Policy Type

Court submission

Date

2011-02-17

Topics

Health care and patient safety

Pharmaceuticals/ prescribing/ cannabis/ marijuana/ drugs

Text

S.C.C. File No.: 33556 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (APPEAL FROM THE BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL) BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA AND MINISTER OF HEALTH FOR CANADA Appellants (Appellants/Cross-Respondents) —and — PHS COMMUNITY SERVICES SOCIETY, DEAN EDWARD WILSON and SHELLY TOMIC, VANCOUVER AREA NETWORK OF DRUG USERS (VANDU) Respondents (Respondents/Cross-Appellants) —and — ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Respondent (Respondent) —and — ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC, DR. PETER AIDS FOUNDATION, VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY, CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, INTERNATIONAL HARM REDUCTION ASSOCIATION AND CACTUS MONTREAL, CANADIAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, REGISTERED NURSES' ASSOCIATION OF ONTARIO AND ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED NURSES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, CANADIAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA NURSES'S UNION Interveners FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP 100 Queen Street — Suite 1100 Ottawa, ON KIP 1J9 Guy J. Pratte/Nadia Effendi Tel: (613) 237-5160 Fax: (613) 230-8842 Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Medical Association 2 TO: Roger Bilodeau, Q.C. REGISTRAR SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND TO: Robert J. Frater Attorney General of Canada Bank of Canada Building 234 Wellington Street, Room 1161 Ottawa, Ontario KlA OH8 Telephone: (613) 957-4763 FAX: (613) 954-1920 E-mail: robert.fratergustice.gc.ca Counsel for Appellant/Respondent on Cross- Appeal, the Attorney General of Canada Robert J. Frater Attorney General of Canada Bank of Canada Building 234 Wellington Street, Room 1161 Ottawa, Ontario KlA OH8 Telephone: (613) 957-4763 FAX: (613) 954-1920 E-mail: robert.frater@justice.gc.ca Counsel for Appellant/Respondent on Cross- Appeal, the Minister of Health for Canada Joseph H. Arvay, Q.C. Arvay Finlay 1350 - 355 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2G8 Telephone: (604) 689-4421 FAX: (604) 687-1941 E-mail: jarvay@arvayfinlay.com Counsel for Respondent, PHS Community Services Society Jeffrey W. Beedell McMillan LLP 300 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K113 6L2 Telephone: (613) 232-7171 FAX: (613) 231-3191 E-mail: jeffbeedell@mcmillan.ca Agent for Respondent, PHS Community Services Society 3 Joseph H. Arvay, Q.C. Arvay Finlay 1350 - 355 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2G8 Telephone: (604) 689-4421 FAX: (604) 687-1941 E-mail: jarvay@arvayfinlay.com Counsel for Respondent, Dean Edward Wilson and Shelly Tomic John W. Conroy, Q.C. Conroy & Company 2459 Pauline St Abbotsford, British Columbia V2S 3S1 Telephone: (604) 852-5110 FAX: (604) 859-3361 E-mail: jconroy@johnconroy.com Counsel for Respondent/Appellant on Cross- Appeal, Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) Craig E. Jones Attorney General of British Columbia 1001 Douglas Street, 6th floor Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4 Telephone: (250) 387-3129 FAX: (250) 356-9154 E-mail: craigjones@gov.bc.ca Counsel for Respondent, the Attorney General of British Columbia Hugo Jean Procureur general du Quebec 1200 Route de l'Èglise, 2e etage Ste-Foy, Quebec G1V 4M1 Telephone: (418) 643-1477 FAX: (418) 644-7030 E-mail: hjean@justice.gouv.qc.ca Counsel for Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec Jeffrey W. Beedell McMillan LLP 300 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K113 6L2 Telephone: (613) 232-7171 FAX: (613) 231-3191 E-mail: jeffbeedell@mcmillan.ca Agent for Respondent, Dean Edward Wilson and Shelly Tomic Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin St P.O. Box 466, Stn "D" Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1C3 Telephone: (613) 233-1781 FAX: (613) 788-3433 E-mail: henry.brown@gowlings.com Agent for Respondent/Appellant on Cross- Appeal, Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Burke-Robertson 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0A2 Telephone: (613) 566-2058 FAX: (613) 235-4430 E-mail: rhouston@burkerobertson.com Agent for Respondent, the Attorney General of British Columbia Pierre Landry Noel & Associes 111, rue Champlain Gatineau, Quebec J8X 3R1 Telephone: (819) 771-7393 FAX: (819) 771-5397 E-mail: p.landry@noelassocies.com Agent for Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec 4 Andrew I. Nathanson Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 2900 - 550 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 0A3 Telephone: (604) 631-4908 FAX: (604) 631-3232 Counsel for Intervener, Dr. Peter AIDS Foundation Ryan D. W. Dalziel Bull, Housser & Tupper LLP 3000 - 1055 West Georgia Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6E 3R3 Telephone: (604) 641-4881 FAX: (604) 646-2671 E-mail: rdd@bht.com Counsel for Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Sheila Tucker Davis LLP 2800 Park Place 666 Burrard Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2Z7 Telephone: (604) 643-2980 FAX: (604) 605-3781 E-mail: stuckergdavis.ca Counsel for Intervener, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority Paul F. Monahan Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 333 Bay Street, Suite 2400 Bay Adelaide Centre, Box 20 Toronto, Ontario M5H 2T6 Telephone: (416) 366-8381 FAX: (416) 364-7813 E-mail: pmonahan@fasken.com Counsel for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Scott M. Prescott Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 1300 - 55 Metcalfe Street Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5 Telephone: (613) 236-3882 FAX: (613) 230-6423 E-mail: sprescott@fasken.com Agent for Intervener, Dr. Peter AIDS Foundation Brian A. Crane, Q.C. