbia Pierre Landry Noel & Associes 111, rue Champlain Gatineau, Quebec J8X 3R1 Telephone: (819) 771-7393 FAX: (819) 771-5397 E-mail: p.landry@noelassocies.com Agent for Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec 4 Andrew I. Nathanson Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 2900 - 550 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 0A3 Telephone: (604) 631-4908 FAX: (604) 631-3232 Counsel for Intervener, Dr. Peter AIDS Foundation Ryan D. W. Dalziel Bull, Housser & Tupper LLP 3000 - 1055 West Georgia Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6E 3R3 Telephone: (604) 641-4881 FAX: (604) 646-2671 E-mail: rdd@bht.com Counsel for Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Sheila Tucker Davis LLP 2800 Park Place 666 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2Z7 Telephone: (604) 643-2980 FAX: (604) 605-3781 E-mail: stuckergdavis.ca Counsel for Intervener, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority Paul F. Monahan Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 333 Bay Street, Suite 2400 Bay Adelaide Centre, Box 20 Toronto, Ontario M5H 2T6 Telephone: (416) 366-8381 FAX: (416) 364-7813 E-mail: pmonahan@fasken.com Counsel for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Scott M. Prescott Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 1300 - 55 Metcalfe Street Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5 Telephone: (613) 236-3882 FAX: (613) 230-6423 E-mail: sprescott@fasken.com Agent for Intervener, Dr. Peter AIDS Foundation Brian A. Crane, Q.C. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin St Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Telephone: (613) 233-1781 FAX: (613) 563-9869 E-mail: brian.crane@gowlings.com Agent for Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Marie-France Major McMillan LLP 300 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K113 6L2 Telephone: (613) 232-7171 FAX: (613) 231-3191 E-mail: mane-france.maior@mcmillan.ca Agent for Intervener, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority Julia Kennedy Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 55 Metcalfe Street Suite 1300 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5 Telephone: (613) 236-3882 FAX: (613) 230-6423 E-mail: ikennedy(&fasken.com Agent for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Michael A. Feder McCarthy Tétrault LLP Suite 1300, 777 Dunsmuir Street Vancouver, British Columbia V7Y 1 K2 Telephone: (604) 643-5983 FAX: (604) 622-5614 E-mail: mfeder(qmccarthv.ca Counsel for Intervener, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, International Harm Reduction Association and CACTUS Montréal Rahool P. Agarwal Ogilvy Renault LLP 3800 - 200 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5J 2Z4 Telephone: (416) 216-3943 FAX: (416) 216-3930 E-mail: ragarwal(iogilvyrenaul1.com Counsel for Intervener, Canadian Nurses Association, Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario and Association of Registered Nurses of British Columbia Owen M. Rees Stockwoods LLP 77 King Street West Suite 4130, P.O. Box 140 Toronto, Ontario M5K IHI Telephone: (416) 593-7200 FAX: (416) 593-9345 E-mail: owenr~stockwoods.ca Counsel for Intervener, Canadian Public Health Association 5 Brenda C. Swick McCarthy Tétrault LLP 200 - 440 Laurier Avenue West Ottawa, Ontario KIR 7X6 Telephone: (613) 238-2000 FAX: (613) 563-9386 Agent for Intervener, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, International Harm Reduction Association and CACTUS Montréal Sally A. Gomery Ogilvy Renault LLP 1500 - 45, O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario KIP lA4 Telephone: (613) 780-8661 FAX: (613) 230-5459 E-mail: sgomery(qogilvyrenaul1.com Agent for Intervener, Canadian Nurses Association, Registered Nurses' Association of Ontaro and Association of Registered Nurses of British Columbia Dougald E. Brown Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP 1500 - 50 O'Connor S1. Ottawa, Ontario KIP 6L2 Telephone: (613) 231-8210 FAX: (613) 788-3661 E-mail: dougald.brown(inelligan.ca Agent for Intervener, Canadian Public Health Association Marjorie Brown Victory Square Law Office 100 West Pender Street Suite 500 Vancouver, British Columbia V6B 1R8 Telephone: (604) 684-8421 FAX: (604) 684-8427 E-mail: mbrown(avslo.ca Counsel for Intervener, British Columbia Nurses' Union Michael A. Chambers Maclaren Corlett 50 O'Connor Street, Suite 1625 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 6L2 Telephone: (613) 233-1146 FAX: (613) 233-7190 E-mail: mchambers(amacorlaw.com Counsel for Intervener, Real Women Canada 6 Colleen Bauman Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP 500 - 30 Metcalfe St. Ottawa, Ontario KIP 5L4 Telephone: (613) 235-5327 FAX: (613) 235-3041 E-mail: cbauman~sgmlaw.com Agent for Intervener, British Columbia Nurses' Union TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I — Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................... .1 A. Overview ......................................................................................................................... 1 B. CMA's Interest in the Appeal ............................................................................................ 1 C. CMA's Position on the Facts ............................................................................................ 1 Part II — Statement of the Questions in Issue ................................................................................3 Part III — Statement of Argument .................................................................................................3 A. Charter Interpretation Must be Guided by Reality, Not Ideology ......................................... 3 B. The Impugned Provisions Infringe Section 7 of the Charter ................................................. 5 (1)Denying Access to Necessary Health care Infringes Section 7 of the Charter.................. 5 (2)The Rights to Life and Security of Patients Have Been Infringed ................................... 5 (3)Drug Addicts Have Not Waived Their Statutory and Constitutional Right to Treatment .................................................................................................................. 6 (4)The Rights to Liberty of the Individual Respondents Have Been Infringed ..................... 8 (5)The Principles of Fundamental Justice Have Not Been Respected ................................. 8 a) The Impugned Provisions Are Arbitrary ..................................................................... 8 b) The Impugned Provisions Are Overbroad ................................................................... 9 C. If There is an Infringement of Section 7, the Law is Not Saved by Section 1 of the Charter ................................................................................................................................ 9 D. Remedy ......................................................................................................................... 10 Part IV — Submissions as to Costs .............................................................................................. 10 Part V — Order Sought ................................................................................................................10 Part VI — Table of Authorities .................................................................................................... 11 Part VII — Statutes, Regulations, Rules ...................................................................................... 13 PART I — STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Overview 1. Fair and equitable access to medically necessary, evidenced-based health care is of fundamental importance to Canadian patients and physicians, as this Court recognized in Chaoulli. 2. Where life and security of a person is at risk because of a medical condition, like drug addiction, the Court's delineation of a government or legislature's constitutional obligations should be guided by facts. Unfounded ideological assumptions about the character of patients must not trump clinical judgment based on the best medical evidence available; otherwise, the life, liberty and security of patients is put at risk arbitrarily, contrary to section 7 of the Charter. 3. The Appellants' position that those addicted to drugs have foregone any right to access medical treatment is antithetical to the raison d'être of the Canadian health care system and inconsistent with the federal government's obligations under section 7 of the Charter. 4. Neither the statutory law nor the Constitution allows the state to deny access to health care because of "lifestyle" choices or presumed waiver of legal or constitutional rights. B. CMA's Interest in the Appeal 5. The Canadian Medical Association ("CMA") is the national voice of Canadian physicians with over 74,000 members across the country. Its mission is to serve and to unite the physicians of Canada and to be the national advocate, in partnership with the people of Canada, for the highest standards of health and heath care. 6. Critical to CMA's role is the upholding of harm reduction as one pillar in a comprehensive public health approach to disease prevention and health promotion. Further, the CMA possesses a distinct expertise and broad-based knowledge of many aspects of policy and law concerning harm reduction as a clinically mandated and ethical method of care and treatment. C. CMA's Position on the Facts 7. By Order dated February 17, 2011, the CMA was granted leave to intervene in this Appeal. 2 8. The CMA accepts the facts as stated by the Respondents. 9. This appeal flows from separate actions commenced by some of the Respondents seeking relief that would obviate the need for exemptions granted by the Federal Minister of Health under section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (the "Act"), S.C. 1996 c. 19. Thus, when within the confines of the Vancouver Safe Injection Site ("Insite"), patient drug users were not liable to prosecution for possession of a controlled substance contrary to section 4(1) of the Act, or staff for trafficking contrary to section 5(1). The initial exemptions, based on "necessity for a scientific purpose", were granted for a term of three years commencing September 12, 2003. They were thereafter extended to December 31, 2007, and then to June 30, 2008. Insite's ability to operate was dependent upon the exemptions. However, no further extensions were forthcoming. 10. In their actions, the Respondents, in addition to the division of powers argument, contended that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act violated section 7 of the Charter, were unconstitutional, and should be struck down. The Respondents were successful before the Applications Judge and the Court of Appeal. 11. The Applications Judge found that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act infringed section 7 of the Charter and declared them to be of no force and effect. 12. On appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and cross-appeal by the Respondents, PHS, Wilson and Tomic, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act were inapplicable to Insite by reason of the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 13. In concurring reasons, Rowles J.A. also found that sections 4(1) and 5(1) engaged section 7 of the Charter and that such application did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice because of overbreadth. 14. The findings of the Applications Judge and Rowles J.A. under the Charter are, the CMA submits, premised on the correct and supported fact that harm reduction is an evidenced-based form of medical treatment for patient drug addicts suffering from the illness of addiction. It is unconstitutional for governments to prevent access to treatment on pain of criminal penalty and deprivations of life, liberty and security of the person on grounds informed by ideological 3 assumptions and not the evidence. PART II - STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 15. The following constitutional questions, as stated by the Chief Justice on September 2, 2010, are to be determined in this appeal: 1. Are ss. 4(1) and 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.c. 1996, c. 19, constitutionally inapplicable to the activities of staff and users at Insite, a health care undertaking in the Province of British Columbia? 