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Policies that advocate for the medical profession and Canadians


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Adoption and implementation of sustainable funding framework for medicare

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1518
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC04-85
The Canadian Medical Association advocates for the adoption and implementation of a sustainable funding framework for medicare based on the policy objectives set out in the Canada Health Access Fund.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC04-85
The Canadian Medical Association advocates for the adoption and implementation of a sustainable funding framework for medicare based on the policy objectives set out in the Canada Health Access Fund.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association advocates for the adoption and implementation of a sustainable funding framework for medicare based on the policy objectives set out in the Canada Health Access Fund.
Less detail

Aligning health and economic policy in the interest of Canadians : CMA’s 2004 Pre-Budget Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1949
Last Reviewed
2012-03-03
Date
2004-11-18
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
  2 documents  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2012-03-03
Date
2004-11-18
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
For the past several years, the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has been delivering two overall messages to the Standing Committee on Finance. First, we believe that Canadians’ health and their health care system must be recognized as ongoing priorities. Second, we have been making the case that economic policy, including tax policy, must be better aligned with national health policy. This year’s brief provides specific examples of how the federal government can take action to address both of these issues. We begin with an assessment or a “check up” of the health of our health system. We then provide constructive suggestions on how to successfully implement the health agreement reached at the September 13-15, 2004 meeting of First Ministers. Finally, we draw attention to the need for continued investments in public health and healthy public policy. Canadians remain increasingly concerned about the future state of their health care system, particularly in terms of accessing essential care. While their health status has improved over the past decades, international comparisons suggest there is considerable room for improvement. The significant announcements made over the past year related to reinvestments in health care and public health are a welcomed start to support health stakeholders in facing these challenges. The next steps must build on this progress. INVESTING IN HEALTH CARE Build on The First Ministers Meeting Agreement In terms of health care, we must begin by noting that the First Ministers Meeting Agreement (FMM Agreement) was a significant achievement. It represents a positive policy framework to run with, but it must now receive the necessary fiscal, political and legislative follow-through. Legislation should be enacted that specifies the accountability framework for the Agreement. The Wait Times Reduction Fund should be subject to contribution agreements that specify how provinces and territories will use their share of this fund to reduce wait times. Critical to future success is the need for health care stakeholders to be actively involved with all facets of the Agreement, particularly in developing clinically derived wait time benchmarks. Make Health Human Resources a Priority At the same time, the federal government can do more to address accessibility to health care services by making a stronger commitment to increasing Canada’s health human resources capacity. Several strategies are outlined in this brief, beginning with the need to ensure that the Wait Times Reduction Fund in the FMM Agreement is used immediately to address the crisis in health human resources rather than in the last four years of the ten-year Agreement as currently projected. One specific health human resources strategy that the federal government should pursue is providing greater support for the training of students in health care professions as part of an overall health human resources strategy. High student debt is a key health human resource issue. It is estimated that, by the time medical students enter their pre-practice postgraduate training period, many are doing so with a debt of at least $120,000 or more. This high debt load is affecting both the kind of specialty that physicians-in-training choose, and ultimately where they decide to practice. As a result, the CMA calls upon the federal government to implement a national strategy to extend the Canada Student Loans interest payment benefit to eligible health professional students pursuing postgraduate training. Such action would provide a fairer approach and would alleviate some of the problems associated with our current training system of health professionals. ALIGNING TAX POLICY WITH HEALTH POLICY The CMA has highlighted the need to better align tax policy with national health policy goals for some time and we believe this challenge remains a priority. One example of where tax policy and health policy can be better aligned is how the GST is currently applied to the health care sector and to physicians—something the Finance Committee has acknowledged in previous reports. Hospitals in Canada must still pay a portion of the GST on their purchase of goods and services siphoning away millions of dollars that would otherwise be used for patient care. The federal government recognized in the 2004 budget the need to provide a full GST rebate to municipalities, one of the four sectors covered by the so-called “MUSH” formula (Municipalities, Universities, Schools and Hospitals). We call on the government to apply the same logic and provide a full GST rebate to the health care sector. Another problem exists with how the GST is applied to independent health professionals, such as physicians, providing care to Canada’s publicly funded system. By virtue of being “tax exempt” under The Excise Act, physicians cannot claim any input tax credits to offset the GST costs they pay on their purchases of equipment, rent and utilities. Unlike other self-employed people, physicians cannot pass on any of these additional costs. This is a fundamental issue of tax fairness. It can be resolved by zero rating the GST on publicly funded health services provided by independent health providers thereby making them eligible to receive input tax credits. INVESTING IN HEALTH This past year saw many positive developments made to Canada’s public health system. The CMA was pleased to see the creation of the position of Minister of State, Public Health. We commend the Government of Canada for its establishment of the Public Health Agency of Canada and for its selection of Dr. David Butler-Jones as the new Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. However, the government must continue to reinvest in public health to ensure that the country has a system that earns the trust of Canadians. Investing in public health also makes good economic policy. We have seen in recent years the incredible economic impact that public health outbreaks can have on a country’s economy. Close the Naylor Gap in Public Health The National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health (the Naylor Report) estimated that approximately $1 billion in annual funding is required to implement and sustain the public health programming that Canada requires. While representing an important reinvestment in this country’s public health system, the funding announced in the 2004 Budget falls well short of this basic requirement. Accordingly, the CMA calls on the federal government to address the $450 million “Naylor Gap” as soon as possible. Establish National Health Goals Guiding this country’s efforts to improve the health of Canadians should be the establishment and monitoring of national health goals. Thus, the CMA fully supports the First Ministers’ call to establish a Pan-Canadian Public Health Strategy that includes the setting of health goals that are independently monitored. These goals should also cover environmental health goals given their direct implication on Canadians’ health status. Invest in Health Not Tobacco Another key area for the CMA where current economic policy is not aligned with national health policy is the Canada Pension Plan’s investment in tobacco stocks. Despite the fact that tobacco continues to kill approximately 45,000 Canadians a year and costs Canadian society approximately $11 billion per year in net cost, the Canada Pension Plan continues to invest millions ($94 million) in the tobacco industry. We strongly believe that the CPP Investment Board should be prohibited from investing in the tobacco industry and that it divest its current tobacco holdings. Other major pension and investment plans have successfully executed this policy including the MD Funds held for Canada’s physicians at MD Management Ltd. a wholly-owned subsidiary of CMA. Accordingly, we call on the Standing Committee on Finance along with the Standing Committee on Health to jointly review the CPP investment policy as it relates to investments in tobacco. The FMM Agreement and last year’s funding announcements for public health must be seen as for what they are—first steps to sustaining Canada’s health care system and its public health infrastructure. Canada’s physicians and the CMA are committed to working with governments and other health care stakeholders to ensure that these financial investments lead to positive and enduring change, and ultimately improved health for all Canadians. RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 1 The federal government move quickly to enact legislation to implement the funding and accountability provisions of the First Ministers’ Agreement. The legislation should specify that the $4.5 billion Wait Times Reduction Fund be subject to contribution agreements with the provinces and territories. Recommendation 2 The federal government work with relevant stakeholders to extend interest free status on Canada Student Loans for all eligible health professional students pursuing postgraduate training. Recommendation 3 As part of an effort to ensure that its tax policy is consistent with the goals of its health policy and the sustainability of Canada’s health care system, the federal government should: - increase the GST rebate for publicly funded health care institutions and clinics to 100% ($90 million annually for hospitals) - zero rate GST on publicly funded health services provided by independent health care providers ($75 million annually for medical services). Recommendation 4 The Standing Committees on Finance and Health hold a joint review of the CPP policy as it relates to investments in tobacco (both current and potential) by the CPP Investment Board. II. CMA’S ANNUAL CHECKUP Much has happened over the past year in regards to Canada’s health and health care systems. First, we witnessed the creation of the Health Council of Canada, an institution that can play a significant role in improving the accountability of Canada’s health system. Second, we saw several announcements aimed at rebuilding Canada’s public health system including the establishment of the Public Health Agency of Canada and the subsequent appointment of Canada’s first Chief Public Health Officer. And in September, federal, provincial and territorial First Ministers reached a historic agreement on a 10-year plan to strengthen health care. Canadians no doubt welcome these developments. They have made it known to governments and health care providers alike that access to health care has become their top public policy issue. Not surprisingly, health was the top issue during the recent federal election campaign. For four years, the CMA has been tracking Canadians’ assessment of our health care system through our National Report Card on the Sustainability of Health Care. We are sad to report that the number of Canadians giving the nation's health care system a grade of C or F this year increased by a dramatic 9% over last year. While Canadians still give the system an overall B grade, the percentage of C and F grades was the highest since Ipsos-Reid began conducting the survey on behalf of the CMA in 2001. Moreover, our survey results found that 97% agreed that any discussion to make the system more sustainable needs to guarantee timely access for essential health services. As our fact sheet on Canadians’ health and their health care system illustrates (see Appendix A), improving access remains a major challenge for our health care system. Canada has one of the poorest physician-to-population ratios among all OECD countries. It is therefore not surprising that in 2003, 14% of Canadians reported not having a regular family physician (25% in Quebec). A recent Statistics Canada survey on wait times found that the proportion of patients who considered their wait time unacceptable was 17% for non-emergency surgery, 21% for diagnostic tests and 29% for specialist visits. 1 Over the past year, CMA has been very active in bringing attention to the issue of access and wait times. The CMA co-sponsored a colloquium on managing wait times last April that culminated in the recently released report, The Taming of the Queue: Toward a Cure for Health Care Wait Times. 2 But what about the state of Canadians’ health itself? Certainly our health status has improved greatly over the past decades. However, while Canadians are among the healthiest people in the world, citizens in several industrialized countries are enjoying better health status. For example, disability-free life expectancy, that is quality of life years lived, for Canadian males is 18th among the 30 OECD countries and 16th for Canadian females. Canada’s rate of infant mortality—deaths during the first year of life—is among the highest in the OECD. But we need not compare ourselves to other countries to find differences in levels of health status. Significant discrepancies in health status also exist among Canadians, be it between provinces, between regions, between communities or between neighbourhoods. For example, there remain significant inequities in health status between Aboriginal Canadians and non-Aboriginal Canadians—the incidence of hepatitis and tuberculosis among Aboriginal Canadians are five and ten times higher respectively than for other Canadians. It has now been over a year since the Report of the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health or the “Naylor Report” was released. The report has lead to some positive developments in rebuilding Canada’s public health system. It will be needed as some serious public health issues continue to face the country including: * the spread of infectious diseases (e.g., C. difficile bacterium); * the rise in the number of Canadians with unhealthy body weights including rising levels of obesity; * high levels of physical inactivity; * smoking, particularly among youth; * relatively low rates of immunization; and * threats to environmental health including those that threaten our clean air, and safe food and drinking water. In summary, notwithstanding all that has transpired this year, Canadians’ health and their health care system remain high public priorities. While their health status has improved over the past decades, there is considerable room for improvement, some of which can be addressed through public health measures and better access to care. The significant announcements made over the past year related to health system and public health financing are a welcomed start to support health stakeholders in facing these challenges. III. THE FIRST MINISTERS’ MEETING AGREEMENT The CMA closely followed the September 13-15, 2004 First Ministers Meeting on the Future of Health Care. In fact, we worked with our health care colleagues leading up to the meeting to identify possible strategies for improving the system. 3 For instance, we recommended the development and adoption of pan-Canadian benchmarks for wait times based on clinical evidence and the creation of a special Canada Health Access Fund to support Canadians’ access to medically necessary care in other regions. While not all of our proposals were accepted, the September First Ministers’ Meeting Agreement (herein referred to as the FMM Agreement) features many aspects that the CMA has been championing for some time and is certainly a positive achievement. In particular, we are happy to see a desire “to make timely access to quality care a reality for all Canadians.” We applaud the leadership shown by the government in this regard. We also believe that the Agreement provides an opportunity for a new era of cooperative medicare by engaging physicians and other providers meaningfully. Contrary to belief, health care providers have not been offered many opportunities to participate at federal, provincial and territorial planning tables. We therefore welcome the opportunity to work collaboratively on identifying clinically derived wait time benchmarks. Canada’s physicians can and desire to play a significant role in this regard. We therefore believe the FMM Agreement is a necessary first step or “a framework to go with” towards strengthening our health care system. But as we said in September following the release of the Agreement, “the real heavy lifting begins now.” Accordingly, we believe that a number of requirements are necessary to ensure this Agreement fulfills its objectives. We see these requirements as putting words to actions for realizing the full potential of the FMM Agreement. Enact Legislation to Confirm Financial Support and Accountability Provisions The CMA supports enacting federal legislation to confirm the budgetary allocations in the Agreement ($18 billion over 6 years and $41 billion over 10 years). This includes a 6% escalator to the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) that will provide predictable funding for provincial and territorial health care systems. This is a provision that we have been recommending for many years. While $41 billion is a lot of money, we must remind ourselves that this amounts to little more than a 3% increase over 10 years of provincial government health expenditures based on projections of current government spending. Moreover, we estimate that the Agreement will add only .2% to Canada’s spending levels per GDP during this period. In other words, the FMM Agreement, while necessary and appreciated, will not propel Canada into the top echelon of health care spenders among the leading industrialized countries. As health care has become a dominant public policy issue, we expect to see future high level discussions in coming years on both future funding levels and on the direction of health care reform efforts. We are also pleased to see a new Equalization agreement that will complement the FMM Agreement. The Equalization program plays a key role in ensuring that all provinces have adequate and comparable levels of health care and other social services. The issue of Equalization payments to the provinces was identified in discussions leading up to the September First Ministers Meeting over concern that increased federal transfers to health care could be offset by decreases in Equalization payments. The subsequent agreement on Equalization will therefore serve to support the FMM Agreement given that increases in health care transfers to provinces will not be offset by decreases in equalization payments while providing predictable multi-year funding. A strong accountability framework also needs to be included in the legislation. The FMM Agreement specifies several process accountabilities such as a commitment by governments to report on access indicators and establish wait time benchmarks by December 31, 2005. The CMA believes that the Wait Times Reduction Fund should be subject to contribution agreements that specify how provinces and territories will use their share of this fund to reduce wait times. For the Agreement to mean something commitments have to backed up—financial and/or political consequences must follow if commitments are not met. It will be important to have an independent, third party organization assess progress in an open and transparent manner. The Health Council of Canada, identified in the FMM Agreement, could be the body to undertake an annual independent assessment, providing it receives the necessary resources to do so. The Canadian Institute for health Information also has an important role to play in ensuring comparable indicators are used to measure progress. It is essential to involve practicing physicians throughout the implementation of the FMM Agreement, particularly in the development of clinically derived wait time benchmarks. The determination of clinically derived wait time benchmarks means just that—they must be clinically derived and must not be based on political or financial considerations. To this end, the CMA will play a leadership role in developing consensus with physicians and other expert organizations on acceptable wait-time standards and protocols based on the best available clinical evidence. RECOMMENDATION 1 The federal government move quickly to enact legislation to implement the funding and accountability provisions of the First Ministers’ Agreement. The legislation should specify that the $4.5 billion Wait Times Reduction Fund be subject to contribution agreements with the provinces and territories. Improve Access by Addressing Health Human Resources The CMA is pleased to see the First Ministers acknowledge for the first time the current and worsening shortage of health human resources (HHR) in this country. However, the FMM Agreement does not adequately provide a strategy for addressing this crisis beyond the development of health human resources action plans and support for an Aboriginal Health Human Resources Initiative. The CMA believes that the lack of immediate action on HHR is one area where the Agreement falls short. As noted in our fact sheet, Canada is currently experiencing a shortage in health human resources. Canada’s ratio of 2.1 physicians per 1,000 population remains one of the lowest among OECD countries and below the OECD average of 2.9. Initial results from the 2004 National Physician Survey—the largest census survey of physicians ever conducted in Canada—find that up to 3,800 physicians will retire in the next two years, more than double the existing rate. Furthermore, 26% of physicians intend to reduce the number of hours they work. 4 One must remember that timely access to health care services is first and foremost about the people who provide quality care and the tools and infrastructure they need to meet the growing demand for medical services in Canada. In order for the FMM Agreement to be successful in improving access to care, governments must make health human resources a major priority beginning by ensuring that the Wait Times Reduction Fund is used immediately to address the crisis in health human resources rather than in the last four years of the ten-year Agreement as currently projected. 5 Given the current shortages in health human resources, action on HHR must begin now—not in 2010. In addition, the CMA calls upon the federal government to play a key role in improving the availability of health human resources by developing a pan-Canadian HHR strategy that includes the involvement of health care providers. Specifically, we need a three pronged pan-Canadian HHR strategy that would address: (1) HHR planning; (2) increasing the supply of health professionals; and, (3) retention issues. Planning Despite the large sum of funding that governments invest in health care, they do so without having the benefit of a national long-term health human resources strategy. Canada has 14 provincial/territorial and federal health care systems in operation. Yet, our immigration policies are largely conducted on a national basis and there is a high degree of labour mobility between provinces. Presently, there is no overall national coordinating committee to assist provinces and territories in the planning of health human resources, particularly one that includes all pertinent stakeholders including physicians and other health care professionals. We believe a National Coordinating Committee for Health Human Resources involving representation from health care professions should be established for such purposes—something both the Romanow and Senator Kirby reports recommended. Research is required to support long-term planning in HHR. The CMA has previously proposed the creation of an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) that would promote collaboration and the sharing of HHR research among the well-known university-based centres of excellence as well as research communities within professional associations and governments. Supply Canada’s HHR policy goal should be to ensure Canada is self-sufficient in the supply of physicians and other health care professionals. Several strategies are required to fulfill this goal. They include: * Dedicating a specific fund to increase enrollment in undergraduate and postgraduate medical education (especially re-entry positions). Medical school enrollment should be increased to a minimum of 2,500 positions by 2007. * Expanding the post-MD system to accommodate the increase in graduates for training including the several hundred international medical graduates (IMGs) in Canada who have been deemed eligible for post-MD training here. The goal should be to increase the number of first-year residency training positions to a level of 120% of the graduates produced annually by Canadian medical schools. See Appendix B for how this can be implemented. The estimated cost of adding 500 positions is $75 million over five years. In fact, this government’s election platform included a commitment to provide funding to top-up training for 1,000 foreign trained medical professionals. * Expediting the integration of international medical graduates by funding a fast-track on-line assessment program administered by the Medical Council of Canada. It would determine the suitability and eligibility of IMGs for completion of post-MD training (estimated cost $20 million over 5 years). * Implementing a national strategy to extend the Canada Student Loans interest payment benefit to postgraduate trainees in medicine. High student debt impacts both the kind of specialty that physicians-in-training choose, and ultimately where they decide to practice—making it a key health human resource issue (see box below). The Canadian Medical Association commends the federal government for its commitment to reduce the financial burden on students in health care professions, as announced in the FMM Agreement. Did you know? Becoming a full-fledged, practicing physician is an arduous and expensive endeavor. It requires a minimum of 9 years (6) of post-secondary education and training that is often financed through sizeable government and private loan debt, such as lines of credit. It is estimated that, by the time medical students enter their pre-practice postgraduate training period, many are doing so with a debt of at least $120,000 (7) or more. RECOMMENDATION 2 The federal government work with relevant stakeholders to extend interest free status on Canada Student Loans for all eligible health professional students pursuing postgraduate training. Retention Retention remains a major concern for the health care workforce including physicians. We speak not only in terms of losing physicians to other countries but to other professional pursuits as well (i.e., opportunities away from the front line delivery of care). There is little point in recruiting new physicians at the front end if we lose sight of how to keep them once they are highly skilled and are in their most productive years. Retention issues are crosscutting. Indeed, a major frustration for physicians today are the difficulties faced trying to access other types of care for their patients such as diagnostic testing, specialty care or community services. Thus, improving access to a comprehensive range of health care providers and services and reducing wait times—as previously addressed—can help. We also believe that investments in information technologies (IT) can help improve the coordination of health care and allow physicians to spend more time with their patients to provide quality care. There is currently limited connectivity among community-based physicians, community based services, specialists, hospitals and diagnostic facilities. IT investments can improve the integration of care, improve patient safety and improve the management of wait times. They can link regional and provincial wait time management systems while supporting more comprehensive scheduling systems. Prescriptions can be sent electronically to the local pharmacist while public health warnings can be sent electronically to physicians’ offices. We recognize that investments in IT are already occurring and systems will be put in place over the next decade. However, we believe that by accelerating IT investments today, system efficiencies and savings can be achieved sooner along with improvements to health care delivery and coordination. The application of tax policy to the health care sector is another retention issue that greatly frustrates physicians. This issue is discussed in the next section. Align Tax Policy With Health Policy The CMA continues to advocate for a review of the relationship between federal tax policy and health care policy in Canada. Taxation is a powerful instrument of public policy. Good tax policy should reinforce and support good health care policy. Yet, it has been 40 years since the federal government last undertook an overarching review of Canada’s tax system (the 1962-1966 Royal Commission on Taxation -the Carter Commission). Standard public finance theory suggests that two objectives of effective tax policy are distributive equity and correcting inefficiencies in the private sector. 8 For some time, the CMA has expressed concern over inequities in tax policy and inconsistencies between national health policy goals and tax policy. We are aware that the committee is looking for ideas on tax changes that can lead to a more productive economy. At the same time, we recognize that the government is committed to improving Canadians’ access to health care. Ensuring this country’s tax policy is supporting our health care system is a good way to achieve both objectives. Specifically, the CMA calls on the federal government to remove the application of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) to the health care sector. Currently, not-for-profit hospital services receive an 83% rebate on the GST they pay on goods and services, while not-for-profit health organizations receive a rebate of 50%. Health care professionals working in free-standing clinics do not qualify for any GST relief (discussed below). The estimated portion of funding paid by hospitals alone back to the federal government in the form of GST revenue is estimated to be $90 million per year. That is the equivalent of the purchase cost of almost 40 MRI machines! The CMA believes that all publicly funded health care services should be spared from having to use scarce health care resources to remit GST and should receive the full GST rebate. Would this be setting a precedent? The answer is “no”. Prescription drugs, a significant proportion of total health care costs, have been zero-rated since 1996. Furthermore, the 2004 federal budget confirmed that municipalities would be able to recover 100% of the GST and the federal component of the harmonized sales tax (HST) immediately. As part of the “MUSH” sector (municipalities, universities, schools and hospitals), we believe the time has come to extend the full rebate to the health care sector. The federal government must stop taxing publicly funded health care. The uneven application of the GST rebate to different health services is also impeding efforts to renew and reorient the delivery of health services. Currently, community-based services such as clinics and nursing homes receive a GST rebate of only 50% while hospitals receive a rebate of 83%. Does it make sense that a nursing home or a home care service should pay more for GST than a hospital, particularly when trying to move to a more accessible community-based system? The variability of GST rebates makes no sense for organizations such as regional health authorities that oversee a range of health services but which pay differing rates. The government acknowledged in its 2003 Budget that there was a need to review how the GST is applied to care settings outside of hospitals. We await this review. Such inconsistencies distort the efficiency of the health care sector yet are relatively simple to address. 9 Physician services, on the other hand, are deemed “tax exempt” under The Excise Act. This means that physicians cannot claim any input tax credits despite the fact they must pay GST on their purchases of equipment, rent and utilities. And unlike other self-employed individuals or small businesses, physicians cannot pass on any of these additional costs as approximately 98% of physician compensation is from government health insurance plans. To date, provincial governments have been unwilling to provide funding to reflect the additional costs associated with the GST (insisting that it is a federal matter). Physicians are not asking for special treatment. They are looking for fairness within the tax system. If physicians, as self-employed individuals, are considered small businesses for tax purposes, then it only seems reasonable that they should have the same tax rules extended to them that apply to other small businesses (i.e., eligibility to receive input tax credits). This is a fundamental issue of tax fairness. In fact, this committee has twice before acknowledged the need to reassess the application of the GST on physician services. 10 The unfair manner in which the GST is applied to the health care sector has been an on-going source of major frustration to the physician community and remains unresolved. We believe that addressing this matter would be helpful in the country’s efforts to retain its physicians. Other self-employed health care providers that provide publicly funded services face a similar problem. RECOMMENDATION 3 As part of an effort to ensure that its tax policy is consistent with the goals of its health policy and the sustainability of Canada’s health care system, the federal government should: - increase the GST rebate for publicly funded health care institutions and clinics to 100% ($90 million annually for hospitals) - zero rate GST on publicly funded health services provided by independent health care providers ($75 million annually for medical services). IV PUBLIC HEALTH: HEALTHY PUBLIC As previously noted, much has happened over the past year with respect to Canada’s public health system. The CMA was pleased to see the creation of the position of Minister of State, Public Health. We commend the Government of Canada for its establishment of the Public Health Agency of Canada and for its selection of Dr. David Butler-Jones as the new Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. The 2004 Budget’s commitment to approximately $665 million for investments for public health over the next 3 years was also a welcomed announcement. The CMA will provide its full support to work with Dr. Butler-Jones and the Public Health Agency of Canada, Ministers Bennett and Dosanjh to develop a coordinated and integrated plan to manage and improve public health in Canada. These developments certainly represent a good step towards rebuilding the country’s public health system. Address the “Naylor Gap” In spite of these initiatives, it remains essential to remind this government and Canadians that further attention to public health is necessary. As a member of the Canadian Coalition for Public Health in the 21st Century (CCPH21), the CMA calls on the federal government to enhance its financial commitment to the renewal of Canada’s public health system The public health system is a vital component of a sustainable health system by reducing pressures on the health care system and providing a net benefit to society. 11 Two thirds of total deaths in Canada are due to chronic diseases such as cardiovascular disease, cancer, lung disease and diabetes (Type II melitus)—many of which are preventable. Investing in public health also makes good economic policy. We have seen in recent years the incredible economic impact that public health outbreaks can have on a country’s economy. For instance, it has been estimated that the SARS outbreak cost the Canadian economy over $1.5 billion in 2003 alone with its impact still being felt. 12 As stated in the Report of the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health (the Naylor Report), “we are constantly a short flight away from serious epidemics.” 13 Accordingly, we were pleased to hear the government’s Speech from the Throne state that the government will proceed with the development of the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network. But we have to overcome several years of inattention to public health issues and the public health infrastructure—something that cannot be rectified in a year. Spending levels on public health in Canada are meager. International comparisons are difficult to find and to compare, but it appears that this is one instance where Canada could learn from its neighbour to the south with its higher level of spending on public health (see Box comparing public health spending between Canada and the United States). 