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin St Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3 Telephone: (613) 233-1781 FAX: (613) 563-9869 E-mail: brian.crane@gowlings.com Agent for Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Marie-France Major McMillan LLP 300 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K113 6L2 Telephone: (613) 232-7171 FAX: (613) 231-3191 E-mail: mane-france.maior@mcmillan.ca Agent for Intervener, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority Julia Kennedy Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 55 Metcalfe Street Suite 1300 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L5 Telephone: (613) 236-3882 FAX: (613) 230-6423 E-mail: ikennedy(&fasken.com Agent for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Michael A. Feder McCarthy Tétrault LLP Suite 1300, 777 Dunsmuir Street Vancouver, British Columbia V7Y 1 K2 Telephone: (604) 643-5983 FAX: (604) 622-5614 E-mail: mfeder(qmccarthv.ca Counsel for Intervener, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, International Harm Reduction Association and CACTUS Montréal Rahool P. Agarwal Ogilvy Renault LLP 3800 - 200 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5J 2Z4 Telephone: (416) 216-3943 FAX: (416) 216-3930 E-mail: ragarwal(iogilvyrenaul1.com Counsel for Intervener, Canadian Nurses Association, Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario and Association of Registered Nurses of British Columbia Owen M. Rees Stockwoods LLP 77 King Street West Suite 4130, P.O. Box 140 Toronto, Ontario M5K IHI Telephone: (416) 593-7200 FAX: (416) 593-9345 E-mail: owenr~stockwoods.ca Counsel for Intervener, Canadian Public Health Association 5 Brenda C. Swick McCarthy Tétrault LLP 200 - 440 Laurier Avenue West Ottawa, Ontario KIR 7X6 Telephone: (613) 238-2000 FAX: (613) 563-9386 Agent for Intervener, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, International Harm Reduction Association and CACTUS Montréal Sally A. Gomery Ogilvy Renault LLP 1500 - 45, O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario KIP lA4 Telephone: (613) 780-8661 FAX: (613) 230-5459 E-mail: sgomery(qogilvyrenaul1.com Agent for Intervener, Canadian Nurses Association, Registered Nurses' Association of Ontaro and Association of Registered Nurses of British Columbia Dougald E. Brown Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP 1500 - 50 O'Connor S1. Ottawa, Ontario KIP 6L2 Telephone: (613) 231-8210 FAX: (613) 788-3661 E-mail: dougald.brown(inelligan.ca Agent for Intervener, Canadian Public Health Association Marjorie Brown Victory Square Law Office 100 West Pender Street Suite 500 Vancouver, British Columbia V6B 1R8 Telephone: (604) 684-8421 FAX: (604) 684-8427 E-mail: mbrown(avslo.ca Counsel for Intervener, British Columbia Nurses' Union Michael A. Chambers Maclaren Corlett 50 O'Connor Street, Suite 1625 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 6L2 Telephone: (613) 233-1146 FAX: (613) 233-7190 E-mail: mchambers(amacorlaw.com Counsel for Intervener, Real Women Canada 6 Colleen Bauman Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP 500 - 30 Metcalfe St. Ottawa, Ontario KIP 5L4 Telephone: (613) 235-5327 FAX: (613) 235-3041 E-mail: cbauman~sgmlaw.com Agent for Intervener, British Columbia Nurses' Union TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I — Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................... .1 A. Overview ......................................................................................................................... 1 B. CMA's Interest in the Appeal ............................................................................................ 1 C. CMA's Position on the Facts ............................................................................................ 1 Part II — Statement of the Questions in Issue ................................................................................3 Part III — Statement of Argument .................................................................................................3 A. Charter Interpretation Must be Guided by Reality, Not Ideology ......................................... 3 B. The Impugned Provisions Infringe Section 7 of the Charter ................................................. 5 (1)Denying Access to Necessary Health care Infringes Section 7 of the Charter.................. 5 (2)The Rights to Life and Security of Patients Have Been Infringed ................................... 5 (3)Drug Addicts Have Not Waived Their Statutory and Constitutional Right to Treatment .................................................................................................................. 6 (4)The Rights to Liberty of the Individual Respondents Have Been Infringed ..................... 8 (5)The Principles of Fundamental Justice Have Not Been Respected ................................. 8 a) The Impugned Provisions Are Arbitrary ..................................................................... 8 b) The Impugned Provisions Are Overbroad ................................................................... 9 C. If There is an Infringement of Section 7, the Law is Not Saved by Section 1 of the Charter ................................................................................................................................ 9 D. Remedy ......................................................................................................................... 10 Part IV — Submissions as to Costs .............................................................................................. 10 Part V — Order Sought ................................................................................................................10 Part VI — Table of Authorities .................................................................................................... 11 Part VII — Statutes, Regulations, Rules ...................................................................................... 13 PART I — STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Overview 1. Fair and equitable access to medically necessary, evidenced-based health care is of fundamental importance to Canadian patients and physicians, as this Court recognized in Chaoulli. 2. Where life and security of a person is at risk because of a medical condition, like drug addiction, the Court's delineation of a government or legislature's constitutional obligations should be guided by facts. Unfounded ideological assumptions about the character of patients must not trump clinical judgment based on the best medical evidence available; otherwise, the life, liberty and security of patients is put at risk arbitrarily, contrary to section 7 of the Charter. 3. The Appellants' position that those addicted to drugs have foregone any right to access medical treatment is antithetical to the raison d'être of the Canadian health care system and inconsistent with the federal government's obligations under section 7 of the Charter. 