2. Does s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.c. 1996, c. 19, infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 3. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 4. Does s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 5. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 16. Questions two to five, which relate to the Charter, are of particular importance for the CMA, and are addressed in more detail below. The CMA submits that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act infrnge the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter and are not justified under section 1. PART III - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT A. Charter Interpretation Must be Guided by Reality, Not Ideology 17. When determining whether or not impugned legislation infringes the Charter, courts must not play host to political debates, but instead must rise above them by ensuring that public policy passes constitutional muster. Chaoull v. Québec (Attorney General), (2005) 1 S.c.R. 791, at para. 89 (CMA Authorities, Tab 2). R. v. Morgentaler, (1988)1 S.C.R. 30 at 45-46 (CMA Authorities, Tab 13). 18. The Appellants' position is clearly premised on ideological preconceptions with regard to individuals suffering from addictions. Yet, as the history of birth control legislation in Canada shows, a legal framework informed by ideological assumptions about the morality of patients seeking to control their reproduction can violate a person's most fundamental rights. See R. v. Morgentaler, supra at 62 where the Court rejected arguments that it should assess administrative structures in the abstract: "when denial of a right as basic as security of the person is infringed by the procedure and administrative structures created by the law itself, the courts are empowered to act" (CMA Authorities, Tab 13). 4 19. In order for the courts to meet their role in determining whether a particular piece of legislation is constitutional, it must consider Parliament's enactments by relying on the available evidence. In fact, it is well established that a deprivation of the rights to life, liberty or security of the person must be proven by solid evidence. Taylor, M. and Jamal, M., The Charter of Rights in Litigation, loose-leaf (Canada Law Book: Aurora, 2010) at para. 17:15 [CMA Authorities, Tab 20]. 20. The presentation of facts is not a mere technicality, but rather it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues: Charter cases will frequently be concerned with concepts and principles that are of fundamental importance to Canadian society. For example, issues pertaining to freedom of religion, freedom of expression and the right to life, liberty and the security of the individual will have to be considered by the courts. Decisions on these issues must be carefully considered as they will profoundly affect the lives of Canadians and all residents of Canada. In light of the importance and the impact that these decisions may have in the future, the courts have every right to expect and indeed to insist upon the careful preparation and presentation of a factual basis in most Charter cases. The relevant facts put forward may cover a wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic and political aspects. Often expert opinion as to the future impact of the impugned legislation and the results of the possible decisions pertaining to it may be of great assistance to the courts. MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 at 361 [CMA Authorities, Tab 5]. 21. Specifically, with respect to section 7 of the Charter, this Court has confirmed that the task of the courts is to evaluate the issue in "the light, not just of common sense or theory, but of the evidence". The Court dispenses with unsubstantiated theoretical arguments, relying instead on empirical and scientific evidence presented by the parties: In support of this contention, the government called experts in health administration and policy. Their conclusions were based on the "common sense" proposition that the improvement of health services depends on exclusivity (R.R., at p. 591). They did not profess expertise in waiting times for treatment. Nor did they present economic studies or rely on the experience of other countries. They simply assumed, as a matter of apparent logic, that insurance would make private health services more accessible and that this in turn would undermine the quality of services provided by the public health care system. The appellants, relying on other health experts, disagreed and offered their own conflicting "common sense" argument for the proposition that prohibiting private health insurance is neither necessary nor related to maintaining high quality in the public health care system. Quality public care, they argue, depends not on a monopoly, but on money and management. They testified that permitting people to buy private insurance would make alternative medical care more accessible and reduce the burden on the public system. The result, they assert, would be better care for all [...] To this point, we are confronted with competing but unproven "common sense" arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of belief. We are in the realm of theory. But as discussed above, a theoretically defensible limitation may be arbitrary if in fact the limit lacks a connection to the goal. This brings us to the evidence called by the appellants at trial on the experience of other developed countries with public health care systems which permit access to private health care. The experience of these countries suggests that there is no real connection in fact between prohibition of health insurance and the goal of a quality public health system. 5 Chaoulli, supra at paras. 136-149 (see also paras. 115, 117, 136-149, 150, 152 where the Court refers to Statistics Canada studies and evidence from other western democracies) [CMA Authorities, Tab 2]. See also Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 601-602 [CMA Authorities, Tab 16]. 22. Drug addicts suffer from a medical condition that can be treated. Hence, Insite is designed as a health treatment aimed at reducing the harmful consequences of drug use as well as exposing its vulnerable patients to other health care options. In this context, the federal legislation and government actions at issue amount to a denial of evidence-based medical treatment whose effect is to put the life and security of patients at great risk. 23. Charter interpretation should generally be grounded on fact rather than speculation or ideological assumptions, especially where life and security of the person (i.e., the patient) is at risk because of a medical condition (such as addiction). In such cases, the Court's delineation of the state's constitutional obligations should be guided by evidence-based medicine and independent clinical judgment. Chaoulli, supra at paras. 85, 107 [CMA Authorities, Tab 2]. See also Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 452-454 [CMA Authorities, Tab 7]; Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 66 [CMA Authorities, Tab 1]. 24. Accordingly, CMA submits that, at the very least, in the health care field where lives are at risk, there must be sound evidentiary basis for legislative and government action that deny medical care. B. The Impugned Provisions Infringe Section 7 of the Charter (1) Denying Access to Necessary Health care Infringes Section 7 of the Charter 25. While the legislature is generally entitled to enact legislation prohibiting drug use or trafficking, this legislation (however well-intended) cannot have the effect of putting the lives of affected persons at risk. This Court has already found in Chaoulli that section 7 of the Charter was infringed when governments impeded timely patient access to care. (2) The Rights to Life and Security of Patients Have Been Infringed 26. Both the Applications Judge and the Court of Appeal found that the right to life and security was engaged in the present case. The evidence on these issues was plentiful: 1. Addiction is an illness. One aspect of the illness is the continuing need or craving to consume the substance to which the addiction relates; 6 2. Injection drug use leads to an increased incidence and prevalence of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis A, B and C, and skin- and blood-borne infections; frequent drug overdoses resulting in significant morbidity and mortality; increased hospital and emergency service utilization; 3. The risk of morbidity and mortality associated with addiction and injection is ameliorated by injection in the presence of qualified health professionals at Insite; 4. User of Insite who are addicted to heroin, cocaine and other controlled substances are not engaged in recreation. Their addiction is an illness frequently, if not invariably, accompanied by serious infections and the real risk of overdose. Reasons for Judgment of the Applications Judge, paras. 87, 89, 135-136, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, pp. 24-25, 34. See also Reasons for Judgment of the B.C. Court of Appeal, para. 30, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, p. 65. (3) Drug Addicts Have Not Waived Their Statutory and Constitutional Right to Treatment 27. The Appellants did not really dispute the medical evidence to the effect that addiction to drugs was a disease. They sought instead to justify their position by claiming that drug addicts had "chosen" their lifestyle and were solely responsible for their medical condition. For the following reasons, this "rationale" does not pass constitutional muster. 28. The Appellants assert that the section 7 rights are not engaged as they stem from an alleged "choice made by the consumer", relying on the fact that 95% of the injections in the downtown east side of Vancouver do not take place at Insite. The Appellants do not explain how this assertion demonstrates why addicts are able to make a choice not to inject themselves, given that it only addresses where they inject themselves. In any event, contrary to the Appellants' choice theory, the evidence before the Applications Judge and his findings were to the contrary: the reasons for the addiction and resulting need are based on a complicated combination of personal, governmental and legal factors, some of which lend themselves to choice and others that do not.' Further, the Applications Judge found that it is the illness of addiction, and the failure to manage it, that has led to further illness and death. Reasons for Judgment of the Applications Judge, paras. 65, 89, 142, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, pp. 21, 24-25, 35. See also Reasons for Judgment of the B.C. Court of Appeal, para. 39, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, p. 67. Contra the facts in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 [Malmo-Levine] [CMA Authorities, Tab 12]. 29. The Appellants' position amounts to a claim that the users of Insite have effectively waived their constitutional rights under section 7. Notwithstanding that the jurisprudence is In fact, the evidence is clear that in the case of the Respondent Tomic, her first experience with illegal drugs was not a personal choice [Reasons for Judgment of the Applications Judge, para. 65, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, p. 21]. 7 unclear as to whether a right under section 7 can actually be waived, it is well established that a waiver or a renunciation of any right under the Charter must be voluntary, freely expressed and accompanied with a clear understanding of the purpose the right was meant to serve and the consequences of declining its protection. There is no evidence whatsoever that the patients of Insite who suffer from addiction, knowingly and unequivocally waived their rights under the Charter, and more specifically their right to access medical treatment. See e.g. Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at paras. 71-72; Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at paras. 96-102; R. v. Richard, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 525, at paras. 22-26; R. v. L.T.H., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 41-42; R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 at 394-396; Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41 at 49; Yorkton Union Hospital v. S.U.N. (1993), 16 Admin. L.R. (2d) 272, at para. 44 (C.A.) [CMA Authorities, Tabs 3, 17, 15, 11, 8, 4, 18 respectively]. 