14 While the role of public health was referred to in the FMM Agreement, no additional funding for public health was included. Comparing Levels of Public Health Spending: Canada vs. the United States Using data from CIHI and the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the CMA has developed the following comparative estimates of spending on public health in Canada versus the United States in 2002. [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY POPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Canada United States 1. Per capita spending on public health services ($CDN, PPP adjusted) $138 $207 2. Share of spending on public health as a % of public health care spending 5.5% 7.2% 3. Share of spending on public health as a % of total health care spending 3.9% 3.3% [TABLE END] The United States spends approximately 50% more on public health than Canada when comparing per capita payments. The United States also spends more on public health when considering public health spending as a percentage of all publicly funded services (due in part to a proportionately smaller publicly funded sector). Conversely, Canada spends more on public health if looking at the percentage of spending on public health as a percentage of total health care spending. This is due in part to a proportionately larger privately funded sector in the United States. Since public health is predominately a public good paid by governments, we believe it is most appropriate to compare the results from the first two indicators. The Naylor Report estimated that public health in Canada accounted for 2.6% to 3.5% of total publicly funded health expenditures in Canada and 1.8% to 2.5% of total health expenditures. While these estimates are lower than those provided above, they still support our observation that public health spending in Canada is lower than in the United States. The Naylor report provided a blue print for action and reinvestment in the public health system for the 21st century. It estimated that approximately $1 billion in annual funding would be required to implement and sustain the public health programs that Canada requires. In its submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, the CMA also identified an essential range of comprehensive public health programming and initiatives totaling an estimated $1.5 billion over 5 years. 15 The federal government has thus far committed approximately $665 million in new programming (one-time funding, over 2 years, and over 3 years), well short of Dr. Naylor’s $1 billion per year. This “Naylor Gap” of approximately $450 million per year is identified below in Table A. [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Table A: Estimating “The Naylor Gap” Naylor Funding Recommendations (by 2006-07) Budget 2004 Naylor Gap Public Health Agency of Canada Related Funding - $300 million per year core budget of PPHB and other related federal services to be transferred to new agency - core functions to be expanded by $200 million per year within 3-5 years - $404 million transferred from Health Canada to Agency - $165 million over 2 years to assist in setting up new agency, increase emergency response capacity, enhance surveillance, establish regional centres of excellence, expand laboratory capacity, strengthen international coordination and collaboration $117.5 million per year ($200 million by Naylor minus $82.5 million per year committed by the federal government averaged out). Moreover, nothing earmarked beyond 2005-06. System Funding 3 programs of transfers at a cost of $500 million per year: - $300 million for Public Health Partnerships Program to build capacity at local level - $100 million for communicable disease surveillance - $100 million to bolster national immunization strategy - $100 million (one-time) to Canada Health Infoway to pay for real-time public health surveillance system - $400 million over three years for: - $300 million for national immunization strategy - $100 million for provinces to address immediate gaps in capacity Approximately $333 million per year ($500 million per year request by Naylor less Budget 2004 commitments of $500 million over 3 years or $167 million per year averaged out.) Total: $1 billion per year $404 million annually plus $665 million in new programming (one-time funding, over 2 years, or over 3 years) Total “Naylor Gap”: $450.5 million per year [TABLE END} We acknowledge that the Public Health Agency of Canada is just being created. We also recognize that Budget 2004 noted that: “The Government of Canada expects to make further investments once the new Canada Public Health Agency is operational, the Chief Public Health Officer has developed a comprehensive public health plan, and the Government has had the opportunity to evaluate the need for additional resources.” 16 Nevertheless, it is critical that reinvestment in Canada’s public health system continue as soon as possible to protect and promote the health of Canadians. These additional investments are needed to fully implement Dr. Naylor’s recommendations. This includes operating costs for a real time communication system for front line public health providers during health emergencies. It would ensure a two-way flow of information between front-line health care providers and public health professionals at the local public health unit, the provincial public health department and the Public Health Agency of Canada. The CMA has recently submitted a proposal to Canada Health Infoway to develop a system (the Health Emergency Communication and Co-ordination Initiative) that would link Canada’s physicians with governmental authorities. The additional investments should also be used to help address the recruitment and retention of public health practitioners. 17 In contrast with other areas of health expenditures, we know very little about how public health dollars are allocated and with what results. Presently, public health expenditures are lumped together with some health system administration costs. We believe there is a need for a better tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures. Set and Meet National Health Goals The CMA was pleased to see support by First Ministers in the FMM Agreement to establish a Pan-Canadian Public Health Strategy and health goals that are independently monitored. We believe health goals are a key component in addressing the serious public health challenges that lie ahead. Goals stimulate action and improve system accountability. Unlike Canada, many other countries—including the United States, the UK and Australia—have set health goals for their populations at the national level. At the CMA’s August 2004 General Council meeting, physicians agreed on health goals for physical activity, healthy body weights and obesity (see box below). These goals are already having an effect. Recently, the BC Minister of Health, Colin Hansen, accepted the challenge from the President of the British Columbia Medical Association, Dr. Jack Burak, to increase fitness levels by 10 per cent by 2010. We also need to be more preoccupied with setting, meeting and monitoring environmental health goals. Let us look at drinking water for example. As hard as it may be for Canadians to believe, a safe supply of water is a key health concern for Canadians today just as it was at the turn of the 20th century. The polluting of our water supply—including the presence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria through the use of antibiotics in human and animal health—and a lack of adequate water treatment infrastructure systems have contributed to the problem. Above all, we as Canadians need to recognize that a large natural supply of water and other natural resources do not eliminate the need for strong environmental governance. Public health officials play an important role in this respect. But it is pointless to set goals without any intention of meeting them. Resources will be necessary to meet the selected health goals such as the training and hiring of public health workers, as well as funding to support public advertising and marketing campaigns. Physical Activity and Healthy Body Weight Goals for Canada (Endorsed at CMA General Council, August 2004, Toronto) The Canadian Medical Association urges all levels of government to commit to a comprehensive, integrated and collaborative national strategy for increasing the physical activity levels of all Canadians, with a target of a 10% increase in each province and territory by the year 2010. The Canadian Medical Association calls on all stakeholders to develop, as an urgent priority, an action plan to address the obesity epidemic in Canada, with a goal of increasing by 15% within ten years the proportion of Canadians who are at a healthy weight. Invest in Health Not in Tobacco Improving health status is more than promoting healthy lifestyle behaviour. A healthy society also requires public policy that supports health (e.g. adequate income and education, proper housing, adequate nutrition, a clean and safe environment.) Tobacco use is a good example of a health risk that has been significantly reduced with the help of public policy measures, such as higher tobacco taxes, continued restrictions on tobacco advertising and promotion, and restrictions on smoking in public places. But there remains inconsistency in Canada's public policies—in this case between the investment policies of the CPP Investment Board and Canada's health policy goals. Canadians are very proud of their public pension plan, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). It is a well-supported social program that has been viewed as a best practice model by several countries. Yet, despite the fact that tobacco continues to kill approximately 45,000 Canadians a year and costs Canadian society approximately $11 billion per year in net cost, (18) the Canada Pension Plan holds $94 million worth of tobacco investments. Canada’s physicians see the toll that tobacco consumption creates. We see the physical and mental suffering that tobacco-caused diseases bring to patients and their families. Accordingly, the CMA has consistently recommended a wide range of measures to control tobacco use such as higher tobacco taxes, continued restrictions on tobacco advertising and promotion, restrictions on smoking in public places, enforcement of bans on sales to minors, reduction of the level of toxic ingredients in tobacco and the provision of smoking cessation programs. We are pleased with the efforts to date but we are by no means finished in our battle. As our fact sheet shows, there are still segments of the population, particularly among our youth, that have high rates of smoking. The federal government in recent years has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on a tobacco reduction strategy that, when combined with efforts being taken by the provinces and municipalities, is making a difference for Canadians. However, the CPP Investment Board is investing and voting as shareholders in a pattern that is inconsistent with both public health policy, and the tobacco reduction measures being implemented across Canada. It is inconsistent and illogical for one arm of government to expend many millions of dollars of public money in an effort to reduce tobacco use, while another arm invests many millions of dollars of money in tobacco companies and supports these companies in their drive to be profitable. Resolution of the Canadian Medical Association General Council, August 2004: …the government amend the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act so that CPP investments in the tobacco industry are prohibited and the CPP Investment Board divests itself of existing tobacco holdings. The CMA is prepared to back up what it is prescribing—MD Management Ltd’s “MD Funds” which are managed for Canada’s physicians has followed this policy for almost ten years. Other major pension and investment plans have successfully followed this policy as well including several US State retirement and pension funds and the American Medical Association Pension Fund. While the CMA clearly believes that the CPP Investment Board should not invest in the tobacco industry and that existing tobacco holdings should be divested, we recognize that this committee might want to look at the matter in greater context to assess its full impact. We suggest that this be done in conjunction with the Standing Committee on Health. RECOMMENDATION 4 The Standing Committees on Finance and Health hold a joint review of the CPP policy as it relates to investments in tobacco (both current and potential) by the CPP Investment Board. IV. CONCLUSION The Finance Committee’s last report on the pre-budget hearings noted that the CMA’s submission identified relatively small, one-time investments that can support the health care system. 19 This year’s submission once again puts forward strategic investments that we believe support Canada’s health policy goals and which serve to effectively implement the FMM Agreement. Our recommendations are also directed at improving the alignment of Canada’s economic policy with its health policy. It is natural to think of an agreement as an end point. But in reality, the FMM Agreement and last year’s funding announcements for public health must be seen as for what they are—first steps to sustaining Canada’s health care system and its public health system. Canada’s physicians and the CMA are committed to working with governments and other health care stakeholders to ensure the financial investments announced over the past year lead to positive and enduring change, and ultimately improved health for all Canadians. END NOTES 1 Claudia Sanmartin et al. Access to Health Care Services in Canada, 2003. Statistics Canada, 2004. 2 Canadian Medical Association. The Taming of the Queue: Toward a Cure for Health Care Wait Times. Discussion Paper. July 2004. Ottawa. 3 CMA, Better Access for Better Health, September 2004; Canadian Healthcare Association, Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Pharmacists Association. “Common Vision for the Canadian Health System,” September, 2004. 4 National Physician Survey, “Initial Data Release of the 2004 Physician Survey”, October 2004. 5 A note listed under the funding schedule indicates that moneys flowing to the Wait Times Reduction Fund for health human resources ($250 million for four years) will come only during the final four years of the Agreement. 6 Average duration. Only 2/16 medical schools have a 3 (versus 4) year program. 7 This estimate is based on federal government actual and estimated costs as well as current actual national average tuition fees in undergraduate programs in medicine. Data sources: (1) Statistics Canada, The Daily, April 26, 2004, National Graduates Survey: Student Debt, p. 3. (2) Government of Canada, Canlearn. Saving for your child's education, The projected cost of your child's education. University Tuition. Typical 1996 university cost living away from home: $13,000 - $3,500 tuition = $9,500 x 24% (8 years x 3% inflation cited in reference above) = $11 780. see: http://www.canlearn.ca/financing/saving/guaranteefuture/clcos.cfm?langcanlearn=en (3) Association of Canadian Medical Colleges for tuition 8 For a further discussion of the role of taxation in public policy, refer to Musgrave, Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave’s Public Finance in Theory and Practices. 1973. New York: McGraw-Hill. 9 Canadian Medical Association, Tax and Health—Taking Another Look. Discussion Paper, May 2002. 10See Keeping the Balance, 1997 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance; Facing the Future: Challenges and Choices for a New Era, 1998 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance. 11 See for example, Laurie J. Goldsmith, Brian Hutchinson and Jeremiah Hurley, Economic Evaluation Across the Four Faces of Prevention: A Canadian Perspective. (Hamilton: Centre for Health Econoimcs and Policy Analysis, McMaster University), May 2004. 12 The Conference Board of Canada, “The Economic Impact of SARS”, Ottawa, May 2003. 13 Report of the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, Learning From SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada, October 2003. 14 Based on data from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/). 15 Canadian Medical Association, Answering the Wake Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan. Submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, June 2003. 16Government of Canada, Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2004, p. 101. 2004. 17 See Answering the Wake-up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan for other initiatives that should be funded to rebuild Canada’s public health system. 18 Adapted from estimates provided by Murray J. Kaiserman, “The Cost of Smoking in Canada, 1991”, Chronic Diseases in Canada, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1997. Available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/cdic-mcc/18-1/c_e.html. 19 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Canada: People, Places and Priorities, November 2002.
Documents
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Annual report on the status of Canada's health care system and its funding

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1517
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC04-84
The Canadian Medical Association will ensure the development of an annual report on the status of Canada's health care system, including a component on the financial sustainability of the publicly funded medicare program.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC04-84
The Canadian Medical Association will ensure the development of an annual report on the status of Canada's health care system, including a component on the financial sustainability of the publicly funded medicare program.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association will ensure the development of an annual report on the status of Canada's health care system, including a component on the financial sustainability of the publicly funded medicare program.
Less detail

Answering the Wake-up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan : CMA submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1960
Last Reviewed
2010-02-27
Date
2003-06-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Health care and patient safety
Population health/ health equity/ public health
  2 documents  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2010-02-27
Date
2003-06-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Health care and patient safety
Population health/ health equity/ public health
Text
The public health system in Canada lies at the heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of our population. When the public health system is working well, few are even aware that it is at work! Only when something goes terribly wrong — like the Walkerton tragedy or when we are faced with a new threat like SARS — is the integral, ongoing role of public health really recognized. The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has been warning that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to the latest crises. Canada’s physicians have repeatedly called for governments to enhance public health capacity and strengthen the public health infrastructure throughout Canada. Our public health system is the first — and often the only — line of defence against emerging and ongoing infectious and noninfectious threats to the health of Canadians. But we are only as strong as the weakest link in the emergency response chain of survival. As most health threats know no boundaries, our public health armaments must be in a constant state of “battle readiness.” In today’s climate of SARS, West Nile Virus, mad cow disease and monkey pox, even the thought that the public health system may be stretched beyond capacity strikes fear into the hearts of Canadians. Physicians have always been an integral part of the public health system serving as medical officers of health, community health specialists and other related roles. Indeed public health cannot successfully fulfill its mandate without the cooperation and commitment of front-line clinicians. In this submission, we reflect on the lessons to be learned from our recent experience with SARS and reflect on the longer-term needs of the public health system as a whole. The objectives of the pan-Canadian Public Health Action Plan proposed by the CMA are, first to realize a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies; and, second, to enhance the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country (see recommendations, below, and Appendix 1). To achieve these twin objectives, three broad strategies are presented for immediate attention. They are legislative reform; capacity enhancement; and research, surveillance and communications. Legislative reform (see recommendations 1–3) The country’s response to SARS has brought into stark relief the urgent need for national leadership and coordination of public health activity across the country, especially during a health crisis. The apparent reluctance to act quickly to institute screening at airports, the delay in unifying the practice community for a concerted response and the appalling communications confusion worked against optimum handling of the outbreak — despite the best efforts of health care professionals. This is a wake-up call that highlights the need for comprehensive legislative reform to clarify the roles of governments with respect to the management of public health threats. A renewed and enhanced national commitment to public health should be anchored in new federal legislation to be negotiated with the provinces and territories. Specifically, the CMA recommends an Emergency Health Measures Act, to deal with emergent situations in tandem with the creation of a Canadian public health agency headed by a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. Capacity enhancement (see recommendations 4–7) The SARS crisis has demonstrated the diminished capacity within the public health system. The Greater Toronto Area (GTA), with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute health systems, has not been able to manage the SARS crisis adequately and carry on other health programs. The acute care system virtually ground to a halt in dealing with SARS. There was little or no surge capacity in Canada’s largest city. We should be grateful that SARS did not first strike a smaller centre in a far less-advantaged region of Canada. A critical element of the public health system is its workforce and the health professionals within the acute care system, such as hospital-based infectious disease specialists and emergency physicians who are the front-line interface. Let there be no doubt that the ongoing efforts of the GTA front-line providers are nothing short of heroic. However, the lack of coordinated contingency planning of hospital and community-based disease control efforts was striking. The overall shortage of critical care professionals and the inability of governments to quickly deploy the required professionals to areas of need contributed to the enormous strain on the public and health care system. Considering the importance of the public health system and its clearly limited capacity to protect and promote the health of Canadians, it is incomprehensible that we do not know how much is actually spent on the system. It is imperative that public health expenditures and capacity, in terms of both physical and human resources, be tracked and reported publicly. The CMA recommends a $1-billion, 5-year capacity-enhancement program to be coordinated with and through the new Canadian public health agency. Research, surveillance and communications (see recommendations 8–10) Canada’s ability to respond to public health threats and acute events, such as SARS, and to maintain its effective public health planning and program development depends on sound research, surveillance and rapid, real-time communications. A concerted pan-Canadian effort is required to take full advantage of our capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. New-millennium challenges require moving beyond old-millennium responses. Enhanced surveillance is an overdue and integral part of public health, performing an essential function in early detection and response to threats of infectious diseases. Mandatory national reporting of identified diseases by all provinces and territories is critical for national and international surveillance. During times of crisis, rapid communication to the public, public health staff and front-line clinicians is of critical importance, but in many jurisdictions impossible. We tested our systems during the SARS outbreak and they came up short. The CMA recommends a one-time federal investment to enhance technical capacity to allow for real-time communication. Conclusion The CMA believes that its proposed three-pronged strategy, as set out in the attached recommendations, will go a long way toward addressing shortfalls of the Canadian public health system. Action now will help to ensure that Canadians can once again be confident that they are protected from any future threat of new infectious diseases. Action now will help Canada regain its position as a leader in public health. We wish the advisory committee well in its deliberations and offer the CMA’s assistance at any time in clarifying the strategies set out in our submission. Recommendations to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health Legislative reform ($20 million / 5 years*) 1. The enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. 2. The creation of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. 3. The appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada; to head the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control; and to work with provinces and territories to develop and implement a pan-Canadian public health action plan. Capacity enhancement ( $1.2 billion / 5 years*) 4. The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. 5. The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. 6. Tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures and capacity (both physical and human resources) by the Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada, on behalf of the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. 7. Federal government funding in the amount of $1 Billion over 5 years to build adequate and consistent surge capacity across Canada and improve coordination among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal authorities to fulfill essential public health functions. Research, surveillance and communications ($310 million / 5 years*) 8. An immediate, sequestered grant of $200 million over 5 years to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to initiate an enhanced conjoint program of research with the Institute of Population and Public Health and the Institute of Infection and Immunity that will expand capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. 9. The mandatory reporting by provinces and territories of identified infectious diseases to the newly established Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to enable appropriate communications, analyses and intervention. 10. The one-time infusion of $100 million, with an additional $2 million a year, for a “REAL” (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Coordination Initiative to improve technical capacity to communicate with front line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. *See Appendix 2: Estimated cost of implementing recommendations. PURPOSE The CMA prepared this submission in response to an invitation from Dr. Naylor to provide input to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. We applaud this initiative and welcome the opportunity to present the views of Canada’s medical community to the committee. The CMA’s basic message is that our health protection laws are woefully outdated and the public health system is stretched beyond capacity. This submission draws on our long history of engagement in public health in Canada and our experience both post-September 11, 2001 and with SARS. It builds on the knowledge and experience of our members, national specialist affiliated societies and provincial and territorial divisions. (We acknowledge, in particular, the outstanding efforts of the Ontario Medical Association and the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians in battling SARS.) In this submission, we examine the lessons to be learned from our experience with the SARS outbreak and reflect on both the immediate and longer-term needs of the public health system as a whole. The objectives of the public health action plan proposed by the CMA are, first, to realize a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies and, second, to enhance the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country, including those posed by preventable chronic disease. INTRODUCTION The public health system in Canada lies at the heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of the population. When the public health system is working well, few are even aware that it is at work! Only when something goes terribly wrong — like the contamination of the blood supply in the 1980s, the Walkerton tragedy or SARS — is the integral, ongoing role of public health recognized. Our public health system is the first — and often the only — line of defence against emerging and ongoing infectious and noninfectious threats to the health of Canadians. But we are only as strong as the weakest link in the emergency response chain of survival. As most health threats know no boundaries, our public health system must be in a constant state of “battle readiness.” We can ill afford any weakness in our public health preparedness. In today’s climate of SARS, West Nile Virus, mad cow disease and monkey pox, the mere thought that the public health system may be stretched beyond capacity strikes fear into the hearts of Canadians. Physicians have always been an integral part of the public health system serving as medical officers of health, specialists in infectious disease and community medicine (who will not remember the stalwart efforts of Dr. Donald Low on SARS?) and in other related roles. Indeed, public health cannot successfully fulfill its mandate without the cooperation and commitment of front-line clinicians. The CMA has been warning for some time that our system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to crises. Canada’s physicians have repeatedly called for governments to enhance public health capacity and strengthen the public health infrastructure throughout Canada. For example, the CMA’s submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance’s prebudget consultations on October 22, 2001 called for substantial investments in public health and emergency response as a first step to improve the public health system infrastructure and its surge capacity. This submission not only reiterates our previous recommendations, but also outlines specific actions that the CMA believes must be taken to ensure a strong public health system in Canada. The Enduring Impact of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome): in February 2003, these four letters sent massive shock waves around the world, causing widespread fear and confusion among health care officials and citizens of many countries. The “fear factor” extended across Canada as people realized the full threat of SARS. Since SARS was first identified in a patient in Toronto in March 2003, 438 probable or suspected cases have been reported to Health Canada and 38 people have died (as of June 23, 2003). However, these numbers do not reflect the full impact of the outbreak. The number of indirect deaths due to system shutdown will never be known. Local public health authorities across the country went on high alert. Those in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) as well as their provincial counterparts diverted almost all of their resources to respond to the crisis. Acute care services were adversely affected as stringent infection-control and screening measures were put into place to control the spread of SARS. In the GTA, the health system — acute and public — was brought to its knees. Over half of the reported SARS cases involved front-line providers as the outbreak largely affected health care settings. Approximately 20 physicians in Ontario contracted SARS and close to 1000 were quarantined. Thousands of nurses and other health care workers also faced quarantine, some more than once. Institutions closed their doors, limiting access to emergency departments, clinics and physicians’ offices. Intensive care units were full and surgeries were cancelled. Front-line health care professionals involved in critical care were stretched to their physical and mental limits. Others found themselves underutilized due to the impact of the infection-control measures on their practice settings. Feast and famine co-existed. Although the outbreak was mainly confined to health care settings, the entire GTA felt the effects. Upwards of 20,000 people entered voluntary quarantine. Businesses were affected. The tourism industry is still reeling. The disruption that SARS caused continues to reverberate through health care systems and economies. In response to urgent requests from both the Ontario Medical Association and Health Canada, the CMA mobilized its membership and assisted in the country’s response to SARS. Everything that could be done was done to facilitate bringing in qualified personnel to relieve those on the front line and make appropriate information available in real time. The CMA has learned its own lessons, both positive and negative. A full chronology of CMA activity is attached as Appendix 3. It has become abundantly clear that Canada’s public health system was ill prepared to deal with the SARS outbreak. If not for the heroic efforts of public health officials, health care providers and research scientists, Canada’s experience would have been much worse. Public health in Canada Public health is the science and art of protecting and promoting health, preventing disease and injury, and prolonging life. It complements the health care system, which focuses primarily on treatment and rehabilitation, sharing the same goal of maximizing the health of Canadians. However, the public health system is distinct from other parts of the health system in two key respects: its primary emphasis is on preventing disease and disability and its focus is on the health needs of populations rather than those of specific individuals. Public health is the systematic response to infectious diseases. It also ensures access to clean drinking water, good sanitation and the control of pests and other disease vectors. Further, it is immunization clinics and programs promoting healthy lifestyles. But it is also there to protect Canadians when they face a public health crisis like SARS. If the public health system is fully prepared to carry out essential services, then communities across the country will be better protected from acute health events. The reality in Canada today is that a strong, consistently and equitably resourced and integrated public health system does not exist. Public health systems across Canada are fragmented — a patchwork of programs, services and resources across the county. In reality, it is a group of multiple systems with varying roles, strengths and linkages. Each province has its own public health legislation. Most legislation focuses on the control of communicable diseases. Public health services are funded through a variable mix of provincial and municipal funding formulae, with inconsistent overall strategies and results, and with virtually no meaningful role for input from health professionals via organizations such as the CMA, or the federal level, in terms of strategic direction or resources. Federal legislation is limited to the blunt instrument of the Quarantine Act and a variety of health protection-related acts. (e.g., Food and Drugs Act, Hazardous Products Act, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Radiation Emitting Devices Act) Some of the laws, such as the Quarantine Act, date back to the late 19th century. Taken as a whole, the legislation does not clearly identify the public health mandate, roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government. In many cases, the assignment of authorities and accountabilities is anachronistic. Moreover, there is little information available on the functioning and financing of Canada’s public health system. There is no “one-stop shopping” for authoritative information on public health issues. In 2001, a working group of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health assessed the capacity of the public health system through a series of key informant interviews and literature reviews. The consistent finding was that public health had experienced a loss of resources and there was concern for the resiliency of the system infrastructure to respond consistently and proactively to the demands placed on it. Significant disparities were observed between “have” and “have-not” provinces and regions in their capacity to address public health issues. The report’s findings are consistent with previous assessments by the Krever Commission and the Auditor General of Canada. In 1999, the Auditor General said that Health Canada was unprepared to fulfill its responsibilities in public health; communication between multiple agencies was poor; and weaknesses in the key surveillance system impeded the effective monitoring of injuries and communicable and non-communicable diseases. In 1997, Justice Horace Krever reported that the “public health departments in many parts of Canada do not have sufficient resources to carry out their duties.” The Challenges Ahead The 21st century brings with it an awesome array of new public health risks and ancient foes. Not all of them can be identified at the present time. New diseases (e.g., SARS, West Nile Virus) will likely continue to emerge. Dr. Alan Bernstein, President of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, recently noted that SARS is here to stay. Old threats, such as contamination of a community water supply (e.g., Walkerton), can strike quickly if vigilance is relaxed or delegated to third parties. This century will likely bring greater focus on threats from the physical environment. Our social environment is also a source of illness as shown by the recent epidemic trends in obesity and type 2 diabetes mellitus. A substantial minority of Canadians continue to smoke. In short, there is no lack of public health threats to Canadians. Although for each of these issues, there is a clear role for clinical care, it is the public health system that will identify and monitor health threats and provide interventions to prevent disease and injury and improve health. The system will also be at the front lines in any response to a biological, chemical or nuclear event. The public health system must have the infrastructure to respond to a range of threats to health, including emergencies. The experience with SARS has reaffirmed that we do not have the system flexibility to respond to these events after they have occurred. It is vital that we take steps now “to embrace not just the essential elements of disease protection and surveillance but also new strategies and tactics capable of addressing global challenges.”