4. Neither the statutory law nor the Constitution allows the state to deny access to health care because of "lifestyle" choices or presumed waiver of legal or constitutional rights. B. CMA's Interest in the Appeal 5. The Canadian Medical Association ("CMA") is the national voice of Canadian physicians with over 74,000 members across the country. Its mission is to serve and to unite the physicians of Canada and to be the national advocate, in partnership with the people of Canada, for the highest standards of health and heath care. 6. Critical to CMA's role is the upholding of harm reduction as one pillar in a comprehensive public health approach to disease prevention and health promotion. Further, the CMA possesses a distinct expertise and broad-based knowledge of many aspects of policy and law concerning harm reduction as a clinically mandated and ethical method of care and treatment. C. CMA's Position on the Facts 7. By Order dated February 17, 2011, the CMA was granted leave to intervene in this Appeal. 2 8. The CMA accepts the facts as stated by the Respondents. 9. This appeal flows from separate actions commenced by some of the Respondents seeking relief that would obviate the need for exemptions granted by the Federal Minister of Health under section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (the "Act"), S.C. 1996 c. 19. Thus, when within the confines of the Vancouver Safe Injection Site ("Insite"), patient drug users were not liable to prosecution for possession of a controlled substance contrary to section 4(1) of the Act, or staff for trafficking contrary to section 5(1). The initial exemptions, based on "necessity for a scientific purpose", were granted for a term of three years commencing September 12, 2003. They were thereafter extended to December 31, 2007, and then to June 30, 2008. Insite's ability to operate was dependent upon the exemptions. However, no further extensions were forthcoming. 10. In their actions, the Respondents, in addition to the division of powers argument, contended that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act violated section 7 of the Charter, were unconstitutional, and should be struck down. The Respondents were successful before the Applications Judge and the Court of Appeal. 11. The Applications Judge found that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act infringed section 7 of the Charter and declared them to be of no force and effect. 12. On appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and cross-appeal by the Respondents, PHS, Wilson and Tomic, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act were inapplicable to Insite by reason of the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 13. In concurring reasons, Rowles J.A. also found that sections 4(1) and 5(1) engaged section 7 of the Charter and that such application did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice because of overbreadth. 14. The findings of the Applications Judge and Rowles J.A. under the Charter are, the CMA submits, premised on the correct and supported fact that harm reduction is an evidenced-based form of medical treatment for patient drug addicts suffering from the illness of addiction. It is unconstitutional for governments to prevent access to treatment on pain of criminal penalty and deprivations of life, liberty and security of the person on grounds informed by ideological 3 assumptions and not the evidence. PART II - STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 15. The following constitutional questions, as stated by the Chief Justice on September 2, 2010, are to be determined in this appeal: 1. Are ss. 4(1) and 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.c. 1996, c. 19, constitutionally inapplicable to the activities of staff and users at Insite, a health care undertaking in the Province of British Columbia? 2. Does s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.c. 1996, c. 19, infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 3. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 4. Does s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 5. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 16. Questions two to five, which relate to the Charter, are of particular importance for the CMA, and are addressed in more detail below. The CMA submits that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act infrnge the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter and are not justified under section 1. PART III - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT A. Charter Interpretation Must be Guided by Reality, Not Ideology 17. When determining whether or not impugned legislation infringes the Charter, courts must not play host to political debates, but instead must rise above them by ensuring that public policy passes constitutional muster. Chaoull v. Québec (Attorney General), (2005) 1 S.c.R. 791, at para. 89 (CMA Authorities, Tab 2). R. v. Morgentaler, (1988)1 S.C.R. 30 at 45-46 (CMA Authorities, Tab 13). 18. The Appellants' position is clearly premised on ideological preconceptions with regard to individuals suffering from addictions. Yet, as the history of birth control legislation in Canada shows, a legal framework informed by ideological assumptions about the morality of patients seeking to control their reproduction can violate a person's most fundamental rights. See R. v. Morgentaler, supra at 62 where the Court rejected arguments that it should assess administrative structures in the abstract: "when denial of a right as basic as security of the person is infringed by the procedure and administrative structures created by the law itself, the courts are empowered to act" (CMA Authorities, Tab 13). 4 19. In order for the courts to meet their role in determining whether a particular piece of legislation is constitutional, it must consider Parliament's enactments by relying on the available evidence. In fact, it is well established that a deprivation of the rights to life, liberty or security of the person must be proven by solid evidence. Taylor, M. and Jamal, M., The Charter of Rights in Litigation, loose-leaf (Canada Law Book: Aurora, 2010) at para. 17:15 [CMA Authorities, Tab 20]. 