30. Indeed, Canadians do not forego their right to health care or to protection from section 7 violations because of their "choice" of lifestyles. The Appellants' position that addicts must take responsibility for the choice they make undermines the raison d'être of the Canadian health care system, namely (as found by the Applications Judge and the Court of Appeal) the fundamental right of Canadians to access medical treatment and the ethical and clinical responsibilities of their health care providers. 31. The Appellants' position skirts the clinical question at issue for physicians and their patients: physicians must treat patients as a matter of good medical practice and ethical obligation, whether the patient is believed to contribute to his or her injury or not. In Canada, neither the ethical obligations of physicians to treat patients, nor the patients' legal right to treatment, are subject to a moral assessment of a patient's lifestyle. Behaviours that might be deemed "risky" do not deprive patients of their rights of access to clinically required medical care. 32. Section 31 of CMA's Code of Ethics (relied on by the Court in the past e) provides that all physicians must "[r]ecognize the responsibility of physicians to promote fair access to health care resources". The patients at Insite would be deprived of positive health outcomes if Insite were to close or even continue to operate under the ongoing threat of closure. 33. Adopting the Appellants' approach to Charter interpretation would set an extremely dangerous precedent. Thus, if one were to apply the rationale of "choice" to other medical 2 See e.g. R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768 at 784-785, where the Court refers to CMA's Code of Ethics [CMA Authorities, Tab 9]. 8 contexts, such as chronic disease, patients suffering from diabetes because of contributing factors such as poor nutrition and lack of exercise would, under the same logic, be denied medical care. Indeed, many of the complex elements beyond individual choice such as socio-economic and genetic factors found by the Applications Judge in the case at bar to shape addiction as an ilness are prevalent in other diseases. This approach would be not only unethical and clinically unsound, but unconstitutionaL. (4) The Rights to Liberty of the Individual Respondents Have Been Infringed 34. The courts have recognized that the threat of criminal prosecution and possibility of imprisonment for an offence is suffcient to trigger the liberty interest and scrutiny under section 7. Malmo-Levine, supra at para. 84 ICMA Authorities, Tab 12). R. v. Parker (2000),188 D.L.R. 4th 385, at para. 101 (Ont. C.A.) ICMA Authorities, Tab 14). 35. Vulnerable patients suffering from addiction and the health care providers who provide treatment at Insite suffer violations of their constitutionally guaranteed rights (section 7 of the Charter) because of the threat of prosecution under the Act. The uncertainty associated with a ministerial exemption mechanism for Insite from certain provisions of the Act imposes a great burden on those already labouring under the weight of addiction. Moreover, health care providers are also put at risk in their ability to provide medically necessary and evidence-based health care services in a timely manner to all citizens by the capricious exemption mechanism contained in the Act. (5) The Principles of Fundamental Justice Have Not Been Respected 36. It is well established that a law that is arbitrary or overbroad will constitute a breach of the principles of fundamental justice. The CMA submits that the Applications Judge was correct when he found that the impugned provisions were arbitrary, or if not arbitrary, grossly disproportionate and overbroad. The Court of Appeal agreed that the provisions were overbroad. P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., loose-leaf (Carswell: Toronto, 2007) at 47-52 to 47-60.1 ICMA Authorities, Tab 19). R. v. Heywood, (1994) 3 S.c.R. 761 at 792-794 ICMA Authorities, Tab 10). Chaoull, supra at para. 127 ICMA Authorities, Tab 2). Rodriguez, supra at 590-591 ICMA Authorities, Tab 16). a) The Impugned Provisions Are Arbitrary 37. A law is arbitrary when it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that 9 lies behind it. In order not to be arbitrary, a limit on the section 7 right requires not only a theoretical connection between the limit and the legislative goal, but a real connection on the facts. Chaoulli, supra at paras. 130-131 [CMA Authorities, Tab 2]. 38. In the present case, by prohibiting access to evidence-based, medically necessary care, the government has contributed to the very harm it claims it seeks to prevent, i.e. drug possession and addiction. The best available medical evidence suggests that clinics such as Insite not only protect life, but offer positive health outcomes and care alternatives to vulnerable patients. 39. Moreover, the justification of any denial of access to necessary medical care based on ideology rather than facts is arbitrary since, by definition, it bears no real connection to the facts. b) The Impugned Provisions Are Overbroad 40. It is a well-established principle of fundamental justice that criminal legislation must not be overbroad. If the government, in pursuing a legitimate objective, uses means which are broader than is necessary to accomplish that objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be violated. Heywood, supra at 792-793 [CMA Authorities, Tab 10]. See also Malmo-Levine, supra at paras. 130-131 [CMA Authorities, Tab 12]. 41. A fortiori, that will be true when the state itself has a particular interest in acting to protect vulnerable persons. In the present case, the evidence before the Applications Judge demonstrated that harm reduction has been a component of Canada's drug strategy for many years. In 2002, the House of Commons Special Committee on the Non-Medical Use of Drugs rejected the dichotomy between harm reduction and an abstinence-based treatment model. It also specifically considered the creation of a safe injection facility in the downtown east side of Vancouver because it recognized that that community presented a "public health disaster". 42. Hence, while the government may be justified in preventing drug possession and trafficking, it cannot cast a legislative prohibition so widely that it captures persons in need of medical care. C. If There is an Infringement of Section 7, the Law is Not Saved by Section 1 of the Charter 43. Should the Court find that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act infringe the rights guaranteed Guy Pratt /Nadia ffend Borden L dner Gervais L 1 0 by section 7 of the Charter, the CMA submits that the provisions cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter as any law that offends the principles of fundamental justice cannot be justified, and more specifically, meet the minimal impairment branch of the section 1 analysis. See e.g. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 99 [CMA Authorities, Tab 6]; Heywood, supra at 802-803 [CMA Authorities, Tab 10]. D. Remedy 44. Fundamental justice requires either permanent exemptions or a declaration that the impugned law, as it applies to users of supervised injection sites, is invalid. The CMA submits that this position is consistent with sound constitutional interpretation of section 7 of the Charter, while protecting the most vulnerable patient populations in accordance with evidence-based medicine and physicians' ethical obligations. PART IV — SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS 45. The CMA seeks no costs and asks that none be awarded against it. PART V — ORDER SOUGHT 46. The CMA submits that constitutional questions two and four should be answered affirmatively. Should the Court answer these questions in the affirmative, however, constitutional questions three and five should be answered negatively. 47. The CMA seeks leave of this Court, pursuant to rule 59(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, to present oral argument at the hearing of this appeal. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/83-74, as amended, Rule 59(2) [Part VII of Factum]. ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 13th DAY OF APRIL, 2011. OTTO1 \ 4423086 \ 7 11 PART VI — TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TAB SOURCES Paras. in factum where cited Cases 1. Auton (Guardian a litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 23 2. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 17, 21, 23, 36, 37 3. Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 29 4. Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41 29 5. MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 20 6. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 43 7. Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 23 8. R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 29 9. R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768 32 10. R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 36, 40, 43 11. R. v. L.T.H., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 739 29 12. R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 28, 34, 40 13. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 17, 18 14. R. v. Parker (2000), 188 D.L.R. 4th 385 (Ont. C.A.) 34 15. R. v. Richard, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 525 29 16. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 21, 36 17. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 29 18. Yorkton Union Hospital v. S. UN. (1993), 16 Admin. L.R. (2d) 272 (Sask. C.A.) 29 12 TAB SOURCES Paras. where in factum cited Secondary Sources 19. Hogg, P., Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., loose-leaf (Carswell: Toronto, 2007) at 47-52 to 47-60.1. 36 20. Taylor, M. and Jamal, M., The Charter of Rights in Litigation, loose-leaf (Canada Law Book: Aurora, 2010) at para. 17:15 19 13 PART VII — STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, sections 1 and 7
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, sections 4(1), 5(1), 56
Rules of Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/83-74, as amended, Rule 59 14 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms PART I OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 Charte canadienne des droits et libertes PARTIE I DE LA LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE 1982 Rights and freedoms in Canada 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Life, liberty and security of person 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Droits et libertes au Canada 1. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertes garantit les droits et libertós qui y sont enonces. Its ne peuvent etre restreints que par une regle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se demontrer dans le cadre d'une society libre et democratique. Vie, liberte et securite 7. Chacun a droit a la vie, a la liberte et a la securite de sa personne; it ne peut etre porte atteinte a ce droit qu'en conformite avec les principes de justice fondamentale. 15 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act S.C. 1996, c. 19 Possession of substance 4. (1) Except as authorized under the regulations, no person shall possess a substance included in Schedule I, II or III. Trafficking in substance 5. (1) No person shall traffic in a substance included in Schedule I, II, III or IV or in any substance represented or held out by that person to be such a substance. Exemption by Minister 56. The Minister may, on such terms and conditions as the Minister deems necessary, exempt any person or class of persons or any controlled substance or precursor or any class thereof from the application of all or any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations if, in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public interest. Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances L.C. 1996, ch. 19 Possession de substances 4. (1) Sauf dans les cas autorises aux termes des reglements, la possession de toute substance inscrite aux annexes I, II ou III est interdite. Trafic de substances 5. (1) Il est interdit de faire le trafic de toute substance inscrite aux annexes I, II, III ou IV ou de toute substance presentee ou tenue pour telle par le trafiquant. Exemption par le ministre 56. S'il estime que des raisons medicales, scientifiques ou d'interet public le justifient, le ministre peut, aux conditions qu'il fixe, soustraire a l'application de tout ou partie de la presente loi ou de ses reglements toute personne ou categorie de personnes, ou toute substance designee ou tout precurseur ou toute categorie de ceux-ci. 16 Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada (in force on October 13, 2006) Regles de la Cour supreme du Canada. (en vigueur le 13 octobre 2006) 59. (1) In an order granting an intervention, the judge may (a) make provisions as to additional disbursements incurred by the appellant or respondent as a result of the intervention; and (b)impose any terms and conditions and grant any rights and privileges that the judge may determine, including whether the intervener is entitled to adduce further evidence or otherwise to supplement the record. (2)In an order granting an intervention or after the time for filing and serving all of the memoranda of argument on an application for leave to appeal or the facta on an appeal or reference has expired, a judge may, in their discretion, authorize the intervener to present oral argument at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, if any, the appeal or the reference, and determine the time to be allotted for oral argument. (3)An intervener is not permitted to raise new issues unless otherwise ordered by a judge. 59. (1) Dans l'ordonnance octroyant l'autorisation d'intervenir, le juge petit : a) prevoir comment seront supportes les &pens supplementaires de l'appelant ou de l'intime resultant de l'intervention; b) imposer des conditions et octroyer les droits et privileges qu'il determine, notamment le droit d'apporter d'autres elements de preuve ou de completer autrement le dossier. (2)Dans l'ordonnance octroyant l'autorisation d'intervenir ou aprês l'expiration du Mai de depOt et de signification des memoires de demande d'autorisation d'appel, d'appel ou de renvoi, le juge peut, a sa discretion, autoriser l'intervenant a presenter une plaidoirie orale a l'audition de la demande d'autorisation d'appel, de l'appel ou du renvoi, selon le cas, et determiner le temps alloue pour la plaidoirie orale. (3) Sauf ordonnance contraire d'un juge, l'intervenant n'est pas autorise a soulever de nouvelles questions.
Documents
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International designation of chrysotile asbestos as a hazardous chemical

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10212
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-89
The Canadian Medical Association will express to the Government of Canada its strong opposition to the government's decision to contest the international designation of chrysotile asbestos as a hazardous chemical.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-08-24
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Resolution
GC11-89
The Canadian Medical Association will express to the Government of Canada its strong opposition to the government's decision to contest the international designation of chrysotile asbestos as a hazardous chemical.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association will express to the Government of Canada its strong opposition to the government's decision to contest the international designation of chrysotile asbestos as a hazardous chemical.
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Joint Policy Statement: Sexual and Reproductive Health, Rights and Realities and Access to Services for First Nations, Inuit and Métis in Canada

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy10261
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-05-28
Topics
Ethics and medical professionalism
Health care and patient safety
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Resolution
BD11-05-157
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) endorses the Joint Policy Statement: Sexual and Reproductive Health, Rights and Realities and Access to Services for First Nations, Inuit and Métis in Canada as outlined in Appendix A to BD 11-113.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2018-03-03
Date
2011-05-28
Topics
Ethics and medical professionalism
Health care and patient safety
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Resolution
BD11-05-157
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) endorses the Joint Policy Statement: Sexual and Reproductive Health, Rights and Realities and Access to Services for First Nations, Inuit and Métis in Canada as outlined in Appendix A to BD 11-113.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) endorses the Joint Policy Statement: Sexual and Reproductive Health, Rights and Realities and Access to Services for First Nations, Inuit and Métis in Canada as outlined in Appendix A to BD 11-113.
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Listening to our Patient's Concerns : Comments on Bill C 54 (Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document Act) : Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1980
Last Reviewed
2019-03-03
Date
1999-03-18
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Health information and e-health
Ethics and medical professionalism
  2 documents  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2019-03-03
Date
1999-03-18
Topics
Health care and patient safety
Health information and e-health
Ethics and medical professionalism
Text
Over the last year, CMA has become increasingly concerned that debate on the issues concerning health information have been framed in terms of access to information with an attendant erosion of privacy and confidentiality. This one-sided approach comes at a time of expansion in our capacity to collect, store, merge, transfer and access information, coupled with trends both in the health care sector and generally related to the use of information To address these concerns and to ensure that privacy and confidentiality in the medical context are valued, protected and preserved, CMA developed and adopted a Health Information Privacy Code. This Code should form the basis of all legislation governing the collection, use and disclosure of health information. Health information is special by its nature. Rules relating to health information must be developed in recognition of its special nature. Ensuring protection of privacy and confidentiality of the patient record must take precedence over other considerations. Bill C-54 fails to do this. Bill C-54 is written from the perspective of encouraging commerce. It appears to have access to information as its dominant value. CMA considers the world of health care to be very different from that of commerce and consequently requiring distinct rules. Health information use must, in all but exceptional and justifiable circumstances, occur only under the strict control of the patient. The patient must be able to exercise control through voluntary, informed consent. Bill C-54 permits the collection, use and disclosure of information without knowledge or consent on grounds such as expediency, practicality, public good, research, offence investigation, historic importance and artistic purpose. The evident lack of protection accorded health information based on such ground, is unacceptable. The absence of protection undermines the integrity of the patient-physician relationship and has the potential to erode the trust patients have in their physicians - a trust that is essential to patients’ willingness to provide the complete information needed to provide them with care. Moreover, distinctions must be made between a patient’s right to know what can or must happen to health information and the right to consent to such use. Not all purposes for the collection and use of health information are equal. Collection and use beyond the therapeutic context should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny before they are permitted to occur. Bill C-54 fails to make such a distinction and treats all purposes that could be identified for information collection or use as equal. Moreover, the Bill has no mechanism to distinguish legitimate purposes, which should be permitted from illegitimate purposes, which should not. In light of the clear deficits in Bill C-54 and the inadequate protection of patient privacy and health information confidentiality, CMA makes the following recommendations: That Bill C-54 be amended to incorporate specific provisions relating to health information and that the provisions of the CMA Code provide the basis of such provisions; and That the proposed rules for health legislation be subject to the legislative test found in CMA’s Code and formulated in light of this process; and That there be a clear definition of the information being accorded a right of privacy and that this definition, at least in the case of health information, include identifiable information, delinked information, anonymous information and any composite form produced when information is linked to any information about a person from any other source; and That, at least in connection with health information, the provisions of the Bill apply equally to the public and the private sectors. I. Introduction The Canadian Medical Association is the national voice of Canadian physicians. Our mission is to provide leadership for physicians and to promote the highest standard of health and health care for Canadians. The CMA is a voluntary professional organization representing the majority of Canada's physicians and comprising 12 provincial and territorial divisions and 43 affiliated medical organizations. On behalf of its 45,000 members and the Canadian public, CMA performs a wide variety of functions, including addressing the emerging issue of electronic health information and confidentiality and privacy. It is in this capacity that we present our position on Bill C 54, The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. CMA commends the government for taking the first, important step of beginning the debate on the protection of personal information. The issues are complex and the interests at stake significant. CMA welcomes the opportunity to provide comments on Bill C-54. CMA hopes that its input will strengthen the Bill by ensuring that patient privacy and the confidentiality of medical records are adequately protected. In preparing this brief CMA has had the benefit of the final report of the federal Advisory Council on Health Infostructure, Canada Health Infoway: Paths to Better Health: Final Report. (“Advisory Council Report”) Where appropriate, CMA cites the findings contained in the report. CMA wishes to underscore the key themes of its brief: A. Health information is special by its nature. Rules relating to health information must be developed in recognition of its special nature. Ensuring protection of privacy and confidentiality of the patient record must take precedence over other considerations. Bill C-54 fails to do this. Bill C-54 is written from the perspective of encouraging commerce. It appears to have access to information as its dominant value. CMA considers the world of health care to be very different from that of commerce and consequently requiring distinct rules. B. Health information use must, in all but exceptional and justifiable circumstances, occur only under the strict control of the patient. The patient must be able to exercise control through voluntary, informed consent. Bill C-54 permits the collection, use and disclosure of information without knowledge or consent on grounds such as expediency, practicality, public good, research, offence investigation, historic importance and artistic purpose. The evident lack of protection accorded health information based on such ground, is unacceptable. The absence of protection undermines the integrity of the patient-physician relationship and has the potential to erode the trust patients have in their physicians - a trust that is essential to patients’ willingness to provide the complete information needed to provide them with care. Moreover, distinctions must be made between a patient’s right to know what can or must happen to health information and the right to consent to such use. C. Not all purposes for the collection and use of health information are equal. Collection and use beyond the therapeutic context should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny before they are permitted to occur. Bill C-54 fails to make such a distinction and treats all purposes that could be identified for information collection or use as equal. Moreover, the Bill has no mechanism to distinguish legitimate purposes, which should be permitted from