<1> CMA’S PROPOSED PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION PLAN No one policy instrument can possibly address the multiple factors involved in meeting the public health challenge head on. Similarly, no one level of government or constituency (e.g., community medicine) can or should shoulder all of the responsibilities. Although we need to restore public confidence quickly, we must also do what it takes to get it right. Accordingly, the CMA is proffering a three-pronged approach to meet the challenge: * A legislative reform strategy * A capacity enhancement strategy * A research, surveillance and communication strategy. These three broad strategies make up the CMA’s proposed 10-point Public Health Action Plan. Taken together, the CMA believes the Plan, if adopted, will serve us very well in the future. Legislative Reform Our experience with SARS — and the seeming lack of coordination between international, federal, provincial and local system levels — should be a massive wake-up call. It highlights the need for legislative reform to clarify the roles of governments with respect to the management of public health issues and threats. Four years ago, national consultations on renewing federal health protection legislation<2> resulted in a recommendation that * “The federal government must be given, either through legislation or through memoranda of understanding among provincial and territorial governments, the authority it needs to effectively address any outbreak of a communicable disease, where the health risk extends beyond provincial borders. * “Federal health protection legislation should be amended to give Health Canada authority to act quickly and decisively in the event of a national health emergency... if it poses a serious threat to public health; affects particularly vulnerable segments of the population; exceeds the capacity of local authorities to deal with the risk; and involves pathogens that could be rapidly transmitted across national and international borders.” Such legislative reform is consistent with the federal government’s well-recognized responsibility to act to protect public health and safety. It fits well with Health Minister McLellan’s recently announced plans to act now to review and update health protection legislation. The SARS outbreak has provided further experience to support these, and in our view, even stronger recommendations. There is ample historical evidence to support the federal government’s role in the management of communicable disease, a role that dates back to the time of confederation. The quarantine power was the initial manifestation of this authority in 1867 under Section 91 of the British North America Act and it gave the federal government the responsibility for ensuring the containment of infectious diseases. The outbreak of the Spanish Flu epidemic in 1918 further highlighted the need for coordinated national efforts and (at the urging of the CMA and others) resulted in the creation of the federal Department of Health in 1919. It would be reasonable to assume that legislators at the time had an expansive view of the need for centralized authority to deal with pan-Canadian health threats. One hundred and thirty-five years after confederation, we have a highly mobile global community. This mobility and the attendant devastating speed with which diseases can spread demand a national response. Currently, there is tremendous variation in public health system capacity among the various provinces and territories and, more particularly, among municipalities and local authorities. Inconsistencies in provincial approaches to public health matters have resulted in significant disparities between and within the provinces.<3> Health Canada’s mandate as set out in its enabling legislation states that “[t]he powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction relating to the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of Canada.” The CMA believes that it is time for the federal government to take responsibility for public health matters that touch the lives of all Canadians. The legal staffs at CMA, in consultation with external experts, have conducted a detailed review of existing legislation. We have concluded, as Health Minister McLellan recently announced, that there is a long overdue need to consolidate and rationalize current related laws. We also believe there is now public support and a demonstrable need to enhance the powers afforded the federal government. We recognize that the government has put forward Bill C-17, the Public Safety Act and a review of health protection legislation is underway. We believe that amending and updating existing legislation is necessary but not sufficient to address today’s public health challenges. The CMA is calling for the enhancement of the federal government’s “command and control” powers in times of national health emergencies. Specifically we are recommending a three-pronged legislative approach. 1. The CMA recommends The enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. The existing Emergencies Act gives the federal government the authority to become involved in public welfare emergencies when regions of the country are faced with “an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent... disease in human beings... that results or may result in a danger to life or property... so serious as to be a national emergency.” However, to use this power, the federal government must declare a “national emergency,” which itself has political and economic ramifications, particularly from an international perspective, and mitigates against its use. The CMA believes that this all-or-nothing approach is not in the public’s best interest. The concept of emergency in the context of public health requires a different response from governments in the future. Although we recognize that provincial and municipal governments currently have preplanned sets of responses to health threats, the CMA is proposing new legislation to allow for a rapid federal response to public health emergencies. The proposed Emergency Health Measures Act clarifies the roles and authority of governments and ensures a consistent and appropriate response with sufficient human and financial resources to protect Canadians faced with a public health emergency. Of utmost importance, all Canadians, regardless of their location, can be assured that the response to a health emergency will be delivered systematically by experts who can sustain the effort as needed. The proposed legislation would be founded on a graduated approach that would give the federal government the powers necessary to deal with a crisis, in an appropriately measured way, as it escalates. As the emergency grows, the government could implement stronger measures as required to meet the challenge — in principle, akin to the Unites States’ homeland security levels, which increase as the level of threat increases (see Appendix 4 for a description of the Canadian Emergency Health Alert System). The CMA strongly believes that the federal government must have jurisdiction to act when the ability of the provinces to respond to public health emergencies is so disparate. The inability of one province to stop the spread of virulent disease would have serious implications for the health of residents in the rest of the country. The federal government and the provinces must work together to ensure the safety of all our citizens. 2. The CMA recommends The creation of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. Although some provinces have established centres of public health expertise, considering the breadth of public health issues, the relative population sizes and differences in wealth, it will never be feasible to have comprehensive centres of public health expertise for each province and territory. Even if one achieved this, there would increasingly be issues of economies of scale and unnecessary duplication among centres. This issue is not unique to Canada.1 The CMA is proposing the development of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) operating at arm’s length from any level of government. CODSC would have overall responsibility for protecting the health of Canadians. The Office would provide credible information to enhance health decisions and promote health by developing and applying disease prevention and control, environmental health and health promotion and education activities. CODSC would enable a consistent and coordinated approach to public health emergencies as well as play a key role in the prevention and control of chronic diseases and injuries. It would provide national health surveillance, apolitical scientific expertise, system development including standards and guideline development, development and dissemination of an evidence base for public health interventions, skills training and transfer of expertise (i.e., through secondment of staff) and resources, including funding for core programs, to other levels of the system (e.g., provincial and local). 3. The CMA recommends The appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada; to head the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control; and to work with provinces and territories to develop and implement a pan-Canadian public health action plan. Many national or federal–provincial–territorial committees play an important role in recommending public health strategies or actions. The National Advisory Committee on Immunization and the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health are two excellent examples. But there is currently no single credible public health authority in whom is vested, through legislation or federal–provincial–territorial agreement, the overall responsibility for pan-Canadian public health issues. Therefore, the CMA is recommending the appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. Potential roles for this officer may include: * Serve as the head of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control * Serve as the national spokesperson for public health with the independence to comment on critical public health issues * Report annually on the health of the population * Develop, implement and report independently to parliament on public health system performance measures * Lead processes to identify and address gaps in the nation’s public health system. Capacity enhancement The public health system infrastructure is the foundation that supports the planning, delivery and evaluation of public health activities. In March 2001, the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Public Health<3> reported, In the view of respondents the system ‘is lacking in depth.’ This means that a sustained crisis would seriously compromise other programming. While the research does not indicate that the public health system in Canada is strained beyond capacity, there does appear to be agreement that there is a capacity to manage just one crisis at a time. However, just 2 years later, the GTA, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and carry on any other programs. The Ontario government recognized this state of affairs when, on 12 June, Ontario’s Health Minister Tony Clement said, “I was concerned that if we had one additional large-scale crisis, that the system would crash.” Important public health issues ranging from immunization to suicide prevention went virtually unaddressed, as the public health capacity in Toronto was overwhelmed. In the absence of a mechanism to share resources within the system and a general lack of overall system surge capacity, the city of Toronto and the province competed with each other to recruit trained staff from other health departments. The SARS outbreak has shown there is no surge capacity in Canada’s largest city. The acute care system in Toronto virtually ground to a halt in dealing with SARS. We must ask ourselves what would have happened if SARS had struck first in a smaller centre in a far less-advantaged region of Canada. Clearly Canada is not fully prepared. We should not have needed a crisis to tell us this. The CMA sees several components to rebuilding the capacity of the public health system. Public health human resources For the essential functions of the public health system to be realized, public health agencies need a workforce with appropriate and constantly updated skills. Canada’s public health workforce is extremely thin. There appear to be too few graduate-level public health professionals (i.e., those holding a master’s degree and physicians who are certified specialists in community medicine); those who do exist are not distributed equitably across jurisdictions. The scarcity of hospital-based infection control practitioners and emergency physicians within the acute care system and the lack of integration of hospital and community-based disease control efforts have been particularly striking during the SARS outbreak. The knowledge and skills required for effective public health practice are not static. They continually evolve as new evidence is identified. However, continuing education programming for public health practitioners is woefully underdeveloped in Canada. Health Canada has made some limited progress in this area, but the issue needs to be addressed much more substantively. 4. The CMA recommends The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. Canada has world-class expertise in public health. However, it does not have the depth of other countries, partly because we do not have a national multidisciplinary school of public health of the calibre of Harvard in Boston, Johns Hopkins in Baltimore and the School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in London. A national school of public health, which might be based on a virtual network of centres nationwide, could * Develop a plan to assess and address the substantial educational needs of new and existing public health staff * Address the coordination of the various academic training programs to meet the needs of the field * Ensure self-sufficiency of our public health workforce. 5. The CMA recommends The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. The SARS outbreak clearly demonstrated the need for a pre-planned approach to supporting and augmenting the public health and acute care workforce during a crisis. When health professionals in the GTA were overwhelmed, we were ill prepared to move health professionals in from other jurisdictions to help. Health professional associations like the CMA took the first steps in investigating and overcoming obstacles regarding licensure and insurance. We were taken aback when we found that the Ontario government had unilaterally awarded an exclusive contract to a for-profit company to arrange for emergency relief. The further delay caused by concerns about privacy, confidentiality and harmonizing fees hampered relief efforts. The deployment of health professionals during health emergencies is too important to be left in the hands of for-profit organizations as it was during the SARS experience. An established Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, operating on a non-profit basis, would * Maintain a “reserve” of public health professionals who are fully trained and could be deployed to areas of need during times of crisis * Co-ordinate the logistics of issues such as portable licensing, malpractice and disability insurance * Identify funding for staff training and a more equitable distribution of numbers and skills among jurisdictions. Investment in public health Considering the importance of the public health system and its capacity to protect and promote the health of Canadians, it is amazing that we have no reliable or comprehensive information about how much money is actually spent on the system or what public health human resources are available across Canada. This is partially due to the lack of uniform definitions, service delivery mechanisms and accounting practices. Even in the absence of reliable data on public health expenditures, there is ample evidence that the public health system continues to operate under serious resource constraints across Canada. 6. The CMA recommends Tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures and capacity (both physical and human resources) by the Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada, on behalf of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. In its latest report on health system expenditures, the CIHI states that 6% of total expenditures in 2000 were spent on “public health and administration.”<4> The inclusion of administrative costs in this figure means that public health funding is substantially less than 6% of health system expenditures.2 Federal Government Estimates report that Health Canada allocated $433 million in 2003–2004 for health promotion and prevention activities with spending scheduled to decrease to $308 million by 2005–2006 or by almost 30%. This decrease in spending exemplifies a decade that has seen tremendous fluctuations in spending on public health activities. The situation is alarming when looked at from a current-dollar basis; there was an 8.8% decrease in funding of public health activities between 1994–1995 and 1997–1998. In fact, federal spending on public health on a constant dollar basis did not regain its 1994–1995 level until 2000–2001. Although the late 1990s saw some reinvestment in public health initiatives, the most recent 2003–2004 estimates suggest that, once again, federal investment in public health will decrease dramatically over the next few years. Indeed, public health continues to represent only a small fraction of total federal direct spending on health (9.7% in 2002–2003). At the provincial level, although we cannot distance public health from administration, we know that it fell victim to the brutal climate of fiscal retrenchment of the 1990s, when in real terms provincial–territorial per capita health spending declined for 5 consecutive years after 1991–1992. During this period, public health was further destabilized by regionalization. According to the Survey of Public Health Capacity in Canada most provincial and territorial officials reported reductions in programming as a result of the transfer of funding and responsibility to regional structures. Although Ontario did not regionalize, in 1997 public health funding was downloaded to municipalities, which left public health departments scrambling to find funds to meet existing programs as well as new services that were mandated by the provincial Health Protection and Promotion Act. Whether talking about federal or provincial–territorial jurisdictions, we can no longer afford to have funding for health and safety subject to the vagaries of financial cycles. However, what perhaps is most alarming is the potentially large economic impact of underinvestment in this area. Although the net cost of the SARS outbreak in Ontario is not yet known, recent estimates suggest that it could be as high as $2.1 billion.3 Given this, the proverbial ounce of prevention that is worth a pound of cure comes to mind suggesting that a relatively modest increase in funding for public health could potentially result in substantial savings in the longer term. 7. The CMA recommends Federal government funding in the amount of $1 billion over 5 years to build adequate and consistent surge capacity across Canada and improve coordination among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal authorities to fulfill essential public health functions. The best way to ensure that the public health system is capable of addressing the range of public health threats, including emergencies, is to significantly increase investment in its capacity. This investment must assist all levels of the system to fulfill essential public health functions, with particular attention to local and regional agencies. The strategic national leadership that we are calling for includes the development of new mechanisms for federal cost sharing of basic public health services and the guarantee of a basic core set of local programs serving everyone in Canada, regardless of where they live. The system also needs to receive targeted funds so that it can do its work smarter and more effectively. Priority areas for this targeted funding should include development of an integrated information system and staff training. Research, surveillance and communications Canada’s ability to respond to emerging public health threats and acute events, such as the SARS outbreak, and to maintain its effective public health planning and program development depends on sound research, surveillance and rapid, real-time communications. 8. The CMA recommends An immediate sequestered grant of $200 million over 5 years to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to initiate an enhanced conjoint program of research with the Institute of Population and Public Health and the Institute of Infection and Immunity that will expand capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. Similar to the efforts in clinical care to support the use of evidence-based practices, interventions in public health must be based on research, evidence and best practices. A national effort should be undertaken to develop and make widely available, on an ongoing basis, a comprehensive and up-to-date review of the evidence base for public health programs. This information would support effective practice, enhance public health research capacity and support other infrastructure elements (e.g., minimum programs and services, performance measurement, system funding). It could also reduce unnecessary duplication of efforts by different public health agencies. We applaud the tremendous work of the unique trans-Canada partnership of 4 CIHR-funded research teams who, in just 11 weeks, discovered the complete DNA sequence of the coronavirus associated with SARS. This is a perfect example of what can be accomplished when our talented research teams work together. The recent announcement by the CIHR of an integrated national strategy for research on SARS reflects the intent of this recommendation for other public health challenges. 9. The CMA recommends The mandatory reporting by provinces and territories of identified infectious diseases to the newly established Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to enable appropriate communications, analyses and interventions. Public health surveillance is defined as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health data necessary for designing implementing and evaluating public health programs. It is an integral part of the public health system and performs an essential function in early detection and response to threats to human health. Current surveillance systems for communicable and noncommunicable diseases are inadequate to allow public health professionals to detect and react to major health issues. For effective public health management, surveillance must be a continuous process covering a range of integrated data sources to provide useful and timely information. 10. The CMA recommends The one-time infusion of $100 million, with an additional $2 million a year, for a “REAL” (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Coordination Initiative to improve technical capacity to communicate with front line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. In today’s world, international travel, business and migration can move infectious diseases around the world at jet speed. But during the SARS experience, governments and public health authorities were unable to communicate in real time with health professionals on the front lines. Gaps in the basic communication infrastructure prevent public health agencies from talking with each other in real time, and also hinder exchanges between public health staff, private clinicians and other sources of information about emerging new diseases. In response to requests from both the Ontario Medical Association and Health Canada, the CMA mobilized its communication networks to provide physicians with critical information about public health management of SARS. In less than 48 hours, via email and fax, we reached over 45,000 physicians with authoritative information. Through the good offices of the Canadian Council of Health Services Accreditation, this information was also made available to over 1500 accredited health facilities across Canada. Although necessity caused the limits of the system to be tested, SARS highlighted the fact that we do not have information systems in place to facilitate real-time communication with health professionals. Information is the key to effective response during times of emergency. Information in real time is also essential for effective day-to-day health care to provide, for example, information on adverse drug reactions. CONCLUSION SARS brought out the best in Canada and Canadians’ commitment to one another. It also turned a bright, sometimes uncomfortable spotlight on the ability of this country’s health care system to respond to a crisis, be it an emerging disease, a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or a large-scale accident. We must learn from the SARS experience and quickly move to rebuild the infrastructure of a strong public health system. The CMA believes that this 10-point Public Health Action Plan will go a long way toward addressing shortfalls in the Canadian public health system. Action now will help to ensure that Canadians can be confident once again that their governments are doing all they can to protect them from the threat of new infectious diseases. We wish the advisory committee well in its deliberations and offer the CMA’s assistance at any time in clarifying the strategies set out in our submission. APPENDIX 1: THE CMA’S PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION PLAN [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] [TABLE END] APPENDIX 2: ESTIMATED COST OF IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Recommendation Estimated cost over 5 years Legislative and institutional reform 1. Canada Emergency Health Measures Act N/A 2. Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) ? $20 million 3. Chief Public Health Officer of Canada Capacity enhancement 4. Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health $100 million 5. Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service $35 million 6. Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada $35 milliona 7. Surge capacity $1 billionb Research, surveillance and communications 8. Canadian Institutes of Health Research $200 millionc 9. Mandatory reporting Included under 2 and 3 above 10. Enhanced reporting $110 million TOTAL $1.5 billion a. Work is currently underway to break-out public health from the current category of “public health and administration.” b. This is an incremental investment in addition to funding currently available under Health Canada’s Health Promotion and Prevention Strategic Outcome area. c. Funding must be sequestered specifically for new initiatives related to public health. Additional money could also be acquired through funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, which received an additional $500 million in 2002–2003 (announced in the 2003 federal budget) to enhance the Foundation’s support of public health infrastructure. [TABLE END] APPENDIX 3: CHRONOLOGY OF THE CMA’S RESPONSE TO SARS 2002 November 16 * First known case of atypical pneumonia (SARS) occurs in Guangdong province, China 2003 February 11 * World Health Organization (WHO) receives reports from the Chinese Ministry of Health about SARS; 305 persons affected and 5 deaths February 13 * Canadian index case arrives in Hong Kong for a family visit February 18-21 * Canadian index case is a guest at the Metropole hotel in Kowloon February 21 * A medical doctor from Guangdong checks into Metropole hotel in Kowloon. The physician, who became ill a week before staying at the hotel, is considered to be the original source of the infection * This leads subsequently to outbreaks in Vietnam, Hong Kong, Singapore and Canada after guests leave the hotel and return home February 23 * Canadian index case returns home to Toronto March 5 * Canadian index patient dies in Toronto, 9 days after the onset of her illness March 12 * WHO issues global alert about SARS March 13 * National and international media reports begin appearing about SARS * The Canadian index patient’s son, Canada’s second SARS victim, dies 15 days after the onset of his illness March 14 * First reports from Toronto about deaths from SARS March 16 * Health Canada receives notice of SARS patients in Ontario and British Columbia; begins regular updates on SARS on its website * Health Canada initiates its pan-Canadian communication infrastructure, based on its pandemic influenza contingency plans March 17 * CMA calls Health Canada to offer assistance and request “real time information.” CMA immediately placed on list of participants in daily pan-Canadian teleconferences. * CMA adds a SARS page to its website home page (cma.ca) with CMA Shortcuts to expert information and daily updates March 19 * CMA alerts all its divisions and affiliates to the Health Canada and CMA SARS web pages * eCMAJ includes SARS updates on its website March 20 * CMA divisions add a link to SARS information for health professionals to their websites * Health Canada requests CMA’s assistance to inform physicians of the public health management guidelines for SARS March 28 * CMA sends an email to 33,000 members (copied to divisions and affiliated societies) to alert them to Health Canada’s SARS public health management documents and SARS web page April 1 * CMA CEO initiates cross-directorate task force and deploys dedicated staff resources. Some other CMA programs deferred/delayed. Task force begins daily staff SARS Working Group meetings * CMA communicates with the Ontario Medical Association on a daily basis April 2 * CMA holds teleconference with divisional communication directors re: SARS April 3 * CMA contacts the British Medical Association to establish whether we can secure a supply of masks from European sources * CMA organizes a teleconference among national health care organizations to discuss SARS developments April 7 * CMA posts electronic grand rounds on SARS for clinicians on cma.ca; * CMA sends email and fax communication to physicians to raise awareness of SARS e-grand rounds on cma.ca * Working with the Mental Health Support Network of Canada, CMA prepares and posts on cma.ca, fact sheets for health professionals and the public on coping with the stress caused by SARS April 9 * CMA hosts second teleconference among national health care organizations to discuss SARS developments April 17 * Electronic grand rounds on SARS updated and promoted through cma.ca April 23 * CMA sends email to membership requesting volunteers for the CMA Volunteer Emergency SARS Relief Network April 24 * CMA consults with the American Medical Association regarding the possibility of US physicians volunteering for the relief network April 25 * CMA CEO sends letter to deputy minister of health about the urgent need to create a national ministerial SARS task force April 30-May 1 * CMA participates in Health Canada-sponsored international SARS conference in Toronto May 6 * Health Canada announces the National Advisory Group on SARS and Public Health, headed by Dr. David Naylor May 12 * Opinion editorial by Dr. Dana Hanson, CMA president, on SARS and public health surge capacity published in The Ottawa Citizen; May 28 * CMA organizes a meeting of national health care organizations to discuss lessons learned from SARS June 3 * CMA receives an invitation to submit a brief to the National Advisory Group on SARS and Public Health June 6 * CMA sends e-mail to targeted segment of its membership (community medicine, public health, infectious disease and medical microbiology) requesting volunteers for the CMA Volunteer Emergency SARS Relief Network June 25 * CMA president outlines the CMA’s Public Health Action Plan during a speech at the Canadian Club in Toronto * CMA submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and public health APPENDIX 4: CMA’S PROPOSED HEALTH EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Health alert may be declared in: Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 * Any area under federal jurisdiction * Any community or province/territory with a risk of transmission to other provinces/territories or countries * Any community or province/territory with insufficient resources to manage the public health emergency within the capacity of the local public health authorities Definition of the area of concern Voluntary quarantine for individuals or property Increasing surveillance Chief public health officer takes the lead in coordinating the response Regulation or prohibition of travel Facilitating communication Reviewing and updating health emergency procedures Determination of local capacity to lead and respond Coordinating necessary response efforts with national disaster relief agencies, armed forces or law enforcement agencies at the federal–provinical–territorial level Medium to significant limitations of civil rights and freedoms Mandatory surveillance Assessing future resource requirements Deployment of a national response team Medium to significant limitations of civil rights and freedoms Evacuation of persons and the removal of personal property Providing the public with necessary information. Discretionary deployment of the national response team or on request of local authorities Quarantine of individuals and/or property with enforcement by law Implementing interventions, as appropriate, and emergency response actions Regulation of the distribution and availability of essential goods, services and resources Assessing further refinement of actions Restricting access to the area of concern Requisition, use or disposition of property Required consent of governor in council No No Yes Yes Yes Lead response team Municipal or provincial Provincial or national Provincial or national National or international International [TABLE END] REFERENCES 1. Garrett, L. Betrayal of trust: the collapse of global public health. New York: Hyperion; 2000. 2. Health Canada. National consultations, summary report: renewal of the federal health protection legislation. Ottawa: Health Canada; 1999. 3. Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health. Survey of public health capacity in Canada: highlights. Ottawa: The Committee; 2001. 4. Canadian Institutes for Health Information. National health expenditure trends: 1975–2002. Ottawa: CIHI; 2002. 5. Lévesque M. The economic impact of SARS. TD Economics Topic Paper. TD Bank Financial Group; 6 May 2003. Available: http://www.td.com/economics/topic/ml0503_sars.html (viewed: 20 June 2003). 1 Many countries (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands) have developed critical masses of public health expertise at the national level. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States, which has a critical mass, great depth of scientific expertise and the tools and fiscal resources to fund public health programs at both state and local levels through demonstration projects, is a sterling example of the effectiveness of such a central agency. 2 A review by the Canadian Institute for Health Information recognizes the problem with current expenditure tracking systems and has recommended separating public health from government administrative costs and prepayment administration in future health system cost estimates. 3 On 6 May, the TD Bank released a paper<5> suggesting that the cost of SARS to the Canadian economy may be between $1.5 and $2.1 billion.