20. The presentation of facts is not a mere technicality, but rather it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues: Charter cases will frequently be concerned with concepts and principles that are of fundamental importance to Canadian society. For example, issues pertaining to freedom of religion, freedom of expression and the right to life, liberty and the security of the individual will have to be considered by the courts. Decisions on these issues must be carefully considered as they will profoundly affect the lives of Canadians and all residents of Canada. In light of the importance and the impact that these decisions may have in the future, the courts have every right to expect and indeed to insist upon the careful preparation and presentation of a factual basis in most Charter cases. The relevant facts put forward may cover a wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic and political aspects. Often expert opinion as to the future impact of the impugned legislation and the results of the possible decisions pertaining to it may be of great assistance to the courts. MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 at 361 [CMA Authorities, Tab 5]. 21. Specifically, with respect to section 7 of the Charter, this Court has confirmed that the task of the courts is to evaluate the issue in "the light, not just of common sense or theory, but of the evidence". The Court dispenses with unsubstantiated theoretical arguments, relying instead on empirical and scientific evidence presented by the parties: In support of this contention, the government called experts in health administration and policy. Their conclusions were based on the "common sense" proposition that the improvement of health services depends on exclusivity (R.R., at p. 591). They did not profess expertise in waiting times for treatment. Nor did they present economic studies or rely on the experience of other countries. They simply assumed, as a matter of apparent logic, that insurance would make private health services more accessible and that this in turn would undermine the quality of services provided by the public health care system. The appellants, relying on other health experts, disagreed and offered their own conflicting "common sense" argument for the proposition that prohibiting private health insurance is neither necessary nor related to maintaining high quality in the public health care system. Quality public care, they argue, depends not on a monopoly, but on money and management. They testified that permitting people to buy private insurance would make alternative medical care more accessible and reduce the burden on the public system. The result, they assert, would be better care for all [...] To this point, we are confronted with competing but unproven "common sense" arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of belief. We are in the realm of theory. But as discussed above, a theoretically defensible limitation may be arbitrary if in fact the limit lacks a connection to the goal. This brings us to the evidence called by the appellants at trial on the experience of other developed countries with public health care systems which permit access to private health care. The experience of these countries suggests that there is no real connection in fact between prohibition of health insurance and the goal of a quality public health system. 5 Chaoulli, supra at paras. 136-149 (see also paras. 115, 117, 136-149, 150, 152 where the Court refers to Statistics Canada studies and evidence from other western democracies) [CMA Authorities, Tab 2]. See also Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 601-602 [CMA Authorities, Tab 16]. 22. Drug addicts suffer from a medical condition that can be treated. Hence, Insite is designed as a health treatment aimed at reducing the harmful consequences of drug use as well as exposing its vulnerable patients to other health care options. In this context, the federal legislation and government actions at issue amount to a denial of evidence-based medical treatment whose effect is to put the life and security of patients at great risk. 23. Charter interpretation should generally be grounded on fact rather than speculation or ideological assumptions, especially where life and security of the person (i.e., the patient) is at risk because of a medical condition (such as addiction). In such cases, the Court's delineation of the state's constitutional obligations should be guided by evidence-based medicine and independent clinical judgment. Chaoulli, supra at paras. 85, 107 [CMA Authorities, Tab 2]. See also Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 452-454 [CMA Authorities, Tab 7]; Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 66 [CMA Authorities, Tab 1]. 24. Accordingly, CMA submits that, at the very least, in the health care field where lives are at risk, there must be sound evidentiary basis for legislative and government action that deny medical care. B. The Impugned Provisions Infringe Section 7 of the Charter (1) Denying Access to Necessary Health care Infringes Section 7 of the Charter 25. While the legislature is generally entitled to enact legislation prohibiting drug use or trafficking, this legislation (however well-intended) cannot have the effect of putting the lives of affected persons at risk. This Court has already found in Chaoulli that section 7 of the Charter was infringed when governments impeded timely patient access to care. (2) The Rights to Life and Security of Patients Have Been Infringed 26. Both the Applications Judge and the Court of Appeal found that the right to life and security was engaged in the present case. The evidence on these issues was plentiful: 1. Addiction is an illness. One aspect of the illness is the continuing need or craving to consume the substance to which the addiction relates; 6 2. Injection drug use leads to an increased incidence and prevalence of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis A, B and C, and skin- and blood-borne infections; frequent drug overdoses resulting in significant morbidity and mortality; increased hospital and emergency service utilization; 3. The risk of morbidity and mortality associated with addiction and injection is ameliorated by injection in the presence of qualified health professionals at Insite; 4. User of Insite who are addicted to heroin, cocaine and other controlled substances are not engaged in recreation. Their addiction is an illness frequently, if not invariably, accompanied by serious infections and the real risk of overdose. Reasons for Judgment of the Applications Judge, paras. 87, 89, 135-136, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, pp. 24-25, 34. See also Reasons for Judgment of the B.C. Court of Appeal, para. 30, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, p. 65. (3) Drug Addicts Have Not Waived Their Statutory and Constitutional Right to Treatment 27. The Appellants did not really dispute the medical evidence to the effect that addiction to drugs was a disease. They sought instead to justify their position by claiming that drug addicts had "chosen" their lifestyle and were solely responsible for their medical condition. For the following reasons, this "rationale" does not pass constitutional muster. 