illegitimate purposes, which should not. This brief will first look at the apparent rationale of Bill C-54 and its potential application to health information. The brief will next describe why CMA considers health information to be special in nature and worthy of special protection. Finally, the brief reviews the difference in approach between Bill C-54 and CMA’s Health Information Privacy Code to illustrate that Bill C-54 provides inadequate protection to patient privacy and health record confidentiality. II. Rationale and Scope of Bill C-54 A. Rational of Bill C-54 The driving force behind Bill C-54 is the support and promotion of electronic commerce. The second part of the Bill is devoted to permitting electronic versions of documents and signatures to be legitimate or ‘originals’ if the provisions of the Act are followed. Part two of the Bill is quite distinct from part one and both parts could stand alone as separate pieces of legislation. Part two simply allows electronic versions of documents and signatures to be recognized as legitimate. On its face, this has little to do with the protection of personal information except to the extent that storage of documents in electronic form provides greater ability to access, link and merge information. Certainly, the Bill appears to draw on this connection by including, in its statement of purpose, the provision of a right of privacy in an era in which technology increasingly facilitates the collection and free flow of information. Part one concerns all forms of information, electronic and otherwise. It gives some protection to personal information by requiring consent in some instances. In CMA’s view, a fundamental difficulty with part one and the Bill in general is that it’s goal is to promote commerce and thus all information is implicitly considered as falling within the ‘commercial’ realm. In the case of health information this is surely not the case or the only consideration. Moreover, this creates a clash of values when applied to a health care system that is a public system. The Advisory Council Report takes a hard line on this issue and states that legislation respecting the privacy protection of health information, “should also contain a clear prohibition against all secondary commercial use of personal health information.” Because all information is subjected to similar rules, there is no attempt within the Bill to distinguish some purposes for collecting information from other purposes. The Bill takes the approach that the purposes should be known and documented. While not stated explicitly, the assumption is that all purposes identified are legitimate and are permitted. CMA has quite a different view when it comes to health information and will expound its view throughout this brief. B. Scope - Application to Medical Records CMA is uncertain whether or to what extent Bill C-54 will apply to health records. The full name of the Act states, in part: An Act to support and promote electronic commerce by protecting personal information that is collected, used or disclosed in certain circumstances.... What are these circumstances? Section 4(1) states that Part 1 (the part protecting personal information) applies in respect of personal information that: (a) the organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial activities; (b) the organization collects, uses or discloses interprovincially or internationally; or (c) is about an employee of the organization and that the organization collects, uses or discloses in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or business. It should further be noted that three years after the Act is in force it will apply equally to activities that occur strictly within the province unless there is legislation in the province that is substantially similar to the Bill (see sections 27(2)(d) and section 30). The first issue is the provision of section 4(1)(a) - collection, use and disclosure in the course of commercial activities. There seems to be an assumption on the part of government that this automatically excludes health records, (although the Act fails to define what is meant by commercial activity). Is this accurate or does the assumption fail to recognize that there is not a clear, unambiguous distinction between what might constitute commercial activity or other activity? There are two points to be made here. The first concerns clarity around where commercial ends and health care begins. Which health care settings that operate for profit are excluded from the Act? This question speaks to the difficulty of delineating what activity is considered health care and what activity is considered commercial. Moreover it recognizes that the increased encouragement to public/private funding of endeavours within the health care sector may make it increasingly difficult to make this distinction; for example in the area of research. The second concerns the movement of health information from the health care setting (recognizing that this is not easily distinguished from the commercial setting) to the commercial setting; for example, health information provided to insurance companies. When health care information is collected in a health care setting and transferred to a commercial setting, which rules apply - Bill C-54 or no rules? In CMA’s view, there is no clear way of distinguishing commercial activity from health care activity in a way that ensures that the health care record is subject to different rules than those pertaining to other records. Moreover, the dilemma for government is that even if such distinction could occur, would it be desirable that health records be subject to no rules? Put in another way, will those organizations that currently collect health care information be entitled to claim that since the information forms part of the health record they are not subject to the provisions of C-54? Under such a regime health care records would be subject to an even lower standard than that provided for information collected in the commercial context. In terms of the provisions of 4(1)(b) - interprovincial and international transfer of information. This appears to apply to all information. In the existing environment and developments such as the “health information highway,” interprovincial transfers of information, the capacity for the central collection and storage of information, mechanisms such as telephone and cable to transfer information and general trends related to population health, it seems likely that interprovincial traffic will grow rather than diminish. The significance of this section, therefore, cannot be underestimated. Finally, the provisions of 4(1)(c) may well contain health information about the employee. In preparing this brief CMA has assumed that the Bill will provide a scheme that applies to some health information. No doubt the extent of the federal governments ability to legislate in this area generally will be the subject of extensive debate. However, CMA has no comment on this debate and provides its opinion in the interests of ensuring that the rules that relate to health information are compatible with preserving the integrity of the patient-physician relationship and the protection of patient privacy and health information confidentiality. CMA considers that the government has an opportunity to provide Canadians with strong privacy rights in health information. Indeed, CMA believes that it is incumbent upon the government to do so. C. Scope - Government Excluded Bill C-54 expressly excludes a large part of government activity from its ambit. While government activity is to some extent governed by the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, P-21, the rules of this act provide less protection than those of Bill C-54. Government should subject itself to at least the same rules that it requires of the private sector in so far as it is a collector and user of information. Moreover, CMA is of the view that government’s practices relating to the collection, storage, merging, transfer and use of health information must be subject to more stringent rules than those found in either the Privacy Act or Bill C-54. The Advisory Council Report also calls for the same rules to apply to the public and private sectors, rules that are more stringent than those found in the Privacy Act or Bill C-54. Therefore, CMA recommends: That, at least in connection with health information, the provisions of the Bill apply equally to the public and the private sectors. III. Considerations Regarding Patient Privacy and Confidentiality: Medical Context Versus Commercial Context A. CMA’s Opinion Over the last year, CMA has become increasingly concerned that debate on the issues concerning health information have been framed in terms of access to information with an attendant erosion of privacy and confidentiality. This one-sided approach comes at a time of expansion in our capacity to collect, store, merge, transfer and access information, coupled with trends both in the health care sector and generally related to the use of information To address these concerns and to ensure that privacy and confidentiality in the medical context are valued, protected and preserved, CMA developed and adopted a Health Information Privacy Code, which is appended to and forms part of this brief. In commenting on this Code the Advisory Council Report notes: The code represents an important contribution to the deliberations of Canadians and legislators on how to safeguard privacy across the health domain. There are a number of principles underpinning the Health Information Privacy Code: 1. The provision of health care to all Canadians irrespective of social circumstances or health status is a highly regarded value in Canadian society. The system is publicly funded and universally accessible. 2. The right of privacy is fundamental to a free and democratic society. 3. Rules relating to health information must recognize its special nature. Health information has a high level of sensitivity, it is confided or collected in circumstances of vulnerability and trust for the primary purpose of benefiting the patient. 4. Physicians now and historically promise that they will keep their patients’ information secret; this is a hallmark of the profession. 5. The patient-physician relationship is one of trust and a central feature of this trust is the belief in patients that information confided in or collected by physicians and other health care providers will be kept secret. 6. Patients believe that the information they disclose or that is gathered as a result of their seeking health care will be used to provide them with health care; uses beyond the provision of health care without knowledge or consent go beyond what a patient’s reasonable expectations were when information was disclosed or gathered and is a breach of the trust patients place in their physicians. 7. Except in very limited circumstances, consent is required for health information collection, use, disclosure or access for any purpose. 8. Information required to provide patients with the health care sought should be readily available to those who require it to provide an aspect of care. 9. Uses of health information for purposes other than the provision of health care to the person seeking care should be subject to rules that: - protect and promote privacy and confidentiality; - generally require express consent; - can be justified according to specific criteria. 10. Patients should know the uses to which their health information is put prior to their disclosure of it. 11. Patients may be reluctant to disclose information if they are concerned about the uses to which the information is put or the persons entitled to access it. B. Public Opinion To determine the public’s view on these issues, CMA commissioned Angus Reid to conduct research in two forms, quantative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups), and has found the following: 1. Patients believe that their health information will be kept confidential and consider this to be important. 2. Patients believe it important to know and control how their health information is shared with others. 3. Patients do not want their health information released to third parties (including governments and researchers) without their knowledge and consent. 4. Patients may have concerns about the release of delinked or anonymous information to third parties without their consent. 