Documents
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Canada Health Access Fund

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1490
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Health human resources
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC04-10
The Canadian Medical Association calls on the federal and provincial/territorial governments to establish a Canada Health Access Fund to assure that individual Canadians can obtain portable and timely access to care at the time and to the extent of their needs.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Health human resources
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC04-10
The Canadian Medical Association calls on the federal and provincial/territorial governments to establish a Canada Health Access Fund to assure that individual Canadians can obtain portable and timely access to care at the time and to the extent of their needs.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association calls on the federal and provincial/territorial governments to establish a Canada Health Access Fund to assure that individual Canadians can obtain portable and timely access to care at the time and to the extent of their needs.
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Canada Health Act

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy621
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
1992-08-19
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC92-22
That the Canadian Medical Association continue to lobby the federal government with respect to its obligations under Section 12.2 of the Canada Health Act.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
1992-08-19
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Resolution
GC92-22
That the Canadian Medical Association continue to lobby the federal government with respect to its obligations under Section 12.2 of the Canada Health Act.
Text
That the Canadian Medical Association continue to lobby the federal government with respect to its obligations under Section 12.2 of the Canada Health Act.
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Chaoulli: CMA/COA submission regarding timeliness of access to health care

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1956
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2004-03-19
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
  1 document  
Policy Type
Court submission
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2004-03-19
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
S.C.C. File No.: 29272 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF QUEBEC) B E T W E E N: JACQUES CHAOULLI AND GEORGE ZELIOTIS Appellants (Appellants) - and - ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC Respondent (Respondent) - and - ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent (Mis en cause) - and - ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MANITOBA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SASKATCHEWAN, AUGUSTIN ROY, SENATOR MICHAEL KIRBY, SENATOR MARJORY LEBRETON, SENATOR CATHERINE CALLBECK, SENATOR JOAN COOK, SENATOR JANE CORDY, SENATOR JOYCE FAIRBAIRN, SENATOR WILBERT KEON, SENATOR LUCIE PÉPIN, SENATOR BRENDA ROBERTSON AND SENATOR DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE CANADIAN ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS, CHARTER COMMITTEE ON POVERTY ISSUES AND THE CANADIAN HEALTH COALITION, CAMBIE SURGERIES CORPORATION, FALSE CREEK SURGICAL CENTRE INC., DELBROOK SURGICAL CENTRE INC., OKANAGAN PLASTIC SURGERY CENTRE INC., SPECIALTY MRI CLINICS INC., FRASER VALLEY MRI LTD., IMAGE ONE MRI CLINIC INC., MCCALLUM SURGICAL CENTRE LIMITED, 4111044 CANADA INC., SOUTH FRASER SURGICAL CENTRE INC., VICTORIA SURGERY LTD., KAMLOOPS SURGERY CENTRE LTD., VALLEY COSMETIC SURGERY ASSOCIATES INC., SURGICAL CENTRES INC., THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATION AND THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ANESTHESIOLOGISTS SOCIETY Interveners FACTUM OF THE INTERVENERS CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE CANADIAN ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATION BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP World Exchange Plaza 1100 – 100 Queen St. Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1J9 Guy Pratte/Freya Kristjanson Tel: (613) 237-5160/(416) 367-6388 Fax: (613) 230-8842/(416) 361-7053 Net: gpratte/fkristjanson@blgcanada.com Solicitors for the Interveners, The Canadian Medical Association and The Canadian Orthopaedic Association AND TO: JACQUES CHAOULLI 21, Jasper Avenue Ville Mont-Royal, Quebec H3P 1J8 Tel.: (514) 738-2377 Fax: (514) 738-4062 Appellant, self-represented AND TO: BERGERON, GAUDREAU, LAPORTE 167, rue Notre Dame de l’Île Gatineau, Quebec J8X 3T3 Richard Gaudreau Tel: (819) 770-7928 Fax: (819) 770-1424 Agent for the Appellant, Jacques Chaoulli AND TO: TRUDEL & JOHNSTON 85, de la Commune Est, 3e étage Montreal, Quebec H2Y 1J1 Philippe H. Trudel Bruce W. Johnston Tel.: (514) 871-8385 Fax: (514) 871-8800 Counsel for the Appellant, George Zéliotis AND TO: MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT LLP 1400 - 40 Elgin Street Ottawa, Ontario K1R 5K6 Colin S. Baxter Tel.: (613) 238-2000 Fax: (613) 238-9836 Agent for the Appellant, George Zéliotis AND TO: BERNARD, ROY ET ASSOCIÉS 8.01 - 1, rue Notre-Dame Est Montreal, Québec H2Y 1B6 Robert Monette Tel.: (514) 393-2336 Fax: (514) 873-7074 Counsel for the Respondent, Attorney General of Québec AND TO: NOËL & ASSOCIÉS 111, rue Champlain Hull, Quebec J8X 3R1 Sylvie Roussel Tel.: (819) 771-7393 Fax: (819) 771-5397 Agent for the Respondent, Attorney General of Quebec AND TO: CÔTE, MARCOUX & JOYAL Complexe Guy Favreau, Tour Est 200, boul. Rene-Levesque O. 5 etage Montréal, Québec H2Z 1X4 André L’Espérance Tel: (514) 283-3525 Fax: (514) 283-3856 Counsel for the Respondent, Attorney General of Canada AND TO: D’AURAY, AUBRY, LEBLANC & ASSOCIÉS 275, rue Sparks Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8 Jean-Marc Aubry, Q.C. Tel.: (613) 957-4663 Fax: (613) 952-6006 Agent for the Respondent, Attorney General of Canada AND TO: MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL Legal Services Branch 6th Floor, Sussex Building P.O. Box 9280 Stn Prov Govt 1001 Douglas Street Victoria, B.C. V8W 9J7 George H. Copley, Q.C. Tel: (250) 356-8875 Fax: (250) 356-9154 Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia AND TO: BURKE-ROBERTSON Barristers and Solicitors 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0A2 Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Tel: (613) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430 Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia AND TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO 720 Bay Street, 4th Floor Toronto, Ontario M5G 2K1 Janet E. Minor Shaun Nalatsuru Tel: (416) 326-4137 Fax: (416) 326-4015 Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario AND TO: BURKE-ROBERTSON Barristers and Solicitors 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0A2 Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Tel: (613) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430 Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario AND TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MANITOBA Department of Justice 1205-405 Broadway Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 3L6 Tel: (204) 945-0679 Fax: (204) 945-0053 AND TO: GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street P.O. Box 466, Stn. “D” Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Tel: (613) 233-1781 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Manitoba AND TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK P.O. Box 6000, Room 444 670 King St., Centennial Building Fredericton, N.B. E3B 5H1 Gabriel Bourgeois, Q.C. Tel: (506) 453-3606 Fax: (506) 453-3275 Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of New Brunswick AND TO: GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street P.O. Box 466, Stn. “D” Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Tel: (613) 233-1781 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of New Brunswick AND TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SASKATCHEWAN Constitutional Law Branch 8th Floor – Scarth Street Regina, Saskatchewan S4P 3V7 Tel: (306) 787-8385 Fax: (306) 787-9111 AND TO: GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street P.O. Box 466, Stn. “D” Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Tel: (613) 233-1781 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Saskatchewan AND TO: AUGUSTIN ROY AND TO: BERGERON, GAUDREAU, LAPORTE 167, rue Notre Dame de l’Île Gatineau, Quebec J8X 3T3 Richard Gaudreau Tel: (819) 770-7928 Fax: (819) 770-1424 Agent for the Intervener, Augustin Roy AND TO: LERNERS LLP 2400 - 130 Adelaide Street West Toronto , Ontario M5H 3P5 Earl A. Cherniak, Q.C. Tel: (416) 867-3076 Fax: (416) 867-9192 Counsel for the Interveners, Senator Michael Kirby, Senator Marjory Lebreton, Senator Catherine Callbeck, Senator Joan Cook, Senator Jane Cordy, Senator Joyce Fairbairn, Senator Wilbert Keon, Senator Lucie Pépin, Senator Brenda Robertson and Senator Douglas Roche AND TO: GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street P.O. Box 466, Stn. “D” Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Brian A. Crane, Q.C. Tel: (613) 233-1781 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Agents for the Interveners, Senator Michael Kirby, Senator Marjory Lebreton, Senator Catherine Callbeck, Senator Joan Cook, Senator Jane Cordy, Senator Joyce Fairbairn, Senator Wilbert Keon, Senator Lucie Pépin, Senator Brenda Robertson and Senator Douglas Roche AND TO: SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL 20 Dundas Street West Suite 1130, P.O. Box 180 Toronto, Ontario M5G 2G8 Steven Shrybman Tel: (416) 977-6070 Fax: (416) 591-7333 Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Labour Congress AND TO: BURKE-ROBERTSON Barristers and Solicitors 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0A2 Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Tel: (613) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430 Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Labour Congress AND TO: UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA P.O. Box 2400, Station CSC Victoria , British Columbia V8W 3H7 Martha Jackman Tel: (250) 721-8181 Fax: (250) 721-8146 Counsel for the Interveners, Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the Canadian Health Coalition AND TO: LANG MICHENER 300-50 O’Connor Street Ottawa , Ontario K1P 6L2 Marie-France Major Tel: (613) 232-7171 Fax: (613) 231-3196 Agent for the Interveners, Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the Canadian Health Coalition AND TO: BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP Suite 2600, Three Bentall Centre 595 Burrard Street, P. O Box 49314 Vancouver, B. C. V7X 1L3 Marvin R.V. Storrow, Q.C. Tel: (604) 631-3300 Fax: (604) 631-3309 Counsel for the Interveners, Cambie Surgeries Corporation, False Creek Surgical Centre Inc., Delbrook Surgical Centre Inc., Okanagan Plastic Surgery Centre Inc., Specialty MRI Clinics Inc., Fraser Valley MRI Ltd., Image One MRI Clinic Inc., McCallum Surgical Centre Limited and 4111044 Canada Inc., South Fraser Surgical Centre Inc., Victoria Surgery Ltd., Kamloops Surgery Centre Ltd., Valley Cosmetic Surgery Associates Inc., Surgical Centres Inc., the British Columbia Orthopaedic Association and the British Columbia Anesthesiologists Society AND TO: BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP World Exchange Plaza 20th Floor, 45 O’Connor Ottawa, Ontario K1P1A4 Gordon K. Cameron Tel: (613) 788-2222 Fax: (613) 7882247 Agent for the Interveners, Cambie Surgeries Corporation, False Creek Surgical Centre Inc., Delbrook Surgical Centre Inc., Okanagan Plastic Surgery Centre Inc., Specialty MRI Clinics Inc., Fraser Valley MRI Ltd., Image One MRI Clinic Inc., McCallum Surgical Centre Limited and 4111044 Canada Inc., South Fraser Surgical Centre Inc., Victoria Surgery Ltd., Kamloops Surgery Centre Ltd., Valley Cosmetic Surgery Associates Inc., Surgical Centres Inc., the British Columbia Orthopaedic Association and the British Columbia Anesthesiologists Society TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I: FACTS 1 1. Overview 1 2. CMA/COA’s Interest in the Appeal 2 3. CMA/COA’s Position on the Facts 3 PART II: QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 8 PART III: ARGUMENT 8 1. Breach of Section 7 of the Charter 8 (a) Right to Life and Security of the Person 9 (i) Infringement of Life and Security of the Person 9 (ii) Real Apprehension of Charter Section 7 Violation 10 (b) Principles of Fundamental Justice 11 (c) Not an Economic Right 15 2. Not Saved Under Charter Section 1 17 PART IV: SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS 18 PART V: ORDER SOUGHT 19 PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 20 PART VII: STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 22 PART I: FACTS 1. Overview 1. The Canadian Medical Association (“CMA”) and the Canadian Orthopaedic Association (“COA”) support the existing single payer (publicly funded) model of health care delivery, but are concerned that delays in access to medically necessary health care may put the life and health of patients in Canada at risk. The CMA/COA submit that governments must address the issue of timeliness of access to health care if they wish to maintain the viability and constitutionality of the social contract that is Medicare. 2. The CMA/COA put forward a position that they believe best protects the public health care system, while at the same time recognizing that failures in that system which threaten the life, liberty and security of the person of patients in Canada may constitute a Charter section 7 breach. The CMA/COA submit that so long as access to medically necessary care is provided in a timely manner, there is no Charter section 7 breach. In the absence of a clear commitment to timely access and where as a matter of fact the public system fails to provide timely access to medically necessary health care, legislative prohibitions that impede access or the means for access to medical treatment necessary to the life, liberty and security of the person do breach Charter section 7. 3. The fundamental issue in this case is whether it is constitutionally justifiable for governments to legislatively preclude a patient from seeking access or the means for access to medical treatment necessary to the life, liberty and security of the person, when such treatment is not available in a timely manner in the public system by reason of significant waiting times, under-funding, inadequate human and physical resources, or other impediments. 4. The purpose and effect of the matrix of federal and provincial statutes applicable to Medicare is to establish the public health care system as the sole payer of medically necessary (“insured”) services. In Québec, for example, the government defines what constitute medically necessary services, pays for all insured service provided to residents of Québec, sets out the conditions under which the insured services may be funded outside the province, and otherwise forbids by law the provision of private insurance for such insured services. While the Québec government has legislated to provide medically necessary care, the legislation does not extend to the provision of timely access to medically necessary care. It is this disjunction which has caused the CMA/COA to intervene in this case. Governments are not held accountable for the failure to provide medically necessary services in a timely manner in the public system. 5. This is not a case of economic rights because in the context of health care any clinically excessive delay can have profound consequences on both the physical and psychological aspects of a person’s life and security of the person. The CMA/COA, as physicians, submit that it is the impact of the deterioration of the public health care system to the point that it cannot deliver timely access to Canadians that is the heart of the issue. In this context, “timely access” refers to the delivery of care within a medically appropriate timeframe. Medically necessary health care delayed is health care denied. 2. CMA/COA’s Interest in the Appeal 6. The CMA is the national voice of Canadian physicians, with over 57,000 members in each of the ten provinces and the three territories. Its mission is to serve and unite the physicians of Canada, and to be the national advocate, in partnership with the people of Canada, for the highest standards of health and health care. An affiliate of the CMA, the COA is a voluntary medical speciality society of physicians with specialized training and certification in orthopaedic surgery. The COA’s goals are to achieve excellence in orthopaedic care for Canadians, in part through ensuring that adequate and accessible health care resources are available for Canadians. 7. The CMA/COA are committed to the fundamental principles of the national system of Medicare – comprehensiveness, universality of coverage, portability of benefits, reasonable access and non-profit administration. Furthermore, the CMA Code of Ethics, article 31, states that physicians should “recognize the responsibility of physicians to promote fair access to health care resources”. However, excessive waiting times in the public system threaten the viability of Medicare unless and until governments clearly commit to and factually do provide timely access. The decision of this Court will have a profound and lasting effect on the Canadian health care system, of which physicians are an integral part. It will directly affect the conditions under which patients receive treatment from physicians and other providers. Canadian Medical Association, Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association, (Ottawa: The Association), October 1996, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 17 3. CMA/COA’s Position on the Facts 8. Madam Justice Piché found at trial that if access to the health system is not possible, it is illusory to think that rights to life and security are respected. She further found that the prohibition on the purchase of private insurance is an infringement of life and security of the person where there are excessive waiting times for essential medical services in the public system. The trial judge found that waiting lists are too long and that, even if the question is not always one of life or death, all individuals are entitled to receive the care they need in a clinically responsive manner. She held, however, that the infringement did not violate fundamental justice given the historical context and the social benefits to all of a publicly funded health care system. Judgment of Piché J., Joint Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, pp. 126-127, 129, 134-135, 143 9. More recently, the serious issue of waiting times for medically necessary health care has been considered by two major national studies – the Canadian Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (the “Romanow Commission”) and the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology (“the Senate Committee”). Each of these significant reports concluded that excessive waiting times exist across the country, that governments have available a number of tools to address such waiting times which are not being used to their fullest extent, and that delays in access to medically necessary services may cause the health of patients to deteriorate, as well as stress and anxiety. Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report, (Ottawa, 2002) (Chair: Roy Romanow) at 137-150 [hereinafter Romanow, Building on Values], CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 15 Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role: Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada, Vol. 6 (Ottawa: 2002) (Chair: Michael Kirby) at 99-121 [hereinafter Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6], CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 16 10. The CMA/COA recognize that wait times for diagnosis and treatment are intrinsic to a health care system. No country has sufficient resources at its disposal to build the excess capacity necessary to meet all health needs on an urgent basis. However, excessive wait times emerged as a major public policy issue starting in the mid- to late-1990s following several years of cuts in the financing of public health care. Moreover, public anxiety has been mounting over lengthening wait times for treatment. Public confidence in the system “being there” at the time and to the extent of need is gradually being lost. Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 109-111, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 16 11. The Senate Committee cited with approval a recent Statistics Canada study, entitled Access to Health Care Services in Canada, 2001, that provides an indication of the extent to which Canadians are subject to waiting times and the associated stress and anxiety: * Almost one in five Canadians who access health care for themselves or a family member in 2001 encountered some form of difficulty, ranging from problems getting an appointment to lengthy waiting times. * Of the estimated five million people who visited a specialist, roughly 18 %, or 900,000, reported that waiting for care affected their lives. The majority of these people (59 per cent) reported worry, anxiety or stress. About 37 % said they experienced pain. * Canadians reported that waiting for services was clearly a barrier to care. Long waits were clearly not acceptable to Canadians, particularly when they experienced adverse effects such as worry and anxiety or pain while waiting for care. Statistics Canada, Access to Health Care Services in Canada, 2001 by C. Sanmartin, C. Houle, J.-M. Berthelot and K. White, (Ottawa, Minister of Industry, 2002) [hereinafter Statistics Canada, Access to Health Care], cited in Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 109, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 21 12. The Statistics Canada report concluded that: Perhaps the most significant information regarding access to care was about waiting times. … Long waits were clearly not acceptable to Canadians, particularly when they experienced adverse affects such as worry and anxiety or pain while waiting for care. Statistics Canada, Access to Health Care, supra at 21, cited in Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 109, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 21 13. Furthermore, the Romanow Report acknowledged the problem that Canadian patients and their physicians are faced with: Waiting for health care is a serious concern for Canadians and it has become a preoccupation for health care professionals, managers, and governments. Studies and public opinion polls have consistently shown that one of the top concerns of rural and urban Canadians is health care access… Long waiting times are the main, and in many cases, the only reason some Canadians say they would be willing to pay for treatment outside of the public health care system… As individual provinces and territories have struggled to deal with waiting times and wait lists within their own systems, progress is being made in some areas but more effort needs to be put into generalizing those efforts across the country… Clearly, the progress is not fast enough for Canadians. More can and must be done across the country to give Canadians what they want and deserve - timely access to health care services they need. Romanow, Building on Values, supra at 138-139, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 15 14. Following its review of the Canadian health care system, the Senate Committee concluded on the issue of waiting time that: In Canada, patient prioritization is not standardized for any medical service (with the exception of [the Cardiac Care Network] in Ontario). This means that there is currently no provincially or nationally accepted method of measuring or defining waiting times for medical services, nor are there standards and criteria for “acceptable” waits for the vast majority of health services. It is impossible, therefore, to determine whether, from a clinical point of view, patients have waited a reasonable or unreasonable length of time to access care. The absence of standardized criteria and methods to prioritize patients waiting for care means that patients are placed and prioritized on waiting lists based on a range of clinical and non-clinical criteria that vary by individual referring physician across institutions, regional health authorities, and provinces. Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 112, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 16 15. The Romanow Commission concluded on the issue of current problems with wait lists: One of the most serious concerns is not only the length of time some people wait but the way in which wait lists are managed. In fact, to say wait lists are “managed” is almost a misnomer. There is no consistent way of dealing with wait lists in particular regions let alone on a provincial or national basis. This affects the health of people who wait and it seriously undermines Canadians’ confidence in their health care system. When individual Canadians are told that they are on a wait list for a particular service, they probably assume that there is a master list that is managed and co-ordinated based on the urgency of their need. In reality, that is not what happens. Romanow, Building on Values, supra at 141-143, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 15 16. Recent international surveys also indicate that the waiting times and access to care for patients who make heavy use of the health care system are markedly poorer in Canada than in four other Western countries. R.J. Blendon et al., “Common concerns Amid Diverse Systems: Health Care Experiences in Five Countries” (2003), 22 Health Affairs 106, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 14 17. On the international scene, since at least the early 1990’s, mechanisms to address excessive wait times including access standards and care guarantees have been the subject of study, debate and practice in several jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, Sweden and New Zealand. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) commissioned a comprehensive study of the international experience with access standards and care guarantees. OECD, Labour and Social Affairs Committee, Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries, Doc. No. DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2003)6 (2003), CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 19 OECD, Labour and Social Affairs Committee, Explaining Waiting Times Variations for Elective Surgery Across OECD Countries, Working Paper No. 7, Doc. No. DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2003)7 (2003), CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 18 18. While the federal government has never taken the position that timeliness is a component of accessibility, such a position is certainly open to it. The Canada Health Act has established five criteria pursuant to which the federal government will cost-share provincial Medicare programs: portability, comprehensiveness, universality, public administration, and accessibility. “Accessibility” has been interpreted to require that there be no financial barriers to accessing hospital and physician services. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, s. 7, 12 19. The CMA proposed to the Senate Committee that guidelines and standards around quality and waiting times be established for a clearly defined basket of core services, and argued that “if the publicly funded health care system fails to meet the specified agreed-upon standards for timely access to core services, then patients must have other options to allow them to obtain this required care through other means.” Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 119, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 16 20. There are concrete Canadian examples of how timely access may be measured and provided such as the Cardiac Care Network of Ontario, and the Western Canada Waiting List Project, both of which are reviewed in the Senate Committee Report. These projects have demonstrated that a substantial improvement in the waiting list problem is possible through adopting an approach based on the clinical needs of patients on waiting lists. The Senate Committee suggested: * A process to establish standard definitions for waiting times should be national in scope, and * Standard definitions should focus on four key waiting periods – waiting for primary care consultation; for initial specialist consultation; for diagnostic tests; and for surgery. Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 103-113, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 16 Romanow, Building on Values, supra at 143-144, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 15 PART II: QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 21. The CMA/COA take a position on the following constitutional questions as stated by this Court in its Order of August 15, 2003: (1) Does s. 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28, infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? (2) If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? (3) Does s. 15 of the Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29, infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? (4) If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 22. The CMA/COA submit that if there is a clear commitment from governments which provides timely access to medically necessary care, there is no constitutional breach. However, constitutional questions #1 and 3, should be answered affirmatively if a patient is denied timely access to health care in the public system with the result that the patient’s life is threatened or the quality of his/her life substantially compromised, and that patient is legislatively precluded from seeking access or the means for access to medically necessary treatment. In this event, the corresponding questions #2 and 4 should be answered negatively. PART III: ARGUMENT 1. Breach of Section 7 of the Charter 23. The analytical approach to be used under section 7 of the Charter has recently been described by this Honourable Court as a three-step process: 1) the identification of the individual interests said to be infringed and a determination of whether those interests fall within the meaning of the phrase “life, liberty and security of the person;” 2) the identification of the principles of fundamental justice engaged in the circumstances of the case; and, 3) whether the threshold infringement found in the first stage of the analysis is inconsistent with the pertinent principle of fundamental justice. R v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, 2003 SCC 74 at para. 83 [hereinafter Malmo-Levine], CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 10 (a) Right to Life and Security of the Person 24. The CMA/COA submit that when a patient is denied timely access to health care in the publicly funded system with the result that the patient’s life is threatened or the quality of her life substantially compromised, and that patient is legislatively precluded from seeking access or the means for access to medically necessary treatment, the infringement of the rights to life and/or security of the person is clear. However, where the health care service at issue is not essential to maintaining quality and quantity of life, and the delay in accessing that treatment is not clinically significant, then the values and principles reflected in Charter section 7 are not engaged. 