28. The Appellants assert that the section 7 rights are not engaged as they stem from an alleged "choice made by the consumer", relying on the fact that 95% of the injections in the downtown east side of Vancouver do not take place at Insite. The Appellants do not explain how this assertion demonstrates why addicts are able to make a choice not to inject themselves, given that it only addresses where they inject themselves. In any event, contrary to the Appellants' choice theory, the evidence before the Applications Judge and his findings were to the contrary: the reasons for the addiction and resulting need are based on a complicated combination of personal, governmental and legal factors, some of which lend themselves to choice and others that do not.' Further, the Applications Judge found that it is the illness of addiction, and the failure to manage it, that has led to further illness and death. Reasons for Judgment of the Applications Judge, paras. 65, 89, 142, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, pp. 21, 24-25, 35. See also Reasons for Judgment of the B.C. Court of Appeal, para. 39, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, p. 67. Contra the facts in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 [Malmo-Levine] [CMA Authorities, Tab 12]. 29. The Appellants' position amounts to a claim that the users of Insite have effectively waived their constitutional rights under section 7. Notwithstanding that the jurisprudence is In fact, the evidence is clear that in the case of the Respondent Tomic, her first experience with illegal drugs was not a personal choice [Reasons for Judgment of the Applications Judge, para. 65, Appellants' Record, Vol. I, p. 21]. 7 unclear as to whether a right under section 7 can actually be waived, it is well established that a waiver or a renunciation of any right under the Charter must be voluntary, freely expressed and accompanied with a clear understanding of the purpose the right was meant to serve and the consequences of declining its protection. There is no evidence whatsoever that the patients of Insite who suffer from addiction, knowingly and unequivocally waived their rights under the Charter, and more specifically their right to access medical treatment. See e.g. Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at paras. 71-72; Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at paras. 96-102; R. v. Richard, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 525, at paras. 22-26; R. v. L.T.H., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 41-42; R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 at 394-396; Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41 at 49; Yorkton Union Hospital v. S.U.N. (1993), 16 Admin. L.R. (2d) 272, at para. 44 (C.A.) [CMA Authorities, Tabs 3, 17, 15, 11, 8, 4, 18 respectively]. 30. Indeed, Canadians do not forego their right to health care or to protection from section 7 violations because of their "choice" of lifestyles. The Appellants' position that addicts must take responsibility for the choice they make undermines the raison d'être of the Canadian health care system, namely (as found by the Applications Judge and the Court of Appeal) the fundamental right of Canadians to access medical treatment and the ethical and clinical responsibilities of their health care providers. 31. The Appellants' position skirts the clinical question at issue for physicians and their patients: physicians must treat patients as a matter of good medical practice and ethical obligation, whether the patient is believed to contribute to his or her injury or not. In Canada, neither the ethical obligations of physicians to treat patients, nor the patients' legal right to treatment, are subject to a moral assessment of a patient's lifestyle. Behaviours that might be deemed "risky" do not deprive patients of their rights of access to clinically required medical care. 32. Section 31 of CMA's Code of Ethics (relied on by the Court in the past e) provides that all physicians must "[r]ecognize the responsibility of physicians to promote fair access to health care resources". The patients at Insite would be deprived of positive health outcomes if Insite were to close or even continue to operate under the ongoing threat of closure. 33. Adopting the Appellants' approach to Charter interpretation would set an extremely dangerous precedent. Thus, if one were to apply the rationale of "choice" to other medical 2 See e.g. R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768 at 784-785, where the Court refers to CMA's Code of Ethics [CMA Authorities, Tab 9]. 8 contexts, such as chronic disease, patients suffering from diabetes because of contributing factors such as poor nutrition and lack of exercise would, under the same logic, be denied medical care. Indeed, many of the complex elements beyond individual choice such as socio-economic and genetic factors found by the Applications Judge in the case at bar to shape addiction as an ilness are prevalent in other diseases. This approach would be not only unethical and clinically unsound, but unconstitutionaL. (4) The Rights to Liberty of the Individual Respondents Have Been Infringed 34. The courts have recognized that the threat of criminal prosecution and possibility of imprisonment for an offence is suffcient to trigger the liberty interest and scrutiny under section 7. Malmo-Levine, supra at para. 84 ICMA Authorities, Tab 12). R. v. Parker (2000),188 D.L.R. 4th 385, at para. 101 (Ont. C.A.) ICMA Authorities, Tab 14). 