5. Patients may be reluctant to confide information as a result of concerns related to its use or disclosure. These findings are consistent with general findings relating to the public’s concerns about privacy and confidentiality. C. The Advisory Council Report The Advisory Council Report relates to the electronic health record. However, given the direction towards the greater use of technology and the underlying principles informing the Advisory Council, CMA believes that the recommendations are generalizable to all health information. A key principle of the Advisory Council is that access by health care professionals should be based on a need-to-know basis under the strict control of the patient. The Council, like CMA calls for scrutiny and justification of secondary uses of health information. The Council is opposed to the use of multipurpose identifiers on the grounds that it becomes too easy for government officials from one department to gain access to a person’s health record or combine a number of records to assemble a comprehensive profile. (Anecdotal evidence suggests that this concern may be justified and that there are insufficient safeguards preventing the flow of health information among government departments) The Council recommends that all governments ensure that they have legislation to address privacy protection specifically aimed at protecting personal health information through explicit and transparent mechanisms. Included in these mechanisms are: * The provision of a precise definition of free and informed consent, as well as a statement of principle that informed consent should be the basis for sharing personal health information; * Any exemption to the requirement of informed consent should be clearly set out in law. More specifically, legislative guidance should be provided on how to balance the right of privacy with the public good for research purposes to implement a coherent and harmonized pan-Canadian system for independent, ethical review. * There should be provisions regulating secondary uses of non-identifiable health information. These provisions should address privacy concern surrounding the degree to which data might be linked back to an identifiable individual. * Legislation should set clear limits on access to and use of health information by third parties outside the health care system. To prevent the serious invasions of privacy that can result from the unrestricted linking of personal health information with other kinds of information on the same individual, the legislation should contain provisions prohibiting the use for any other purpose of unique personal identifiers in health information systems. D. The Approach in Bill C-54 Bill C-54 is inadequate in its protection of health information. The Bill makes a meagre attempt at distinguishing among varying types of personal information and gives no additional protection to information that is highly sensitive (such as health information). The Bill permits the collection, use and disclosure of information without knowledge or consent on grounds such as expediency, practicality, public good, research, offence investigation, historic importance and artistic purposes. In the context of health information, these grounds should be subject to intense scrutiny to determine their relevance and legitimacy. In CMA’s view and according to the tests established in the CMA’s Code, some of these grounds would not withstand such scrutiny. E. Conclusion CMA’s Code offers a template for the protection that should be accorded health information, a template that appears to have some public support and that strives to retain patient confidence in their physicians and the health care system. The Report of the Federal Advisory Council also recognizes that special rules are required for health information. The Council’s Report places strong emphasis on the protection of privacy, recognizes that as a general rule the flow of health information should be on a need-to-know basis and under the control of the patient through the exercise of free and informed consent and requires limits on the secondary use of health information. In CMA’s view, Bill C-54 should incorporate specific rules relating to health information and CMA’s Code should form the basis of these rules. CMA recommends: That Bill C-54 be amended to incorporate specific provisions relating to health information and that the provisions of the CMA Code provide the basis of such provisions. In addition, CMA’s Code provides a test that legislation addressing health information should be subjected to. This test (found in section 3.6 of the CMA Code) states: Any proposed or existing legislation or regulation made under legislative authority that permits or requires health information collection, use, disclosure or access shall be subjected to the following legislative test: (a) There must be demonstration that: (i) a patient privacy impact assessment has been conducted, the analysis has been made public and has been duly considered prior to the introduction of legislation [section 3.5 of the Code provides guidance with respect to the patient privacy impact assessment]; (ii) collection, use, disclosure and access will be limited to the greatest degree possible to ensure that * the collection of health information by persons external to the therapeutic context will neither trade on nor compromise the trust of the patient-physician relationship; * patients are not likely to be inhibited from confiding information for primary purposes; * the ability of physicians to discharge their fiduciary duties to patients will not be compromised; and, * patient vulnerability will not be exploited; (iii) collection, use, disclosure and access will be restricted to what is necessary for the identified purpose(s) and will not impede the confiding or collection of information for primary purposes; (iv) provisions exist for ensuring that patients are provided with knowledge about the purpose(s) and that, subject to 3.6(b), patient consent is clearly voluntary; (v) the means used are proportionate and the collection will be limited to purposes consented to or made known to the patient; (vi) the patient’s privacy will be intruded upon to the most limited degree possible in light of the purpose(s) consented to or made known to the patient; (vii) linkage of the health information will be limited; and (viii) unless clear and compelling reasons exist: * all reasonable steps will be taken to make health information anonymous; and * if it has been demonstrated that making health information anonymous would render it inadequate for legitimate uses, the information will be collected and stored in a deidentified-relinkable format. (b) When nonconsensual collection, use, disclosure or access is permitted or required by legislation or regulation that meets the requirements of the Code, the following conditions must also be met: (i) the right of privacy has to be violated because the purpose(s) could not be met adequately if patient consent is required; and (ii) the importance of the purpose(s) must be demonstrated to justify the infringement of the patient’s right of privacy in a free and democratic society. (c) Any legislative provision or regulation that permits or requires health information collection, use, disclosure or access nonconsensually shall not, without compelling reasons, be applied retroactively to existing health information. In its current form, Bill C-54 would not pass the scrutiny of the test. Consequently, CMA recommends: That the proposed rules for health legislation be subject to the legislative test found in CMA’s Code and formulated in light of this process. IV. Specific Comments on Bill C-54 From the Perspective of CMA’s Health Information Privacy Code This section highlights some key distinctions between the approach taken by Bill C-54 and CMA’s Health Information Privacy Code. The purpose of this section is to illustrate through examples the divergence of approaches taken with the ultimate aim of demonstrating that Bill C-54 is inadequate in the protection it accords health information. A. General Bill C-54 and CMA’s Health Information Privacy Code are based on the Canadian Standards Association’s Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (CSA Code). Bill C-54 and the CMA Code also augment the CSA Code’s provisions where considered necessary. The need to extend the provisions of the CSA Code demonstrates that the CSA Code, being general in nature, provides inadequate protection to information in many instances. Although Bill C-54 and the CMA Code are based on the CSA Code, each takes a different approach to the ultimate protection accorded information. This divergence demonstrates that there are many ways to resolve issues left unresolved by the CSA Code. In other words, it is not a foregone conclusion that basing provisions on the CSA Code will result in appropriate or adequate protection of information. Rather, resolution of issues requires thought and deliberation and will depend in some measure on the primacy given to certain values. Bill C-54 appears to have given access primacy in the pursuit of commerce, whereas CMA gives privacy protection primacy in the pursuit of the provision of health care in accordance with physicians fiduciary obligations to patients and the integrity of the patient-physical relationship. CMA did not develop its approach in a vacuum. It reviewed and was inspired by the report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, entitled Privacy: Where Do We Draw the Line? This report articulates and makes explicit many of the issues that should be informing the current debate on Bill C-54. In addition, the Report of the Advisory Council takes a very different approach to Bill C-54. The Report recognizes the need to pay more than lip service to protecting privacy and confidentiality and recommends specific measures aimed at doing this. B. Information Protected Bill C-54 The Bill covers “personal information” which is defined to mean “information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form.” This definition raises a host of questions: 1. Does the Bill cover or not information that has been delinked to an identifiable individual but that could be relinked to identify them? 2. Does the Bill only exclude anonymous information - that is, information that could never be relinked to an indentifiable individual? And if so, is there an unjustified assumption that information can, in all cases, be rendered truly anonymous? 3. In the case of delinked and anonymous information, who decides that information about an identifiable individual can be rendered delinked or anonymous? The holder of the information or the person to whom the information pertains? 