25. “Timely access” to health care refers to the delivery of care within a medically appropriate time frame. As discussed in paragraph 20, there are existing Canadian and international initiatives to develop and refine medically appropriate time frames. (i) Infringement of Life and Security of the Person 26. In the context of health care, any clinically excessive delay can have profound consequences on both the physical and psychological aspects of a patient’s life and security of the person. OECD, Labour and Social Affairs Committee, Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries Annex 1, Doc. No. DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2003)6/ANN1 (2003), CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 20 27. The CMA/COA submit that delay in the medical context, when caused by government laws and policies, may clearly threaten an individual’s life and security of the person. The significance of government-caused delay in the criminal context was recognized in R. v. Morgentaler. Chief Justice Dickson, as he then was, in R. v. Morgentaler found that the increased risk to a woman’s health resulting from the delay caused by the government procedures in obtaining an abortion deprived her of her security of the person. Justice Beetz recognized the additional danger to a woman’s health caused by the state’s intervention which prevented “access to effective and timely medical treatment.” R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 59, 101 [hereinafter Morgentaler], CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 11 28. The infringement of a person’s security is not restricted to the physical aspect. State interference with bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress also constitute a breach of security of the person. There must be an objective assessment of state interference “on the psychological integrity of a person of reasonable sensibility.” It requires more than ordinary stress and anxiety, but does not need to escalate to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at para. 60 [hereinafter New Brunswick], CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 7 Morgentaler, supra at 60, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 11 29. The failure to obtain timely health care may have a serious and profound effect on an individual well beyond the normal stress and anxiety of life. Where there is an increased risk to both physical and mental health resulting from excessive delay in obtaining medically necessary health care, a deprivation of security of the person and significant diminution in the quality and quantity of life will ensue. (ii) Real Apprehension of Charter Section 7 Violation 30. The evidence before the trial judge supports a finding that there is a real apprehension of a violation of Charter section 7 rights. At trial, Piché J. heard evidence from more than fifteen witnesses, including both expert physicians and professors, as well as patients who have been intimately involved with the public health care system. A large quantity of evidence was presented on the delays in access to health care, and its consequences in such fields as orthopaedics, ophthalmology, oncology, cardiology and emergency care. She concluded: De ces témoignages, le Tribunal retient d’abord la sincérité et l’honnêteté des médecins qui ont témoigné, de leur désir de changer les choses, de leur impuissance malheureuse devant des listes d’attente trop longues. Le Tribunal retient que les listes d’attente sont trop longues, que même si ce n’est pas toujours une question de vie ou de mort, tous les citoyens ont droit à recevoir les soins dont ils ont besoin, et ce, dans les meilleurs délais. Judgment of Piché J., Joint Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, pp. 42, 43 31. The CMA/COA submit that deference must be paid to the findings of fact of the trial judge. In the alternative, the CMA/COA submit that this Court has before it all the necessary evidentiary support in order to make the determination on reasonable hypothetical circumstances. The protection under the Charter embodies a preventative aspect when a violation is apprehended, as observed by the trial judge. As Justice Forget at the Court of Appeal held: Obliger une personne à attendre d’être gravement malade (ou d’avoir subi un grave accident) avant d’entreprendre des procédures pour obtenir des soins adéquats de santé aurait pour effet, dans la majorité des cas, de rendre illusoire le recours, compte tenu de l’imprévisibilité de la maladie et de son évolution. Judgment of Court of Appeal, Forget J., Joint Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, p. 187 New Brunswick, supra at paras. 56-68 and 91, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 7 32. The CMA/COA submit that this Honourable Court should not be waiting for, in the words of the trial judge, “une question de vie ou de mort” before acting. Cases such as Stein v. Québec (Régie de l’Assurance-maladie) demonstrate that timely access to necessary medical care is a real concern. Failures of timely access pose a significant risk to s. 7 rights. Stein v. Québec (Régie de l’Assurance-maladie), [1999] Q.J. No. 2724 (S.C.), CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 13 (b) Principles of Fundamental Justice 33. The section 7 analysis then turns to the principles of fundamental justice which are found in “the basic tenets of our legal system.” The objective of the Health Insurance Act is to regulate the single payer (publicly funded) Medicare system in Québec. The CMA/COA are committed to a sustainable health care system which provides for timely and fair access to medically necessary care. All aspects of health care are intrinsically linked to time – prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and follow up – yet there is no commitment from governments to timeliness as a core aspect of the provision of health care. As a result, the CMA/COA submit the legislation violates principles of fundamental justice due to arbitrariness and irrationality. Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 512, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 8 34. This Honourable Court has identified the three criteria that must be fulfilled in order to establish a principle of fundamental justice: First, it must be a legal principle. This serves two purposes. First, it "provides meaningful content for the s. 7 guarantee"; second, it avoids the "adjudication of policy matters": Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 503. Second, there must be sufficient consensus that the alleged principle is "vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice": Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 590. The principles of fundamental justice are the shared assumptions upon which our system of justice is grounded. They find their meaning in the cases and traditions that have long detailed the basic norms for how the state deals with its citizens. Society views them as essential to the administration of justice. Third, the alleged principle must be capable of being identified with precision and applied to situations in a manner that yields predictable results. Examples of principles of fundamental justice that meet all three requirements include the need for a guilty mind and for reasonably clear laws. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4 at para. 8, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 3 35. The CMA/COA respectfully submit that the trial judge erred in this case in balancing the harms to individuals with the greater good to society of Medicare, under the rubric of Charter section 7 rather than under Charter section 1. As this Court has recently held: The balancing of individual and societal interests within s. 7 is only relevant when elucidating a particular principle of fundamental justice… Once the principle of fundamental justice has been elucidated, however, it is not within the ambit of s. 7 to bring into account such “societal interests” as health care costs. Malmo-Levine, supra at para. 98, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 10 36. This Honourable Court recently reiterated that the state has an interest in avoiding harm to those subject to its laws which may justify parliamentary action: In other words, avoidance of harm is a “state interest” within the rule against arbitrary or irrational state conduct mentioned in Rodriguez, at p. 594, previously cited, that Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that a breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individuals’ rights will have been deprived for no valid purpose. Malmo-Levine, supra at para. 131, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 10 37. The state has a particular interest in acting to protect vulnerable persons. All patients, including those waiting to receive medical care, are vulnerable to the exercise of state power which limits access to health care. The CMA/COA submit that in the context of the single payer (publicly funded) model of health care delivery where access to alternate means for such care is prohibited by the state, patients are a vulnerable group. It is an arbitrary and irrational use of state power for the Québec Legislature, in section 15 of the Health Insurance Act, to prohibit alternative meaning of access to health care services without assuming a concomitant state obligation to guarantee timely access to necessary medical care, where the failure to afford timely access may lessen the quality and quantity of life. Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29, s. 15 New Brunswick, supra at para. 70, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 7 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at para. 88, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 1 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 595, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 12 38. The CMA/COA submit that it is open to this Court to read the concept of timeliness into the existing legislative provisions so as to render them constitutionally compliant. However, in the context of health care, a commitment to timeliness must be demonstrated in fact. The evidence before the trial judge and the findings of the Romanow Commission and the Senate Committee clearly indicate that access to medically necessary health care is not always provided in a timely manner. 39. In the absence of a commitment which provides timely access to publicly funded care, it is irrational for the state to prohibit access or the means of access to other forms of medically necessary care. The CMA/COA do not argue that governments must fund all medical services, but rather that having chosen to provide insured medical services under a single payer (publicly funded) model and prohibiting private insurance for these services, the government must provide the insured services in a timely manner. Failure to do so would be irrational, as it would constitute state action harming vulnerable persons. Hitzig v. Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 3873 (C.A.) at paras. 113-121, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 6 40. Timeliness as a concept integral to many aspects of fundamental justice has been recognized by the common law and equity, through such concepts as laches, or the timeliness of trial rights. In particular, timeliness in the provision of medically necessary health care is essential to preserving human dignity, security of the person and promotion of human health. Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 at paras. 121-133, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 2 R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 at 1219-1223, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 9 41. This is not just a failure of the Québec provincial legislature: it is an issue which involves the constitutional obligations of the federal government as well. As discussed above, one of the five criteria established by the federal government for cost-sharing of provincial Medicare is the principle of “accessibility”. The federal government, however, has not acknowledged timeliness as an aspect of accessibility. 42. Recognizing timeliness as intrinsic to accessibility and the requirements of fundamental justice is consistent with the constitutional commitments made by both the federal and provincial governments in section 36(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides: 36(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to: (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; …; and (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 36(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982] 43. Section 36(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 establishes a constitutional commitment to promoting opportunities for well-being, and providing essential public services of reasonable quality. However, where governments fail to provide access to necessary medical care in a timely fashion in the public system, it is irrational to use the legislative power of prohibition to forbid viable alternatives. This irrationality contravenes principles of fundamental justice. Where Medicare contains no method of measuring or achieving timely access, the promise that governments will provide medically necessary treatment becomes illusory. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 36(1), supra 44. In the alternative, if this Honourable Court were to conclude that the prohibition is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because it promotes legitimate social interests, the CMA would respectfully submit that this conclusion should not be a “frozen” one. Any decision should not enshrine the status quo of excessive wait times as a perpetually viable constitutional state of affairs. This Court could establish threshold criteria for the life and health of Canadian citizens, below which the larger public good cannot be used to justify violations of individual rights. Recent studies such as the Romanow Commission and the Senate Committee found that the waiting time issue is dynamic, evolving and not static. (c) Not an Economic Right 45. Some of the respondents and interveners argue that the issue is one of economic rights – the purchase of insurance – which is not protected by the Charter. The CMA/COA submit that in the realm of access to health care, insurance can be a tool to secure that which is Charter protected – timely access to medically necessary health care. The economic aspect is incidental to securing the right. 46. The CMA/COA take the position that any economic and contract aspects are merely incidental to the real issue of the s. 7 right to life, liberty and security of the person. The trial judge concluded that economic barriers in the impugned legislation are ancillary to the principle of access to health care: Le Tribunal estime que les barrières économiques établies par les articles 15 LAM et 11 LAH sont intimement liées à la possibilité d’accès à des soins de santé. Sans ces droits, compte tenu des coûts impliqués, l’accès aux soins privés est illusoire. Dans ce sens, ces dispositions sont une entrave à l’accès à des services de santé et sont donc susceptibles de porter atteinte à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de la personne. Judgment of Piché J., Joint Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, pp. 126-127 47. The CMA/COA submit that the trial judge was correct in concluding that excessive delay in the provision of necessary medical care violates the right to life, liberty and security of the person. Any economic rights to contract are incidental. This case is about patients in Canada having the right to quality health care in a timely manner. Judgment of Piché J., Joint Appellants’ Record, Vol. I, pp. 125-127, 133-134 48. To deny Canadians the right to timely access to health care on such conjectural grounds as the secondary aspect of this case, which touches economic or contractual aspects, would denude section 7 of its promise to life, liberty and security of the person. A legislative prohibition on the purchase of insurance when timely access is not provided is not the denial of an economic right, but the denial of a fundamental right to life, liberty and security. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at paras. 91-93 [hereinafter Eldridge], CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 4 2. Not Saved Under Charter Section 1 49. It is clear that once an infringement of section 7 is established, the onus moves to the Government to justify the infringement under s. 1 pursuant to the Oakes test. The framework under section 1 was first established in R v. Oakes : A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once two conditions are met. First. the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Second, the means chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation; (2) the impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter guarantee; and (3) there must be proportionality between the effect of the measure and its objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the right. New Brunswick, supra at para. 95 citing Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at para. 182, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 7 50. It has long been established that the rights protected under section 7 are of significant importance and cannot ordinarily be overridden by competing social interests. In addition, “rarely will a violation of the principles of fundamental justice…be upheld as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 at para. 91, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 5 New Brunswick, supra at para. 99 citing Re B.C. Motor Vehicle, supra at 518, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 7 51. The values in issue here are similar to those considered by this Honourable Court in Eldridge, where La Forest J. for the Court held: Given the central place of good health in the quality of life of all persons in our society, the provisions of substandard medical services to the deaf necessarily diminishes the overall quality of their lives. The government has simply not demonstrated that this unpropitious state of affairs must be tolerated in order to achieve the objective of limiting health care expenditures. Stated differently, the government has not made a “reasonable accommodation” of the appellants’ disability. Eldridge, supra at para. 94, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 4 52. The Romanow Commission has advocated central management of waiting lists, with common indicators, benchmarks and public accounting. The Senate Committee has recommended care guarantees. These are strong indications that solutions exist in a public health care system that will extend a commitment to timely access to medically necessary health care. Kirby, The Health of Canadians, Vol. 6, supra at 103-113, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 16 Romanow, Building on Values, supra at 143-144, CMA/COA Authorities, Tab 15 53. The CMA/COA submit that if this Court holds that the legislation contravenes the Charter, governments have open to them a full range of options that could be implemented to address excessive waiting times for care. These include government commitments to assurances of timeliness as an essential element of the provision of medically necessary care where wait times are excessive, adopting timeliness as an element of “accessibility” under the Canada Health Act, and committing to clinically responsive access standards as envisioned by the Senate Committee. Other measures such as streamlining and improving the portability of out-of-province provisions in provincial Medicare statutes may also be considered by governments. In the absence of such assurances, however, a system which precludes alternative means to obtain medically necessary health care is unconstitutional where wait times are excessive. 54. Accordingly, it is submitted that a violation of Charter section 7 could be justified pursuant to section 1 if and only if the government were able to prove, on a balance of probabilities based on reliable and credible evidence rather than conjecture, that no alternative exists that could be implemented to ensure timeliness while at the same time maintaining the viability of the public single-payer. PART IV: SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS 55. The CMA/COA seeks no costs and asks that none be awarded against it. PART V: ORDER SOUGHT 56. The CMA/COA submit that when a person’s life is threatened or the quality of his or her life is substantially compromised and that person is prohibited from obtaining the medically necessary treatment through other means, even though the publicly funded system is unable to provide the necessary care, then constitutional questions # 1 and 3 should be answered affirmatively and the corresponding questions # 2 and 4 should be answered in the negative. Any declaration of unconstitutionality should, however, be delayed by three years, or such other period of time as this Court shall determine, so that the government may during this period institute the systemic commitment to timely access to medically necessary care and ensure simultaneously that individual patients receive care in as timely a manner as possible. 57. The CMA/COA seek leave of this Court, pursuant to rule 59(2), to present oral argument at the hearing of this appeal. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, as amended, Rule 59(2) ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED December 12, 2005 Guy Pratte Freya Kristjanson ::ODMA\PCDOCS\LG-OTT-2\350103\1 PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Paragraph Nos. B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315………………..37 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307……………….40 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4……………………………………………………………………………34 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624…………………….48, 51 Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844………………………………………………50 Hitzig v. Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 3873 (C.A.)………………………………………………….39 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46……………………………………………………………….28, 31, 37, 49, 50 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486………………………………………………...33 R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199………………………………………………………………..40 R v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, 2003 SCC 74………………………………………….23, 35, 36 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30……………………………………………………….27, 28 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519……………………….37 Stein v. Québec (Régie de l’Assurance-maladie), [1999] Q.J. No. 2724 (S.C.)…………………32 Secondary Sources Paragraph Nos. R.J. Blendon et al., “Common concerns Amid Diverse Systems: Health Care Experiences in Five Countries” (2003), 22 Health Affairs 106………………………………….16 Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report, (Ottawa, 2002) (Chair: Roy Romanow)……………………………………………………9, 13, 15, 20, 52 Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role: Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada, Vol. 6 (Ottawa: 2002) (Chair: Michael Kirby)……………………………………………………….9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 52 Canadian Medical Association, Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association, (Ottawa: The Association), October 1996…………………………………………..7 OECD, Labour and Social Affairs Committee, Explaining Waiting Times Variations for Elective Surgery Across OECD Countries, Working Paper No. 7, Doc. No. DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2003)7 (2003)……………………………………………...17 OECD, Labour and Social Affairs Committee, Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries, Doc. No. DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2003)6 (2003)………………………………….17 OECD, Labour and Social Affairs Committee, Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries Annex 1, Doc. No. DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2003)6/ANN1 (2003)………………...26 Statistics Canada, Access to Health Care Services in Canada, 2001 by C. Sanmartin, C. Houle, J.-M. Berthelot and K. White, (Ottawa, Minister of Industry, 2002)……………………………………………………………………………….11, 12 PART VII: STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Loi canadienne sur la santé, L.R.C. 1985 c. C-6 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 7. Le versement à une province, pour un exercice, de la pleine contribution pécuniaire visée à l'article 5 est assujetti à l'obligation pour le régime d'assurance-santé de satisfaire, pendant tout cet exercice, aux conditions d'octroi énumérées aux articles 8 à 12 quant à : a) la gestion publique; b) l'intégralité; c) l'universalité; d) la transférabilité; e) l'accessibilité. 12. (1) La condition d'accessibilité suppose que le régime provincial d'assurance-santé : a) offre les services de santé assurés selon des modalités uniformes et ne fasse pas obstacle, directement ou indirectement, et notamment par facturation aux assurés, à un accès satisfaisant par eux à ces services; b) prévoie la prise en charge des services de santé assurés selon un tarif ou autre mode de paiement autorisé par la loi de la province; c) prévoie une rémunération raisonnable de tous les services de santé assurés fournis par les médecins ou les dentistes; d) prévoie le versement de montants aux hôpitaux, y compris les hôpitaux que possède ou gère le Canada, à l'égard du coût des services de santé assurés. (2) Pour toute province où la surfacturation n'est pas permise, il est réputé être satisfait à l'alinéa (1)c) si la province a choisi de conclure un accord et a effectivement conclu un accord avec ses médecins et dentistes prévoyant : a) la tenue de négociations sur la rémunération des services de santé assurés entre la province et les organisations provinciales représentant les médecins ou dentistes qui exercent dans la province; b) le règlement des différends concernant la rémunération par, au choix des organisations provinciales compétentes visées à l'alinéa a), soit la conciliation soit l'arbitrage obligatoire par un groupe représentant également les organisations provinciales et la province et ayant un président indépendant; c) l'impossibilité de modifier la décision du groupe visé à l'alinéa b), sauf par une loi de la province. 7. In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal year, the health care insurance plan of the province must, throughout the fiscal year, satisfy the criteria described in sections 8 to 12 respecting the following matters: (a) public administration; (b) comprehensiveness; (c) universality; (d) portability; and (e) accessibility. 12. (1) In order to satisfy the criterion respecting accessibility, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must provide for insured health services on uniform terms and conditions and on a basis that does not impede or preclude, either directly or indirectly whether by charges made to insured persons or otherwise, reasonable access to those services by insured persons; (b) must provide for payment for insured health services in accordance with a tariff or system of payment authorized by the law of the province; (c) must provide for reasonable compensation for all insured health services rendered by medical practitioners or dentists; and (d) must provide for the payment of amounts to hospitals, including hospitals owned or operated by Canada, in respect of the cost of insured health services. (2) In respect of any province in which extra-billing is not permitted, paragraph (1)(c) shall be deemed to be complied with if the province has chosen to enter into, and has entered into, an agreement with the medical practitioners and dentists of the province that provides (a) for negotiations relating to compensation for insured health services between the province and provincial organizations that represent practising medical practitioners or dentists in the province; (b) for the settlement of disputes relating to compensation through, at the option of the appropriate provincial organizations referred to in paragraph (a), conciliation or binding arbitration by a panel that is equally representative of the provincial organizations and the province and that has an independent chairman; and (c) that a decision of a panel referred to in paragraph (b) may not be altered except by an Act of the legislature of the province. CONTRATS D'ASSURANCE ET SUBROGATION Contrats d'assurance prohibés. 15.  Nul ne doit faire ou renouveler un contrat d'assurance ou effectuer un paiement en vertu d'un contrat d'assurance par lequel un service assuré est fourni ou le coût d'un tel service est payé à une personne qui réside ou qui séjourne au Québec ou à une autre personne pour son compte, en totalité ou en partie. Contrats en vigueur pour d'autres services et biens. Si un tel contrat a aussi pour objet d'autres services et biens, il demeure en vigueur quant à ces autres services et biens et la considération prévue à l'égard de ce contrat doit être ajustée en conséquence, à moins que le bénéficiaire de ces services et de ces biens n'accepte de recevoir en échange des avantages équivalents. Délai de remboursement. Si la considération a été payée à l'avance, le montant du remboursement ou de l'ajustement, selon le cas, doit être remis dans les trois mois à moins que la personne assurée n'accepte au cours de cette période de recevoir des avantages équivalents. Montants inférieurs à 5 $. Si le montant total des remboursements ou des ajustements qui doivent être effectués à l'égard d'une même personne en vertu d'un contrat conclu pour au plus une année est inférieur à 5 $, le montant n'est pas exigible mais il doit être remis au ministre pour être versé au Fonds de la recherche en santé du Québec visé dans l'article 96. Exception. Le premier alinéa ne s'applique pas à un contrat qui a pour objet l'excédent du coût des services assurés rendus hors du Québec ou l'excédent du coût des médicaments dont la Régie assume le paiement. Il ne s'applique pas non plus à un contrat qui a pour objet la contribution que doit payer une personne assurée en vertu de la Loi sur l'assurance médicaments ( chapitre A-29.01). CONTRACT OF INSURANCE AND SUBROGATION Coverage under contract of insurance prohibited. 15.  No person shall make or renew a contract of insurance or make a payment under a contract of insurance under which an insured service is furnished or under which all or part of the cost of such a service is paid to a resident or temporary resident of Québec or to another person on his behalf. Contract in force for other services and property. If such a contract also covers other services and property it shall remain in force as regards such other services and property and the consideration provided with respect to such contract must be adjusted accordingly, unless the beneficiary of such services and of such property agrees to receive equivalent benefits in exchange. Delay for reimbursement. If the consideration was paid in advance, the amount of the reimbursement or adjustment, as the case may be, must be remitted within three months unless the insured person agrees, during such period, to receive equivalent benefits. Amounts less than $5. If the total amount of the reimbursements or adjustments to be made as regards one person under a contract made for not more than one year is less than $5, the amount shall not be exigible but it shall be remitted to the Minister to be paid to the Fonds de la recherche en santé du Québec contemplated in section 96. Excess cost. The first paragraph does not apply to a contract covering the excess cost of insured services rendered outside Québec or the excess cost of any medication of which the Board assumes payment nor does it apply to a contract covering the contribution payable by an insured person under the Act respecting prescription drug insurance ( chapter A-29.01). Loi sur l’assurance-maladie, L.R.Q., c. A-29, article 15 Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29, section 15. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 36, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 36. 1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. 36. 1) Sous réserve des compétences législatives du Parlement et des législatures et de leur droit de les exercer, le Parlement et les législatures, ainsi que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, s'engagent à a) promouvoir l'égalité des chances de tous les Canadiens dans la recherche de leur bien-être; b) favoriser le développement économique pour réduire l'inégalité des chances; c) fournir à tous les Canadiens, à un niveau de qualité acceptable, les services publics essentiels. 59 (2) Le juge peut à sa discrétion, une fois les mémoires de demande d'autorisation d'appel, d'appel ou de renvoi déposés et signifiés, autoriser l'intervenant à présenter une plaidoirie orale à l'audition de la demande d'autorisation d'appel, le cas échéant, de l'appel ou du renvoi, et déterminer le temps alloué pour la plaidoirie orale. 59 (2) After all of the memoranda of argument on an application for leave to appeal or the facta on an appeal or reference have been filed and served, a judge may, in his or her discretion, authorize an intervener to present oral argument at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, if any, the appeal or the reference, and determine the time allotted for oral argument. 36. 1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. 36. 1) Sous réserve des compétences législatives du Parlement et des législatures et de leur droit de les exercer, le Parlement et les législatures, ainsi que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, s'engagent à a) promouvoir l'égalité des chances de tous les Canadiens dans la recherche de leur bien-être; b) favoriser le développement économique pour réduire l'inégalité des chances; c) fournir à tous les Canadiens, à un niveau de qualité acceptable, les services publics essentiels. Règles de la Cour suprême du Canada, DORS/2002-156, tel qu’amendées, Règle 59(2) Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, as amended, Rule 59(2) 36. 1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. 36. 1) Sous réserve des compétences législatives du Parlement et des législatures et de leur droit de les exercer, le Parlement et les législatures, ainsi que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, s'engagent à a) promouvoir l'égalité des chances de tous les Canadiens dans la recherche de leur bien-être; b) favoriser le développement économique pour réduire l'inégalité des chances; c) fournir à tous les Canadiens, à un niveau de qualité acceptable, les services publics essentiels.