35. Vulnerable patients suffering from addiction and the health care providers who provide treatment at Insite suffer violations of their constitutionally guaranteed rights (section 7 of the Charter) because of the threat of prosecution under the Act. The uncertainty associated with a ministerial exemption mechanism for Insite from certain provisions of the Act imposes a great burden on those already labouring under the weight of addiction. Moreover, health care providers are also put at risk in their ability to provide medically necessary and evidence-based health care services in a timely manner to all citizens by the capricious exemption mechanism contained in the Act. (5) The Principles of Fundamental Justice Have Not Been Respected 36. It is well established that a law that is arbitrary or overbroad will constitute a breach of the principles of fundamental justice. The CMA submits that the Applications Judge was correct when he found that the impugned provisions were arbitrary, or if not arbitrary, grossly disproportionate and overbroad. The Court of Appeal agreed that the provisions were overbroad. P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., loose-leaf (Carswell: Toronto, 2007) at 47-52 to 47-60.1 ICMA Authorities, Tab 19). R. v. Heywood, (1994) 3 S.c.R. 761 at 792-794 ICMA Authorities, Tab 10). Chaoull, supra at para. 127 ICMA Authorities, Tab 2). Rodriguez, supra at 590-591 ICMA Authorities, Tab 16). a) The Impugned Provisions Are Arbitrary 37. A law is arbitrary when it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that 9 lies behind it. In order not to be arbitrary, a limit on the section 7 right requires not only a theoretical connection between the limit and the legislative goal, but a real connection on the facts. Chaoulli, supra at paras. 130-131 [CMA Authorities, Tab 2]. 38. In the present case, by prohibiting access to evidence-based, medically necessary care, the government has contributed to the very harm it claims it seeks to prevent, i.e. drug possession and addiction. The best available medical evidence suggests that clinics such as Insite not only protect life, but offer positive health outcomes and care alternatives to vulnerable patients. 39. Moreover, the justification of any denial of access to necessary medical care based on ideology rather than facts is arbitrary since, by definition, it bears no real connection to the facts. b) The Impugned Provisions Are Overbroad 40. It is a well-established principle of fundamental justice that criminal legislation must not be overbroad. If the government, in pursuing a legitimate objective, uses means which are broader than is necessary to accomplish that objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be violated. Heywood, supra at 792-793 [CMA Authorities, Tab 10]. See also Malmo-Levine, supra at paras. 130-131 [CMA Authorities, Tab 12]. 41. A fortiori, that will be true when the state itself has a particular interest in acting to protect vulnerable persons. In the present case, the evidence before the Applications Judge demonstrated that harm reduction has been a component of Canada's drug strategy for many years. In 2002, the House of Commons Special Committee on the Non-Medical Use of Drugs rejected the dichotomy between harm reduction and an abstinence-based treatment model. It also specifically considered the creation of a safe injection facility in the downtown east side of Vancouver because it recognized that that community presented a "public health disaster". 42. Hence, while the government may be justified in preventing drug possession and trafficking, it cannot cast a legislative prohibition so widely that it captures persons in need of medical care. C. If There is an Infringement of Section 7, the Law is Not Saved by Section 1 of the Charter 43. Should the Court find that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the Act infringe the rights guaranteed Guy Pratt /Nadia ffend Borden L dner Gervais L 1 0 by section 7 of the Charter, the CMA submits that the provisions cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter as any law that offends the principles of fundamental justice cannot be justified, and more specifically, meet the minimal impairment branch of the section 1 analysis. See e.g. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 99 [CMA Authorities, Tab 6]; Heywood, supra at 802-803 [CMA Authorities, Tab 10]. D. Remedy 44. Fundamental justice requires either permanent exemptions or a declaration that the impugned law, as it applies to users of supervised injection sites, is invalid. The CMA submits that this position is consistent with sound constitutional interpretation of section 7 of the Charter, while protecting the most vulnerable patient populations in accordance with evidence-based medicine and physicians' ethical obligations. PART IV — SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS 45. The CMA seeks no costs and asks that none be awarded against it. PART V — ORDER SOUGHT 46. The CMA submits that constitutional questions two and four should be answered affirmatively. Should the Court answer these questions in the affirmative, however, constitutional questions three and five should be answered negatively. 47. The CMA seeks leave of this Court, pursuant to rule 59(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, to present oral argument at the hearing of this appeal. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/83-74, as amended, Rule 59(2) [Part VII of Factum]. ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 13th DAY OF APRIL, 2011. OTTO1 \ 4423086 \ 7 11 PART VI — TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TAB SOURCES Paras. in factum where cited Cases 1. Auton (Guardian a litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 23 2. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 17, 21, 23, 36, 37 3. Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 29 4. Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41 29 5. MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 20 6. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 43 7. Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 23 8. R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 29 9. R. v. Dersch, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 768 32 10. R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 36, 40, 43 11. R. v. L.T.H., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 739 29 12. R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 28, 34, 40 13. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 17, 18 14. R. v. Parker (2000), 188 D.L.R. 4th 385 (Ont. C.A.) 34 15. R. v. Richard, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 525 29 16. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 21, 36 17. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 29 18. Yorkton Union Hospital v. S. UN. (1993), 16 Admin. L.R. (2d) 272 (Sask. C.A.) 29 12 TAB SOURCES Paras. where in factum cited Secondary Sources 19. Hogg, P., Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., loose-leaf (Carswell: Toronto, 2007) at 47-52 to 47-60.1. 36 20. Taylor, M. and Jamal, M., The Charter of Rights in Litigation, loose-leaf (Canada Law Book: Aurora, 2010) at para. 17:15 19 13 PART VII — STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, sections 1 and 7