4. Is it accurate or reasonable to assume that people have no interest in information emanating from them once it has been rendered delinked or anonymous? CMA Health Information Privacy Code The CMA Code provides a broad definition of health information: Health information means any information about a patient that is confided or collected in the therapeutic context, including information created or generated from this information and information that is not directly or indirectly linked to the provision of health care. It includes all information formats. In addition, the CMA Code covers identifiable information, delinked information, anonymous information and any composite form that is produced when health information is linked to other information about the patient. CMA’s research indicates that patients may have an interest in their information when it is in delinked and anonymous formats. Advisory Council Report The Advisory Council Report addresses this issue in a number of ways. In making recommendations concerning the definition of health information the Report calls for legislation that embodies: a clear definition of health information, broad enough to incorporate health information collected in public and private systems and to ensure that equal obligations and penalties apply to both public and private sectors. The report recognizes a spectrum of data formats: completely anonymous, linked to pseudo-identities, code linked and reidentifiable, completely identifiable. In terms of sensitivity, the Report notes that information that can be re-identified is somewhat more sensitive that completely anonymous data or anonymous data linked to pseudo-identities and that completely identifiable health information is the most sensitive type of health information. The Report also notes that there can be some degree of risk of re-identification of what was believed to be anonymous data through such processes as data matching and the results of analysis using small cells. In this light, the Report recommends: A definition of personal health information, which takes into account the spectrum of potential identifiability in the case of health information. Furthermore, in the case of secondary uses of health information, the Report notes that provisions regulating secondary uses of non-identifiable health information must form part of the legislation. Such provisions should address privacy concerns surrounding the degree to which data might be linked back to an identifiable individual. The Report raises further issues relating to the use of delinked and anonymous data. The Report notes that there may be group interests and concerns regarding data collected and states: Privacy can also be a concern for groups such as Aboriginal and immigrant communities. These communities worry that research on their members could be released to the media without notice and used in a negative way. This emerging issue is growing in importance and, in the Council’s view, should be a serious consideration in the context of ethical reviews of proposed research projects. It is important to note that in these instances it is not the fact that data is linked to an identifiable individual that is of concern. Rather, it is the ability to accumulate, process and dissect information that has ramifications for an individual because they are part of a group segregated and identified by the research. Finally, the Report considers the use of person-based data but not people’s names, for statistical purposes and notes that this too raises concerns about privacy. The Report notes that: “These concerns have traditionally been seen as a tradeoff against data access for research and analysis in the public interest.” The Report restates this to provide a more positive view of privacy and states: “the best way for analysts to maintain the public’s consent to use sensitive (but anonymous) health data is to show the public that privacy, confidentiality and security are being taken seriously.” Recommendation That there be a clear definition of the information being accorded a right of privacy and that this definition, at least in the case of health information, include identifiable information, delinked information, anonymous information and any composite form produced when information is linked to any information about a person from any other source. C. Knowledge of Purpose Prior to Collection Bill C-54 Bill C-54 is ambiguous in its provisions relating to whether or not a person should know the purposes for which information will be used prior to disclosure. This is due in part to the use of the term “knowledge and consent” as one concept rather than distinguishing the knowledge requirement from the consent requirement. What a person should know in relation to the purposes information might be used or disclosed for, prior to its being given is distinct conceptually from whether the person must consent before information can be used or disclosed for a particular purpose. Schedule 1 of the Bill contains a number of principles. For the purposes of this brief the schedule will be referred to in terms of the principles (and their subparagraphs). Principle 2 addresses the identification of purposes that information will be used or disclosed for. Provided a purpose is identified it becomes a legitimate purpose under the Bill. Subparagraph 3 states that the identified purposes should be specified at or before the time of collection. Section 5(2) of the Bill states that the use of ‘should’ in schedule 1 indicates a recommendation and does not impose an obligation. Therefore, according to subparagraph 3, it is recommended but is not obligatory that disclosure occur. On the other hand, principle 3 addresses consent and appears to impose an obligation by stating that the knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate. Similarly subparagraph 2 appears to create something of an obligation by stating, “organizations shall make a reasonable effort to ensure that the individual is advised of the purposes for which the information will be used.” The relationship between these sections should be clarified and made consistent. CMA is pleased to note that principle 3 has been modified to define when, and only when, organizations may collect information without knowledge or consent. Section 7(1)(a) permits the collection of information without knowledge and consent when collection is clearly in the interests of the individual and consent cannot be obtained. The intent of this section could be made clearer, particularly in terms of who determines the “interests of the individual.” Otherwise this exception could give undesirable license to collect without knowledge or consent. The provision in section 7(1)(b) is more problematic. This section appears to favour withholding knowledge from an individual if such knowledge would compromise accuracy, defeat the purpose for collection or prejudice the use. In some instances it may well be that if an individual is provided with knowledge of the purposes for which information is collected and the uses to which it will be put, they may choose to withhold information rather than disclose it, and in doing so would clearly compromise accuracy, defeat the purpose for collection or prejudice the use the information will be put to. This is contrary to the principle found in principle 4.1 which recognizes that information should not be collected by misleading or deceiving individuals. The intent of this section should be far clearer and circumscribed in such a way as to make it clear that it is not permissible to withhold knowledge or not seek consent simply on the basis that if a person had knowledge they would not wish to disclose information. Section 7(1)(c) allows collection without knowledge or consent for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes. This provision is totally inappropriate in the case of health information. CMA Health Information Privacy Code The CMA Code is considerably more restrictive that Bill C-54. It recognizes that in the therapeutic context, health information is confided by or collected from patients under the patient presumption that it is necessary to meet his or her therapeutic needs. CMA also believes that the potential that health information may be subsequently collected, used, disclosed or accessed for other purposes without patient consent should be made known to patients before information is confided or collected for the primary therapeutic purpose. CMA further notes that it is not acceptable to withhold knowledge from patients deliberately out of concern that knowledge could inhibit them from confiding important information fully and truthfully. CMA limits the circumstances the nonconsensual collection of health information to those: 1. Permitted or required by legislation; 2. When ordered or decided by a court of law. Moreover, the CMA gives explicit direction to legislators with respect to the conditions under which legislation should permit or require health information collection (see section 3.6 of CMA Code). In the case of nonconsensual collection, the following conditions are stipulated: 1. The right of privacy has to be violated because the purposes could not be met adequately if patient consent is required; and 2. The importance of the purposes must be demonstrated to justify the infringement of the patient’s right of privacy in a free and democratic society. While Bill C-54 is clearly enabling the collection of information, it does not, in CMA’s opinion put sufficient emphasis on or provide protections that preserve privacy and confidentiality, especially in the medical context. D. Use Without Knowledge Or Consent Bill C-54 Once information has been collected and despite the, albeit inadequate, limits placed on collection without knowledge or consent, it can be put to even greater use than the purposes it has been collected for with or without knowledge or consent. Section 7(2) opens up dramatically the uses to which collected information may be put without either knowledge or consent. At a minimum and without little additional administrative effort, the enumerated grounds of section 7(2) (and 7(3))should be made known to an individual prior to their disclosure of information, which would be in keeping with the principle of openness and explicitness. Section 7(2)(a) allows use in connection with the investigation of an offence. In the medical context this might be problematic particularly if it is interpreted to impose an obligation. Generally, there is no obligation to assist in the investigation of an offence and indeed the fiduciary duty between patient and physician and the duty of confidentiality owed to the patient by the physician would suggest that physicians not offer information despite its usefulness. Section 7(2)(b) recognizes emergency situations. However, as worded, section 7(2)(b) would allow access to anyone’s information if it is for the purpose of acting in respect of an emergency threatening the life, health or security of an individual. The implications of this section should be carefully thought through. Do we really intend to give such a broad licence to access anyone’s information on the basis of an emergency. In CMA’s view there should be some limiting principle that takes into account the prevailing view that people generally are not required to go to the assistance of others (emergency or otherwise) and that information about oneself is considered worthy of protection against use or disclosure despite its potential benefit to others for example, genetic information or HIV, Hepatitis C status. Section 7(2)(c) is very problematic as it permits the use of “identifiable” information for a host of purposes, including statistical and research, when it is impractical to seek consent. Even though the Commissioner must be informed of the use before the information is used the Commissioner has no power to approve or reject the use, and since the use is legitimate under the Bill provided the Commissioner has been notified there would be no grounds open to the Commissioner to cause an audit to occur. This section gives significant scope to use information that has been collected without knowledge or consent and certainly in the case of health information is problematic. CMA Health Information Privacy Code The CMA Code makes a clear distinction between the primary purpose for the collection and use of health information and secondary purposes for its use. The key distinction between these two categories is that primary purposes relates to the provision of the health care benefit sought whereas secondary purposes are ends or aims that are not directly related to the provision of care. The CMA Code divides secondary purposes into two categories: 1. Secondary legislated purposes, those purposes that have been subjected to the legislative test specified in the Code and have subsequently been written into law; 2. Secondary nonlegislated purposes are any other purposes, such as education or research not governed by legislation, that meet the provisions of the CMA Code and the secondary nonlegislative test provided by the Code. The tests that CMA requires both to go through relate to: 1. Impact on privacy. 2. Impact on the patient-physician relationship, especially confidentiality and trust. 3. Impact on the willingness of patients to disclose information. 4. Impact on patients’ ability to receive care. 5. Evidence of broad public support for the measure. 6. The use will not exploit or compromise the trust of the patient-physician relationship. 7. Patient vulnerability will not be exploited. 8. Under most circumstances patients will be fully informed of the purpose and patient consent will be clearly voluntary. 9. Patient privacy will be intruded upon to the most limited degree possible. 