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CMA’s Annual Check-up of Canada’s Health Care System: Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance Pre-Budget Consultations

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1953
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2003-09-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
  2 documents  
Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2003-09-25
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
Text
The past year has been an historic one for health and health care in Canada. We applaud the federal government for the reinvestments that were made at the time of the February 2003 Health Accord. However, what we as physicians continue to hear in our offices, clinics and hospitals right across the country is continuing concern from our patients that Canada’s health care system won’t be there for them when they need it. And so while we can understand government’s desire to “turn the page” on health care issues, the temptation must be resisted. It is appropriate and prudent that at least once a year, the federal government take the pulse of the health care system – an annual check-up – to take stock of where we’ve been and identify priorities for the coming year. This year, the Canadian Medical Association’s (CMA’s) submission to the Standing Committee on Finance moves largely away from macro funding issues to focus in on strategic initiatives that are national in scope and promise high returns in terms of value for money. Specifically, we identify three areas that require immediate new investments while reminding committee members of work that remains unfinished from years past. Unfinished Business While the CMA applauds the federal government for its leadership in achieving the 2003 Health Accord, it is now time to follow through on some outstanding promises that were made. In particular, there are two areas that require special mention. At the time of the First Ministers’ Health Accord in February 2003, the federal government agreed to provide up to an additional $2 billion into Canada’s health care system at the end of this fiscal year (2003/04) if a sufficient surplus above the normal Contingency Reserve were available. The federal government must honour their commitment. Health cannot be treated as a residual after other contingencies are addressed. Equally important is moving forward with establishing the Canada Health Council. Suggestions to water down the mandate of the health council to make it more palatable to some jurisdictions are not the answer. Canada needs a robust mechanism that will provide for enhanced evidence and accountability on how Canada’s health care dollars are spent. Canada needs a Health Council that will create a meaningful place at the table for Canadians, health care providers and other stakeholders to provide input on how the system operates and monitor its performance. Protecting Public Health The public health system in Canada lies at the very heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of our population. It is the view of the CMA that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to emerging crises. On June 25, 2003, the CMA submitted a brief to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health headed by Dr. David Naylor. In it the CMA called upon the federal government to make a minimum investment of $1.5 billion over five years to achieve legislative reform; capacity enhancement; and enhanced research, surveillance and communications capacities. In particular, the CMA calls for immediate funding of two specific priorities. The first is the same proposal that the CMA brought to the Standing Committee on Finance last year – the REAL (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative. The purpose of this initiative is to increase the capacity of the public health system to communicate in real time, between multiple agencies and with health care providers. Had CMA’s earlier recommendations been acted upon, perhaps we would have been better prepared to communicate with health care providers when SARS first appeared in Toronto. Improved communications must be a priority this time around – we cannot afford to let this recommendation languish another year. The second short-term priority for public health is to invest in an emergency supply chain for use in times of crisis. SARS showed us that the Greater Toronto Area, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and maintain its capacity to meet other acute care requirements or important public health services such as suicide prevention programs. The federal government must assure Canadians that plans are in place when the health care system is again tested with another public health emergency. Ensuring Adequate Supply, Distribution and Mix of Canada’s Health Human Resources Health is primarily a people business. Of all of the critical issues facing Canada’s health care system, none is more urgent than the shortages of health providers. Simply put, if people are not available to provide care and treatment to patients everything else is irrelevant. While we were encouraged with the $90 million provided in the 2003-04 to “improve national health human resources planning and co-ordination, including better forecasting of health human resources needs”, details of how these funds will be allocated and for what purposes remain unclear. The CMA has proposals on how this money could be used to support much needed health human resource planning that are ready to be pulled off the shelf and implemented. For example, the CMA believes that an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) should be established to address the human side of health, just as existing institutes address the technological (CCOHTA) and information aspects of health (CIHI). Addressing the Health Status of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples Particularly alarming is the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples where, despite some improvements over the past few decades, Canada has been largely unable to adequately address the health issues facing this community. At CMA’s annual general meeting in August 2003, Health Minister Anne McLellan noted that despite significant investment Canada’s aboriginal people continue to have poor health outcomes. The CMA recommends that the federal government adopt a comprehensive review to look at how the money being spent on health, health care and related areas of investment for Aboriginal people can result in better health outcomes. The current results are not good enough. We must do better. Conclusion For those involved in the health care community, and indeed for all Canadians, this has truly been a remarkable year for Canada in terms of health and health policy. In many ways, the events of February marked a turn toward significant reinvestment in the health care system. However, with the outbreak of SARS in Ontario and the emergence of other significant public health concerns such as West Nile virus, health continued to be a top-of-mind concern for many Canadians. We also know that despite investments made in the 2003 federal budget, there continue to be areas for targeted, strategic initiatives that promise high payoff in terms of value for money. Public health, health human resources and the health status of Canada’s aboriginal people are the three areas that we have highlighted where additional attention and funding can make a real impact at the national level. When considering these investments, however, we must remember that we cannot afford to rob Peter to pay Paul. Both the public health and the acute care systems must simultaneously benefit from increased investment in order not to download one problem onto the other. To return to the analogy of an annual health check-up, let us conclude with this prognosis. Many actions taken in the past year should help over time address the acute symptoms of the patient. However, we must not be complacent. Long term health requires follow-through on last year’s initiatives, targeted new investments and ongoing vigilance. We look forward to the year ahead. INTRODUCTION When historians look back on 2003, they may very well call it the year of health. Since the Canadian Medical Association’s (CMA’s) presentation to the Standing Committee on Finance on October 22, 2002, several key events have highlighted health and health care issues in the minds of Canadians. Senator Michael Kirby and the Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology kicked off the year by releasing its final report of the review of the federal health care system in October 2002. This report was followed closely by the release of the final report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (the Romanow Commission) in November. In February 2003, Canada’s First Ministers agreed to their second Health Accord in just over two years. February also brought the federal government’s 2003 federal budget, which featured health as a key element. Emerging threats to the health of Canadians such as SARS and West Nile virus, coupled with ongoing concern that the health care system is not meeting patient needs in a timely way, clearly illustrate the prominence health care has played as an issue over the past year. Indeed, Canadians continue to show unwavering interest in health and the health care system. According to an EKOS Poll, Private Voices, Public Choices, health care was consistently identified as Canadians’ highest priority for the federal government as compared to other significant public policy issues (debt, level of taxation and unemployment) between August 1995 and January 2002.i Despite ongoing consensus on the need to make progress in the area of health, polling done for the CMA by Ipsos Reid found that the public remains unsatisfied with the federal government’s response to the health issue. In the CMA’s recently released Third Annual National Report Card on Health Care, 64% of respondents gave the federal government either a “C” or “F” rating in their performance in dealing with health care in Canada.ii Notwithstanding, the CMA acknowledges that the flurry of activity and the amount of public attention that health and health care has garnered over the past year can lead to policy fatigue. However, practitioners working in the health care system continue to see the concern of Canadians about being able to access health care services when and where they need them. Add to that their heightened sense of vulnerability in the face of new infectious diseases and ongoing reports about the poor state of our public heath care infrastructure, and anxiety regarding health and the health care system over the past year has become almost palpable. Health care is also a huge sector of our economy. At over $112 billion dollars,iii Canada’s health care system represents 9.7% of our Gross Domestic Productiv. At the federal level, major transfers to other levels of government (a large proportion of which goes to support health care in the provinces and territories) represents almost a quarter (22%) of total program spending by the federal government.v And so, while the physicians of Canada can understand the desire to “turn the page” on health care issues, the temptation must be resisted. It is appropriate and prudent that at least once a year, the federal government take the pulse of the health care system – an annual check-up if you like – to take stock of where we’ve been and identify priorities for the coming year. The CMA recognizes that great strides were made last year in terms of reinvestment in Canada’s health care system. As such, this submission to the Standing Committee on Finance will move largely away from macro funding issues to focus in on targeted, initiatives that are national in scope and promise high returns in terms of value for money. Specifically, we have identified three areas that require immediate new investment. 1. Protecting public health; 2. Ensuring adequate supply, distribution and mix of Canada’s health human resources; and 3. Addressing the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. Will any of these initiatives alone improve the overall health of Canadians and increase their access to health care? The answer is no. But by improving the public health infrastructure; ensuring better supply of health human resources; and addressing the particularly urgent health care needs of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, the proposed initiatives represent significant steps that can be taken toward eliminating many of the access issues that are top of mind concerns for so many Canadians. However, before discussing these priorities for new investment, there are a couple of areas of unfinished business that need to be brought to the attention of members of the Standing Committee. Unfinished Business – delivering on the health accord promise Federal Reinvestments in Health Care Financing In February 2003, the federal government announced new funding of $24.9 billion over 5 years1 for the provinces and territories. This was a significant investment and we applaud the federal government for making health a priority, while noting that a gap persists between the reinvestments made and the CMA’s recommendations for new funding to shore up Canada’s core health care system. (Appendix A provides further details of this gap in funding). At the time of the First Ministers’ Health Accord in February 2003, the federal government agreed to provide up to an additional $2 billion into Canada’s health care system at the end of this fiscal year (2003/04) if a sufficient surplus above the normal Contingency Reserve were available.vi Over the past summer however reports in the media have suggested that this money may not be forthcoming, a concern that has impacted negatively on the federal/provincial/territorial (F/P/T) relationship and created a barrier for advancing the business of health care reform. It is exactly this unpredictability that fosters provincial/territorial distrust of the federal government’s role in health care. While the CMA firmly believes that the federal government has a critical role to play in supporting health care across the country, it must fulfil this role in a manner that reassures provinces and territories that promises made are promises kept. This must be the modus operandi of federal health investments. Let us state in the strongest words possible that the CMA and Canada’s physicians expect the Government of Canada to ensure its fiscal house is in order so that this commitment can be fulfilled. Canada’s health care system must not be treated as a residual after other contingencies are addressed. Canada Health Transfer The CMA was pleased to see the 2003 budget announce the creation of a separate Canada Health Transfer effective April 1, 2004. It is the CMA’s view that this measure is a significant step toward greater accountability and transparency of funds and we applaud the federal government for this bold initiative. However, in creating the Canada Health Transfer the government has neglected to build-in the key feature of how to ensure the ongoing sustainability of federal support for health care in the provinces and the territories. Without a built-in escalator, claims by the federal government that its investments have introduced sustainability into the system ring hollow. As it stands now, the Canada Health Transfer does not provide for increases in funding to grow in step with increases in health care expenditures or our ability to pay as a country. In the longer term this will result in a return to the imbalance between federal funding of provincial and territorial health expenditures. The CMA reiterates its recommendation made last year to the Standing Committee on Finance and to the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, that a built-in escalator tied to increases in GDP is a fundamental component of the Canada Health Transfer. Canada Health Council One of the biggest piece of unfinished business arising from the February 2003 Health Accord is the continued lack of progress in the area of the Canada Health Council. Canadians are demanding greater accountability for their health care system. Canadians are also fed-up with inter-jurisdictional bickering on health care financing. A Council would provide a forum to allow for non-political assessment of health care issues divorced from the political wrangling that has defined health care in Canada for more than a decade. It would also enhance F/P/T accountability on how health care dollars in Canada are being spent in order to ensure that Canada’s health care dollars are being used wisely. In February, governments promised Canadians that the Health Council would be set up in May. Throughout the summer of 2003, federal government officials indicated that it would be just a matter of time. Most recently, at their Annual Conference on September 4, 2003, F/P/T Ministers of Health agreed to take another seven weeks to “expedite work on the Health Council”.vii Prior to that meeting, the CMA challenged Health Ministers to ratify an implementation plan for a Canada Health Council that would have a council in place no later than November 28, 2003, one year after the release of the final report of the Romanow Commission.viii Suggestions to water down the mandate of the Health Council to make it more palatable to some jurisdictions are not the answer. Canada needs a robust mechanism that will provide for enhanced evidence and accountability on how Canada’s health care dollars are spent. Canadians need an independent, empowered Council. Senator Kirby said it when he called for a National Health Care Council.ix Commissioner Romanow said it when he recommended a Health Council of Canada.x Canadians are demanding greater accountability. Enough is enough. Get on with it. Health Research Another area for continued reinvestment is health research. In our submission to the Romanow Commission, the CMA called for federal government support of health research equal to at least 1% of national health expenditures. For 2002 this would equal approximately $1.1 billion. Actual budgeted expenditure by the federal government for the Canadian Institutes of Health Research for 2002/03 was only $727.2 million.xi Canada must move beyond viewing health care expenditures as a drain on government budgets and start treating them the same as in any other sector – investments. Today’s research provides tomorrow’s treatments. For example, the benefits of increased investment in research extend far beyond the scientist’s lab. Rather, the return on investment is potentially many times the initial investment through increased trade potential, increased innovation and increased productivity. For this reason, the CMA supports, in principle, that idea proposed by Dr. Henry Friesen for the creation of a Health Innovation Council to encourage greater innovation and investment in Canada’s health care system. Key Recommendations Keep your word. Direct the Minister of Finance to honour his promise to put $2 billion back into Canada’s health care system in this fiscal year. Introduce a built-in escalator into the Canada Health Transfer to ensure the federal contribution to the health system keeps pace and remains sustainable. Enough is enough! Establish the Canada Health Council. Identify support for health research equal to at least 1% of national health expenditures. Protecting public health The public health system in Canada lies at the very heart of our community values. It is the quintessential “public good” and is central to the continued good health of our population. It includes the systematic response to infectious disease, but also much more. It ensures access to clean drinking water, good sanitation and the control of pests and other disease vectors. It provides immunization clinics, and programs promoting healthy lifestyles as well as being there to protect Canadians when they face a public health crisis like SARS. Our public health system is the first — and often only — line of defence against emerging and ongoing infectious and noninfectious threats to the health of Canadians. But we are only as strong as the weakest link in the emergency response chain of survival. Most health threats know no boundaries, so our public health armaments must be in a constant state of “battle readiness.” It is the view of the CMA that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to emerging crises. At no time was this more apparent than following the tragic events of September 2001. As a result, the CMA dedicated our 2001 submission to the Standing Committee on Finance to issues related to emergency preparedness in terms of security, health and capacity. In light of SARS and other public health threats those recommendations continue to ring true today.xii It is our contention that had these actions been taken, Canada would have been better prepared to face the recent public health challenges. Unfortunately, the opposite road was taken. Rather than making reinvestments in public health, the federal government has scheduled declines in departmental spending in this area. In fact, according to Government of Canada estimates, by 2005/06 public health expenditures are planned to decrease in current dollars to their lowest level in over a decade (Chart 1). And while we were encouraged by recent investments made in the health care system, we question the lack of investment and forecast reductions in funding for public health. We cannot continue to rob Peter to pay Paul. Both the public health and acute care systems require ongoing investments and attention. On June 25, 2003, the CMA submitted a brief to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health headed by Dr. David Naylor. In it we identified the need to establish a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies. We also highlighted the need to enhance the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country. To achieve this, we call on the federal government to make a minimum investment of $1.5 billion over five years to achieve legislative reform; capacity enhancement; and enhanced research, surveillance and communications capacities. (For additional detail, please refer to CMA’s submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, June 2003.xiii A copy of our recommendations and associated costs are attached as Appendix B.) While significant, this level of funding represents only a small investment relative to the massive potential cost of, for example, another SARS crisis. $1.5 billion over five years should be treated as the minimum that could be allocated to these initiatives in order to operationalize each of the recommendations. Estimates do not include existing expenditures on public health that would be reallocated within the public health system. While all of our recommendations for the public health care system are important, there are two components that the CMA believes need immediate action by the federal government. The first refers to the particular urgency to improve communications between health professionals and address immediate shortages in supplies and equipment. Last year we came to the Standing Committee on Finance with a proposal for the REAL (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative. The purpose of this plan was to increase the capacity of the public health system to communicate in real time, between multiple agencies and with health care providers. (A copy of the REAL proposal is attached as Appendix C.) This followed the call in our 2001 submission for increased communications between public health officials, police, fire and ambulance services, hospitals and other services.xiv The effectiveness of the public health system depends, largely, on its capacity to disseminate authoritative information in a timely way. Information is key to be able to respond to patient needs effectively during times of emergency. Information in real time is also essential for effective day-to-day health care to provide, for example, information on adverse drug reactions. Had the CMA’s 2001 and 2002 recommendations been acted upon, perhaps we would have been better prepared to communicate with health care providers when SARS first appeared in Toronto. As it was, the CMA mobilized its own communication networks to provide physicians with the critical information that they needed to manage SARS. And while this worked to get the word out in a pinch – it also underlined the fact that Canada does not have information systems in place to facilitate real-time communication with health professionals. How many SARS-type events must we have? This must be a priority. With a one-time infusion of $100 million, and an additional $2 million a year, the REAL proposal would provide the technical capacity to communicate with front-line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. We cannot afford to let this recommendation languish another year. The second short-term priority for public health is to invest in emergency supply chain for use in times of crisis. SARS showed us that the Greater Toronto Area, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and maintain its capacity to meet other acute care requirements or important public health services such as suicide prevention programs. Most hospitals work on a just-in-time inventory basis for the purchase of drugs. Without some sort of plan to quickly re-supply their pharmacies and expand their capacity, patient care suffers. Emergency bed space is also lacking. The federal government must assure Canadians that plans are in place when the health care system is again tested with another public health emergency. That is where the federal government can ensure the health system’s readiness and reassure Canadians that help will be there when they need it. (Additional information is provided in Appendix D.) Key Recommendation Immediately allocate $1.5 billion over 5 years to reinforce Canada’s public health care system in order to respond to public health threats and acute events, such as SARS starting with a Rapid Effective Accessible Linked (REAL) Health Communications and Co-ordination Initiative; and an emergency medical supplies and equipment supply chain. Health human resources Health is primarily a people business. Of all of the critical issues facing Canada’s health care system, none is more urgent than the shortages of health providers. Bluntly put, if the people are not available to provide care and treatment to patients everything else is irrelevant. The CMA has been encouraged by significant movement toward the implementation of the 1999 Canadian Medical Forum recommendations calling for an increase in undergraduate medical training positions and the subsequent 30% increase in the number of first-year, first-time medical students. Despite these efforts, there continues to be growing concern over the shortage of physicians. Statistics Canada figures suggest that the number of Canadians who do not have a family physician is greater than three million. Indeed, in order for Canada to meet the OECD average with respect to physician numbers, Canada must increase the number of physicians by an alarming 38%. Given that Canada continues to average a net loss of approximately 200 physicians per year due to emigration, action must come without delay to address this growing concern. Similarly, research published last year by CNA predicts that Canada will have a shortage of 78,000 registered nurses by 2011 and up to 113,000 by 2016.xv While we were encouraged with the $90 million provided in the 2003-04 to “improve national health human resources planning and co-ordination, including better forecasting of health human resources needs”xvi, details of how these funds will be allocated and for what purposes remain unclear. Indeed, it appears to be somewhat of a shell game with various federal departments vying for funding but no one department coming forward to provide leadership with clear proposals. The CMA has proposals on how this money could be used to support much needed health human resource planning that are ready to be pulled off the shelf and implemented. For example, the CMA believes that an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) should be established to address the human side of health, just as existing institutes address the technological (CCOHTA) and information aspects of health (CIHI). It would be a virtual institute, in the same sense as the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR). The Institute should promote collaboration and the sharing of research among the well-known university-based centres of excellence (e.g., MCHP and CHSPR) as well as research communities within professional associations and governments. It would enable and focus on needs-based long-term planning. HIHuR would have the ability to embark upon large scale research studies such as needs-based planning that is beyond the purview or financial ability of any single jurisdiction. Standard methodologies could be established for data collection and analysis to estimate health human resource requirements based on the disease-specific health needs and demands of the population (e.g., Aboriginal peoples, the elderly, etc.). The institute would work in close collaboration with primary data providers such as Statistics Canada and CIHI. It would complement the work of the new Canada Health Council. Possible deliverables of the model could include such cross-disciplinary issues as measuring effective supply, functional specialization, regulatory restrictions, and assessing new and existing models of delivery. The institute could build on and maintain the initiatives of the various health sector studies. The institute would advise on medium and long-term research agendas that could be adopted and implemented by such funding bodies as CHSRF and CIHR. The CMA recommends that base funding be provided by the federal government (with other members also financially supporting the HIHuR) and that the annual budget for the institute be $2.5 million with an initial institute development grant from the federal government of $1 million. (Further details of the HIHuR funding proposal are attached in Appendix E). High tuition fees also have the potential to have a serious, negative impact on the supply, mix and distribution of health human resources. The CMA is very concerned that high tuition fees in undergraduate programs in medicine are creating barriers to access to a medical education and threatening the diversity of future physicians who later serve the needs of Canadians. High tuition fees have made a medical education unaffordable to many Canadians and may create an imbalance in admissions to medical school by favouring those who represent the affluent segment of society and not the variety of groups reflected in the Canadian population. High student debt loads, as a consequence of high tuition fees and insufficient financial support, can also influence students’ decisions about practice specialty and practice location. Ultimately, these factors could threaten the availability of services provided to Canadians, particularly in rural and remote communities. For these reasons, the CMA is an active participant on the National Professional Association Coalition on Tuition (NPACT) and supports its recommendations concerning professional tuition and access to post-secondary education. Key Recommendation Instruct federal departments to work together on key health human resource initiatives and fund a new Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR). Health status of Aboriginal peoples Throughout the 1980s, Canada either just maintained or lost ground in the international rankings on key health indicators with other leading industrialized countries. In 1990, Canada ranked fifth on the United Nations Human Development Index measuring average achievement on three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life; knowledge; and a decent standard of living. In 1991, Canada moved to second place behind Japan and in 1992 Canada topped the list. In 2001, however, Canada dropped back to third place as a result of new figures for life expectancy and educational enrolment.xvii Since the 1980s, Canada has continued to improve in key indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. However, other industrialized countries have also made improvements either equalling and in many cases, quite dramatically surpassing gains made in Canada. As a result, Canada’s ranking has either stayed the same or dropped. For example, although Canada’s infant mortality rate dropped by 22% between 1990 and 1999, its rank dropped from 5th to 17th among the 31 industrialized countries included in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Similarly, Canada’s ranking for life expectancy at birth decreased over the same period from 3rd to 5th. (Additional information on how Canada compares to other countries in terms of health status indicators is attached as Appendix F.) Particularly alarming is the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples where, despite some improvements over the past few decades, Canada has been largely unable to adequately address the health issues facing this community. The facts speak for themselves: * The incidence and prevalence of chronic and degenerative diseases (diabetes, cardiovascular disease, cancer and arthritis) is higher among Aboriginal Canadians than for the rest of the population (e.g., the rate of Type II diabetes among First Nations is three to five times that of Canadians in general and is considered a growing problem); * Certain infectious diseases are more prevalent among Aboriginal Canadians (e.g., the incidence of hepatitis and tuberculosis are five and ten times higher, respectively, than for other Canadians); and * Manifestations of mental health problems such as violence, suicide and sexual abuse are widespread (e.g., the rate of death from suicide is four times higher among the Inuit than Canadians in general.) These problems are compounded by the remoteness of many Aboriginal communities, which makes access to health services and infrastructure costly and difficult. Other issues include the distinct health needs of different Aboriginal communities (First Nations, Metis, Inuit and urban Natives) and jurisdictional problems such as the separation of health and social services and conflicting or overlapping F/P/T areas of responsibility. As well, it is broadly accepted that the health status of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples is a result of a broad range of factors and is unlikely to be improved significantly by merely increasing the quantity of health services. Instead, inequities within a wide range of social and economic factors must also be addressed, for example: income and education; environmental hazards, water quality, housing quality and infrastructure; and maintenance of cultural identity. At CMA’s annual general meeting in August 2003, Health Minister Anne McLellan noted that despite significant investment Canada’s aboriginal people continue to have poor health outcomes. Simply put, these results are unacceptable. The CMA recommends that the federal government adopt a comprehensive review to look at how the money being spent on health, health care and related areas of investment for Aboriginal people can result in better health outcomes. The current results are not good enough. We must do better. Key Recommendation The federal government should adopt a comprehensive review to look at how the money being spent on health, health care and related areas of investment can result in better health outcomes. CONCLUSION For those involved in the health care community, and indeed for all Canadians, this has truly been a remarkable year for Canada in terms of health and health policy. In many ways, the events of February marked a turn toward significant reinvestment in the health care system. However, with the outbreak of SARS in Ontario and the emergence of other significant public health concerns such as West Nile virus, health continued to be a top-of-mind concern for many Canadians. We also know that despite investments made in the 2003 federal budget, there continue to be areas for targeted, strategic initiatives that promise high payoff in terms of value for money. Public health, health human resources and the health status of Canada’s aboriginal people are the three areas that we have highlighted where additional attention and funding can make a real impact at the national level. When considering these investments, however, we must remember that we cannot afford to rob Peter to pay Paul. Both the public health and the acute care systems must simultaneously benefit from increased investment in order not to download one problem onto the other. Finally, promises made must be promises kept. The federal government must ensure that the fiscal environment is such so that it can fulfill its commitment to provide an additional $2 billion in this fiscal year. As well, the CMA intends to hold the federal government and the provinces and territories to their promise to implement a Canada Health Council. Governments must open the political black box of health decision making and let others in. To exclude physicians and other health stakeholders would seriously undermine the Health Council and deprive it of the benefits of first-hand insight into how care is actually delivered. Governments must take advantage of this opportunity to introduce a mechanism that will provide evidence to Canadians that they are getting a good return on their investment in health care. To return to the analogy of an annual health check-up, let us conclude with this prognosis. Many actions taken in the past year should help over time address the acute symptoms of the patient. However, we must not be complacent. Long term health requires follow through on last year’s initiatives, targeted new investments and ongoing vigilance. We look forward to the year ahead. Appendix A: Federal Reinvestments in Health Care Financing In the January 2003 document, From Debate to Actionxviii, the Canadian Medical Association challenged Canada’s First Ministers to put the health of Canadians first. With respect to health care financing, we underlined the need for a financial commitment to health care that is adequate, stable, predictable, transparent and sustainable. In February 2003, the federal government announced new funding to the provinces and territories of $24.9 billion over 5 years.2 The CMA and others suggested that these reinvestments were good but insufficient to address the challenges facing Canada’s health care system.xix Specifically, we had called for a minimum commitment by the federal government to “fund 50% of the core health care system with at least half of the federal government’s contribution in cash”.xx. (Core defined to include non-targeted and targeted investments in infrastructure such as health human resources, information technology, capital infrastructure, and rural and remote access.) Altogether, we called for a minimum cash investment of $31.5 billion over 5 years to renew the health care system. [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] Gap Between 2003 Health Accord and CMA Recommended Re-Investments in Canada’s Health Care System ($ billions) 2003?2004 2004?2005 2005?2006 2006?07 2007?2008 Total Core Funding 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.9 $21.3 Targeted Core 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 $2.5 Targeted New Programs 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 $7.7 Total 4.0 5.5 7.0 7.3 7.7 $31.5 Federal Reinvestments 4.8 3.3 4.9 5.2 6.7 $24.9 Remaining Gap in Funding (0.8) 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.0 $ 6.7 [TABLE END] There remains a significant gap of almost $ 7 billion over 5 years between our estimate of the minimum requirement needed for the renewal of the health care system and the new resources dedicated by the federal government. In light of this, the CMA calls upon the federal government to finish its unfinished business and allocate an additional $7 billion over 5 years in its next budget for the Canada Health Transfer to shore up Canada’s health care system. Appendix B: Recommendations to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health Legislative reform ($20 million / 5 years*) 1. The enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. 