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, sections 4(1), 5(1), 56

Rules of Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/83-74, as amended, Rule 59 14 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms PART I OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 Charte canadienne des droits et libertes PARTIE I DE LA LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE 1982 Rights and freedoms in Canada 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Life, liberty and security of person 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Droits et libertes au Canada 1. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertes garantit les droits et libertós qui y sont enonces. Its ne peuvent etre restreints que par une regle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se demontrer dans le cadre d'une society libre et democratique. Vie, liberte et securite 7. Chacun a droit a la vie, a la liberte et a la securite de sa personne; it ne peut etre porte atteinte a ce droit qu'en conformite avec les principes de justice fondamentale. 15 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act S.C. 1996, c. 19 Possession of substance 4. (1) Except as authorized under the regulations, no person shall possess a substance included in Schedule I, II or III. Trafficking in substance 5. (1) No person shall traffic in a substance included in Schedule I, II, III or IV or in any substance represented or held out by that person to be such a substance. Exemption by Minister 56. The Minister may, on such terms and conditions as the Minister deems necessary, exempt any person or class of persons or any controlled substance or precursor or any class thereof from the application of all or any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations if, in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public interest. Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances L.C. 1996, ch. 19 Possession de substances 4. (1) Sauf dans les cas autorises aux termes des reglements, la possession de toute substance inscrite aux annexes I, II ou III est interdite. Trafic de substances 5. (1) Il est interdit de faire le trafic de toute substance inscrite aux annexes I, II, III ou IV ou de toute substance presentee ou tenue pour telle par le trafiquant. Exemption par le ministre 56. S'il estime que des raisons medicales, scientifiques ou d'interet public le justifient, le ministre peut, aux conditions qu'il fixe, soustraire a l'application de tout ou partie de la presente loi ou de ses reglements toute personne ou categorie de personnes, ou toute substance designee ou tout precurseur ou toute categorie de ceux-ci. 16 Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada (in force on October 13, 2006) Regles de la Cour supreme du Canada. (en vigueur le 13 octobre 2006) 59. (1) In an order granting an intervention, the judge may (a) make provisions as to additional disbursements incurred by the appellant or respondent as a result of the intervention; and (b)impose any terms and conditions and grant any rights and privileges that the judge may determine, including whether the intervener is entitled to adduce further evidence or otherwise to supplement the record. (2)In an order granting an intervention or after the time for filing and serving all of the memoranda of argument on an application for leave to appeal or the facta on an appeal or reference has expired, a judge may, in their discretion, authorize the intervener to present oral argument at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, if any, the appeal or the reference, and determine the time to be allotted for oral argument. (3)An intervener is not permitted to raise new issues unless otherwise ordered by a judge. 59. (1) Dans l'ordonnance octroyant l'autorisation d'intervenir, le juge petit : a) prevoir comment seront supportes les &pens supplementaires de l'appelant ou de l'intime resultant de l'intervention; b) imposer des conditions et octroyer les droits et privileges qu'il determine, notamment le droit d'apporter d'autres elements de preuve ou de completer autrement le dossier. (2)Dans l'ordonnance octroyant l'autorisation d'intervenir ou aprês l'expiration du Mai de depOt et de signification des memoires de demande d'autorisation d'appel, d'appel ou de renvoi, le juge peut, a sa discretion, autoriser l'intervenant a presenter une plaidoirie orale a l'audition de la demande d'autorisation d'appel, de l'appel ou du renvoi, selon le cas, et determiner le temps alloue pour la plaidoirie orale. (3) Sauf ordonnance contraire d'un juge, l'intervenant n'est pas autorise a soulever de nouvelles questions.