10. Linkage of health information will be restricted and consented to by patients. In other words, CMA is not satisfied that any and all secondary purposes for the use of health information should be permitted. Rather, CMA seeks justification for the secondary use and assurance that the secondary use will neither impede nor undermine the patient-physician relationship and the provision of health care to the patient. Moreover, the CMA Code only permits use without consent if it is permitted or required by legislation or when ordered or decided by a court of law. The Advisory Council Report Like CMA, the Advisory Council Report makes distinctions among various types of uses. The report calls for legislation to clearly prohibit all secondary commercial use of personal health information. In addition, the Report recommends that there be provisions regulating secondary uses of non-identifiable health information and that such provisions should address privacy concerns surrounding the degree to which such data might be linked back to an identifiable individual. In this context, the Report recommends that legislation set clear limits on access to and use of health information by third parties outside the health care system. In addition the Report reviews the uses of health information for statistical and research purposes. The Report’s findings with respect to statistical use have already been discussed. In connection with research, the Report calls for a number of safeguards and restrictions: 1. Where the data sets used have a higher level of potential identifiability, “the general rule should be informed consent and stringent assurances about privacy protection and security arrangements are necessary before a researcher can have access to personally identifiable information.” 2. The Report recognizes that in some instances it may be impractical to obtain consent from patients. Whether in anonymous or identifiable form the Report requires that notice be given about the use of the information in either form. In the case of the use of identifiable information, the Report states that the research should be subject to independent ethics review with the onus on the person seeking to use the information without consent to demonstrate that: (a) a tangible public good of significant benefit will result; (b) consent is impossible to secure at a reasonable cost; (c) less identifiable data will not serve the same purpose; and (d) no harm can occur to any person directly or indirectly [note the above discussion on group privacy] as a result of this use of his or her personal information. E. Disclosure Without Knowledge Or Consent Bill C-54 The comments found under C. and D. above apply equally here. Section 7(3) adds further instances when collected information can be disclosed to others without knowledge or consent. CMA Code In the case of health information CMA takes a far more restrictive approach. In the case of use, disclosure or access the CMA Code states: The potential that health information, in whole or in part, may be subsequently collected, used, disclosed or accessed for other purposes without their consent, and what those purposes might be, must be made know to the patient by reasonable means before it is confided or collected for primary purposes. Moreover, the CMA Code recognizes that information disclosed by one organization is collected by another. The Code defines collection to mean: the act of accessing, receiving, compiling, gathering, acquiring or obtaining health information from any source, including third parties, and by any means. It includes information collected from the patient, as well as secondary collection of this information in whole or in part by another provider or user. The collecting organization should be bound by the provisions of the CMA Code, which generally requires consent for use for any purpose and always requires knowledge of the potential purposes that information will or must be put to prior to the information being disclosed. CMA’s Code states: Health information custodians must ensure that third parties privy to health information have adopted this Code or are bound by equivalent provisions. Finally, the CMA Code explicitly recognizes that information can be retrieved from a variety of sources to formulate records. Any and all such practices and the composite form developed are given the same degree of protection as that accorded the original data collected by or through the patient. F. Information Flow Within Organizations Bill C-54 Bill C-54 defines use to include, “the transfer of personal information within an organization.” Therefore, to the extent that Bill C-54 restricts the free flow of information it restricts in within an organization. In the health care context this is not a reasonable or desirable outcome. CMA Code The CMA Code recognizes that the free flow of health information is desirable to the extent that it furthers the provision of the health care benefit sought and that it occurs with patient consent. The CMA Code defines the primary purpose to mean: (i) Primary therapeutic purpose is the initial reason for a patient seeking or receiving care in the therapeutic context, and pertains to the delivery of health care to a particular patient with respect to the presenting health need or problem. It encompasses consultation with and referral to other providers on a need-to-know basis. (ii) Primary longitudinal purpose concerns developing composite health information about a particular patient, such as a detailed medical history, beyond direct application to the presenting health need or problem, in order to enhance ongoing care to that person. The Code goes on to state that: Health information collection, use, disclosure or access for the primary therapeutic and longitudinal purposes may be as extensive as necessary to fulfil these purposes and reflect the high level of trustworthiness and accountability of health professionals in the therapeutic context. And further states that: Security safeguards shall impede as little as possible health information collection, use, access and disclosure for primary purposes. Finally, in addressing consent the Code states: Consent to health information collection, use, disclosure and access for the primary therapeutic purpose may be inferred. Consent to subsequent collection, use, disclosure and access on a need-to-know basis by or to other physicians or health providers for this purpose, and for this purpose alone, may be inferred, as long as there is no evidence that the patient would not give express consent to share the information. G. Individual Access Bill C-54 Bill C-54 restricts the right of individual access to personal information. The grounds for denying access to information are inappropriate in the health care context. CMA Code The CMA Code follows the prevailing case law as it relates to medical records. Primarily this gives the patients a right of access to their record in all but very limited circumstances. These circumstances are, if there is a significant likelihood of a substantial adverse effect on the physical, mental or emotional health of the patient or substantial harm to a third party. The onus lies on the provider to justify denial of access. H. Accuracy and Amendment Bill C-54 Bill C-54 requires that information be as accurate, complete and up-to-date as possible and that it shall not be routinely updated unless this is necessary to fulfil the purpose for its collection. In so far as amendment is concerned, Bill C-54 permits amendment to the record in specified circumstances. CMA Code The CMA Code takes a different approach in light of the nature and purpose of health information. The Code recognizes that the “recording of statements of fact, clinical judgements and determinations or assessments should reflect as nearly as possible what has been confided by the patient and what has been ascertained, hypothesized or determined to be true using professional judgement.” In terms of amending the record in light of a patient’s request, the CMA Code seeks to preserve the original record but also note the patient’s concerns. To accommodate both requirements the CMA Code states: Patients who have reviewed their information and believe it to be inaccurately recorded or false have the right to suggest amendments and to have their amendments appended to the health information. I. Sensitivity Bill C-54 In a number of instances Bill C-54 and in particular schedule 1 recognize that medical records have a high level of sensitivity attached. Which in turns warrants special attention concerning consent, reasonable expectations, individual access and implicity, the degree of security that is appropriate. CMA Code The CMA Code seeks to recognize that while all health information is sensitive (when considered against other forms of information about individuals) there are also variations in the level of sensitivity in various aspects of the health record. The CMA Code defines the “sensitivity of health information” to refer to: the patient’s interest in keeping the information secret. It varies according to the nature of the information, its form, and the potential negative repercussions of its collection, use or disclosure on the patient’s interests. Under the Code’s consent provisions it is stated that: Although all health information is sensitive and should be treated as such, the more sensitive the health information is likely to be, given what is known about the circumstances or preferences of the patient, the more important it is to ensure that consent is voluntary and informed. With respect to security the Code states: The development of security safeguards with respect to levels of access for various users shall recognize the differences in the sensitivity of health information and permit access accordingly. V. Conclusions The increased capacity to collect, store, transfer, merge and access information coupled with trends that support increased use of and access to information have the potential to erode our traditional understanding and protection of privacy and confidentiality. The issues are complex and the choices we must make are difficult. Nevertheless, these issues should be squarely on the table and the choices that we make must be clear, transparent and defensible. Of paramount importance is that the public is not mislead into believing that their information is being protected or kept confidential when in fact it is not. Therefore, even to refer to Bill C-54 as the “Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act” should be the subject of debate. Is the Bill truly about information protection or is it actually about permitting access to information? Bill C-54 presents one approach, an approach that values commerce and access. In CMA’s view the approach is totally inadequate when applied to health information. CMA also believes that the public would also find Bill C-54 inadequate. CMA presents a different approach, an approach that values privacy and the preservation of the trust and integrity of the patient-physician relationship. CMA believes that its approach would receive broad public support. Moreover, CMA believes that to the extent the CMA Code presents tests rather than conclusions, these tests should be administered in good faith prior to legislative initiatives related to health information or in the case of secondary usage of health information in general. CMA believes that its approach draws support from the Federal Advisory Council Report, which also recognizes the importance of preserving patient privacy and the confidentiality of the health record in an era of increased use of technology. Implicitly, the Report recognizes that the benefits of such technology cannot be realized if public support, based on assurance of privacy protection, cannot be secured. CMA urges this committee to implement CMA’s recommendations and in doing so provide the type of protection that health information deserves and that Canadians desire. VI. Summary of Recommendations That Bill C-54 be amended to incorporate specific provisions relating to health information and that the provisions of the CMA Code provide the basis of such provisions; and That the proposed rules for health legislation be subject to the legislative test found in CMA’s Code and formulated in light of this process; and That there be a clear definition of the information being accorded a right of privacy and that this definition, at least in the case of health information, include identifiable information, delinked information, anonymous information and any composite form produced when information is linked to any information about a person from any other source; and That, at least in connection with health information, the provisions of the Bill apply equally to the public and the private sectors.
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