2. The creation of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. 3. The appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada; to head the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control; and to work with provinces and territories to develop and implement a pan-Canadian public health action plan. Capacity enhancement ( $1.2 billion / 5 years*) 4. The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. 5. The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. 6. Tracking and public reporting of public health expenditures and capacity (both physical and human resources) by the Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada, on behalf of the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. 7. Federal government funding in the amount of $1 Billion over 5 years to build adequate and consistent surge capacity across Canada and improve co-ordination among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal authorities to fulfill essential public health functions. Research, surveillance and communications ($310 million / 5 years*) 8. An immediate, sequestered grant of $200 million over 5 years to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to initiate an enhanced conjoint program of research with the Institute of Population and Public Health and the Institute of Infection and Immunity that will expand capacity for interdisciplinary research on public health, including infectious disease prevention and control measures. 9. The mandatory reporting by provinces and territories of identified infectious diseases to the newly established Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to enable appropriate communications, analyses and intervention. 10. The one-time infusion of $100 million, with an additional $2 million a year, for a “REAL” (rapid, effective, accessible and linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative to improve technical capacity to communicate with front line public health providers in real time during health emergencies. Appendix B: Estimated Cost of Implementing the Recommendations [TABLE CONTENT DOES NOT DISPLAY PROPERLY. SEE PDF FOR PROPER DISPLAY] RECOMMENDATION ESTIMATED COST OVER 5 YEARS Legislative and Institutional Reform 1. Canada Emergency Health Measures Act N/A 2. Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) ? $20 million 3. Chief Public Health Officer of Canada Capacity Enhancement 4. Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health $100 million 5. Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service $35 million 6. Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada $35 milliona 7. Surge capacity $1 billionb Research, surveillance and communications 8. Canadian Institutes of Health Research $200 millionc 9. Mandatory reporting Included under 2 and 3 above 10. Enhanced communications $110 million TOTAL $1.5 billion [TABLE END] a. Work is currently underway to break out public health from the current category of “public health and administration.” b. This is an incremental investment in addition to funding currently available under Health Canada’s Health Promotion and Prevention Strategic Outcome area. c. Funding must be sequestered specifically for new initiatives related to public health. Additional money could also be acquired through funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, which received an additional $500 million in 2002–2003 (announced in the 2003 federal budget) to enhance the Foundation’s support of public health infrastructure. Appendix C: REAL (Rapid, Effective, Accessible , Linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative The effectiveness of the public health system is dependent, in large part, on its capacity to communicate authoritative information in a timely way. A two-way flow of information between experts and the practising community is necessary at all times. It becomes essential during emergency situations. Information, including health advice and alerts, needs to move out to front line health care providers from public health bodies. Information, such as data for surveillance and analysis purposes, needs to move in from these front line providers to the public health authorities. To detect new emerging diseases or health threats and effectively care for their patients, front-line health professionals must have accurate and timely information. Conversely public health specialists depend on information coming in from the front lines to track disease and institute appropriate public health interventions. Despite the tremendous developments in information management, there has been scant attention paid to this issue within public health. The SARS outbreak highlighted various weaknesses in our current communication capacity. Gaps in the basic IT infrastructure prevented public health agencies and acute care institutions from communicating with each other in real-time. There are a number of anecdotal reports of public health units stationing personnel inside hospitals to retrieve information and then telephone it into their units. Case investigators used paper-based files to manage the hundreds of cases reported to public health units, and to investigate and follow up of thousands of contacts. Identification of clusters and links between cases literally depended upon pencil and paper and brainpower. Toronto Public Health did create a database for its SARS cases and could send it electronically to the province. However the province had a different database which raised concerns about the transfer of data files from one system to another. The deficiency in IT capacity hindered exchanges between public health staff, private clinicians and other sources of information. The potential for a disconnect in communications between different jurisdictions (international, national, provincial/territorial, municipal) and sectors (environment, health, transportation) that are affected by a health emergency is a further challenge to the public health system. The importance of communicating essential health advice and public health management protocols to front line practitioners and institutions cannot be overstated. During the SARS experience it became evident that government did not have information systems in place to communicate rapidly with physicians across the country. In response to requests from Health Canada the CMA was able to mobilize its communication networks to get information to physicians in real-time. It is interesting to note that in local areas the problem often was not one of not enough information, but of too much information, which was often confusing, conflicting or impractical for a practice setting. Consistent messaging disseminated in a coordinated fashion is essential for a consistent and coordinated response to a health crisis. The CMA believes that the federal government must take a leadership role to ensure that the communication tools and information technology necessary for a modern efficient public health system, with the capacity to mount a rapid and informed response to public health emergencies, are in place in all regions of the country. The CMA brought this to the attention of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance in October 2001, and again in October 2002 with our recommendation for a REAL (rapid, effective, accessible, linked) Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative. We called for a one-time infusion of $100 million, and an additional $2 million a year, to improve technical capacity to communicate with front-line public health providers in real-time during health emergencies. This initiative would facilitate seamless communication between local, provincial and federal levels of the public health system and rapid, real-time communication between the public health sector and other components of the health care system. It must also ensure a two-way flow of information between front-line health care providers and public health professionals at the local public health unit, the provincial public health department and the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. The REAL Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative would improve the ability of the public health system to communicate in a rapid fashion by: * Providing a focal point for inter-jurisdictional communication and co-ordination in order to improve preparedness in times of emergency; * Developing a seamless communication system leveraging formal and informal networks and * Researching the best way to disseminate emergency information and health alerts to targeted health professionals and public health officials in a rapid, effective and accessible fashion. As well as funding research and demonstration projects, funding should also be allocated to provinces/territories and municipalities to build their connectivity infrastructure. The initiative should build on communication systems currently in place, filling gaps and enhancing capacity. Communicating with Health Professionals. One of the key lessons the CMA has drawn from the experience of SARS is that physicians take up information in different ways. Some want it by e-mail, others by fax and still others by mail. Even those with e-mail have expressed a desire to get emergency information in a different format. Other health care associations have also employed various ways to communicate with their membership. During the SARS crisis, the existing communication networks between health professionals were an important, if informal, avenue to disseminate and in some cases explain public health interventions and information. In fact ten national health care associations3 met via teleconference and in person during the crisis to share information and ensure a consistency of message to health professionals. This sector can play a critical role in bridging the gap between clinicians and the public, as well as in the delivery of credible public education and training to both professionals and the public. The importance of communicating timely and relevant information directly to those in leadership positions (Chief of Staff, Hospital CEO) should not be overlooked. These individuals can make the information relevant for their particular setting, and ensure that it is widely disseminated within their community. The uptake of new information is influenced by many qualitative factors and research is needed to determine how best to communicate with individual physicians and other health care providers in emergency situations. Any new communication processes should be based on sound research and build on existing communication networks. The REAL Health Communication and Co-ordination Initiative would be led by the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control and would undertake work in three phases. 1. Research Phase For example: * Evaluation of communications during the SARS crisis * Quantitative research on how health professionals want to receive information * Catalogue of existing communication networks 2. Pilot projects in areas such as risk communications and information management in public health. 3. Evaluation and dissemination of best practices in communications and information management. Appendix D: Emergency Medical Supplies and Equipment Supply Chain In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the CMA, in its October 2001 pre-budget submission to the Standing Committee on Finance, stressed the fact that in the event of a significant attack on our population among the first points of contact with the health system will be doctors’ offices and the emergency rooms of our hospitals. The SARS outbreak has proven that this point is just as valid when faced with a public health emergency. SARS showed us that the Greater Toronto Area, an area with one of Canada’s most sophisticated public and acute care health systems, was not able to manage the SARS crisis and maintain its capacity to meet other acute care requirements or important public heath services such as suicide prevention programs. Most hospitals work on a just-in-time inventory basis for the purchase of drugs. Without some sort of plan to quickly re-supply their pharmacies and expand their capacity, patient care suffers. Emergency bed space is also lacking. The federal government must assure Canadians that plans are in place when the health care system is again tested with another public health emergency. That is where the federal government can ensure the health system’s readiness and reassure Canadians that help will be there when they need it. We have also witnessed in recent years the enormous strain these facilities can be placed under when even something quite routine like influenza strikes a community hard. The acute care occupancy rates of Ontario public hospitals across the Ontario Hospital Association regions in 1999-00 illustrate this point. In three of the five regions (Eastern Ontario, Central and South West) the occupancy rate ranged from 94% to 97%.xxi The highest rate was found in the very heavily populated Central region. A British Medical Journal study suggests that an occupancy rate over 90% indicates that the hospital system is in a regular bed crisis.xxii This problem is not unique to Ontario: “the decrease in the number of acute care beds across Canada over the past decade, coupled with an aging population and our extraordinary success in extending the survival of patients with significant chronic illness, has eliminated any cushion in bed occupancy in the hospital system.”xxiii With this in mind, picture the impact of another public health crisis such as an influenza pandemic when hundreds of thousands of individuals could be affected. The public health system and medical diagnostic and treatment systems in the community and hospitals would become overwhelmed very quickly without the ability to absorb the extra caseload. We need no further demonstration of the need to enable hospitals to open beds, purchase more supplies, and bring in the health care professionals it requires to meet the need. Currently the National Emergency Stockpile System can supply up to 40,000 cots, as well as medical supplies and relatively rudimentary hospital equipment. Reports indicate, however, that much of the equipment is decades old, and that protocols for logistical management (e.g., transport and rapid deployment) are outdated. There is an urgent need to reassess and reaffirm capacity in this context. The SARS experience also brought to our attention the critical lack of equipment. The Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians (CAEP) has noted that many emergency departments across the country are not adequately equipped for 21st century infection control challenges. They do not have negative pressure rooms with contained toilets, often have only one resuscitation suite for critically ill patients and do not have a safe place to segregate accompanying persons. Nor do they have protective hoods like the PARR device that is needed to safely intubate SARS patients. CAEP concluded that most emergency departments are not physically designed to cope with infection control problems. The federal government must assure Canadians that municipal and provincial plans are in place with an overarching national plan to support these jurisdictions if their service capacities are overwhelmed. But the government should help further by making available an emergency fund that would enable hospitals to plan and organize their surge capacity. The purpose of having such elaborate response plans and stockpiles of supplies and equipment is to be ready for the possibility that, in spite of all efforts to prevent a catastrophe from occurring, it nevertheless happens. That is where the federal government can facilitate the health system’s readiness and reassure Canadians that help will be there when they need it. Appendix E: Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) While the need for more health human resources is apparent, resource planning is difficult and fraught with complexity. Answers must balance affordability, reflect population health needs and consider issues pertaining to the supply, mix and distribution of physicians. Over the last decade, a number of stakeholders including government, associations, and researchers have invested significant resources in health human resource planning.xxiv However, these groups do not systematically communicate with each other and do not always buy into each other’s products. The result is silo-based planning, lack of progress on key areas of database development, and an overall failure to address important issues such as professional burnout. The CMA seeks to build consensus within the medical profession on major program and policy initiatives concerning the supply, mix and distribution of physicians and to work with major stakeholders in identifying and assessing issues of mutual importance. At the same time, the CMA remains sensitive to Canada’s provincial and territorial realities with respect to the fact that health human resource planning requires assessment and implementation at the local or regional level. However, there is a need for a national body to develop and coordinate health human resources planning initiatives that take into account the mobility of health care providers nationally and internationally. Identification of the need for more coordinated research in the area of health human resources has come from many sources. In the Listening for Directions report of 2001xxv, the partner organizations indicated health human resources as the number one priority theme for research funding over the next two to five years. A joint report in 1995 by national organizations representing occupational therapists, physiotherapists, dieticians and nurses established an integrated health human resources development framework with three main components of planning, education and training, and management.xxvi Similarly, the Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc. (CPRN) commissioned by Mr. Romanow to investigate and summarize health human resource issues, recommended the creation of a national health human resources coordinating agency to provide focus and expertise for health human resource planning. Senator Kirby also identified the need for such a planning body in his final report. He recommended that the federal government work with other concerned parties to create a permanent National Coordinating Committee for Health Human Resources, to be composed of representatives of key stakeholder groups and of the different levels of government.xxvii Finally, the final report of the Commission of the Future of Health Care in Canada called for a substantial improvement in the base of information on Canada’s health workforce and the need to establish a comprehensive plan for addressing supply, distribution, and education issues.xxviii The CMA believes that an arm’s length Health Institute for Human Resources (HIHuR) should be established to address the human side of health, just as existing institutes address the technology (CCOHTA) and information aspects of health (CIHI). It would be a virtual institute, in the same sense as the Canadian Institute for Health Research. The Institute should promote collaboration and the sharing of research among the well-known university based centres of excellence (e.g., MCHP and CHSPR) as well as research communities within professional associations and governments. It would enable/focus on needs-based long term planning. HIHuR should have the ability to embark upon large scale research studies such as needs-based planning that is beyond the purview or financial ability of any single jurisdiction. Standard methodologies could be established for data collection and analysis to estimate health human resource requirements based on the disease-specific health needs and/or demands of the population (e.g., Aboriginal peoples, the elderly, etc.). The institute would work in close collaboration with primary data providers such as Statistics Canada and CIHI. It would complement the work of the new Canada Health Council. Possible deliverables of the model could include such cross-disciplinary issues as measuring effective supply, functional specialization, regulatory restrictions, and assessing new and existing models of delivery. The institute could build on, and maintain, the initiatives of the various health sector studies. The institute would advise on medium and long-term research agendas that could be adopted and implemented by such funding bodies as CHSRF and CIHR. It is recommended that base funding be provided by the federal government (with other members also financially supporting the HIHuR). It is proposed that the annual budget for the institute would be $2.5 million with an initial institute development grant from the federal government of $1 million. Appendix F : Straight facts about health…Is Canada getting left behind? Straight facts about health... Is Canada getting left behind? Through the 1980s, Canada has either remained the same or lost ground in the international rankings on key health indicators with other leading industrialized countries surpassing our progress. This worrisome turn of events, the Canadian Medical Association believes, needs attention. United Nations Human Development Index In 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began publishing an annual Human Development Report (www.undp.org/hdr). The Human Development Index (HDI) is one of the key indicators in this report. It is a composite index that measures average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life; knowledge and a decent standard of living. How has Canada fared? In 1990, Canada ranked fifth. Canada moved to 2nd place behind Japan in 1991 and into 1st place in 1992. It again dropped behind first-place Japan in 1993. Canada then led the world on the HDI between 1994 and 2000. In 2001, Canada dropped back to 3rd place. As the UNDP reported in 2001, “Norway is now ranked first in the world and Australia second. Both moved narrowly ahead of Canada, the leader for the previous six years, as a result of new figures for life expectancy and educational enrolment. Canada fell in the rankings even though its per capita income rose by 3.75 percent.” Canada remained in 3rd place in 2002. World Health Organization health system performance indicators The World Health Organization (WHO) (www.who.int/whr) ranked the health system performance of 191 member countries for the first time in its 2000 World Health Report. The ranks are based on the measurement of population health in relation to what might be expected given the level of input to the production of health. WHO presented two rankings. The first, performance on health level, considers health status in disability-adjusted life expectancy relative to a country’s resource use and human capital. Canada ranked 35th among 191 countries with respect to this indicator in 2000. The second indicator is a measurement of overall performance. This assesses health system attainment relative to what might be expected for five goals of the health system, including health status, health inequality, level and distribution of responsiveness and fairness in financing. In 2000, Canada ranked 30th on the index of overall performance. France led the world on this indicator in 2000. International health indicators Since the 1980s, Canada has continued to record improvements on key health indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. However, other industrialized countries have also recorded improvements that have either equaled or, in some cases, quite dramatically surpassed the gains made in Canada. As a result, Canada’s ranking has either stayed the same or dropped. Infant Mortality — Although Canada’s infant mortality rate dropped by 22% between 1990 and 1999, its rank dropped from 5th to 17th among the 31 industrialized coun-tries included in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Other countries have recorded even greater gains; for example, Sweden and Austria both recorded a drop of 43% in infant mortality over the same time period. Among others, Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic now rank ahead of Canada. However, the United Kingdom, United States and Australia rank behind Canada. Perinatal Mortality — Between 1990 and 1999, Canada’s perinatal mortality rate declined by 18% while its international ranking remained essentially the same — moving from 10th in 1990 to 11th in 1999. In comparison, the perinatal mortality rate for 1st-ranked Japan dropped by 31% during the same period. Life Expectancy — In 1999, Canada ranked 5th in life expectancy at birth, down from 3rd in 1990. During the 1990–1999 period, total life expectancy increased by 1.8% in Canada, compared to 2.0% in 1st-ranked Japan. Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) — Healthy life expectancy is based on life expectancy but includes an adjustment for time spent in poor health. In its 2002 World Health Report, WHO presented HALE esti-mates for 191 countries during 2001. Among these countries, Canada ranked 20th in 2001, tying with the Netherlands at 69.9 years at birth. Japan and Switzerland headed the list at 73.6 and 72.8 years respectively in 2001. Health human resources per capita Canada continues to lag behind other industrialized countries with respect to physicians per 1000 population. The OECD average of 2.8 per 1000 population is one-third higher than Canada’s rate of 2.1 (including post-graduate residents), placing us 23rd out of 27th for this indicator. In a comparison of G-8 countries (excluding Russia) between 1990 and 1999, Canada was the only country that did not show any improvement in the physician-to-population ratio. The situation for nurses is equally distressing. Canada placed only 12th in 1999 and experienced a 7% drop in the ratio between 1990 and 1999 from 8.1 per 1000 population to 7.5. This puts Canada in the middle of the G-8 group. Public sector as percent of total health spending Among the industrialized (OECD) countries, Canada has consistently reported one of the lower public shares of total health spending since the 1980s. In 1985, Canada’s public spending on health represented 75.6% of total health spending — placing Canada at 14th among the 22 countries reporting. In 2000, with public spending rep-resenting 72% of total health spending, Canada ranked 16th among 26 countries reporting. Canada’s 2000 level of public spending was down almost four percentage points from 1985. Note: The UNDP contains 173 countries, WHO contains 191 countries and the OECD contains 31 countries. Life expectancy figures represent years at birth. Infant mortality represents the number of deaths of babies less than one year of age that occurred during a year per 1000 live births during the same year expressed as a rate. Perinatal mortality represents the number of deaths under 7 days (early neonatal deaths) plus fetal deaths of 28 weeks of gesta-tion or more per 1000 total live births (live and stillbirths). Health indicators data are from OECD Health Data, 2002, 4th ed. www.oecd.org/healthdata. WHO performance indicators for 2002 are based as estimates for 1997. ENDNOTES 1 $24.9 billion includes all new federal transfers to the provinces and territories (targeted and non-targeted) announced at the time of the First Ministers’ meeting on February 4/5, 2003 and confirmed in the February 18, 2003 Federal Budget. It includes the $2 billion in funding to be made available at the end of fiscal year 2002/03. It does not include previously announced CHST funding, nor investments in federal health programs. 2 $24.9 billion includes all new federal transfers to the provinces and territories (targeted and non-targeted) announced at the time of the First Ministers’ meeting on February 4/5, 2003 and confirmed in the February 18, 2003 Federal Budget. It includes the $2 billion in funding to be made available at the end of fiscal year 2002/03. It does not include previously announced CHST funding, nor investments in federal health programs. 3 Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians, Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation, Canadian Dental Association, Canadian Healthcare Association, Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Infectious Disease Society, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Pharmacists Association, Canadian Public Health Association, Association of Canadian Academic Healthcare Organizations i Ekos Research Associates. Presentation to the Charles E. Frosst Foundation for Health Care. Private Voices, Public Choices. November 7, 2002. ii Canadian Medical Association. Third Annual National Report Card on Health Care. August, 2003. (Conducted by Ipsos Reid). p. 17. iii Canadian Institute of Health Information. National Health Exenditure Trends, 1975-2002. December 2002. iv Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Health Data 2003. v Government of Canada. The Budget Plan, 2003. February 18, 2003. p. 211. vi Government of Canada. The Budget Plan, 2003. February 18, 2003. p. 69. vii News Release, Annual Conference of Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ministers of Health, Halifax, Nova Scotia, September 4, 2003. viii Canadian Medical Association. Press Release, “CMA Calls for Council by November 28 – Further Delay Unacceptable”. September 3, 2003. ix Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada: The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role Volume Six: Recommendations for Reform. October 2002. p. 17 - 20. x Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada. Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report. November 2002. p. 52. xi Canadian Institutes of Health Research. Report on Plans and Priorities for the Fiscal Year, 2003-2004. p. 29. xii For more information, please refer to CMA’s 2001 report to the Standing Committee on Finance, Security Our Future … Balancing Urgent Health Care Needs of Today with the Important Challenges of Tomorrow. November 1, 2001. xiii Canadian Medical Association. Submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. Answering the Wake-up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan. June 2003. xiv Canadian Medical Association. Presentation to the Standing Committee on Finance Pre-Budget Consultations. Securing our Future … Balancing Urgent Health Care Needs of Today With the Important Challenges of Tomorrow. November 1, 2001. xv Canadian Nurses Association. Canada’s Nurses See Latest Data as a Warning: Action Needed to Address Nursing Shortage. Press Release, September 17, 2003. xvi Government of Canada. The Budget Plan, 2003. February 18, 2003. p. 78. xvii United Nations Human Development Project. Human Development Report 2001. Press Release, July 10, 2001, Mexico City (www.undp.org/hdro). xviii Canadian Medical Association. From debate to action. Message to First Ministers … It’s time to put the health of Canadians first. January 2003. xix Other organizations that reiterated the need for additional investment in health care included the Canadian Healthcare Association (Press Release, February 18, 2003 (www.cha.ca) and the Association of Canadian Academic Healthcare Organizations (Press Release, February 19, 2003 (www.ACAHO.org). xx Canadian Medical Association. From debate to action. Message to First Ministers … It’s time to put the health of Canadians first. January 2003. p. 8. xxi Ontario Hospital Reporting System, 2001. Acute Care Occupancy Rates, Ontario Public Hospitals by OHA region, 1999/00. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. xxii Bagust A, Place M, Posnett J. Dynamics of bed use in accommodating emergency admissions: stochastic simulation model. BMJ; 319: 155-158 July 17, 1999. xxiii Nicolle L. Viruses without borders. Can J Infect Dis Vol. 11, Issue 3, May/June 2000 (Downloaded from Web: October 23, 2001: www.pulsus.com/Infdis/11_03/nico_ed.htm) xxiv At the national level there are a number of bodies that, in some cases, have been involved in health human resource planning issues for literally decades. The long standing Advisory Committee on Health Human Resources reported to the Conference of Deputy Ministers on health human resource issues but it functioned without outside expertise from the provider community and found it difficult to implement an integrated approach to planning. The National Coordinating Committee on Postgraduate Medical Training did include membership from both the medical profession and the government but its mandate was narrow (postgraduate training of physicians) and the committee was de facto sunsetted a couple of years ago. xxv Canadian Health Services Research Foundation. Listening for Direction: A National Consultation on Health Services and Policy Issues. June 2001. xxvi Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists, Canadian Dietetic Association, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Physiotherapy Association, Integrated Health Human Resources Development – Pragmatism or Pie in the Sky, August 1995. xxvii Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role, Final Report, October 2002. xxviii Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada. Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report. November 2002. p. 108.