Less detail

Policy Type

Policy endorsement

Last Reviewed

2019-03-03

Date

2011-03-05

Topics

Population health/ health equity/ public health

Text

Note: These Guidelines are not intended to encourage people who choose to abstain for cultural, spiritual or other reasons to drink, nor are they intended to encourage people to commence drinking to achieve health benefits. People of low bodyweight or who are not accustomed to alcohol are advised to consume below these maximum limits. Guideline 1 Do not drink in these situations: When operating any kind of vehicle, tools or machinery; using medications or other drugs that interact with alcohol; engaging in sports or other potentially dangerous physical activities; working; making important decisions; if pregnant or planning to be pregnant; before breastfeeding; while responsible for the care or supervision of others; if suffering from serious physical illness, mental illness or alcohol dependence. Guideline 2 If you drink, reduce long- term health risks by staying within these average levels: Women Men 0–2 standard drinks* per day 0–3 standard drinks* per day No more than 10 standard drinks per week No more than 15 standard drinks per week Always have some non-drinking days per week to minimize tolerance and habit formation. Do not increase drinking to the upper limits as health benefits are greatest at up to one drink per day. Do not exceed the daily limits specified in Guideline 3. Guideline 3 If you drink, reduce short- term risks by choosing safe situations and restricting your alcohol intake: Risk of injury increases with each additional drink in many situations. For both health and safety reasons, it is important not to drink more than: Three standard drinks* in one day for a woman Four standard drinks* in one day for a man Drinking at these upper levels should only happen occasionally and always be consistent with the weekly limits specified in Guideline 2. It is especially important on these occasions to drink with meals and not on an empty stomach; to have no more than two standard drinks in any three-hour period; to alternate with caffeine-free, non-alcoholic drinks; and to avoid risky situations and activities. Individuals with reduced tolerance, whether due to low bodyweight, being under the age of 25 or over 65 years old, are advised to never exceed Guideline 2 upper levels. Guideline 4 When pregnant or planning to be pregnant: The safest option during pregnancy or when planning to become pregnant is to not drink alcohol at all. Alcohol in the mother's bloodstream can harm the developing fetus. While the risk from light consumption during pregnancy appears very low, there is no threshold of alcohol use in pregnancy that has been definitively proven to be safe. Guideline 5 Alcohol and young people: Alcohol can harm healthy physical and mental development of children and adolescents. Uptake of drinking by youth should be delayed at least until the late teens and be consistent with local legal drinking age laws. Once a decision to start drinking is made, drinking should occur in a safe environment, under parental guidance and at low levels (i.e., one or two standard drinks* once or twice per week). From legal drinking age to 24 years, it is recommended women never exceed two drinks per day and men never exceed three drinks in one day. 2 Approved by the CMA Board in March 2011 Last reviewed and approved by the CMA Board in March 2019. The above is excerpted from the report, Alcohol and Health in Canada: A Summary of Evidence and Guidelines for Low-Risk Drinking Available: https://www.ccsa.ca/sites/default/files/2019-04/2011-Summary-of-Evidence-and-Guidelines-for-Low-Risk%20Drinking-en.pdf (accessed 2019 March 01).

Less detail