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CMA Submission on infrastructure and governance of the public health system in Canada: Presentation to the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1954
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2003-10-08
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
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Policy Type
Parliamentary submission
Last Reviewed
2011-03-05
Date
2003-10-08
Topics
Health systems, system funding and performance
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The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has prepared this submission for the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology study on the governance and infrastructure of the public health system in Canada and its response during public health emergencies. We applaud this initiative and welcome the opportunity to present the views of Canada’s medical community. Introduction Canada has a distinguished history as one of the best countries in the world in which to live, ranking number one on the UN’s Human Development Report from 1994 to 2000. Our health care system was a major contributor to the country’s top position but in the past few years Canada has lost ground in international rankings on key health indicators. For example, although Canada’s infant mortality rate dropped by 22% between 1990 and 1999, other countries recorded greater declines in infant mortality over the same time period. As a result, Canada’s rank dropped from 5th to 17th among the 31 industrialized countries included in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 1999, Canada ranked 5th in life expectancy at birth, down from 3rd in 1990. During the 1990-1999 period, total life expectancy increased by 1.8% in Canada but other countries made larger gains. The CMA believes that this worrisome turn of events needs attention. Delegates to its 2003 General Assembly called on the federal government to commit to the goal of establishing Canada as the top country worldwide, regarding the health status of its citizens, within ten years. To achieve this Canada will need a national strategy that defines national health goals and can seriously address the health inequalities that continue to exist in Canada. Improvement to health status in Canada will not be possible without a strong, effective and well-resourced public health system. Unfortunately we do not have that today. For years the CMA has been warning that our public health system is stretched to capacity in dealing with everyday demands, let alone responding to new and emerging health threats. Canada’s physicians have repeatedly called for governments to enhance public health capacity and strengthen the public health infrastructure throughout Canada. For example, the CMA’s submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance’s pre-budget consultations on October 22, 2001 called for substantial investments in public health and emergency response as a first step to improve the public health system infrastructure and surge capacity. It also drew attention to the need for improved co-ordination and communication between jurisdictions. In February 2003, before the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert about Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the CMA again raised concerns about the capacity of Canada’s health system to handle emerging infectious diseases without being overwhelmed. This warning came in the CMA’s submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health hearings on West Nile Virus. Most recently, in our submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS & Public Health, Answering the Wake-Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan, the CMA called for a clearer alignment of authority and accountability in times of extraordinary health emergencies. The submission also recommended enhancement of the system’s capacity to respond to public health threats across the country. The Public Health Action Plan and accompanying technical backgrounders have previously been circulated to the Committee and are attached as Appendix 1. In this submission we will expand on the recommendations contained in Answering the Wake-Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan to focus on the federal government’s role in public health. Particular emphasis will be placed on legislative reform, human resource capacity enhancement, and surveillance and communications. Public Health in Canada Public health is the science and art of protecting and promoting health, and preventing disease and injury. It complements the health care system, which focuses primarily on treatment and rehabilitation, sharing the same goal of maximizing the health of Canadians. However, the public health system is distinct from other parts of the health system in two key respects: its primary emphasis is on preventing disease and disability and its focus is on the health needs of populations rather than those of specific individuals. It is interesting to note that Canada’s current public health legislation was enacted more than a half century before our health care legislation. Public health is about ensuring access to clean drinking water, good sanitation and the control of pests and other disease vectors. Further, it is immunization clinics and programs promoting healthy lifestyles and healthy environments. It is also the systematic response to infectious diseases, there to protect Canadians when they face a public health threat like SARS. When the public health system is fully prepared to carry out essential services, communities across the country are better protected from acute health events. Unfortunately it is only when something goes terribly wrong, as in the Walkerton tragedy when 7 people died and 1,346 were affected by E. coli contamination of a community well, that the important role and contribution of public health is highlighted. Today’s reality is that Canada does not have a strong, integrated, consistently and equitably resourced public health system. In 2001, a working group of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health assessed the capacity of the public health system through a series of key informant interviews and literature reviews. The consistent finding was that public health had experienced a loss of resources. There was also concern for the resiliency of the system’s infrastructure and its ability to respond consistently and proactively to the demands placed on it. Significant disparities were observed between “have” and “have-not” provinces and regions in their capacity to address public health issues. The report’s findings are consistent with previous assessments by the Krever Commission and the Auditor General of Canada. In 1999, the Auditor General said that Health Canada was unprepared to fulfil its responsibilities in public health: communication between multiple agencies was poor; and weaknesses in the key surveillance system impeded effective monitoring of injuries and communicable and non-communicable diseases. In 1997, Justice Horace Krever reported that the “public health departments in many parts of Canada do not have sufficient resources to carry out their duties.” Public health systems across Canada are fragmented. It is less a system and more a patchwork quilt of programs, services and resources across the county. In truth, it is a group of multiple systems with varying roles, strengths and linkages. Each province has its own public health legislation. Most legislation focuses on the control of communicable diseases. Public health services are funded through a variable mix of provincial and municipal funding formulae, with inconsistent overall strategies and results, and with virtually no meaningful input from health professionals via organizations such as the CMA, or its divisions and affiliates, in terms of strategic direction or resources. Federal legislation is limited to the blunt instrument of the Quarantine Act and a variety of health protection-related acts like the Food and Drugs Act, Hazardous Products Act, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Radiation Emitting Devices Act. Some of the laws, such as the Quarantine Act, date back to the late 19th century. Taken as a whole, the legislation does not clearly identify the public health mandate, or the respective roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government. In many cases, the assignment of authorities and accountabilities is anachronistic. The existing Emergencies Act gives the federal government the power to become involved in public welfare emergencies when regions of the country are faced with “an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent….disease in human beings .. that results or may result in a danger to life or property … so serious as to be a national emergency.”1 However, in order to use this power, the federal government must declare a “public welfare emergency” which itself has political and economic implications, particularly from an international perspective, that mitigate against its use. CMA believes that this all-or-nothing approach is not in the public’s best interest and that the concept of national emergency in the context of public health requires a different and differentiated response from governments in the future. In its submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health the CMA called for the enhancement of the federal government’s “command and control” powers in times of national health emergencies through the enactment of a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act. The Act would give the federal government specific authority to act for a pre-determined, temporary period of time, during a declared extraordinary health emergency. It would also provide the authority for development of a graduated health alert system with corresponding public health interventions to enable a rapid co-ordinated response as a public health threat emerges. The declaration of a health alert would imply that financial, scientific and human resources from the federal government would be available as required to address the crisis. An incremental level of federal assistance should be associated with each of the five levels of health alert to help meet the basic costs of response and recovery when such expenditures exceed what an individual province or territory could reasonably be expected to bear on its own. For example at level three a 50/50 cost sharing arrangement could be envisioned with this increasing to 90/10 at level 5. At health alert levels 1 and 2 the financial contribution should be considered to be within the operational funds of the proposed Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. Financial assistance that may be required during health alert levels 3 to 5 should be submitted to and approved by the Governor in Council during the authorization for declaration of the health alert. The level of health alert and affected area would be reviewed regularly and modified as needed. The graduated system of health alerts proposed by CMA will ensure a more appropriate and effective response to public health emergencies than currently exists.2 The CMA has also brought the issue of emergency response forward on the international stage through its membership in the World Medical Association (WMA). At the WMA General Assembly in September 2003, delegates from over 50 countries supported a motion put forward by the CMA urging the WHO to enhance its emergency response protocol to deal with world epidemics such as SARS. (See Appendix ll.) The WMA agreed to establish a working group, headed by the CMA, to develop a public health risk alert plan. The report of the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health has now been submitted to the federal health minister. The federal government must not let this report languish on the shelf. It must develop a plan to respond to its recommendations in order to create a strong and well-resourced public health system with adequate surge capacity and sufficient highly qualified public health professionals. The CMA has determined that a very targeted incremental investment of $1.5 billion over five years is needed to address the legislative reform and capacity enhancement required to bring our public health system into the 21st century. Simply re-allocating funds within existing health budgets is not sufficient and would only negatively impact efforts to shore the core of current health care services. Recommendation One The federal government rapidly move to enact a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation. This new Act would allow for a more rapid national response, in co-operation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. Recommendation Two The federal government invest in the country’s public health system with an immediate commitment of $ 1.5 Billion over five years to rebuild the public health infrastructure. An Action Plan for the Federal Government National leadership is critical to articulate the key issues and challenges facing public health today and to implement comprehensive strategies to address the deficiencies in the system’s infrastructure. The CMA has called for a renewed and enhanced national commitment to public health anchored in new federal legislation. Legislative Reform Canada’s response to SARS brought into stark relief the urgent need for national leadership and coordination of public health activity across the country, especially during such a serious health crisis. It was a wake-up call that highlighted the need for comprehensive legislative reform to clarify the roles of governments and public health officials with respect to the management of public health threats. The development of a national public health system ought not to occur by the instalment plan, provoked by SARS-like events. It must be carefully planned and evaluated. This, in turn, requires clear identification of key issues and mobilization of resources. A sustainable public health system also requires a critical mass of technical expertise to support essential public health functions3. The CMA believes that the federal government has a critical role to play in the development of a strong, co-ordinated pan-Canadian public health system. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, national leadership has been instrumental in clearly defining health goals for the population and stating the role of the public health system, its key infrastructure elements and the development of strategies to attain them. Canada does not have a formal national leadership position comparable to England’s Chief Medical Officer or the Surgeon General in the US. There is currently no single credible public health authority vested, through legislation or federal-provincial-territorial agreement, with the overall responsibility for pan-Canadian public health issues. The CMA has recommended the appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada with decision-making powers in areas of federal jurisdiction. Currently there is tremendous inequity in the public health system capacity among different provinces and territories. Considering the breadth of public health issues, the relative population sizes and differences in wealth, it will never be feasible to have comprehensive centres of public health expertise for each province and territory. Even if one achieved this, there would increasingly be issues of economies of scale and unnecessary duplication among centres. This issue is not unique to Canada.4 The CMA has proposed the establishment of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control (CODSC) as a key component of its public health action plan. A comprehensive centre of public health expertise allows for a strategic pan-Canadian approach to public health planning and services while developing a critical mass of scientific and public health expertise and resources that can be deployed to any region in the country when necessary. A first priority of the CODSC must be to facilitate pan-Canadian agreement on the definition of the core functions of the public health system as it will not be possible to assess and develop system infrastructure if these are not defined. (As noted earlier in this paper the Federal-Provinical-Territorial Advisory Committee on Public Health has suggested five core functions.) A follow-up step to the development of core functions for public health is to identify national health goals to improve health status and address health inequities within populations across the country. The impact of inequality in health on health status can be seen within the aboriginal population. The degree of ill health within their communities is one of Canada’s major unresolved challenges. Although there have been significant improvements over the past few decades, the overall health status of Aboriginal peoples falls well below that of others living in Canada. Mortality and morbidity records indicate that life expectancy, while varying among communities, remains significantly less than that of the average Canadian. And the incidence and prevalence of chronic and degenerative diseases (Type II diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular disease, cancer and arthritis) is increasing. The CODSC would be a key player in establishing health goals and supporting Aboriginal peoples with public health expertise and resources. The CODSC and the Chief Public Health Officer of Canada will also have a central role in providing public health services to those areas falling under federal jurisdiction where local and provincial Chief Medical Officers of Health do not have access or authority. Airports, railways, military bases, aboriginal peoples living on reserve, federal meat packing plants and national parks are examples of areas under federal jurisdiction. The delivery of public health in these jurisdictions has been especially compromised by the lack of comprehensive coordination between provincial and federal systems. The CODSC must address this issue. Under the CMA’s plan, CODSC would become the lead national agency on public health matters with a broad mandate to co-ordinate all aspects of planning for national public health emergencies. It would also provide ongoing national health surveillance and work closely with provinces/territories to reinforce other essential public health functions. The Chief Public Health Officer of Canada would head the CODSC and act as the lead scientific voice for public health in Canada. To effectively carry out its mandate the CODSC’s structure must respect five guiding principles. It must be: * Independent – At arm’s length from government, insulated from day-to-day vagaries of political pressures while remaining accountable to Canadians. * Science-based – Adherence to the highest standards of risk assessment and decision-making with a view to safeguarding the health of Canadians. * Transparent – Open to public scrutiny and encouraging public participation in its activities. * Responsive – Characterized by a nimble decision-making process and a capability of deploying resources and expertise quickly and efficiently to any part of the country. * Collaborative – Partnership-oriented, fostering collaboration with other federal, provincial and non-governmental partners. There are three main options for the governance structure of the CODSC. Canadian and international precedents exist for each of the options. 1. Federal departmental entity Under this option, the CODSC would be created under federal legislation as a departmental branch or agency with the minister of health having general authority for its management and direction. The chief public health officer would be answerable to the minister and to the Prime Minister for the quality of management and advice provided by the office and for any actions taken by agency officials. This would not be very different from what already exists at Health Canada. The critical difference is that the CODSC would be a separate entity reporting to the minister of health, as opposed to the current structure where the Population and Public Health Branch is an entity within the department. Canadian examples: Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Pest Management Regulatory Agency International example: U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 2. National arm’s length agency This option consists of incorporating the office as a not-for-profit entity under the Canada Corporations Act (Part II), with the federal and provincial governments as members/shareholders. The CODSC would be structured on a corporate model with a board, and the chief public health officer acting as CEO. However, instead of direct accountability to Parliament, the office would be accountable to the Conference of F-P-T Ministers of Health. This option would signal a more radical departure from current arrangements and would make CODSC more of a joint venture with the provinces and territories. While the concept is intriguing, this model might place the management of national public health concerns too far from the ambit of governmental accountability. Canadian examples: Canadian Blood Services, Canadian Institute for Health Information, Canada Health Infoway, Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment 3. Federal arm’s length agency This middle option would consist of creating a more independent entity within the purview of the federal government. Under this approach, CODSC would be structured on a corporate model in which decision-making powers are vested in a board. The board, in turn, would be accountable to Parliament and the public for the exercise of these powers. The chief public health officer would be CEO and would oversee the day-to-day operation of the office. CODSC would be created through new federal legislation but would remain under the health portfolio, with accountability to Parliament through the health minister. Canadian examples: Canadian Institutes for Health Research, Canadian Centre for Substance Abuse, Hazardous Materials Information Review Commission International example: U.K. Health Protection Agency While each of the options discussed has strengths and weakness, a federal arm’s length agency would be the best fit with the CMA’s vision for the CODSC. It would mark a departure from the status quo in that the level of professional autonomy would increase and the level of ministerial involvement in professional issues would be reduced. This would contribute to making the CODSC more credible as a science-based organization. The board governance structure would encourage participation from the broader public health community and could therefore be more effective in creating partnerships with other key players. Illustration of a federal arm’s length agency CMA is very encouraged with the strong support for a Canadian public health agency shown by federal Health Minister Anne McLellan and her provincial /territorial counterparts following their most recent meeting. We also welcome their recognition of the need for significant resources to deliver the kind of integrated, collaborative national public health infrastructure needed to protect the health and safety of Canadians. 5 We have estimated the incremental cost of establishing and operating the CODSC to initially be $20 million over five years, over and above existing funding for programs that could be transferred to the new office such as emergency preparedness and response, and surveillance co-ordination. In its recent brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance 2003 pre-budget hearings, CMA asked that these monies be allocated immediately to allow for the creation of the CODSC within the next fiscal year. Recommendation Three That the federal government create a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control led by a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to be the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. Recommendation Four That the federal government allocate at least $20 million / 5 years with appropriate ongoing funding, over and above the funding for existing national public health programs, for the creation and operating expenses of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. Health Human Resource Capacity Enhancement The CMA has been speaking out on the impact of the shortage of physicians and other health care professionals on the acute care system for the last five years. In prior submissions to this Committee, to the House of Commons Committee on Finance and to the Royal Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, the CMA called for increased funding for the recruitment, education and on going training of physicians to address the current crisis in the acute care workforce. The SARS outbreak has clearly demonstrated that Canada’s public health workforce is especially thin. The shortage of community medicine and infectious disease specialists, nurses and laboratory technicians affects our capacity to respond to health threats. For the essential functions of the public health system to be realized, public health agencies need a workforce with appropriate and constantly updated skills. As the first line of defence against threats to the health of Canadians, the public health system must be able to respond quickly to an emergency with a skilled and trained workforce with sufficient numbers to meet the demands of the crisis. While Health Canada has made some limited progress to help address ongoing education needs of public health practitioners, there are virtually no resources currently dedicated to address public health emergency response skills or the essential cross-training that is critical during a public health crisis. Effective cross-training boosts surge capacity by equipping public health practitioners with knowledge and skills that can be called upon in times of public health emergency while allowing them to fulfil essential public health services at other times. CMA’s submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health has called for investment in multidisciplinary training programs in public health and the dissemination of best practices to public health professionals.6 But our country’s response to SARS also confirmed the co-dependent nature of the public health and acute care systems. The scarcity of hospital-based infection control practitioners, emergency physicians, nurses and technologists in the clinical and laboratory arenas within the acute care system were particularly striking during the SARS outbreak. This clearly demonstrated the need for a pre-planned approach to support and augment the public health and acute care workforce during a crisis. With essentially no plan in place to systematically shift human resources within the public health and acute care systems, we were ill prepared to move health professionals from other jurisdictions to respond to the crisis. Consequently Toronto public health and acute care professionals were stretched to their physical and mental limits. Recruitment of health care professionals to assist in the Greater Toronto Area depended, to a large degree, on volunteerism rather than co-ordinated efforts. Therefore, the CMA has proposed the establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service to work in collaboration with non-governmental health organizations like the CMA and the Canadian Public Health Association and function under the auspices of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control.7 The Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service would be made up of a core group of highly trained and mobile public health professionals, employed by the CODSC, able to carry out emergency response interventions as directed by the Chief Public Health Officer of Canada. But what SARS also clearly demonstrated was the need to be able to support and provide respite to the physicians and nurses overwhelmed by the influx of patients to acute care facilities and the accompanying institutional infection control measures. The CMA believes that the federal government must have access to a predetermined cadre of health care professionals willing to be deployed to provide acute care “locum” services during health emergencies. The CMA is well positioned to play an important part in recruiting physicians for an Emergency Relief Network. CMA’s MedConnexions online job matching service for health professionals, developed in partnership with Industry Canada, is a tool that could be used to disseminate information on the Network and collect contact information from physicians interested in volunteering to be deployed to provide local services. Volunteers would be asked to provide services that they normally provide, (for example, emergency medicine, intensive care, respirology, infection control) or other general services in affected areas to provide relief to staff that are stretched to the limit. Training in outbreak investigation would allow these individuals to also supplement the public health workforce in times of crisis. CMA would maintain control of the volunteer list and establish procedures to ensure that the information on the list is accurate and current. CMA would also undertake to determine that issues such as compensation (payment services and lost time [e.g., because of quarantine]), licensing, liability, disability coverage, logistics (travel and accommodation) are covered. CMA would contact members of the list in response to a request from the federal government through the CODSC. Recommendation Five That the federal government invests $250,000/ year on an ongoing basis to establish, in partnership with the profession, an Emergency Relief Network of physicians able to provide “locum” services during health emergencies. Recommendation Six That the federal government under the auspices of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control provide funding for the training of physician volunteers in outbreak investigation. Surveillance and Communications The effectiveness of the public health system is also dependent, in large part, on its capacity to communicate authoritative information in a timely manner. A two-way flow of information between experts and the practising community is necessary at all times but becomes especially crucial during emergency situations. A well-functioning public health system will allow for this two-way communication — disease information to a central body that can analyze the aggregate data, and a capability to share aggressively and in real time the resulting analytical assessment with front line workers. A pan-Canadian surveillance system must be a fundamental component of the public health system. One of the keys to building a strong surveillance system is a robust connectivity with all points of health care. This would ensure real time notification through a pan Canadian health surveillance system of the occurrence of reportable diseases by front line health care workers throughout the country. All jurisdictions have embarked on information technology strategies that will build the connectivity to points of care over time. It is estimated that this work will take up to 10 years to complete and will require a $4 billion investment. Provinces and territories are at different stages of advancing this agenda and Ontario probably has the most progressive initiative. (It has committed to spending approximately $1 billion to put in place the pipelines that provide the connectivity and will cover the costs to carry the information traffic.) It is also important to note that Canada, as a World Health Organization member state, has international obligations in public health surveillance under the International Health Regulations (IHR). The IHR, introduced in 1969 to help monitor and control four serious diseases which had significant potential to spread between countries, involve: i. Notification of cases: * WHO Member States are obliged to notify WHO for a single case of cholera, plague or yellow fever, occurring in humans in their territories, and give further notification when an area is free from infection. * These notifications are reported in WHO's Weekly Epidemiological Record. ii. Health-related rules for international trade and travel. iii. Health organization: Measures for deratting, disinfecting, and disinsecting international conveyances (ships, aircraft, etc.) are to be implemented at points of arrival and departure (ports, airports and frontier posts). The health measures called for are the maximum measures that a state may apply for the protection of its territory against cholera, plague and yellow fever. iv. Health documents required: Requirements are included for health and vaccination certificates for travellers from infected to non-infected areas; deratting/deratting exemption certificates; health declarations- Maritime Declaration of Health; Aircraft General Declaration. 8 The IHR are currently under revision to include mandatory reporting of “public health emergencies of international concern”. 9 The health consequences of new infectious diseases are magnified because these public health threats cross local, provincial/territorial and national borders. Decisions made by one government have a direct impact upon the activities of adjacent governments. Canadian jurisdictions must co-ordinate their approaches to public health challenges to ensure they are effectively managed. Canada must ensure that our surveillance networks and public health infrastructure are up to the challenge in order to meet our international obligations to recognize and deal with emerging infectious diseases. In our submission to the National Advisory Committee on SARS & Public Health the CMA argued for a $1 billion infusion to rebuild the capacity of the public health system. Part of this investment is to help with the communication dimension of the connectivity problem. SARS highlighted the fact that Canada does not have information systems in place to facilitate real time communication with front line health professionals. Gaps in the basic communication infrastructure prevented public health agencies from interacting with each other in a timely manner. They also hindered exchanges between public health staff, private clinicians and other allied health workers about the latest information on the management of the disease. In addition, contact information, when it was there, was found to be seriously out of date and communications methods were not appropriately targeted to the end users. CMA learned some valuable lessons about how to provide real time communications to physicians. The health crisis resulted in the CMA mobilizing our communication networks to provide physicians with critical information about the public health management of SARS. Over 50,000 physicians received pertinent information on SARS over a 24-48 hour period of time. In addition, over 1500 health care facilities received critical authoritative information on SARS via the Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation. For the first time in Canadian history an e-grand rounds initiative was launched to provide on line advice to physicians across this country in a format that they are familiar with. While the CMA succeeded in getting the information to physicians virtually in real time it was clear that the current infrastructure was inadequate. The CMA had to jury-rig a system that tied together disparate information lists and communications channels to move the information out to physicians. There was no guarantee the approach would work and there was no guarantee it would be timely. Luck was on our side. But we cannot continue to rely on luck; we must rely on sound management and planning. A stronger and more complete communications capacity to move information to physicians needs to be in place as soon as possible. This system has to ensure that the information is shared in a manner that respects the confidentiality and modality of how physicians would like to receive time sensitive information. One of the key lessons drawn from this latest emergency is that information is taken up by physicians in different ways. Some like to receive it by e-mail, others by fax and still others by mail. Even those with e-mail have expressed a desire to get emergency information in a different format. Iterative research will provide the information necessary to construct a solution that best maps how physicians work. There is a critical need to invest in data management infrastructure to maintain physician contact information (over 20% changes yearly) and build the correct modality channel to forward emergency information. This is a labour intensive process without which the assurance of reaching the majority of physicians would be compromised. The CMA has carried out an internal assessment on how it can best mobilize its own outreach capabilities coupled with those of its 12 divisions and has determined that with a one time investment of $250,000 for research, development and implementation of internal IT systems and ongoing operational funding of $100,000 a more robust, timely and assured connectivity with physicians will result. It is estimated that this connectivity could be built within the next twelve months. Recommendation Seven That the federal government partner with the CMA and the Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation to ensure the capacity to communicate with physicians in real time during health emergencies. Recommendation Eight That the federal government invest in communication between professionals within the health care system through immediate funding for dedicated internet connectivity for all physicians in Canada. Conclusion SARS brought out the best in Canada and Canadians’ commitment to one another. It also turned a bright, sometimes uncomfortable spotlight on the ability of this country’s health care system to respond to a crisis, be it an emerging disease, a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or a large-scale accident. We must learn from the SARS experience and quickly move to build the infrastructure of a strong public health system. Different parts of the country have developed particular public health strengths and we can build on these strengths. With national leadership, commitment and resources, Canadians can have a well-functioning pan-Canadian public health system. The CMA believes that the federal government has a critical responsibility to ensure that the infrastructure for a strong public health system to serve all Canadians is in place. Summary of Recommendations 1. That the federal government rapidly move to enact a Canada Emergency Health Measures Act that would consolidate and enhance existing legislation, allowing for a more rapid national response, in co-operation with the provinces and territories, based on a graduated, systematic approach, to health emergencies that pose an acute and imminent threat to human health and safety across Canada. 2. The federal government invest in the country’s public health system with an immediate commitment of $ 1.5 Billion over five years to rebuild the public health infrastructure. 3. That the federal government create a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control led by a Chief Public Health Officer of Canada to be the lead Canadian agency in public health, operating at arm’s length from government. 4. That the federal government allocate $20 million / 5 years with appropriate ongoing funding, over and above the funding for existing national public health programs, for the creation and operating expenses of a Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control. 5. That the federal government invest $ 250,000/ year on an ongoing basis to establish, in partnership with the profession, an Emergency Relief Network of physicians able to provide “locum” services during health emergencies. 6. That the federal government under the auspices of the Canadian Office for Disease Surveillance and Control provide funding for the training of physician volunteers in outbreak investigation. 7. That the federal government partner with the CMA and the Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation to ensure the capacity to communicate with physicians in real time during health emergencies. 8. That the federal government invest in communication between professionals within the health care system through immediate funding for dedicated internet connectivity for all physicians in Canada. Appendix l (These documents available on the CMA website, under Submissions to Government) Answering the Wake-Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan, June 2003 Technical Backgrounders, July 21, 2003 Appendix ll WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Latest releases: 15 September 2003 Action Urged to Improve Response to World Health Epidemics The World Health Organisation has been urged by physicians of the World Medical Association to enhance its emergency response protocol to deal with world epidemics such as Sars. Meeting in Helsinki for their General Assembly, WMA delegates from almost 50 countries were critical of the way in which the Sars epidemic was handled earlier this year and in particular the failure of WHO to involve physicians early enough. The WMA Assembly called on the WHO to provide for the "early, ongoing and meaningful engagement and involvement of the medical community globally, including initiating immediate discussion on the establishment of an effective and real time means of communicating reliable, evidence-based information to front line workers and the establishment of reliable sources of products and materials needed to safeguard the health of front line workers and their patients". The WMA has also agreed to develop a public health risk alert plan covering areas of communications, preventive measures for physicians and patients, best practice in terms of diagnostic and therapeutic methods and evidence-based travel advice for the public. The plan is to be drawn up by a working group headed by the Canadian Medical Association, which, at the height of the Sars epidemic in Canada, managed to contact 26,000 physicians via e mail and the internet. The CMA described the World Medical Association's new resolution as "a wake up call to the world". The WMA has now invited all national medical associations to share the lessons learned during the Sars epidemic by providing details of measures taken in their countries to strengthen the responsiveness of their public health systems. Printed from: http://www.wma.net/e/press/2003_20.htm 1 Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.22 (4th Supp), s. 5. “National emergency” is defined in section 3 as “an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada, and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.” (Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.22 (4th Supp) section 3). 2 See Appendix 1: Technical Backgrounders to Answering the Wake-Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan for details on the Emergency Health Alert System. 3 The FPT Advisory Committee on Population Health recommended the following as essential functions of the public health system: population health assessment; health surveillance; health promotion; disease and injury prevention; health protection. 4 Many countries (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands) have developed a critical mass of public health expertise at the national level. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States, which has a critical mass, great depth of scientific expertise and the tools and fiscal resources to fund public health programs at both state and local levels through demonstration projects, is a sterling example of the effectiveness of such a central agency. 5 McLellan promises health cash injection, A4, The National Post, 04-09-2003 6 Recommendation 4 of Answering the Wake-Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan: The creation of a Canadian Centre of Excellence for Public Health, under the auspices of the CODSC, to invest in multidisciplinary training programs in public health, establish and disseminate best practices among public health professionals. 7 Recommendation Five of Answering the Wake-Up Call: CMA’s Public Health Action Plan: The establishment of a Canadian Public Health Emergency Response Service, under the auspices of the CODSC, to provide for the rapid deployment of human resources (e.g., emergency pan-Canadian locum programs) during health emergencies. 8 http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/current/en/print.html accessed September 15, 2003 9 (http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/revision/en/print.html) accessed July 4, 2003
Documents
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Compensation ceilings for GP's and access to front-line services

https://policybase.cma.ca/en/permalink/policy1524
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Ethics and medical professionalism
Health human resources
Health systems, system funding and performance
Physician practice/ compensation/ forms
Resolution
GC04-51
The Canadian Medical Association recommends that compensation ceilings for general practitioners where they exist be removed in order to improve access to front-line services.
Policy Type
Policy resolution
Last Reviewed
2017-03-04
Date
2004-08-18
Topics
Ethics and medical professionalism
Health human resources
Health systems, system funding and performance
Physician practice/ compensation/ forms
Resolution
GC04-51
The Canadian Medical Association recommends that compensation ceilings for general practitioners where they exist be removed in order to improve access to front-line services.
Text
The Canadian Medical Association recommends that compensation ceilings for general practitioners where they exist be removed in order to improve access to front-line services.
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28 records – page 1 of 3.